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INTRODUCTION: “Are these your children?” 
Thesis 
 The thesis of this research is that anticommunism in the Cold War was centrally a 
hegemonic project which, through defining a largely conservative and exclusionary 
form of Americanism, secured, for most of the period covered, the unity of a broad 
‘historical bloc’ including fractions of capital with diverse modalities of surplus 
extraction, trade unions and state apparatuses. In so doing, it cemented the role of the 
Jim Crow South within American nationhood, provided its dominant classes with 
techniques of violence and consent through which to suppresses challenges to 
segregation, and supplied an invaluable element of a complex ideological nexus in 
which Southern white supremacy could be understood and valued. The breakdown of 
the anticommunist consensus exposed great strategic and ideological fractures over 
the necessity and merits of Jim Crow, both within the dominant and dominated 




Figure 1: ‘Are These Your Children?’ United Klans of America advertisement. 
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“Are these your children?” 
 Did the Cold War free African Americans, or did it prolong their oppression? Put 
another way, did the Cold War imperative of resisting communism both domestically 
and internationally thwart the achievement of critical mass in the civil rights struggle, 
or did it pressure the United States government to embark, however reluctantly, on 
the major decisions that would lead to desegregation? Did the fear of communism 
limit the coalition-building potential of the civil rights movement, or did 
anticommunism provide the civil rights movement with an acceptable patriotic 
discourse within which they could articulate their democratic demands? Did it do 
more to unify and expand the segregationist bloc, or did it divide it and ruin its 
fortunes? (On this debate, see Dudziak, 2002; Hall, 2005; Marable, 2007; Arnesen, 
2012; Berg, 2007) 
 One way of addressing these questions is to ask why segregationists leaned as 
much as they did on anticommunist discourses and techniques. Consider the 
advertisement illustrated above. Particularly sinister even by the standards of the Ku 
Klux Klan, the flyer was published in Georgia, 1963, and featured an image of a 
biracial crowd of children playing in a park. The headline asked, “Are these your 
children?” The text, rather than making any specific comment regarding the children, 
left the image and headline to speak for itself, polysemically. Instead, it stated a 
number of “facts” concerning recent civil unrest and the connection between “the 
Communist Party” and “Martin Luther King’s organisation”. Finally, it invited 
members of the public to a “Fish Fry” and two “Cross-Burning Public Speaking” 
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events. (Southern Regional Council, 1983). The meaning was clear: communist 
subversion was responsible for the civil rights movement and for the scenes of ‘race-
mixing’ depicted in the photograph. And the Klan was the necessary organ of white 
solidarity and civil countersubversion, which task undoubtedly included brutally 
punishing infringements on the South’s racial order. 
 Such claims of communist instigation behind the civil rights movement were 
common currency on the segregationist Right. The American Nazi Party published 
similar claims at greater length in its ‘Rockwell Report’. The John Birch Society went 
further and asserted that, not only was the civil rights movement instigated by 
communists, but the US as a whole was “60-80%” under Communist domination. 
Among more mainstream Southern conservatives, the same doctrine was espoused by 
the White Citizens’ Council, a mass social movement in the leadership of resistance 
to desegregation. The issue of segregation was merely, as an article in their 
publication, Citizens, argued, “the leading edge of the Communist attack on 
America”. In Little Rock, Arkansas, at the height of the ‘Massive Resistance’ 
campaign, hundreds of white demonstrators gathered outside the state capitol to 
protest against the integration of Central High School which had been enforced by 
101st Airborne two years previously. Their placards bore the legends: “Race Mixing 
is Communism” and “Stop the Race-Mixing March of the Antichrist”. (Woods, 2004: 
145-6; Clark, 1976: 107; Bledsoe, 1959) Southern pro-segregationists were capable 
of speaking and acting in a complex variety of registers, far from unified on almost 
anything except their racism. Yet, insofar as there was a consensus upon anything in 
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Southern politics, whites at least overwhelmingly agreed on this point: that 
communism was behind the civil rights movement. 
 Of course, such discourse was not purely the product and provenance of Southern 
segregationists or their far right allies. Its primary materials were supplied in bulk by 
agencies of the American federal government, notably the FBI, the House 
UnAmerican Activities Committee (HUAC), and the Senate Internal Security 
Subcommittee (SISS). These institutions did not merely provide the information upon 
which charges of communist subversion were based. They legitimised the allegations 
made by Southern segregationists by reproducing them, justified the repressive 
measures deemed necessary by Southern states in the defence of segregation, and 
provided a model for local investigative bodies. (See Woods, 2004; Lewis, 2004; 
Clark, 1976) Indeed, as Schrecker (2002) points out, the state is an essential element 
of any successful variant of the anticommunist network in the United States. Thus, it 
seems that there was an articulation between the national state, Southern state 
apparatuses and elements of civil society in the anticommunist reaction against civil 
rights. 
 There are a number of possible ways of understanding why this counter-civil 
rights alliance emerged as it did, bound at the nexus of anticommunism. It might be 
argued that the establishment of an anticommunist consensus, promulgated through 
civil society organisations, and the development of a series of apparatuses to police 
that consensus, provided segregationists with a one-off historical opportunity to 
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conserve the racial order. In this view, their anticommunism was strategic. Or, more 
crudely, a ruse or decoy. Another argument might be that there was an elective 
affinity between an ideology which claims to defend the American political-economic 
framework and safeguard it against communist subversion, and one which claims to 
defend the South’s essential Americanism and protect its political-economic order 
against overthrow. This is treat their anticommunism as doctrinal. A third possible 
explanation would be that, in fact, the civil rights movement was but one element of a 
global assault on white supremacy that was driven by communist political 
organisation and informed by communist ideology. This treats the anticommunism of 
segregationists as essentially adequate, or in some important sense correct. 
 Treating either explanation as sufficient risks, as Lewis (2004) suggests, 
flattening the historical realities of both American anticommunism and its racial 
order. Rather, to understand the role of anticommunism in the struggles over 
segregation, to understand what anticommunism is, it is necessary to situate it in its 
conjuncture in all of its overdetermined complexity. 
Why it matters 
  These questions are not purely of historical merit, but have an important bearing 
on the sociology of race, class and political ideology. Further, they have a 
contemporary resonance, as forms of anticommunism, linked to racial significations, 
persist and exert powerful effects on US political life. 
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 Though lacking a coherent global narrative to which their cause might be affixed, 
and while lacking strategic control of the state, the Tea Party anti-socialist movement 
bears some similarities to past anticommunist networks. When Kovel (1992) 
predicted the perpetuation of forms of American anticommunism after the Cold War, 
he may not have anticipated the precise lineaments of Tea Party style anti-socialism. 
However, he did observe that anticommunism in its American declination is a politics 
of identity, of national belonging. To be a communist “was to be ipso facto disloyal, a 
traitor pushed off the edge of society into an abyss of non-being”. There was thus an 
inextricable link between political identity and acceptance into the national 
community. So it is today that, as the Tea Party mounts a countersubversive campaign 
against ‘socialism’ and in defence of free markets, the very charge itself is linked to 
race and national belonging. 
 Former Republican congressman Tom Tancredo lamented in 2010 that “People 
who could not even spell the word ‘vote’ or say it in English put a committed socialist 
ideologue in the White House ... we do not have a civics, literacy test before people 
can vote.” With the reference to literacy tests, Tancredo touched on one of the 
measures used in the Jim Crow south to deny African Americans suffrage. 
(Zimmerman, 2010) The imagery of the ‘Tea Party’ is also heavily racialised, with 
Obama depicted variously as a ‘witch doctor’, a ‘barbarian’ or, perhaps most potent 
of all, a Muslim. These images, argues Enck-Wanzer (2010), “serve to mark Obama 
as a threatening, uncivilised, racialised Other without invoking the term ‘race’”. For 
Wise (2009), the charge of ‘socialism’ is itself heavily racialised, “little more than 
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racist code for the longstanding white fear that black folks will steal from them, and 
covet everything they have”. Taking this approach, of course, risks enacting precisely 
the type of ‘flattening’ that Lewis warned against. Before alighting on such 
conclusions, one would have to account for the peculiar Hayekian pedigree of the Tea 
Party, and specifically the conception of ‘socialism’ embedded in Hayek’s warning to 
“socialists of all parties”. One should also take seriously the Tea Party’s defence of 
property rights against redistributive taxation and public healthcare, which surely 
cannot be reduced to their racially laden aspects. (Zernicke, 2010; Hayek, 2006: 37) 
 Nonetheless, this research is not intended simply to excavate patterns of ideation 
and practice which can be put to use in interpreting a contemporary problem. Rather, 
to pose the questions raised at the start of this introduction is to:  
1. address at a sociological level the controversial arguments about the impact of 
Cold War anticommunism on the struggles over segregation and civil rights;  
2. raise crucial sociological questions about the organisation of the US social 
formation both in this specific conjuncture and more generally;  
3. query the relationship between what could be called generic elements of social 
organisation, such as ideology, politics and production; 
4. interrogate the relationship between race and class, persuasion and power, 
consent and coercion; and 
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5. examine the modalities of political domination and leadership in capitalist 
democracies, and the role that race can play in organising both cohesion and 
antagonism. 
 In this research, the central sociological question I ask is: what is race, what is its 
relationship to class and other antagonisms, and how does it function in hegemonic 
projects, of which anticommunism can be considered a type? The ‘global’ problem 
addressed by this research is therefore that of hegemony in the Gramscian sense. In 
the literature review, I address in more detail my reasons for adopting this theoretical 
purview. Here, I will restrict myself to stating the case briefly. This research is 
intended in part as a contribution to historical materialism, developing its categories 
and applying them to the ‘concrete analysis of concrete situations’. The questions it 
addresses are posed very much on that terrain. This is not to say that the categories of 
historical materialism are asserted as a priori truths. They do not have that status, and 
the ‘scientificity’ of marxism remains an open question. I simply assert that marxism 
is one way of explaining societies which has advantages regarding what I am 
attempting to explain, above all in its attention to the practices through which a 
society is reproduced, the antagonisms structuring those reproductive practices, and 
the complex unity of many levels on which those practices operate.  
 In this research, I will be particularly interested in deploying those developments 
of historical materialism which give most attention to the conjuncture – that is, to the 
unity-in-difference of many elements of society at a given historical moment – and to 
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the role of what marxism calls the superstructures (ideology, politics) in the 
organisation of a society. It seems to me that since both anticommunism and race 
inescapably operate as ideological and political practices, and since they have clearly 
been linked in the period I’m discussing to questions of political leadership, consent 
and violence, the Gramscian optic of hegemony offers the most advantageous 
perspective for considering the questions raised above. 
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CHAPTER ONE: Literature Review. “Even its children know that the South 
is in trouble.” 
“[T]he theme remains always the same, the verdict is ever ready and invariably 
reads: “Socialism!” Even bourgeois liberalism is declared socialistic, bourgeois 
enlightenment socialistic, bourgeois financial reform socialistic. It was socialistic 
to build a railway where a canal already existed, and it was socialistic to defend 
oneself with a cane when one was attacked with a rapier. 
“This was not merely a figure of speech, fashion, or party tactics. The bourgeoisie 
had a true insight into the fact that all the weapons it had forged against feudalism 
turned their points against itself, that all the means of education it had produced 
rebelled against its own civilization, that all the gods it had created had fallen 
away from it. It understood that all the so-called bourgeois liberties and organs of 
progress attacked and menaced its class rule at its social foundation and its 
political summit simultaneously, and had therefore become ‘socialistic.’” – Karl 
Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte 
Introduction: a general statement of the problem 
 In the residuum of World War II, the United States seized the leading position in a 
system of competing nation-states. Having relieved the United Kingdom of many of 
its imperial assets and emerged from the war less scathed than any other participant, 
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it embarked upon a struggle against the USSR. The premise of this struggle was that 
the USSR was not just a dictatorship, but an expansionist totalitarian state which was 
unable to live peacefully alongside competitors. The international communist 
movement was thus a conspiracy for global domination. The US assembled an 
alliance of capitalist states in order to contain this power, including military alliances 
such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but it also constructed an architecture 
of liberal world governance, from the United Nations to Bretton Woods. It worked to 
restructure the production processes of allied states along the Fordist lines then 
prevalent in the US, and encouraged the development of indigenous capitalist 
industries in developing nations. America’s expansion, then, was a complex, 
multifaceted enterprise, hardly reducible to any single imperative – but for the 
duration of the Cold War, the master-narrative of American ascendancy was one of 
‘Free World’ resistance to global communism. 
But the ‘Free World’ was not entirely free. Much of it was in colonial chains, 
apartheid was taking root in South Africa, genocidal ‘White Australia’ policies were 
in place, many of America’s allied states were dictatorships constructed by the US 
military itself, and in the twelve Southern states of the US there existed a one-party 
white-supremacist tyranny which was sharply at odds with the democratic creed the 
US claimed to uphold. Globally, the US found itself trying to sustain a multiracial 
anticommunist coalition, while at the same time upholding white supremacy where it 
was efficiently anticommunist, and where the racist assumptions of policymakers led 
them to fear the ‘premature independence’ of black populations. (Schmitz, 2006). 
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Domestically, the US power bloc – fractions of American capital fused together 
under the leadership of manufacturers, acting through the state – sought to assemble a 
broad anticommunist coalition, in which was incorporated leading businesses, unions, 
state personnel, and both of the dominant parties. Here too, the ambiguities of 
managing hegemony in a white supremacist system were felt. While the national 
liberal state embarked on a limited, cautious civil rights agenda, in the Deep South a 
virulent form of racial anticommunism emerged to defend the institutions of white 
supremacist capitalism. Indeed, Southern planter and textile capital, representing 
politically powerful fractions within the US power bloc, constituted a bulwark of 
hard-line anticommunism. Despite the problems that a one-party racial dictatorship in 
the South posed for the United States’ global projection of ‘soft power’, policymakers 
in Washington were extremely reluctant to chasten or roll back this system. For, with 
all these difficulties, the specific configuration of class and race relations, the 
conjunction of different modes of rule in north and south, served the purposes of 
hegemony for a time. Indeed, for the South, anticommunism proved an exceptionally 
potent weapon against the emerging civil rights coalition, despite the fact that 
segregation itself posed challenges to Washington’s ability to maintain its 
anticommunist coalition internationally. This structuring ambiguity is the problem 
addressed by this research. Why, given the problems that segregation posed for Cold 
War strategies, was anticommunism such an effective weapon in the hands of 
segregationists? How did the latter come to believe, and convince others, that the 
civil rights struggle was driven by communist subversion? What political and 
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ideological resources did anticommunism provide and when, and why, did it cease to 
be effective? 
  This research will study an historical problem through a sociological lens. It will 
look at the interdependence and inter-penetration of racial and anticommunist politics 
in the US South, in the period 1945-65, which I will refer to as the ‘classical’ phase of 
Cold War anticommunism. It will seek to demonstrate that the anticommunist 
practices — first at the international and national levels, then in the South after 
Brown v the Board of Education — constituted a countersubversive programme 
aimed at responding to transitional pressures first at the international level 
(represented, for example, by decolonisation), then at the level of the national state 
(in terms of the necessary centralisation and concentration of American state 
capacities to manage its global dominance), and then at the level of Southern states 
and economies (in terms of the reorganisation of productive spaces, the collapse of 
the traditional rural and small-town bases of segregation, the growth of urban 
industries, and the development of local and municipal state capacities in absorbing 
the dysfunctions produced by these changes). It will show that crises in the Southern 
system enabled the emergence of a new civil rights coalition capable of challenging 
interdependent hierarchies of power, supported by a transformation of the balance of 
class and political forces within the Federal state. This in turn called into existence a 
white resistance coalition, extending from state apparatuses to paramilitary forces to 
civil institutions. In order to adequately explain the real course of events, I will also 
seek to explain not just the strategic rationality but also the subjective meaning of 
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anticommunism in these contexts. This is where marxism reaches its limits, or so I 
will argue, and I therefore turn to a form of discourse analysis grounded in Lacanian 
psychoanalysis. This analysis will show that connecting white-supremacy and 
anticommunism, enabling it to be far more effective than if segregationists simply 
used anticommunism as a cover, was a kernel of ideological fantasy, structurally very 
similar to antisemitic fantasy. For a time, this fusion of racism and red-hunting was 
able to cohere a hegemonic alliance of class forces, providing it with a strategic and 
moral direction. 
A research paradigm 
Since the 1990s, there has been belated and growing historical attention to the 
international dimensions of America’s racial order. The specific connections between 
civil rights and anticolonial movements (Horne, 2009; Bush, 2009), between 
America’s battle for dominance in the Third World and its domestic policies 
(Dudziak, 2002), between its internal suppression of communism and the counter-
civil rights struggle (Woods, 2004; Lewis, 2004, 2005), and between its global racial 
politics and anticommunist precepts (Borstelmann, 2001) have all been explored by 
historians. Vitalis (2000, 2002, 2007) has produced compelling studies of the 
globalisation of Jim Crow structures by American capital, from within the discipline 
of International Relations. The intersection between anticommunism and race 
management in Southern industries has also been subject to a detailed historical 
treatment by Korstad (2003). 
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What is now needed is a sociological approach to this subject, a working 
theoretical articulation which explains the nature of the intersections whose history 
has been excavated. This is what this research seeks to do, using Gramscian 
categories – notably, ‘hegemony’, the ‘historical bloc’, and ‘passive revolution’ – in 
order to determine the extent and manner of the inter-dependence of Southern white 
supremacy and Cold War anticommunism. The master-concept here is hegemony. In 
class-democratic societies, hegemony is that state of affairs, always temporary and 
usually unstable (Hall, 1986), wherein the ruling class achieves such a broad 
consensual basis for its operations that it no longer merely dominates, but leads. This 
is the result of a complex series of practices, compromises, threats and inducements 
at the level of production, social and civil life, and the state and its modes of presence 
in society. 
As such, this research is conducted firmly within the terrain of a particular strain 
of historical materialism. There were a number of alternative theoretical approaches 
available to me. I might have, for example, adopted a Weberian approach in which 
the relationship between race and class would be theorised as, first a relation between 
different modes of stratification, between status and marketable advantage; second, 
between productive types (industrial mass production) and legitimacy (race and, later, 
anticommunism); third, between diverse modes of domination – charismatic, 
traditional and rational-legal – as embodied in Democratic Party dominance; the 
bureaucratic rationality of the modern state and its possible tension with pre-modern 
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state forms. Indeed, the Weberian approach to social action, power and dominance 
offers a rich and suggestive conceptual apparatus with which to approach this subject. 
Alternatively, I might have approached this question with a functionalist, structuralist 
or neoliberal purview, and each could have yielded fruitful results. There is no 
compelling proof that the theoretical underpinnings of either of these approaches is 
necessarily stronger or weaker than any of the others. 
So why have I opted for an historical materialist problematic? In part, the answer 
is simply that this is the research programme that I am committed to, and this project 
is an attempt to develop and refine the conceptual materials of historical materialism 
through their application to a concrete situation. But marxism also offers some 
advantages for those conducting this type of research. First, it is a problematic whose 
démarche, as Goran Therborn put it (2008: 138), is the central attention it gives to the 
reproduction of social relations. (In fact, feminist writing did a great deal to bring out 
this particular dimension of marxist thought. See, for example, Federici, 2012). This 
allows us to ask, for example: what contribution does race make to the reproduction 
of the basic relations of a society? Does it inhibit, allow or catalyse that reproduction? 
By what means? How do the institutional forms and actions of a state accelerate or 
retard reproduction while being themselves reproduced? Secondly, it is an approach 
which radically de-naturalises the phenomena that are made to appear as ‘natural’ or 
‘given’. This allows us to treat ‘race’ as something that is historically produced, 
socially constructed, not a biological given. The palpable ‘confirmations’ that we 
experience as race can be understood as the socio-symbolic outcomes of social and 
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political struggles. (Hall et al, 2013; Omi & Winant, 1994) Thirdly, I think the 
marxist emphasis on the fundamentally antagonistic nature of social relations calls 
attention to the dysfunctions and discontinuities that are likely to be present in the 
process of reproduction, such that no outcome can be adduced as necessarily 
functional to the social formation. Given that the period I cover is one of intense 
social transformation and struggle, featuring the deformation, preservation and 
breakdown of old forms of domination, and their replacement with new types, it is 
advantageous to adopt an approach which permits this process to be theorised. 
Further, the historical materialism of which I make use is of a particular type. The 
research involves the ‘concrete analysis of concrete situations’ whose theoretical 
object is the specific conjuncture of the post-war United States. I do not attempt to 
present a rigorous demonstration of the operation of historical ‘laws’ identified by 
Marx. Rather, the historical determinacy of laws in Marx’s research project points to 
the need for concrete investigation to determine “the boundaries” of the articulation 
of “productive force and relation of production” at any given conjuncture. (Banaji, 
2010: 47) When Marx turns his attention to concrete situations, for example in the 
Eighteenth Brumaire, his approach is far from the positivist attempt to validate laws 
already supposedly established by historical data. On the contrary, he sets out to 
discern the lineaments of class and political formations, the shifting valences of 
ideological cynosures, the class alliances and mutating allegiances: this highly 
conjunctural analysis pays off with the emergence of concepts such as ‘Bonapartism’, 
or the ‘praetorian state’. (On the text’s relevance for the analysis of political power 
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and the state, see Jessop, 2002). The selection of a specifically Gramscian idiom to 
provide the framework of the research has two motivations. In the first instance, I 
value Gramsci’s insistence on the analysis of the “conjuncture”, of “situations”, of the 
“socio-historical moment” which is never “homogenous”, but which is “rich with 
contradictions”. (Sassoon, 1981: 180-193) That approach will give me some means to 
theorise a quite complex texture of social transformation. In the second, Gramsci’s 
acknowledgment of the formative effectivity and autonomy of the ‘superstructural’ 
aspects of a social formation, above all ideology, political organisation and the state 
and their role in constituting social classes, is extremely useful in a study of the role 
of the intersection of race and anticommunism – both of which I theorise as political-
ideological formations – in securing class rule. 
I will also, in theorising the role of the state, make use of the work of Poulantzas 
(1978, 2014) where the Gramscian problematic of hegemony is articulated with an 
Althusserian materialism (Thomas, 2011). By resisting the reification of ‘the state’ in 
classical political theory, and by treating it as a specific material condensation of the 
balance of class and political forces, he provides a theoretical underpinning to 
Foucault’s observation that the state has no heart, no essence, and is merely “the 
mobile shape of a perpetual statification or statifications”. (Foucault, 2008) This 
conceptualisation also stresses the fissiparousness of the state, the role of ‘pockets of 
resistance’ within it, the tensions between its hierarchically distributed apparatuses 
and spatially distributed ‘sites of power’, and the always complex ‘play’ of opposing 
class and political forces from which the general ‘line’ of ‘the state’ emerges. Much 
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has been done to build on those insights (Aaronowitz & Bratsis, 2002) and give them 
concrete historical applications (Panitch & Gindin, 2012), but I consider Poulantzas’s 
work on the state to be unsurpassed within the marxist tradition.  The advantage of 
this approach for this research is that it helps situate the cultural, and moral-regulative 
aspect of state practices, and particularly law, in the constitution of race. (Gilroy, 
1982; Gilroy & Simm, 1985)  
However, it is not my intention to produce an obsessively cohesive, theoretically 
closed, account of the problem. This is why, in regard to certain aspects of state 
power (legitimacy, territoriality, representation), I will also find it useful to engage 
with other sources, such as Harvey (2005), Lefebvre (2009), Holloway & Picciotto 
(1979), Arrighi (2009), and Tilly (1992) among others. Likewise, when it comes to 
ideology and the analysis of state discourse, I find Gramscian concepts such as 
’common sense’ and ‘hegemony’ useful, alongside Poulantzas’s emphasis on the 
state’s monopolisation of knowledge in the division between manual and mental 
labour. However, I will also make use of Laclau’s (1977) articulation of Marx and 
Lacan. I will return to Lacan but here it suffices to say that by stressing the emptiness 
of signifiers, their overdetermination within a given discourse, and their ability to be 
articulated within distinct discursive regimes, Laclau offers some means by which to 
understand the struggles over ‘Americanism’, ‘communism’, ‘liberty’ and their 
related thematics more clearly. 
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It is also useful to specify the role of Althusser’s materialism in this study. 
Although I don’t habitually refer to Althusserian concepts throughout the work, there 
is a real sense in which the “aleatory materialism” which I think is characteristic of 
his work, and particularly the concepts of “overdetermination” and “contradiction”, 
has a formative role in guiding my interpretation of situations. (Althusser, 1999; 
Althusser, 2005; Lahtinen, 2009) I also find useful Althusser’s stress on the 
materiality of ideology, its role in the reproduction of social relations,  and the 
integral relationship of ideological “apparatuses” to the state. (Althusser, 2014) I am 
aware that there are criticisms, including from within the marxist tradition, of the 
theoretical resources I’m making use of here. While Gramsci was rebuked by 
Althusser as the bearer of an idealist ‘historicist’ problematic – quite unjustly (Elliott, 
2006: 27-30; Thomas, 2009: 1-37) – Althusser is often taxed with a ‘structuralism’ 
that is rigidly mapped onto a mechanistic and outmoded base-superstructure 
topography, and which permits no theoretical space for human agency and is thus 
profoundly conservative in its effects. (Thompson, 1978) For my part, I find 
Montag’s (2013) attempt to read Althusser in relation to his theoretical conjuncture, 
convincing as an effective reply to these criticisms and defence of a non-structuralist, 
‘aleatory’ current in Althusserian marxism. One criticism which would apply to both 
Gramsci and Althusser, which I find more compelling is that they attempt to sustain, 
in their own distinctive articulations, an historically unjustifiable ‘base-
superstructure’ dichotomy. (Thompson, 1978; Wood, 1981) It is more accurate to 
speak of the relative separation of economic and political practice in the capitalist 
mode of production. The ‘base-superstructure’ figure, however, does fulfil two useful 
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purposes. First, it maintains an analytical distinction between economic and political-
ideological practices; and second, it assigns the primary determining role, “in the last 
instance”, to economic or productive processes – even if “the lonely hour of the ‘last 
instance’ never comes”. (Althusser, 2005: 113) 
 In order to begin to define the terrain in which my research takes place, I will 
begin with a discussion of anticommunist practices in US history. ‘Practices’ is used 
here in the sense discussed by Althusser, viz.: “all the levels of social existence are 
the sites of distinct practices: economic practice, political practice, ideological 
practice, technical practice and scientific (or theoretical) practice. We think the 
content of these different practices by thinking their peculiar structure, which, in all 
these cases, is the structure of a production”. (Althusser & Balibar, 2009: 58) At the 
most general level, the structure of production has three stages: i) raw materials are 
brought into relation with one another; ii) a labour of transformation is performed 
using some means of production; and iii) an end-product results. The determinant 
moment in this process is the labour of transformation itself; it is this which decides 
the kind of practice involved. When investigating anticommunist practices, I will 
consider them largely as operating at the political-ideological ‘level’, even where they 
have a constitutive role in productive processes.  
Anticommunism belongs to a family of ‘countersubversive’ practices. 
Countersubversion has an especially long pedigree in the United States, where the 
presumed conspiracies of Freemasons, Catholics, Mormons, African Americans, the 
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‘yellow peril’, and of course ‘Reds’ have serially aroused movements in defence of 
Americanism. In addition to its racial and national connotations, countersubversion is 
intimately bound up with patriarchal practices and the masculinist ‘regeneration 
through violence’. (Melley, 2001; Slotkin, 1973; Davis, 1960) In the liberal tradition, 
countersubversion is treated as an aberration, a ‘paranoid style’ in politics birthed by 
the inability of certain marginal social groups to adapt to the pragmatic, compromise-
based politics of the United States. (Hofstadter, 1972) As Corey Robin points out, 
(Robin, 2004: 15), this is rooted in an inadequate liberal analysis of the sources of 
political fear. While the Cold War state was repressive, it was not openly lawless, not 
flagrantly crushing civil liberty in the manner of the ‘totalitarian’ nemesis. Because of 
this, Cold War liberals were remarkably blasé about its abuses, reducing political fear 
to a psychopathology. However, this both underestimates the true level of state 
repression and misses the way in which political fear is distributed through the 
vectors of civil society which are supposed, in liberal theory, to be the bulwark 
against state terror. It is therefore important to take countersubversion seriously, as a 
typology of repressive (but not merely repressive) practices aimed at conserving 
relations of domination.  
However, there is a problem in speaking about anticommunism at this level of 
abstraction. Ruotsila and Power both point out that anticommunism does not speak in 
a single voice, while Power seeks to redeem traditions of anticommunism that were 
not marred by extra-legal assaults on civil liberties. (Power, 1998; Ruotsila, 2001) 
The generic category ‘anticommunism’ is thus inhibitive if left undifferentiated. I will 
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momentarily come to the different political and ideological strands of 
anticommunism, but it’s also worth noting the different modalities in which 
anticommunism can be practiced. For example, a mainstay of writing on 
anticommunism is the ‘network’. These networks triangulate around three basic 
coordinates: civil society organisations (‘patriotic’ vigilante, liberal, trade union), 
capital, and the state. Of these, the most potent constituent is the state, which is the 
unifying element, the weaponised cutting edge, producing the public inquiries, the 
executed traitors and the raids – capable of raising anticommunism from being the 
obsession of an organised lobby to the level of being a ‘national obsession’. 
(Schrecker, 2002: 12-14 & 25) Yet, this poses questions which cannot be answered in 
terms of the ‘network’. Why, and under what circumstances, does the state become an 
anticommunist combatant? What does it contribute that the other elements cannot? 
Above all, how does the state relate to the social terrain in which communist and 
anticommunist practices operate? As soon as these questions are posed, it is clear that 
is necessary to separate the network into its different dimensions in order to answer 
them. 
 I proceed by situating the South in relation to the US capitalist system during the 
Cold War. This entails, to start with, a theoretical clarification of what is included in 
the capitalist ‘mode of production’. For example, is it merely a particular 
combination of forces and relations of production? If so, what manner of combination 
persisted in the US in the reference period? Can we speak of articulated modes of 
production in the South, and the persistence of feudal forms, or does Jim Crow effect 
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a total subsumption of social relations under capitalism? (Kayatekin, 2001; Post, 
2011) How far need our account specify the mechanisms of the system’s 
reproduction? (Wolpe, 1980: 6-19) In examining the southern social formation, the 
possible articulation of combined modes of production within it, and the extent to 
which capitalism ‘underdeveloped’ black America (Marable, 2000) and perhaps even 
the south itself, I will ask how this determined the possibilities for hegemony within 
the South, its position within the US social formation and its impact on the political 
management of different types of space (local, national and international). 
 Having thus located the South, I turn to the question of the relationship between 
race and anticommunism in the construction of hegemony during the period of 
‘classical anticommunism’ in the Cold War.  Using the concept of the Fordist 
‘historical bloc’ to explain the relations of production and the specific form of 
productive forces which dominated the US in this period, I also avail myself of 
Gramsci’s analysis of ‘Americanism and Fordism’, to explain the relationship 
between Fordist production methods, ‘Americanist’ ideology and US global 
hegemony. (Rupert, 1995; Gramsci, 1971) I examine the question of ‘hegemony’, and 
the exceptionally broad alliance of class forces that massed under the rubric of 
anticommunism.  Here, the key problem is what combination of coercion and consent 
permitted the assembly such forces unified around a broad set of anticommunist 
objectives and thematics. It is clear that coercion played a significant role in the 
marginalisation of insurgent social forces excluded from the post-war class 
compromise. It is equally clear, however, that significant popular forces not only 
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consented to the anticommunist vulgate, but actively participated in its promulgation. 
The reconciliation of antagonistic interests and subject-positions thus needs to be 
explained partially in terms of persuasion and particularly the formulation of 
hegemonic languages through which these diverse agents are incorporated as a ‘chain 
of equivalences’. If, as Voloshinov argues, “the word is the most sensitive index of 
social changes”, the mutations in political discourse should provide a symptomatic 
insight into the changing lived relation of American subjects to their political 
environment. (Voloshinov, 1986: 19) Importantly, we are speaking of languages in the 
plural, and specifically the decussation of the Southern lexis of conservative white-
supremacy, racial populism, anticommunism, and what might be termed ‘national 
liberal’ discourses. 
This is where Lacan enters as a disruptive element in my approach. One of the 
starting points of this research is that the anticommunism of segregationists should be 
taken very seriously. It may be that the conflation of “Race-Mixing” with 
“Communism”, so common in segregationist discourse in the phase of Massive 
Resistance, is literally untrue. This is not a reason to dismiss such claims, either by 
treating it as a ruse, or as a delusion. It would also be a mistake to try to rationalise 
such beliefs. There are certainly ways to make sense of white-supremacist 
anticommunism. For segregationists, white-supremacy was a meritocratic system, 
reflecting innate differences between people. It was also a delicate local modus 
vivendi, a carefully elaborated cultural ecology. Finally, it was built in to American 
traditions, validated in the north as much as the south. The attack on it could be 
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construed as an unAmerican, state-sponsored assault on a well-maintained, free 
enterprise society – ‘socialism’, or ‘excessive government’ at best. (Lewis, 2000: 
233)  There is truth in this, but to leave it at that would be to gloss over, rather than 
encounter, what is disturbing about this discourse. It is one thing to look for the 
‘rational kernel’ in social behaviour; it is another to forget, in doing so, that the 
irrational is part of social life as well.  
Lacan’s work was devised for clinical applications, not for social criticism. It is 
imperative, in using Lacan for a discourse analysis, to be aware of the limitations of 
transposing concepts devised for a clinical practice into academic work. One very 
clear limit is that when an analysand ‘slips’ or says something polysemic or garbled, 
the analyst is in a place to draw attention to it and encourage the analysand to speak 
more about it. The analyst who is reading texts composed over half a century ago and 
whose authors are beyond contact is not in this position. Likewise, where the analyst 
interprets for the analysand, the intention is to “make waves”, to allow the subject to 
undertake a radical shift in his or her subject-position. (Lacan, quoted in Fink, 2007: 
81) Nothing like this is involved in academic interpretation. I will develop this further 
in Chapter Six. Nonetheless, there are two key aspects of this approach which suggest 
that it can be useful here. First, Lacan’s contention that the unconscious is “structured 
like a language” (Lacan, 2006: 737), and indeed is filled with language, explodes the 
dichotomy of subject and structure. The Lacanian subject, rather like the Althusserian 
subject, is the bearer of a structure. In the case of Lacan, the subject is the bearer of 
the signifier: this means that subjectivity is not a hidden essence, but something that 
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is accessible because we are “parlêtres” – speaking beings.  Second, Lacan’s 
insistence on the letter of speech – that is, not on what is supposedly ‘meant’, but on 
what is actually said – allows one to explore the contradictions, ambiguities, sense 
and non-sense of speech, without trying to master it on the basis of supposed existing 
knowledge. Lacan warned analysts against trying to ‘understand’ the analysand’s 
discourse precisely because it would involve foregrounding the analyst’s own 
meanings. (Miller, 2011: 1-13; Fink, 2014; Lacan, 2006: 394) This approach, in my 
view, helps overcome the limitations of Verstehen, insofar as the latter rests on the 
unwarranted assumption that we know enough about one another to understand the 
meaning attached to behaviour. Third, because the master-concept of psychoanalysis 
is the unconscious, because the fundamental theoretical construct is that there is a 
part of the self which is not experienced consciously but which exerts effects in 
speech, in the fact that subjects give a bad, incoherent and contradictory account of 
themselves, it is possible to engage in a suspicious reading of texts which nonetheless 
takes them fully at their word. There is no need to look ‘beneath the surface’ of the 
text; the point is to notice the holes in meaning and warps that appear, and to follow 
their logic. On the basis of these and similar principles, Lacanians have developed a 
rigorous and reflexive approach to discourse analysis. (Frosh, 2014; Parker, 2005, 
2014; Pavón-Cuéllar, 2010) Using these means, I will be able to give myself the 
opportunity to temporarily suspend the rush to theoretically master the material, and 
follow the discourse of white-supremacist anticommunism to the letter. 
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A brief history of American anticommunism 
Two phases of anticommunism 
I will give a more detailed outline of the phases of anticommunism in Chapter 
Three, in order to identify the specific role of the international terrain in the formation 
of American, and particularly Southern, anticommunism. In that chapter, I will relate 
anticommunism to a strategy in the management of ‘uneven and combined 
development’ in what I will refer to as an imperialist world-system. (Trotsky, 2008; 
Poulantzas, 1978; Panitch & Gindin, 2003; Panitch & Gindin, 2012) Here, I simply 
want to briefly map the historical terrain. 
  
The first wave of anticommunism in the US arose in response to the Russian 
Revolution and its effects on the international order, but also condensed a number of 
anxieties arising from economic turmoil amid demobilisation, strike waves, and the 
growing self-organisation of African Americans. Both in its international dimensions, 
including intervention in Russia, and in its domestic elements, the state played a 
leading role. New legislation, and new repressive apparatuses, targeted ‘aliens’, while 
the dominant ideological responses identified socialism as a foreign, ‘German’, or 
even ‘Jewish’ credo, and worried about subversion among African Americans. 
Beyond the state, a broad network of businesses, citizens groups and armed militias 
took the fight to actual and supposed reds. The Communist Party of the USA 
(CPUSA) did go onto play a ‘subversive’ role in African American politics, on the 
basis of which it developed some degree of support among black workers who, by 
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1946, made up 14% of their membership. (Foglesong, 2007; Bush, 2009; Kovel, 
1997: 14-22; Heale, 1990: 60-96; Solomon, 1998: 219-21; Woods, 2004: 19-21) 
The second wave of anticommunism, which I refer to as the ‘classical phase’, took 
place as the US assumed global dominance, and amid an upsurge of global 
anticolonial struggles in which communists often played a leading role. This entailed 
the internationalisation of the American state (Poulantzas, 1978; Panitch & Gindin, 
2012) and also to an extent the internationalisation of its cultural and social forms. 
Civil rights became a global issue, particularly as the US sought to build support in 
the Third World for a front against communism. In this struggle, Southern industry 
and politicians often played a leading role as the most militaristic component of a 
Cold War power bloc. They were able to legitimise their role in the American nation 
partly on the basis of their militant anticommunism, and partly on the basis of 
national ideological traditions sustaining ‘states rights’. To the extent that Cold War 
liberals sought to change the racial order, they did so against stubborn resistance from 
Southern politicians who were otherwise a key component of the anticommunist 
alliance. Moreover, in launching a national anticommunist crackdown, with loyalty 
oaths and political investigations, they provided segregationists with the means to 
suppress civil rights movements. They also broke up political alliances, such as the 
‘Popular Front’ Left, in which the CPUSA had played a variable but often 
constructive role, which could advance civil rights. Finally, when the Supreme Court 
outlawed school segregation in Brown v the Board of Education, the anticommunist 
practices developed nationally could be replicated in Southern states and deployed 
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against the NAACP and other civil rights bodies. (Borstelmann, 2001; Schmitz, 1999, 
2006; Woodward, 1966: 131-2; Dudziak, 2004; Lewis, 2004; Smith, 2010; 
Gesselbracht, 2007; Horne, 1985, 1988, 1991, 2004) 
The defeat of the ‘Popular Front’ and the construction of a hegemonic 
anticommunist bloc 
 The defeat of the ‘Popular Front’ Left was the necessary condition for the success 
of classical anticommunism. 1948 was a nodal year in this respect, during which a 
number of tendencies crystallised, a number of decisive battles were settled, and a 
new order came into view. By that point, the Cold War liberal front, Americans for 
Democratic Action (ADA) had been formed. Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram’ and Winston 
Churchill’s ‘iron curtain’ speech had dictated the broad lineaments of Cold War 
doctrine. Truman’s loyalty programmes had begun, HUAC had become a standing 
committee, and there were investigations underway into Hollywood communism. The 
anti-union Taft-Hartley bill had been enacted over the objections of organised labour, 
and of Truman himself. The ultimately doomed attempts to unionise the south – the 
CIO’s effort, known as ‘Operation Dixie’ was the more energetic of these – had been 
launched.  
 Internationally, the anti-colonial movement had scored a painful victory with 
independence for India. The Republic of Korea was founded amid conditions of 
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intense social struggle tending toward civil war. The ‘Berlin Blockade’ was 
underway, and Russian control of the Eastern Bloc was consolidated. The US was 
headed toward conflict with the USSR. The CPUSA, the most dynamic sector of the 
‘Popular Front’ Left, attempted to galvanise opposition to US policy. However, it had 
been compromised by its support for the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and its uncritical 
support for the USSR despite its territorial aggrandisements. If communists 
campaigned for ‘peace’ and the cessation of Cold War hostilities, the counterpoint of 
the US was that it waged war for ‘freedom’. (Lieberman, 2010: 32) 
  
 The 1948 presidential election is worth examining, as it was to be the last test of 
the ‘Popular Front’ Left, and it condensed many of the previously mentioned features. 
The Progressive Party’s candidate, Henry Wallace, enjoyed the backing of those 
shades of the Left and labour movement which had not been co-opted into the anti-
communist front. Wallace, dyspeptic about the rush toward hostility with Russia, 
decried it as a “position of ruthless imperialism”, and promised peaceful co-existence 
with communism at a time when most Americans believed that the Soviet Union 
posed a serious threat to American security, and thus to freedom. Democratic 
strategists attacked Wallace using the prevailing wisdom, even promoted by more 
sophisticated liberals such as George Kennan, that the Soviet Union was engaged in a 
conspiracy to subvert the ‘free world’. In the formative years of the Cold War, such 
beliefs were expressed in Congressional and Justice Department investigations into 
‘foreign agents’ and espionage, which was alleged to have taken place at the highest 
levels of government. As such, the Wallace campaign was susceptible to charges of 
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treason and disloyalty if it could be depicted as a communist front. Democratic 
strategy, outlined in the ‘Clifford memorandum’ duly sought to “identify him in the 
public mind with the Communists” (Yarnell, 1974: 32-3, 90; Kovel, 1997: 43-9; 
Schrecker, 1998: 159-67). 
 This was an effective strategy, compelling liberals and moderate socialists to 
make clear their objections to Wallace’s ‘appeasement’. Norman Thomas accused 
Wallace of condoning “human slavery under Stalin”. But it was the ADA which 
landed the most damaging blows. Its cardinal conviction was that it was impossible to 
cooperate with communists in a progressive cause; that ‘united fronts’ inevitably 
became communist fronts. This issue was the key one that divided the ADA liberals 
from the Progressives supporting Wallace. With the founding support of the grande 
dame of New Deal liberals, Eleanor Roosevelt, the ADA was well-placed to exploit 
the Progressives’ weakness. Nor was it only the liberals who belaboured Wallace. The 
radical pacifist A J Muste described him as “the instrument and captive” of the 
CPUSA, while Dwight MacDonald argued that whether or not Wallace was an agent 
of Moscow, he “behaves like one”. (Yarnell, 1974: 87; Lieberman, 2010: 52) 
 This by itself may not have been a sufficient strategy had not Truman 
incorporated elements of popular discontent into his campaign, belabouring ‘big 
business’ and Wall Street, championing certain labour interests, and also articulating 
some African American grievances. The Progressives were defeated, gaining just over 
1.1m votes, 2.4% of the national total. (Goldzwig, 2008: 61-70; Mayers, 2007: 297) 
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Truman’s victory can be argued to have played a decisive role in consolidating the 
Cold War ‘historical bloc’. An alliance of Fordist producers, integrated with a 
national security state, now exercised hegemony, providing the nation with a global, 
historic mission, asserting American global dominance to protect freedom and 
democracy against its Soviet opponents, and this was one which could attract the 
support of potentially oppositional elements.  
Hegemony: ideology and coercion 
 The extraordinary breadth of the classical anticommunist front, ranging from 
labour unions, leftists such as Norman Thomas and Dwight MacDonald, anti-racist 
organisations such as the NAACP, the ‘Vital Center’ liberals convoked in the ADA, to 
business lobbies and the white despotisms in Southern states, demands some 
explanation. I shall say, briefly, that classical anticommunism comprises a set of 
political, legal and ideological practices articulated in a hegemonic project, aimed at 
producing a new popular ‘common sense’ favourable to ‘free enterprise’ and 
American global hegemony. I will suggest, drawing from Gramsci’s analysis of 
‘Americanism and Fordism’, that anticommunism and the southern racial caste 
system intersected with Fordist production methods and America’s informal empire 
to co-produce an ‘Americanist’ ‘historical bloc’. (Gramsci, 1971: 277-320) Cold War 
anticommunism had to plausibly incorporate within itself elements of popular 
aspirations, and anxieties. In one mode, it offered material measures to secure popular 
consent, and in another it operated on fears of global communist expansionism and 
domestic subversion that, though exaggerated, were not wholly unrealistic. 
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(Schrecker, 1998: 161) In so doing, it successfully condensed and articulated what 
Hall (1985) referred to in a different context as “highly contradictory subject-
positions”. This was possible because “common nuclei of meaning” were 
“connotatively linked to diverse ideological-articulatory domains”. This enabled a 
process of ‘transformism’, the “partial absorption and neutralisation of those 
ideological contents” through which resistance to class domination was expressed. 
(Laclau, 1977: 160-1) Further, as Thomas (2009: 161-7) points out, the Gramscian 
concept of hegemony includes coercive direction, and coercion was absolutely central 
to breaking up breaking up the ‘Popular Front’ Left and absorbing elements of the 
shattered coalition, through the vector of ‘Vital Center’ liberalism (Schlesinger, 
1998), into a new articulation polarised to the right. 
  
 The South was central to the anticommunist coalition, with Southern politicians 
in local and federal state bodies promulgating securitarian and ideological responses 
to leftist and anti-racist movements, and providing a template of ‘Americanism’ that 
was powerful in the classical phase of Cold War anticommunism. (Lewis, 2004: 
10-29) Southern business alliances such as the Southern States Industrial Conference 
engaged in political activism in defence of the ‘free enterprise’ system against 
perceived challenges from socialism, welfarism, and civil rights. (Jewell, 2010) 
Anticommunism in the South was bound up with a politics of racial populism, the 
latter being a form of popular-democratic interpellation of white citizens in support of 
a project of racial self-defence against an ‘elite’ integrated into the Federal 
government. (On this use of ‘populism’, see Laclau, 1977)  
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 To understand the efficacy of racial populist interpellation, we can avail ourselves 
of Gramsci’s writing on ‘The Southern Question’, wherein he discusses the uses of 
regional variations and locally embedded cultural patterns, as well as northern quasi-
colonial chauvinism toward southerners, in dividing subaltern classes and frustrating 
the formation of counter-hegemonic movement. (Gramsci & Verdicchio, 2005; see 
also Hall, 1996) To give this its specific relevance, though, it is necessary to appraise 
the manner in which ‘race’ is constitutive of class relations in the US. Historically, 
class consciousness among white American workers has taken the form of a ‘white 
labour republicanism’ (Roediger, 2007), in which white workers were bound to the 
racial system through fear of being reduced to the level of the ‘slave’. Their 
aspirations for self-determination and dignity in labour were thus incorporated into 
the ruling ideology. This, alongside the paternalistic relationship between workers 
and bosses that often accompanied whiteness, accounts significantly for the failure of 
unionisation drives such as ‘Operation Dixie’, which was also the subject of red-
baiting. It was, in particular, “the racialism of communism” that alienated Southern 
white workers. (Boswell, Brown, Brueggemann & Peters Jr., 2006: 155) 
 The state, as noted by Schrecker (2002: 25), was central to classical 
anticommunism. Following Poulantzas (1978), we can conceptualise this role in 
terms of the presence of the state in the reproduction of the relations of production, 
and thus in the constitution of social classes. The political, legal and ideological 
relations which constituted classical anticommunism were logically condensed in the 
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state, because the state is the material condensation of class relations, and affords a 
strategic base for an overall direction in the development of productive relations. 
(Therborn, 2008: 151)  The role of the state in this constitution has to be 
differentiated, however, between local and national state forms, as many of the effects 
of racial politics are expressed in a highly regionalised pattern. (James, 1998) In 
addition, as the above indicates, the relationship between the national state’s inward 
directed behaviour, and its outward directed behaviour demands attention. If 
anticommunism connected domestic and global hegemonic projects, so racist and 
colonial assumptions were formative of responses to communism both domestically 
and internationally. (Borstelmann, 2001; Schmitz 1999, 2006) 
The Southern social formation 
“If the Negro is permitted to engage in politics, his usefulness as a labourer is at 
an end.” – A Mississippian comments on the introduction of Jim Crow laws to the 
state. Quoted, Wood, 1986: 118 
“We can view the urban region as a kind of competitive collective unit within the 
global dynamics of capitalism. Like individual entrepreneurs, each urban region has 
the autonomy to pursue whatever course it will, but in the end each is disciplined by 
the external coercive laws of competition. Its industry has to compete within an 
international division of labour, and its competitive strength depends on the qualities 
of labour power; the efficiency and depth of social and physical infrastructures; the 
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‘rationality’ of lifestyles, cultures, and political processes; the state of class struggle 
and social tension; and geographical position and natural resources endowments.” – 
David Harvey. Quoted in Wilson, 2000: 108 
The capitalist mode of production and race in the South 
 David Harvey offers a strategic view of space in the field of capital accumulation 
and the division of labour. If we infer that the “external coercive laws of competition” 
have constantly buffeted the southern United States as they have every other region, 
what implications does this have for the development of the Deep South as a regional 
formation? In what way and to what extent did capitalist imperatives mould the 
emergence of southern markets in chattel and chattel-produced goods? Did capitalism 
underdevelop the South?  Or, did capitalism underdevelop black America?  
Manning Marable’s argument that capitalism did underdevelop black America 
suggests that the system was able to develop “not in spite of the exclusion of Blacks, 
but because of the brutal exploitation of Blacks as workers and consumers”. The 
paradox of American history, in this view, is that each advance of white freedom, 
affluence and state power was accomplished alongside black unfreedom, poverty and 
powerlessness. Development, meaning “the institutionalization of the hegemony of 
capitalism as a world system,” relied on a non-white periphery characterised by 
“chattel slavery, sharecropping, peonage, industrial labour at low wages, and culture 
chaos” for black people. This allowed the accumulation of surplus value from black 
workers to take place at an escalated rate compared to the equivalent for white 
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workers. It was insured by systems of white supremacy which commanded the 
dependency of black populations – notably, a majoritarian political system that 
ensured that black minorities could only successfully advance agendas acceptable to 
either of the two main white capitalist parties.  “The constant expropriation of surplus 
value created by Black labour is the heart and soul of underdevelopment”. (Marable, 
2000, p. 2 & 7) This analysis, drawing from dependency theory, but above all from 
the work of W E B Du Bois, suggests that the global ‘colour line’ is a precondition 
for capitalist development, and the knot in which the antagonisms of the capitalist 
mode of production – the exploitation of labour and colonial subjection, as much as 
the oppression of women – are condensed. 
 David Roediger, also informed by Du Bois, takes a substantially similar position, 
rebuking those Marxists who have classified antebellum slavery as a form of agrarian 
feudalism. While in the abstract, he maintains, capitalism is structured around the 
dual freedom of labour (from the means of production; to sell one’s labour power as 
property), unfree labour is historically perfectly compatible with capitalism provided 
slavers exist and compete within a world market based on free labour. Further, while 
capitalism has certain homogenising tendencies, it should not be expected to be 
‘colour blind’ or to eventually level all national, religious and racial distinctions. The 
process of ‘race-making’ in capitalism is continuous, as profits are maximised 
through the social production of difference. (Roediger & Esch, 2009; Roediger, 2008: 
64-69; Lowe, 1999: 28-29)  
 44
 How one addresses this issue depends in part on how one understands the 
capitalist mode of production (CMP), and its relationship to precapitalist modes of 
production (PCMPs). In general, my position is that a mode of production consists of 
a specific conjunction of relations and forces of production. In this conjunction, 
productive relations have explanatory priority, as these determine the boundaries of 
productive forces (the form of surplus extraction determining the labour process). The 
capitalist mode of production is thus defined principally by the productive relations 
that are specific to it (the particular relationship of labour power to the means of 
production, the relations of effective possession of each, the form of surplus 
extraction), and secondly by the productive forces (the labour process and the relative 
quantity of surplus extracted). (Callinicos, 2004; 2014) 
 In this light, it would seem to be difficult to sustain the thesis that antebellum 
slavery itself was a CMP. For, the defining condition of antebellum slavery is the 
extra-economic bondage of the labourer to some means of production as a condition 
of her existence. This is quite at odds with the ‘dual freedom’ of the proletarian under 
capitalism; the worker who has been completely ‘freed’ from the means of 
production, but is also ‘free’ to sell her labour power. Charles Post thus argues that 
antebellum slavery was a decidedly non-capitalist form, and that the forging of 
American capitalism arose from the combined modes of production (slavery, petty 
commodity production, mercantile capital) in which capitalist imperatives exerted 
overall dominance. From this perspective, the dominant farmer republican ideology, 
as well as the political form of slaver dominance (Democratic Party hegemony), were 
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pre-capitalist. This structure of articulated modes of production motivated regional 
(north-south) competition and expansionism, which was eventually resolved by the 
Civil War and the victory of capitalism. (Post, 2011; Davidson, 2011; Ashworth, 
1995; Ashworth, 2007)  
 Post’s argument focuses more on the productive forces (the labour process, the 
instruments of production) than on productive relations. And it is on the ground of 
productive relations, and specifically the position of the labourer with respect to the 
means of production, that Sidney Mintz broached the question of whether the 
plantation slave was a proletarian. Through an examination of Caribbean sugar 
plantations and the forms of labour relation (slave, indentured, free, etc.) prevalent in 
them, he discloses the co-existence and co-dependence of these forms in the same 
labour systems. Mintz shows: that slavery rarely exists in a pure form; that it is 
possible for elements of the slave labour form to overlap with the free labour form in 
concrete labour processes (the separation of the worker from the means of 
production); that elements of both were historically articulated within a capitalist 
labour process; that slaves themselves could adopt ‘free labour’ roles, for example in 
the production of food; and that it would be an error to become stuck in an ideal-
typical abstraction in which the slave is the eternal other of the proletarian. (Mintz, 
1978) Post allows for the articulation of different modes of production within distinct 
economies and regions, but Mintz’s argument suggests that in the concrete social 
formation, different modes of production may be articulated in the same labour 
process. 
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 Indeed, Post appears to have no difficulty with the argument that ‘free labour’ 
needn’t exist in a pure form in capitalism. It is his argument, for example, that 
following the Civil War non-capitalist forms persisted in the South in the form of 
household-based sharecropping, until the Jim Crow era. The imposition of 
segregation was coextensive with the planters’ transition to capitalist ‘labour tenancy’ 
as the dominant mode of extraction – indeed, in this view, segregation was a 
necessity for its effective reproduction given the inability of planters to subsume the 
labour process under their control. The disenfranchisement of blacks and many poor 
whites was necessary for agrarian capitalism due to a specific feature of its 
production cycle and the disjunction with labour-time. (There is a ‘slack season’ 
between planting and harvesting and, as a result, agrarian capital often requires the 
legal-juridical coercion of labour-power.)  In this sense, Jim Crow was a pathology of 
racialised capitalism that, while functional in various ways, was no longer necessary 
for its successful reproduction once technological advances allowed for the effective 
subsumption of the labour process by the 1940s. (Mann, 1990; Post, 2011; Hahn, 
2003)  
 This specification of the relationship between CMP and PCMP has consequences 
for how we situate the South within the US and the global division of labour during 
the classical phase of anticommunism. In Chapter Four, I will argue that the juridical, 
extra-economic coercion of labour in Jim Crow, like the ‘paternalism’ of Southern 
mill owners, in part reflects the formative influence of a PCMP, a feudal remnant on 
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the development of Southern capitalism. (Kayatekin, 2001) This left the South in a 
certain place relative to the development of capitalism, predominantly in its industrial 
form, in the US as a whole. The South was, in effect, underdeveloped by capitalism, 
precisely because the dominant capitalist imperatives drove the extraction of surplus 
value in the slave South by means of regional competition, and then impelled the 
imposition of a segregated polity as part of the indispensable means through which 
the South would converge with the nation. 
The place of the South in American nationhood 
“Even its children know that the South is in trouble”. – Lillian Smith. 
  During the classical period of anticommunism, the South was beginning to make 
a transition to Fordist production methods: it was en route to ‘Americanisation’, in a 
sense that will be discussed later. Its largest economic sector, the textile industry, was 
concentrated in a cluster of small production units, in small towns, across four states. 
By far the major producer was North Carolina, followed by South Carolina, Georgia 
and Alabama. North Carolina’s productive advantage derived from the fact that it 
enjoyed access to an army of cheap surplus labour that was poorly organised, lacked 
political clout and lacked the protection of the law from the most intensive forms of 
exploitation. (Minchin, 1997: 2; Wood, 1986: 68)  
 Industrialisation was taking place slowly, and industrial unionism fared poorly. 
Worse still, the civil unrest arising from the struggle to end segregation, deterred 
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investors. The business advocates of the ‘new south’ were not as invested in white 
supremacy as the planters’ regime, and began to voice unease as the civil rights 
movement grew.  This did not mean that they had a principled objection to Jim Crow; 
their objections were phrased purely in terms of ‘law and order’, and the dire 
consequences for any city or state that could not protect property from lawless mobs. 
Jim Crow, if no longer necessary for the reproduction of capitalist relations in the 
South, was certainly an economic advantage for business, not only maintaining pay 
differentials that undermined the bargaining power of labour – the strong empirical 
and historical evidence is that racism increases inequality in white income 
distribution – but also maintaining a folkish, cross-class solidarity among whites, 
which unions found it very difficult to break through. However, a segregated South, 
shaken by anti-racist struggles, would have difficulties restructuring its operations to 
become competitive on a national level. At the same time, however, the business sell 
for the South was still predicated, as it had been throughout the Depression, on the 
promise of a low-wage labour market guaranteed by a near union-free environment. 
Southern Democratic politicians forced through right-to-work laws, and collaborated 
with Republicans in Washington on labour issues, such as Taft-Hartley. The textile 
drive by the CIO and Textile Workers’ Organising Committee in the latter half of the 
1930s had made some inroads into the industry, but these gains were least impressive 
in the South – by 1939, the union had managed to organise only 7% of the region’s 
mill hands. A subsequent drive by the Textile Workers’ Union of America, between 
1945 and 1955, was an even more dismal failure, and pragmatic efforts to work 
around the failure by forging cooperative relationships with anti-union politicians 
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ended up reinforcing the grip of forces that had defeated them: the Democratic Party 
and white supremacism. (Bernstein, 2010: 616-623; Brattan, 1997; Wilson, 2000: 25 
& 108-109; Reich, 1981) The South was thus in a strange place. Southern capital 
enjoyed political power disproportionate to its economic power. It strategically 
dominated a region that had a good claim to represent the historical core of the 
United States. (Macleod, 1974; Blumrosen & Blumrosen, 2007) Yet it also seemed to 
be in a spotlit enclave where its racial practices were the occasion for global censure 
(and thus reluctant intervention from Washington, Dudziak, 2000), and where its 
social problems and seeming underdevelopment relative to the national norm seemed 
to undermine the grandiose notions that the region’s defenders.  
  It is a commonplace of the American turn to overseas colonies in 1898 that it was 
coterminous with an extensive nationalisation of sentiment, an anti-sectional impulse 
that saw north and south re-united. This displacement of domestic tensions in 
overseas expansion was anticipated and welcomed by statesmen. Woodrow Wilson, 
for example, held that sectionalism arose primarily over the matter of commercial 
interests, while the collective commitment to the higher purpose of colonialism 
would relieve the focus on “the money question” – a classic articulation of what 
Losurdo calls Kriegsideologie. (Thorsen, 1988; Losurdo, 2001) What was 
nationalised, arguably, was the renascence of white supremacy in the South, so that 
both press and politicians of the North would express support for the emerging forms 
of segregation known as Jim Crow, and lament the egalitarian impulses of 
Reconstruction and the Fifteenth Amendment. (Weston, 1972: 1-15) Yet even at this 
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moment, the fact is that in the geography of US imperialism, the South was assigned 
the status of a ‘tropic’ – in Nancy Leys Stephan’s words, “a place of radical otherness 
to the temperate world”. Its relative backwardness in terms of capitalist development, 
and its attendant forms of racialised capitalism, fuelled this perception. So while 
north and south were ostensibly reconciled on the axis of racial nationalism, the 
regionalisation of the United States, the otherness of the South and its urgent need of 
reform, was reinforced on the very same ground.  (Ring, 2009) 
 Southern politicians, organic intellectuals and business lobbies responded to this 
denigration on the plane of culture, arguing for tolerance of their native customs and 
their rare and delicate cultural ecology. They linked the defence of free markets and 
cosmopolitanism to the southern ‘way of life’. This was, for example, the tactic of 
Anthony Hart Harrigan, the first executive director of the Southern States Industrial 
Council, writing in the National Review. More generally, for racial conservatives the 
South was a citadel of ordered liberty, of civilization and “aristocratic” virtue. 
(MacLean, 2010; Lowndes, 2008) Such declarations naturally arouse suspicion. The 
feudal order to which such categories adverted had long since been subsumed in the 
South, and they read like nothing so much as the signposted thematics of Dixieland.  
 If the South’s still rural economy, and supposed cultural staidness and 
traditionalism, contrasted it with the cultural celerity of the North, this trope adverted 
only to already racialised (and embourgeoised) assumptions about culture. It colludes 
with what W T Lahmon described as those “polite external forces” struggling to 
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maintain sovereignty over insubordinate subaltern forms. (Lahmon, 1998: 152) Of 
course, the much vaunted traditionalism of the South, culturally enacted in a certain 
Hellenic formalism in architecture, design and music, was a style peculiar to Ulster 
Scot and English settlers, and was even there less evident in the working classes than 
among the Southern gentry. Certainly, such Hellenism was a polite external force 
relative to the open-ended, experimental and improvised character of much African 
American culture. (Bronner, 2009; Burrison, 2007: 103) The area in which the South 
was and remains most distinctive is language, with numerous surviving (or only 
recently extinct) colonial English dialects alongside Cajun French, Isleño Spanish, 
and indigenous languages. Southern English itself is a creolised product of “multiple 
lines of descent”, with a dominant English ‘core’, as well as Scotch-Irish and African 
grammar, syntax and phonology fusing into a single “speechway”. (Algeo, 2003) 
 This form of southern cultural particularism can be read through the 
homogenizing processes of capitalism, not merely as a defensive reaction but as a 
willing process of commodification. “Dixification”, in which the cultural specificities 
of the south are absorbed into a spectacular fable of diversity (Dixieland), was 
already inscribed into the defence of Jim Crow. (Romine, 2008: 1-2) This 
Dixification-by-speech-act meant that at the precise moment when the apologists of 
white supremacy were flaunting their feudal sensibilities, they were bidding for 
incorporation in the American national imaginary on the terms of globalizing 
industrial capitalism. Anticommunism furnished the means to make this transition 
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effective. A case, perhaps, where “the royalists are the true pillars of the constitutional 
republic”. 
Fordism, the ‘historical bloc’ and languages of hegemony 
Americanism and Fordism: the ‘historical bloc’ 
 I have suggested that the US was ruled by a Fordist ‘historical bloc’ in the period 
of classical anticommunism. According to Gramsci, an ‘historical bloc’ consists of an 
articulation of “structures and superstructures … That is to say the complex, 
contradictory and discordant ensemble of the superstructures is the reflection of the 
ensemble of the social relations of production.” Within the historical bloc, “material 
forces are the content and ideologies are the form”, though this distinction is “merely 
didactic”, because “material forces could not possibly be historically conceived 
without form, and ideologies would be individual whims without material forces”. 
(Gramsci, 1971: 471) Gramsci here specified both a formal, conceptual relationship 
between “two areas of abstract reality”, and a concrete description of the relationship 
between these two areas in a social formation. The concrete relation is between 
different social forces, and perhaps different modes of production articulated in a 
single national economy (as in the Risorgimento). Within this historical bloc, it is 
possible to have numerous combinations of political alliances and differing 
distributions of power among dominant classes and fractions, without the basic unity 
of the bloc being disturbed. For a new historical bloc to come into existence requires 
a “political initiative” on the part of emerging class forces to shift “the dead weight of 
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traditional policies”. (Sassoon, 1981: 121; Gramsci, 1971: 263) The historical bloc is 
above all, then, a conjunctural fact.  
 What is the relation between the ‘historical bloc’ and hegemony?  Gramsci’s 
analysis of ‘Americanism and Fordism’ centred on the rationalisation of production 
techniques involved, suggesting that Fordism represented an historically progressive 
transition away from individualism and competition toward collectivism and 
planning, albeit one taking place within capitalist logic. It was a transition that was 
easier to accomplish in the United States owing to the psycho-physical acculturation 
of workers to industrial life, as well as to the rationalisation of America’s 
demographic composition, so that it lacked the “vast army of parasites”, the classes 
with no economic function, the unproductive landed gentry, clerics and middle 
classes who still predominated in parts of Europe. Thus, the reactionary forms of 
resistance to Fordism in Europe, extolling idyllic patriarchy, ruralism, Catholicism 
and the artisanal life, were largely absent in the United States. (Gramsci, 1971) Just 
as central to Fordism according to Gramsci was its moral and religious dimension, 
and particularly the regulation of the sexual instinct. While Gramsci saw a potentially 
progressive, rational development in this, it was dealt with in a despotic way by 
Henry Ford, reflecting his need to ensure that workers would be able to reproduce 
their labour power in its normal state, his wider concern with the sensualisation of 
culture (epitomised by ‘Jewish’ jazz), and his support for Prohibition. The living 
conditions imposed in ‘Fordlandia’, Ford’s failed attempt to create an enclave of 
Fordist America in Brazil producing rubber, included the regulation of workers’ diet 
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and the export of Prohibition. These represent the most consistent attempt by Ford to 
impose these norms. For Ford, the corporation was a prototype of the nation, and the 
habits of its workforce should reflect those of a healthy, Christian society. Fordism 
was not, then, simply a method of production. It was also a productivist ideology tied 
to a narrative of civilizational advance, Americanism, and a Christian ethic of labour. 
(Rupert, 1995; Gramsci, 1971; Grandin, 2010; Beynon, 1984, pp. 40-41)  
 Yet, it would be erroneous to treat Fordism in itself as the means of labour’s 
incorporation into the post-war system. While Gramsci focuses on the famous ‘high 
wages’ of workers under the Fordist pattern, these production methods had 
consequences that Gramsci’s analysis did not envisage. A mainstay of industrial 
sociology on the subject — particularly from the 'labour process' perspective — is the 
claim that corporate planning tends to remove skills and initiative from the ‘shop 
floor’. (Braverman, 1974; Pfeffer, 1979; Beynon & Nichols, 1977; Sennett, 1972) In 
the words of Ford’s ghost-writer, the “net result” of these methods was “the reduction 
of the necessity for thought on the part of the worker”. (Rupert, 1995: 63) This gave 
rise to a zombie-like existence for workers. Resistance to this tendency could take 
various forms. It could be passive. Workers, Garson (1994), explains, could develop 
games and objectives to make the work more interesting, or simply refuse to do a bad 
job by sticking strictly to procedure. Or it could take the form of industrial struggles 
over the control of the labour process, where it has been a central doctrine of Ford 
that this is one thing that is not up for negotiation. (Beynon, 1984) There was 
therefore no necessary reason, if the left in the labour movement was not cannibalised 
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by anticommunism, why ‘high wages’ alone should deliver industrial peace, or why 
productivity agreements, often the cause of the intensification of labour and the risks 
attached to it, and a further shift in control over labour processes to managers, should 
be the basis for class compromise rather than class struggle. 
 Importantly, American labour was not merely incorporated into a domestic 
Fordist bloc, but also its globalization under the rubric of ‘free trade unionism’ and 
anticommunism. This was possible in part because US planners embraced ‘New 
Deal’ thinking in their construction of the global financial and economic architecture, 
repudiating the laissez-faire economic liberalism that, for example, Southern 
industrialists and policymakers still favoured. (Callinicos, 2009: 165-187; Smith, 
2003; Smith, 2005: 82-121) Thus, a liberal world economic order, reinforced by 
reciprocal trade agreements and Marshall Plan aid, was one which labour could 
perceive that it had a stake in. It would allow America’s production machine to thrive, 
create jobs and growth within the US, improve the bargaining power of labour, and 
constitute the best response to “Soviet Communist imperialism”. (Rupert, 1995: 
44-46) While interwar Europe displayed forms of reactionary resistance to 
‘Americanisation’, the Fordist model is what was successfully transfused into 
European productive centres under Washington’s post-WWII hegemony, with the 
guidance of sympathetic social democratic or Christian Democratic leaderships. (Van 
der Pijl, 1984) Thus, in the post-war United States, at home and abroad, hegemony 
flowed from the factory.  
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Hegemonic languages and political identities 
 “Italy is a fact, now we need to make Italians.” – Massimo D’Azeglio on Italian 
unification. 
 Hegemony is political class leadership, in two senses: 1) leadership within a class 
alliance, either bourgeois or proletarian; 2) dominance over other classes. Leadership 
within the “system of class alliances” entails the hegemonic class or fraction 
assimilating the interests and perspectives of allied classes and providing a moral and 
intellectual framework that accommodates them. Stuart Hall reminds us that 
hegemony is neither a normal nor a fixed state, but a condition of rule that must 
constantly be constructed: “‘hegemony’ is a very particular, historically specific, and 
temporary ‘moment’, in the life of a society. It is rare for this degree of unity to be 
achieved, enabling a society to set itself a quite new historical agenda, under the 
leadership of a specific formation or constellation of social forces. Such periods of 
‘settlement’ are unlikely to persist forever. There is nothing automatic about them. 
They have to be actively constructed and positively maintained.” (Hall, 1986) 
Hegemony is that “homogeneous politico-economic historical bloc, without internal 
contradictions” — an overstatement — which must be consolidated through 
“conscious, planned struggle”. (Gramsci, 1971: 263) 
 In what manner is hegemony constructed? Coercion plays an important role, 
particularly with regard to those excluded from the hegemonic bloc. But while force 
“can be employed against enemies”, it is ineffective “against a part of one's own side 
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which one wishes rapidly to assimilate, and whose ‘good will’ and enthusiasm one 
needs”. (Gramsci, 1971: 263) In a hegemonic moment, the dominant mode of rule is 
through ideology. The dominant ideology cements an array of contradictory subject-
positions. In this respect, the dominant ideology must incorporate within its body 
elements of popular ideology, which are then represented as a set of differences, with 
their specifically antagonistic aspect neutralised. (Mouzelis, 1978) A hegemonic 
project must transform the terms of political discourse in this manner, creating a new 
definition of reality. 
 In this sense, then, we are speaking of hegemonic languages. The dominant 
register of US anticommunism in the classical period was that of liberal nationalism, 
in which the United States was extolled as a unique bulwark of democratic freedoms, 
civil rights and individualism, against the collectivist, undemocratic tyranny of the 
USSR. While I have maintained that the ‘line of political demarcation’ in 
anticommunism is the defence of the capitalist social formation, the symbolic field of 
anticommunism was organised, quilted around the master-signifier of ‘freedom’. The 
master-signifier of ‘freedom’ organised a chain of cognate signifiers – ‘democracy’, 
‘human rights’, ‘choice’, ‘free markets’, ‘diversity’, ‘individualism’, and their 
negations – in a contested discursive field, in which the Southern white power bloc 
conducted its hegemonic practices.  
 This has important resonances in American politics, particularly when contrasted 
with ‘slavery’. Communists and their allies in the United States were frequently 
 58
baited as agents, or at best apologists, of (in Norman Thomas’ phrase) “human 
slavery under Stalin”. (Yarnell, 1974: 87) The vernacular of abolitionism is being 
accessed here, but not only of abolitionism. The institutions of slavery in American 
history could be reproved as an abridgment of human rights, as in the radical tradition 
of Frederick Douglass, William Lloyd Garrison, Lydia Marie Child, Benjamin Lundy 
or the Grimké sisters. But it was as likely to be reviled as a lowly social status that 
properly belonged only to the raced, as in the tradition of ‘white labour 
republicanism’. (Roediger, 2007)  
 More broadly, depending on one’s sociolect, freedom could mean the freedom to 
sell one’s labour power as one’s own property; the freedom to purchase that labour 
power and put it into circulation with means of production; the freedom to organise a 
union; the freedom from unionism; the freedom of African Americans as equal 
citizens in a capitalist democracy; the freedom of a racial caste to enjoy the privileges 
of segregation; etc. The ability of ‘freedom’ to occupy this role, then, unifying diverse 
subject-positions, arises because it is a “tendentially empty signifier”, one of several 
such, enabling “common nuclei of meaning” to be “connotatively linked to diverse 
ideological-articulatory domains”. (Laclau, 1977) 
 The idioms of ‘antitotalitarianism’ played a similar role. Cold War 
‘antitotalitarianism’ effectively merged all non-liberal sources of politics into the 
(curiously ductile, indefinite, polysemous) category of ‘totalitarianism’. (Losurdo, 
2004) This was not merely a contrivance of Cold War political science, but reflected 
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concrete experiences. In the workers’ movement, the locution ‘Red Fascism’ began to 
emerge as the Popular Front Left was strained by revelations concerning the scale of 
repression in the USSR and the sudden ‘anti-imperialist’ lurch of the CPUSA in 
response to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. In effect, what Koestler rendered in fiction, 
and what Brzezinski et al formalised as an anticommunist orthodoxy, had been 
anticipated in the organised labour movement. (Rupert, 1995: 156-7) The uses of 
‘antitotalitarianism’ were as diverse as those for ‘freedom’. If for the Southern States 
Industrial Council, civil rights legislation was a “blueprint for totalitarianism”, for a 
liberal Southern woman like Lillian Smith, it was the Southern white supremacist 
system that was ‘totalitarian’. (Sensing, 1964; Smith, 1993: 120). I will now turn to a 
different aspect of the unity of these subject-positions. 
Racial populism and southern identity 
 For Gramsci, the ‘Southern Question’ was one of revolutionary praxis: how a 
revolutionary working class in the north of Italy could unite with southern peasants in 
a possible hegemonic formation capable of challenging capitalism. The northern 
bourgeoisie had united Italy’s territories in a formation dominated by capitalism, but 
where feudal relations remained prevalent in the south. Northern attitudes to the south 
reflected the quasi-colonial relationship between the two: southerners were lazy, 
backward and feckless. By an obverse logic, northern workers were seen in the south 
as privileged, overpaid ‘lords’ involved in a dissolute urban lifestyle whose values 
were at variance with those obtaining in the south. The problem, then, was that the 
unity of the popular classes could not be taken for granted, but had to be constructed. 
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The disaggregation of the peasantry meant that there it could not provide the unifying 
instance, so the task fell to a centralised and collectivised proletariat. The northern 
working class, to become hegemonic within a ‘system of alliances’ capable of 
challenging capitalism, had to incorporate the interests and perspectives of other 
subaltern classes and fractions. It was no mere task of co-optation: the working class 
had to offer a programme that would be of real benefit to its potential class allies. It 
was also necessary to wage cultural struggles to overcome the prejudices that 
disorganise the popular classes to the advantage of the hegemonic bloc. (Gramsci & 
Verdicchio, 2005; Santucci, 2010: 101-108) 
 However, the question that Gramsci studied, though it produced answers that 
resonated beyond its own subject, was historically determinate, concerned with 
historically produced systems of difference thrown up in the Italian social formation 
in the conjuncture following unification. In studying the Southern US, and its role in 
the anticommunist coalition, my problem is different. The issue raised is how the 
combatants of anticommunism successfully disorganise popular class opposition and 
incorporate elements of the popular classes.  The traditions of Southern populism 
must be considered carefully. I have suggested that racial populism in the South 
worked as a similar factor in the incorporation of white workers as class compromise 
did in the North. In fact, Southern populism possessed almost the opposite valence 
before its defeat to capitalist class forces in the late 19th Century. Although the 
movement emerged over the defence of customary rights and traditions that were 
under attack from capitalist forces, it swiftly gave a new cultural and political form to 
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the intensifying class antagonisms in the rural South, and also attempted to connect 
these to similar experiences in the North and West. The cooperation between the 
Southern Farmers’ Alliance and the Knights of Labor eventually produced a platform 
for a populist class alliance, a common political and economic endeavour in the 
short-lived People’s Party. The movement foundered on its own segregated structures, 
and on the unresolved tensions between the conservative and radical wings which 
expressed class divisions between propertied farmers and tenant farmers. It ran up 
against the limits of its political vision, rooted in the defence of small producers 
which had been central to Southern politics since the American Revolution, and 
finally it suffered from the co-optation of significant aspects of its agenda by the 
Democratic Party. (Hahn, 2006) 
 Southern ‘racial populism’ is, by contrast, that form of political practice 
elaborated by the Democratic Party through the defeat of Southern populism and the 
development of Jim Crow. In interpreting this, I find Laclau’s concept of populism as 
a form of popular-democratic interpellation, working on the antagonism between the 
‘people’ and the ‘power bloc’, useful – with some caveats. For Laclau, populism is a 
discursive, ideological phenomenon, since the ‘people’ do not exist in productive 
relations. Whereas class antagonisms operate at all levels of the mode of production, 
and relate to the fundamental conflict between the working class and the ruling class, 
populist interpellations work on the antagonism between the people and the power 
bloc.  ‘Populism’ is a ‘tendentially empty signifier’, with no class connotations and 
thus a raw material in the waging of class struggles. In the hands of dominant classes 
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and fractions, this permits “the presentation of popular-democratic interpellations as a 
synthetic-antagonistic complex with respect to the dominant ideology”. This is to say, 
there is oppositional content to popular-democratic articulations which can be 
absorbed and neutralised, or the dominant classes and fractions can, when hegemony 
breaks down, organise the oppositional content in an antagonistic thrust to re-organise 
the power bloc rather than depose it. (One can think here of the New Right’s 
articulation of certain popular ideas in a reactionary discourse aimed at re-organising 
the Fordist-Keynesian bloc as a neoliberal bloc.)  (Laclau, 1977; Mouzelis, 1978)  
 Racial populism involves, for these purposes, the signifier of ‘race’ acting as a 
tendentially empty signifier in which class connotations have been displaced onto the 
terrain of race. But this does not merely mean the absorption of oppositional content: 
rather, in the Deep South, it was articulated in a “synthetic-antagonistic complex” 
regarding the dominant ideology of liberal nationalism. It set up white, Christian, 
Southern folk in counterposition to Jews, ‘Papists’, African Americans, the Federal 
government (at least, the institutions of the New Deal), and of course communists, 
whose insidious work could be located behind each of the former. 
 Racial populist interpellations thus produced a folkish, Southern political identity, 
one of the multiple identities articulated within the anticommunist carapace. 
Gramsci’s insight was to see in bourgeois hegemonic practices the elaboration of a 
unity in division: that is, Italian unity on capitalist terms meant the division of 
popular classes along cultural, ethnic lines. But identities do are not stable factors in 
 63
politicisation. If identity is indeed a ‘politics of location,’ then the political uses of a 
given identity are partially contingent on the location it inhabits. If the process of 
identification begins with the necessarily fictive narrativization of the self, this very 
fact that this process is fictive, that it is semi-arbitrarily sutured, means that an 
identity never has the unified, settled character that (some of) the advocates of 
‘identity politics’ tend to claim for it, and is thus susceptible to contestation. (Hall, 
2003)  
 The susceptibility of such identification to more or less universal, or particular, 
articulations has to do with its location in the social structure and the calculable 
interests of its bearers. Identification, after all, proceeds through the identification of 
others with similar values and interests. The closure of identity is, moreover, only 
semi-arbitrary, as it can take place along lines of real antagonism. As fields of 
politicisation, some identities are more potentially universal than others, to the extent 
that their relationship to the dominant relations of exploitation and oppression can 
open them to communist interpellation. The dominant liberal nationalist register of 
Cold War anticommunism offers, of course, only that parochial form of universalism 
peculiar to empires, one which has limited appeal for the oppressed or most 
exploited, but which successfully interpellated the relatively better off sections of the 
working class. In the South, we find folkishness and particularism rather than 
universality on the anticommunist side. These identities, though perhaps inadequate 
for a would-be world hegemon, also made their claim on Americanism. Indeed, they 
claimed to represent the only true Americanism, the white, Christian, patriarchal 
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America of free enterprise and Anglo-Saxon democracy which alone could withstand 
the solvent effects of communism. And the South was the sector of US society that 
favoured American expansionism more than any other, despite reservations about the 
incorporation of multiracial states like Hawaii into the union (which was as much 
anticommunist as racist, given employers’ express fears that the ILWU ran the island-
state like a socialist dictatorship). (Gaughan, 1999; Ziker, 2007) The seeming paradox 
of Cold War hegemonic politics is that the unity and dominance of the US ruling 
class in the classical period of anticommunism rested on cleavages in the social 
formation in which it reproduced itself, while its universalism depended on its 
perpetuation of oppressive particularisms. 
  
Social movements: overcoming reification. 
In the last analysis, the defence and breakdown of Southern segregation, the ‘way 
of life’ to which everyone from Faubus to Wallace was committed, hinged on the 
formation of coalitions in movement. The efficacy of anticommunism in cohering 
segregationists and disorganising civil rights activists was ultimately tested in a 
struggle between two social movements: Massive Resistance, and Civil Rights. I deal 
with these two movements in some detail, in Chapters Seven and Eight, but analysing 
things in this way poses a problem: in what conditions is it intelligible to call 
‘Massive Resistance’ a social movement?  
There is certainly a tendency for social movement theorists to write as if, in Paul 
Byrne’s words, social movement supporters were “clearly located on the left of the 
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spectrum”. (Byrne, 1997: 74) Such a view is at least questionable: mass movements 
of the right are as much part of the historical landscape as those of the left. 
(Davidson, 2013) Aside from this, there is a tendency to speak of an emergent “social 
movement society” (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998), part of a a “global civil society” in 
opposition to public authorities  (Colas, 2001; James & Van Seters, 2014; Purdue, 1
2007), which exists in “a field of autonomy or of independence vis-a-vis the 
system” (Melucci, 1980: 220), and attempts to “emancipate” civil society “from the 
state” (Offe, 1980). The African American civil rights movement which reached its 
peak between the years of 1954 and 1968 is considered an archetypal example of the 
emerging ‘new social movement’ format which since became the dominant form of 
collective action by organised publics. (Giugni, 1999: xiii-xiv) Where might Massive 
Resistance fit into this schema? 
Massive Resistance seems to pose a problem for this conception in a number of 
ways. It certainly involved collective agencies and actions “in sustained interaction 
with elites, opponents, and authorities”. (Tarrow, quoted in Giugni, 1999: xxi-xxii.) 
Likewise, it entailed “sustained, organised public effort making collective claims on 
target authorities”, using a “repertoire” of contentious tactics, performances and 
“representations of WUNC: worthiness, united, numbers and commitment”. (Tilly, 
2004: 3-4) And yet, at the same time, it was also a rightist counter-movement, an 
attempt to suppress social change, waged against a civil society movement and 
 This may be related to the view of social movements as a format particular to leftist politics. 1
Tilly, acknowledging that this has not always been the case, nonetheless refers to a “right-wing 
appropriation of social movement forms”, implying that the format has a genetic belonging to 
the left. (2004: 89-90) Robin (2011: 41-60) provides a wider context for this view, in which 
the Right historically adopts its modes of organising and ideological strategies from the Left.
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supported by elites and several public authorities. Its action, at various points, 
transcended the state-civil society dichotomy implied in so much social movement 
literature, whether embedded in the ‘resource mobilization theory’ (RMT) 
problematic, or that of ‘New Social Movement’ (NSM) theory. (There is, perhaps, 
more than an element of truth in Castells’s criticism of social movement theories for 
reducing the heteroclite elements of social movements “into a single category, ‘The 
Poor’ fighting back at ‘The Establishment’”. (Castells, 1983: 49)) One strategy for 
resolving this problem would be to loosen the definition, adopting even more abstract 
descriptive criteria. Thus, Snow, Soule & Kriesi refer only to “some extra- or non-
institutional collective action”, which allows for movements with some types of 
‘institutional’ action in their repertoire. Offe (1985) refers to “a space of 
noninstitutional politics” which cuts across the divide, in liberal political theory, 
between public and private. In a similar way, Diani and Della Porta define social 
movements as collective engagements “involved in conflictual relations with clearly 
identified opponents” meant to “promote or oppose social change”, engaged in 
episodes of collective action which “are perceived as components of a longer-lasting 
action”, “linked by dense informal networks”, and sharing “a distinct collective 
identity.” (Della Porta & Diani, 2006: 20) This too would be consistent with the 
patterns of Massive Resistance.  
Yet, what is striking about these definitions is that they operate at a purely 
empirical and descriptive level, and as such the theoretical generalisations are 
pointedly indeterminate: “in sustained interaction”; “sustained, organised”; “some … 
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action”; “perceived as components of a longer-lasting action”. Quite what constitutes 
sustained, or longer-lasting, action is necessarily unclear. What is the difference 
between a campaign and a social movement in this context? How much non- or extra-
institutional action relative to institutional action constitutes a social movement? 
What organisations count as institutions? For example, a social movement against the 
institution of segregation might involve the institutions of organised labour, liberal 
lobbies, the civil rights infrastructure, and elements of the Democratic and 
Republican parties. What exactly is extra- or non-institutional about this? Another 
criteria we might apply is to say that a social movement is broader than a particular 
protest event, or even an individual campaign. How much protest activity is sufficient 
to make the difference? How does a campaign acquire enough mass and momentum 
to become a social movement? It seems that the category of the ‘social movement’, 
having been taken for granted, is impossible to pin down by reference to any 
determinate characteristics. 
I would suggest that the fundamental problem here is a reification of the category. 
That is, it takes a classification – the ‘social movement’, as the label for a series of 
apparent social outcomes – as a given, and sets about trying to define its 
characteristics and relate them functionally to one another. The classification, and 
then subsequently the theory, begins to function as knowledge, and the glaring 
aporiae in the theory no longer noticed. Melucci (1996: 5) attests to his “dismay” as 
the category of “new social movements” which he coined “has been progressively 
reified” such that “contemporary collective phenomena” are taken to “constitute 
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unitary empirical objects”. It becomes arguably worse when various concepts 
referr ing to cer ta in social movement dynamics , such as ‘e thnic-
competition’ (Cunningham, 2012), are reified and treated as if they explain 
phenomena rather than demanding explanation.  
In order to find a route out of this deadlock, it is necessary to ask: what is the 
underlying problematic here, and what is its yield? What dilemmas is it trying to 
avoid, and what dynamics is it trying to explain? Answering this concisely 
necessarily involves a degree of reduction and glides over certain complexities, but in 
broad historical terms it can be said that social movement studies emerged in 
response to an emergent form of political organisation and activity in which: i) 
radicalised middle class elements played a leadership role, rather than the labour 
movement; ii) the extant political Left was problematised as out-datedly 
authoritarian; and iii) the mode of action tended to involve ‘direct actions’ such as sit-
ins, roadblocks, or occupations, rather than the emphasis being on traditional strikes, 
marches or lobbying. (Davidson, 2013: 279) That is, there is a comparative aspect of 
social movement theory: these movements are in the first instance being measured 
against the benchmark of traditional left-wing labour movements. Against these 
standards, the emerging social movements are found to be oriented toward symbolic, 
cultural and social gains which are distinct from traditional economic-class gains. 
They do not ‘interpellate’ their subjects as members of a class so much as of members 
of an identity-based group. These changes are then said to be related to the 
institutionalisation and perpetuation of the social movement format as the main mode 
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of democratic participation, as a result of changes to the structures of work, 
consumption, urban living, and communication in post-industrial societies.  (Meyer 2
& Tarrow, 1998; Snow, Soule & Kriesi, 2004; Touraine, 1971; Offe, 1985) The yield, 
then, is that the analysis of social movements appears to provide a complexification 
of theory to match the complexification of social structure. It stresses the autonomy 
of the symbolic and cultural dimensions of action, against the (actual and perceived) 
economic-reductionism or class-reductionism of traditional marxist analyses. In place 
of misleading conceptions of a totalised, centred social structure, it produces new 
concepts, such as ‘the network’, or the ‘social milieu’, and the analysis of 
technological and communicative structures in the formation of such. (Touraine, 
1971: 28-29; Castells, 2009; Melucci, 1996) 
There is, however, another compelling basis for the reification. In his 
Psychoanalysis of Fire, Gaston Bachelard (1964: 59) anatomised the 
“epistemological obstacles” posed to the understanding of the phenomenon of fire by 
the intuitions which had developed around fire as an apparent object. Bachelard refers 
to the “substantialistic obstacle” and the “animistic obstacle” which arise in 
attempting to understanding the phenomenon. (Bachelard, 1964: 62-63). These are 
not mere delusions. There are qualities of the experience of fire, Bachelard suggests, 
which give rise to the possibility of viewing fire in this way, as either a substance or 
subject. However, while these qualities can be situated at the level of the Lacanian 
 These observations are most applicable to ‘New Social Movement’ (NSM) theories, and less so 2
to ‘resource-mobilisation’ theories (RMT), whether of the “entrepreneurial” or “political 
process” declination. The latter offer a different type of yield, in that they are concerned with 
the political and economic rationalities of social movements, above all the opportunities and 
resources available to different actors. (See McCarthy & Zald, 2001)
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‘real’, it is at the level of the symbolic order that their meaning is fixed. That is, it is 
the fire ‘idea’ which gives rise to the palpable experience of fire as an ‘object’. 
(Bratsis, 2002: 260-264) The reification of social movements occurs in part because 
the idea is itself formative of the experience of them. In this light, social movements 
can appear as an essence through which the various contradictory manifestations can 
be related to one another functionally, or as the emergency of a type of historical 
subjectivity in which the same contradictory phenomena are likewise given a 
spurious coherence.  
In Chapter Seven, I develop an approach to social movements based on the social 
processes from which they emerge, pivoted above all on the problem of social 
reproduction, while at the same time proposing some interpretive principles which 
help account for tendencies in right-wing social movements. 
Conclusion: the aims of this research 
This research sets out to achieve a number of related objectives. It aims to 
demonstrate that Cold War anticommunism played a critical role in the prolongation 
of the Southern white-supremacist system, which had entered into crisis by the post-
war period. Approaching this problem from a number of starting points, it seeks to 
provide an integrated account of the intersection of anticommunism and racism on 
the international level, the national and local state level, the economic (or 
geoeconomic level), and the level of discourse. I argue that anticommunism provided 
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a means of managing several transitional problems: the restructuring of the world-
system under US dominance; the restructuring of the American state to meet the 
demands of its new international role; the realignment of national and Southern 
politics in order to marginalise labour militants and leftists and enable a period of 
political stability and profitable accumulation to ensue; the temporary deflection of 
crisis tendencies in the Jim Crow system by means of their political management 
through reorganised state apparatuses and the emergence of new coalitions secured 
by anticommunism. Meanwhile, at the level of discourse, I identify a distinct 
fantasmatic kernel which I claim structures the ideology of white-supremacist 
anticommunism, while helping to account for some of its dysfunctionality.  
These different levels of analysis are then brought to bear in the assessment of 
Massive Resistance and Civil Rights as social movements, wherein I aim to 
demonstrate: i) that Cold War anticommunism disrupted and deflected the emergence 
of a precious civil rights movement rooted in leftist and labour movements; ii) that in 
the initial phase of Massive Resistance, anticommunism both cohered and mobilised 
a new right-wing coalition, and helped disrupt and suppress an emerging civil rights 
coalition; iii) that, however, the thawing of international pressures, the declining 
efficacy of anticommunism at a national level and the repudiation of anticommunist 
laws by the Supreme Court, ensured that the strategy began to fall apart, while 
creating a political opportunity for Civil Rights. In the conclusion, I will qualify this 
argument in a number of ways, suggesting that there were a number of ways in which 
anticommunism could have been counterproductive to the defence of white-
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supremacy. Yet, the overall point will stand that the main effect of anticommunism 
was to prolong the life of segregation, and to delay the coming of its civil rights 
nemesis. 
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CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY: Up to my neck in it. 
The questions raised in this research concern the relationship of the Cold War, and 
particularly the ensemble of anticommunist practices deployed under its rubric, to the 
preservation or destruction of segregation in the southern United States.  
The thesis is that anticommunism promulgated by and through the national state 
during the Cold War was centrally a hegemonic project which had the effect of 
prolonging the life of segregation, managing and delaying a life-threatening crisis by: 
empowering Southern politicians to limit the advance of civil rights goals within the 
state; augmenting the repressive capacities of the state so as to ensure social stability 
and, as a result, weakening pro-civil rights organisation; disrupting and disintegrating 
an emerging pro-civil rights coalition until the emergence of a neonate alliance in 
Montgomery, Alabama; cohering a segregationist coalition offering maximum 
resistance to civil rights, particularly in the half-decade following Brown vs Board of 
Education; supplying that coalition with the political techniques, repressive 
repertoires, and intelligence to assail the civil rights movement; and providing an 
important ideological resource which could help explain, rationalise and motivate 
resistance to civil rights. However, while temporarily deflecting the crises of Jim 
Crow (1945-1954), anticommunism suffered declining efficacy at the national level 
from the mid-1950s onward, as international conflicts thawed, HUAC and SISS 
declined in power, and the Supreme Court struck down anticommunist decisions. 
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This provided a political opportunity for Civil Rights, while undermining the efficacy 
of white-supremacist anticommunism beyond the South. However much I nuance this 
claim, this is the argument I sustain throughout the work. 
This account also depends upon a series of subsidiary, supporting arguments, in 
that it implies a number of claims about: i. the nature of the Cold War itself as a series 
of determinant processes working across different domains (international, national, 
regional; and economic, political and ideological); ii. the relationship of Southern 
segregation to US capitalism, its class formations, and its political systems; iii. the 
nature of ‘race’ as an organising idea in a social formation the relative roles of 
ideology and coercion in the maintenance of political authority and leadership; iv. the 
nature of state power and its relationship to social classes and their constitution; and 
v. the role of ideology as a formative factor in daily life as well as in political and 
social contest.  
It also mobilises a particular conceptual apparatus which defines in advance some 
of what I think is taking place. To the usual marxist system of concepts such as mode 
of production, relations/forces of production, mode of extraction, surplus value/
exploitation, base/superstructure, and class struggle, I add the Gramscian lexis of 
hegemony, historic bloc consent/coercion, moral direction, transformism, passive 
revolution, geoeconomy, and systems of alliances. This is further augmented and 
leavened by concepts drawn from other marxists and a wide range of non-marxist 
thinkers (with a particular role for Lacanian psychoanalysis, to which I will return). 
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The appropriateness of this theoretical approach has already been described in 
Chapter One, but in brief it can be stated as follows. While core marxist concepts 
connect different levels of social practice and reproduction by reference to underlying 
structural-relational mechanisms and without the need for a detailed account of 
subjectivity and agency, Gramsci’s marxism seeks to develop, from the core of 
historical materialist concepts, a rich explanatory repertoire for dealing with political 
agency and ideological subjectivity, and the connections between these and political 
dominance. This approach allows one to relate political and ideological processes to 
productive and economic processes (for example, by treating ideology as formative 
of productive relations), without collapsing the former into the later. It respects the 
specific effectivity of the different ‘instances’ of a social formation. This is fruitful for 
an analysis of both race and anticommunism, since both operate primarily at a 
political and ideological register, but can also have a formative, organising role in the 
organisation of work, extraction and the constitution of classes. It also helps to 
develop an account of the complementary/contesting roles of anticommunism as both 
violence and moral persuasion in securing segregation. And it helps explain how 
ideologies of race and anticommunism might play a role in cohering alliances (of 
classes and class fractions) at a certain time and place, and fragmenting them at 
another time and place. 
The knowledge claims which I advance in this research are therefore of a 
particular type. They are not, in the first instance, value-neutral, but proceed on the 
premise that any description of the social world is necessarily value-laden. They 
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imply in their conceptual foundations a political commitment which must be taken 
into account. They also do not rest on the deduction of laws from empirical data, in 
the positivist fashion. Causal inferences are not made on the basis of ‘constant 
conjunctions’ (which are vanishingly rare in the social world), but on the basis of 
generative mechanisms and relations proposed by theory (historical materialism). The 
theoretical relations and processes described here are offered as plausible 
explanations for the observed phenomena, rather than as ‘real’ entities in themselves. 
These explanations are supported by certain empirical controls and contrasts 
established in the historical analysis, archival research, discourse analysis and case 
studies, which are intended to exclude or diminish the persuasive power of 
contrasting explanations. Empirical controls are established, for example, by 
comparing and contrasting distinct eras (what happened in 1954-1954, as compared 
to 1955-1965), distinct situations (Civil Rights and Massive Resistance campaigns in 
Arkansas and Alabama), and actual with possible outcomes (the conditions existing 
for the emergence of an effective civil rights movement in the immediate post-war 
period, as compared to its failure to materialise). In sum, while the work proceeds on 
the basis of an historical materialist ontology (already described in Chapter One), the 
epistemological framework is most consistent with that of ‘critical realism’. (Archer, 
Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson & Norrie, 1998; Bhaskar, 2013; Collier, 1994) 
Structure of the Research & Exposition 
The nature of the research subject indicated a requirement for primarily qualitative 
methods of analysis, and an epistemology and theoretical stance concordant with 
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such methods. This is, of course, not as straightforward an assertion as it may appear 
since increasingly the emphasis in social sciences is on ‘mixed methods research,’ 
wherein research is considered best positioned on a continuum between quantitative 
and qualitative. (Cresswell, 2003) The research questions concern complex patterns 
of behaviour and events, and the equally complex meanings behind them. This 
certainly necessitated detailed, ‘thick' description and analysis of what I have framed 
as 'the conjuncture’. But it did not preclude quantitative methods, such as the creation 
or statistical analysis of datasets. Nonetheless, such methods simply proved 
unnecessary to make my argument, and arguably would have involved an inefficient 
use of limited time and resources.  And because the research question pertained to 3
historical events most of whose participants can be presumed deceased, there was no 
possibility of accumulating this qualitative data through direct interview or 
ethnographic observation. Instead, the qualitative methods I used included: the 
analysis of historical materials using critical theory, document and discourse analysis, 
case studies, and ‘constant comparative’ methods. 
Because the theoretical object of the research was 'the conjuncture’ (1945-1965) 
and what I have argued was a hegemonic project developing, rising and falling within 
it, I found it useful to analyse the distinct 'levels' or 'instances' (economic, political 
 Arguably, at any rate, “the differences between the quantitative and qualitative traditions are only 3
stylistic and are methodologically and substantively unimportant”. (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994: 
5)
 78
and ideological) on which hegemony operates.  The way in which I analysed these 4
‘instances’ was largely determined by the nature of the Cold War conjuncture and the 
questions the research posed about it. In particular, the analyses of two social 
movements, Massive Resistance and Civil Rights, which form the apex of this 
research, proceed on the basis of an original account of social movements which 
resists the reification of the category, ‘social movement,’ and instead seeks to explain 
them as a series of outcomes of economic, political, and ideological processes 
wherein a given set of social relations is put in question. The explanations and 
inferences used in Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight are inductively dependent on the 
inferences developed in the preceding chapters, which are structured in such a way as 
to isolate distinct forms of transitional crisis and the role of anticommunism in the 
management of each. So: 
i. ‘the political’ is divided up into the international system of competing national 
states, the national state, and the local 'sites of power’ which organise the 
distribution of state power (Poulantzas, 2014) because the political context of the 
Cold War was determined at all three distinctive levels of political power. In the 
first instance, the meaning and use of Cold War anticommunism was determined 
by the structure of international competition between rival national states with 
formal commitments to, respectively, communism and capitalist democracy. It 
 My theoretical gamble is that these 'instances' correspond to real differences in the social field, 4
predicated on distinct types of practice producing different types of social relationship. Here, 
though I use an Althusserian concept, I am not referring to Althusser's 'regional' theory of the 
capitalist mode of production (Jessop, 1982), wherein it is conceived of as a structure of three 
distinct structures (economy, politics and ideology). Rather, I am relying on a ‘relational’ theory in 
which the economic, political and ideological are always-already mutually articulated and only 
separable for analytical purposes.
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was determined in the second place by political struggles at the level of the 
national state, over the balance of political forces that would decide the direction 
of policy and social organisation in the post-war United States. And thirdly, it was 
determined by a struggle over the future of white-supremacist political 
organisation in the Southern states. Understanding the role of anticommunism at 
these three levels of political practice is necessary, and their interaction, is 
essential in order to identify the degrees to which Cold War anticommunism 
facilitated and impeded Civil Rights and Massive Resistance. For example, as 
will be seen in Chapter Eight, if Cold War anticommunism is understood 
primarily as an international struggle for democracy as opposed to communist 
totalitarianism, then one could make a strong case for saying that it offered a 
unique political opportunity structure for African Americans in their struggle for 
democracy. If, contrarily, it is understood to embrace a multifarious set of 
struggles for the international strategic dominance of powerful sectors of US 
capital linked to the management of colonial breakdown and the re-ordering of 
the global ‘colour line’ (Du Bois, 2007), for the domestic dominance and relative 
cohesion of a coalition of capitalist fractions organised as a ‘power bloc’ (whose 
fissiparousness, given inter-capitalist competition and fractionalisation, can be 
considered a constant difficulty of political rule), and for the preservation of 
white-supremacy, above all in the Southern states, then one could make a 
powerful case for saying that Cold War anticommunism closed down 
opportunity-structures for African Americans pursuing democratisation. 
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ii. the economic is analysed primarily in relation to the Southern 
'geoeconomy' (Hoare & Smith, 1971) and its evolution and political management, 
because this is the level at which economic developments made the greatest 
impact on the course of Civil Rights and Massive Resistance struggles, as well as 
the availability of Southern populations for anticommunist practices. In 
particular, if the crisis of Jim Crow was driven in part by industrialisation and 
urbanisation and its demographic effects, the breakdown of relations of personal 
authority which secured white-supremacy in rural economies, and the 
development of new labour processes and production systems, then one might 
anticipate that the conditions in those states which were least equipped to adapt to 
these changes would be most conducive to Massive Resistance campaigns, 
irrespective of the role of anticommunism. The analysis of this geoeconomic 
crisis in Chapter Four focuses on North Carolina, a comparatively affluent and 
centralised Southern state where these transitional tendencies were most 
advanced, and in particular on textiles, the culturally, politically and 
economically dominant industry in the South. However, the later discussion of 
Massive Resistance and Civil Rights in Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight finds 
these tendencies operating throughout the South, and a number of case studies are 
chosen to control for the extent of their operation; and  
iii. the ideological is dealt with using a Lacanian analysis of the discourses of 
anticommunism and white-supremacy, in order to address the question of 
whether there is a ‘fit’ between these discourses, and what the subjective 
investments in their combination might be. There would be room, as the 
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conclusion suggests, for a wider discussion of the cultural and ideological forms 
of the post-war United States and the Southern states, or for an analysis of 
ideological-state apparatuses (churches, families, and schools for example) and 
their role in the transitional crises of Jim Crow. Nonetheless, with limited time 
and space, I have prioritised the goal of determining where and how the 
ideologies of race and anticommunism are subjectively articulated. I decided to 
approach ideology in this register, using Lacanian analysis, partially for strategic 
reasons - that is, to counteract any tendencies toward excessively rationalising 
the uses of anticommunism in segregationist practice and thereby flattening it as 
either simply a lucid instrumentalisation or as a delusion. Another reason to opt 
for a discourse analysis was to push against the limits of interpretive sociology, or 
Verstehen. To some extent, understanding in this sense is essential in this type of 
qualitative research, since I am setting out to comprehend motives, and place 
actions in an “intelligible … context of meaning”. (Weber, 1978: 8) Nevertheless, 
I work on the premise that motives may not always be accessible to this kind of 
understanding, and that actions may at times neither speak for themselves nor be 
spoken for by their context. We may, for example, infer from the fact that a crowd 
of white Southerners bear placards describing “Race Mixing” as “Communism” 
that they regard racial integration as inimical to America’s economic and political 
systems, as being driven by communist actors and interests, and as being 
informed by communist ideology. But we could equally draw other conclusions: 
for example, that they regard it as useful to link integration to communism in this 
way, in order to undermine the legitimacy of the former, or that linking the two is 
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a helpful mobilising tool, or that it solves certain cognitive difficulties, or that it 
is what God decrees. Given that it is not possible for the researcher to know 
better than actors themselves what motivated them, I have chosen a discourse 
analysis method in order to study what they themselves say. But since those 
actors often do not give a good account of their own motives and preferences, I 
have chosen a Lacanian approach to analysing their text which provides me with 
a series of conceptual tools by which to anatomise and interpret the symptomatic 
gaps and contradictions in how actors explain themselves. 
The relations thus identified between the variables of analysis through the study of 
these ‘instances’ are then brought to bear in the study of two social movements, Civil 
Rights and Massive Resistance, wherein the economic, political and ideological 
determinants of their success or failure are anatomised.  
This research is, finally, in large part a study of social movements as potentially 
hegemonic or counter-hegemonic formations, and the conditions for their emergence, 
and subsequent success or failure. The analysis of social movements was not the only 
way in which this subject could have been approached. Since a hegemonic project is 
first and foremost a project for class leadership, the research focus should help 
explain how classes are composed and formed for political leadership. It would be 
quite logical, for example, to pivot the research on labour processes and their 
management and examine how anticommunism and segregationism intersected to 
disorganise the working class (cf Korstad, 2003). The decision to identify social 
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movements as the focus for research, as the ‘Research Narrative’ explains, was driven 
by the preliminary findings of the empirical research, which indicated that white-
supremacist anticommunism was most relevant to the political and ideological 
determinants of class formation. 
Case Studies 
In order to drill deeper into the historical strata and develop further evidence to 
support the research arguments, I decided to identify and investigate a number of case 
studies using a combination of scholarship and archived documents such as 
newspaper and magazine articles, pamphlets, interview transcripts, leaflets, 
membership cards and correspondence. In choosing the case studies, I aspired to meet 
three conditions. First, the cases should all pertain directly to an example where the 
reproduction of Jim Crow is challenged. Second, they should present detailed 
evidence capable of testing the causal inferences developed in the research. Third, the 
cases should be sufficiently different from one another in their characteristics to 
enable ‘maximal’ comparison, thus controlling for the influence of certain variables 
such as the degree of urbanisation and industrialisation, demographic composition, 
the centralisation or decentralisation of the local state formation, and the traditions of 
political accommodation with or hostility to civil rights demands. Thus, in the 
penultimate three chapters, I study three cases:  
i. the Massive Resistance campaign to close Georgia schools and the white 
liberal campaign to keep them open (1958-1961);  
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ii. the Arkansas Civil Rights movement, and the Massive Resistance campaign 
that developed in opposition to it (1955-1961); and  
iii. the Alabama Civil Rights movement and Massive Resistance opposition 
(1955-1965). 
Example i. concerns a moment of profound crisis for the state of Georgia, wherein 
the future of the state’s arguably underdeveloped economic base and its educated 
labour force is put at risk in the attempt to defend a segregated school system that is 
in great danger. It is, as such, exactly where one should expect to find some of the 
dynamics and causal mechanisms described throughout the research. If white-
supremacist anticommunism has a particular role in conserving white-supremacy, one 
should expect to find it here. The example also provides a wealth of discursive data 
which I was able to analyse in order to test the inferences established in Chapter Six, 
on white-supremacist anticommunist discourse. 
Example ii. deals with the sharp and seemingly unpredictable lurch of Arkansas 
political elites from a posture of accommodation with civil rights to one of truculent 
hostility leading to a series of humiliating showdowns with the Federal government. 
Here, a border state with ‘moderate’ political traditions, an advanced industrial 
infrastructure and a rapidly urbanising population, which seemed well-equipped to 
handle the demands of transitioning away from segregation, suddenly proved 
remarkably brittle. Here again, the reproduction of traditional systems of authority 
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and social control were in peril, and if white-supremacist anticommunism played a 
role in shoring up tradition, it would do so in Arkansas. 
Example iii. addresses the emergence and subsequent trajectory of the Civil 
Rights movement in Alabama, beginning in Montgomery and culminating in Selma. 
There, local political elites had traditions of relative racial ‘moderation,’ combined 
with class-populism. Indeed, politicians of this ilk tended to do well in the immediate 
aftermath of Brown. But as the Civil Rights movement developed, so too did 
powerful mechanisms of repression, emergency legal measures and well-connected 
segregationist campaigns linked to repressive apparatuses, to stop it. Almost to a 
unique degree, Alabama political elites — with considerable white support — 
maintained resistance to the bitter end. This represents another opportunity to test for 
the salient presence of anticommunist politics and ideology. 
Just as important as their similarities is where these examples differ. Arkansas was 
a traditionally accommodationist border state with a left-tinged Governor and a 
policy of ‘minimum compliance’ when its struggles began. It had a well-developed 
industrial infrastructure, an effective, centralised state, and a public opinion that was 
by no means diehard segregationist. Yet, it rapidly became one of the leading outposts 
of Massive Resistance. Georgia was an overwhelmingly segregationist, Deep South 
state with a strongly segregationist political leadership, and an underdeveloped and 
still largely rural economy, when the Massive Resistance school closures campaign 
began. Yet, within three years, the state’s political leadership had effectively ceased 
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all Resistance policies and began to engineer a policy of minimum compliance. 
Alabama was the least economically developed of any of these states, the least 
politically centralised and least equipped to reorganise its traditional forms of 
political authority. Even though its initial response to Brown vs the Board of 
Education had not been to support hardline segregationism, it became notorious for 
precisely this. The differences in geoeconomic development, demographic patterns, 
state capacity, and political tradition and trajectories, allow for these factors to be 
controlled and either excluded as significant causal factors, or taken into account. 
Ultimately, if white-supremacist anticommunism plays a similar political and 
ideological role in all three cases, one can infer that it relates to what they have in 
common - the transitional crises of Jim Crow - rather than what distinguishes them. 
Choosing Archives 
 This is a work primarily of historical and political sociology and, as indicated, it 
is qualitative rather than quantitative in its approach. It is based on i) a case study 
methodology; ii) archival research; iii) document analysis, bringing psychoanalytic, 
discourse analysis and methods of historical interpretation to bear; iv) a dialogic 
engagement with the texts and other materials discovered in the archives. 
The research disposes of four types of data. The first is documentary archives 
(business records, letters, newspaper clippings); the second is oral history records 
(discussions with civil rights activists, textile workers, housekeepers, etc); the third is 
secondary texts; and the fourth is interview material with subjects bearing relevant 
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experience or expertise. Since the period I am looking at covers a period some 50-70 
years ago, and involves generations that have largely passed on, my access to the 
period overwhelmingly consists of recorded oral transcripts and documentary 
sources. While the majority of the information which allows me to develop the 
historical and political context of this subject takes the form of secondary sources, 
books written by historians, anthropologists, sociologists and geographers at some 
spatial and temporal remove from the events described, several archives have been 
approached for primary resources. 
 The archives of primary materials accessed include: 
• The Southern Regional Council papers, 1944-1968. Library of Congress, 
Washington DC 
• The Frank Porter Graham Papers, 1908-1990. University of North Carolina, 
Chapel Hill NC 
• The Glencoe Mills Records, 1837-1978. University of North Carolina, 
Chapel Hill NC 
• Civil Rights Greensboro project, University of North Carolina. Greensboro 
NC 
• The Southern Oral History Program Collection, 1973-2013. University of 
North Carolina, Chapel Hill NC 
• ‘Broadsides Collection’. Digital archive. University of Arkansas Libraries, 
Fayetteville, AL. 
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• The Citizens’ Council newspaper. Digital archive. University of 
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA. 
• Ku Klux Klan newspaper clippings. Digital archive. Birmingham Public 
Library, Birmingham, AL. 
• The King Center. Digital archive. Atlanta, GA. 
These archives cover a wide range of materials, from individual correspondence to 
institutional records; from newsletters and trade publications to bus schedules; from 
political campaign literature to oral recollections. They cover events pertinent to 
Massive Resistance and Civil Rights in Arkansas, Alabama, Mississippi and North 
Carolina, but they also cover the wider arc of Southern history. The kinds of 
information they yield are overwhelmingly discursive, and thus appropriate to the 
development of ‘thick,’ detailed narrative, and the interpretation of meaningful 
action. These are by no means the only archives I could have used in light of my 
research problematic. They are the archives which were referenced in key texts, and 
which I was able to gain access to digitally or in person. The fact that other salient 
archives are not included in this list is simply an indication of the limits of time and 
resources, particularly given the late reorganisation of the research (see ‘Research 
Narrative’ later in this chapter). But the omission of an enormous amount of 
potentially relevant data has to be taken as read and factored in as a limitation of the 
research. 
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The advantages that these types of source material seem to offer are that: i) they 
appear to offer an immediate glimpse into an historical period that has passed; ii) they 
are authoritative in the sense that the documents have been through a process of 
verification, selection and cataloguing by reputable knowledge-producing 
institutions; iii) they are comprehensive in that the documents appear to cover an 
exceptionally broad range of individual and institutional activities; and iv) at least 
insofar as they are documents, they appear to ‘speak for themselves’ and impose their 
own meaning that is independent of the researcher’s will. 
 However, no archive speaks for itself. To begin with, the archives consist of 
already selected, arranged and thematically sorted materials, the integrity of which 
depends upon a great many factors. The types of materials compiled can include: i) 
systematic records of correspondence, meeting minutes, memoranda, legal notices 
and transcripts of public talks, according to the practices of the original archival 
source, be it a corporation, an academic, or a civil society body; ii) more or less 
random collections of the newspaper clippings, collected brochures, letters, receipts 
and memorabilia assembled over a period of time by an individual or the head office 
of an organisation. The archive viewer is then left to contend with the question of 
what sort of biases informed the original production of the materials, their being kept 
as a record by individuals or institutions, their being selected as important by a library 
or other institution, their being catalogued in particular ways. One most also take into 
account the historical conjuncture in which these documents were originally 
produced, with its complex of economic, political and ideological formations.  
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 In the case of the Glencoe Mills records, for instance, it is clear that two types of 
documents were retained: official company documents and the private and personal 
documents of Walter Green, the last manager of Glencoe Mills. These may reflect the 
priorities of the firm, in that matters pertaining to production, turnover and accounts 
would be more likely to be discussed than the concerns of the population of the mill 
village and the workers on the plant at Burlington. They may also reflect the career 
and concerns of Walter Green. The fact that these documents were recovered and 
donated as a gift to the University of North Carolina by Preservation North Carolina 
would also reflect the importance given to official documentary resources. The 
archivists then had to select a form of cataloguing by theme and period which 
reflected extant historical concerns, which arguably acted against the discovery of 
new patterns and types of knowledge. And, of course, the researcher’s discovery of 
the archives depends to a large extent upon information available in the existing 
literature, known to historians and sociologists, and otherwise available through 
online search facilities. This again has a tendency to lead one to already well-
traversed archives. There is no ready solution to these problems. One way of 
counteracting the dominance of official data is recourse to oral histories involving 
detailed interviews with workers and other citizens whose concerns are often 
overlooked in the archives. I have chosen to deal with the tendency toward the 
reproduction of existing knowledge by applying critical and reflexive theory of the 
kind discussed in the literature review. And the biases of an individual, an institution 
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or a conjuncture can only be acknowledged as an inevitable aspect of the records and 
discounted for in the presentation of findings. 
 Perhaps one of the biggest problems facing a researcher is the sheer volume of 
material in many of the archives, and the difficulty of selecting rational criteria for 
choosing where to look and how much time to spend on each area. I have had to 
select procedures and criteria for each particular archive – adjusted to its structure, 
the material basis of the record (boxes of papers or microform, for example), the 
extent of digitisation of the catalogue – for selecting which portions of the archives to 
study and how to record my findings. In the case of The Glencoe Mills Records, for 
example, there were 59 boxes, each including up to dozens of thematically labelled 
folders. The contents and their arrangement are carefully catalogued on the 
University of North Carolina Library website, with associated keywords indicating 
the themes of the documents contained in each folder. These are only accessible in 
person on advance request at the Louis Round Wilson Special Collections Library. I 
used a range of criteria from catalogue ‘keywords’ to date-ranges to identify 
promising boxes. To cover as much material as possible, I took dozens of 
photographs per box of all potentially relevant documents with my smartphone, 
saving the images to an Evernote folder. This meant that even while taking great care 
to check and scrutinise the documents, I could move relatively swiftly through the 
material. 
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 In the case of the Southern Regional Council records, microforms were 
catalogued in a detailed book-length manuscript titled Guide 131, which had to be 
requested and read in the Library of Congress. The relatively detailed cataloguing 
made it possible to narrow the search down to several hundred microform reels. This 
was far too much material to look at, and so inevitably I had to be even stricter in 
selecting the material. I began with ten reels per day. Since the microform viewer 
allowed images of slides to be saved onto a memory stick, it was in principle possible 
to simply adopt a strategy of saving as many images as possible and reviewing them 
later. However, each reel had hundreds of slides, so by itself this would not permit 
much of the archive to be covered. Given this problem, the only way forward was to 
skim through the slides as rapidly as realistically possible and pause on slides which 
looked as though they contained interesting data. The resulting recovery of data, 
though containing a great deal of information, is a mere fraction of the total archive 
that it is drawn from. 
 The oral sources are principally those released as part of The Southern Oral 
History Program Collection, 1973-2013, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill 
NC. These are interviews with mill hands, home makers, business owners, civil rights 
activists, communists, and others, conducted by a number of historians over several 
decades for diverse purposes, and deposited with the University of North Carolina. 
They are now available digitally as part of the SOHP. Some of the interviews are 
available as audio files, some only as pdf transcripts, and some in both formats. Oral 
resources provide qualitative accounts of concrete events in the history that I’m 
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describing, and have the advantage of being primary documents. Moreover, they 
constitute examples of discourse which are susceptible to discourse analysis. They 
reach individual experiences otherwise inaccessible to me, and provide a counter to 
official knowledge production. The issues that arise with such sources are that, i) the 
recall of the interviewees may be wrong, or incomplete; ii) the interviews, though 
relatively unstructured, do include prompts from the interviewer for certain types of 
memory, and thus a degree of selection on the part of the historian is built in to this 
type of source; iii) the sources are not random, but dependent upon the availability of 
interviewees which may be limited by willingness to participate, incapacity or death, 
as well as by the attention of the historian; and iv) of course, the perspective of 
interviewees is as subject to the pressures of the conjuncture forming their 
experiences as that of any other source. Throughout all of this, I am aware that in a 
sense I am making the documents speak. Taking statements, claims, references and 
images from their context, I am shaping them into a particular narrative as well as a 
literary form and ‘mode of emplotment’. (White, 1975) However, the possibility of 
truth emerging from this type of research has been well-defended by Evans (2001, 
2002), and it is upon this possibility that I stake my research. With that said, it 
remains for me to explain the methodological advantages of the distinctive Lacanian 




Chapter Six develops an argument about the fantasmatic kernel structuring the 
discourse of white-supremacist anticommunism. Beginning with a general Lacanian 
argument about ‘whiteness’ and ideological fantasy, it applies this to an analysis of 
some salient examples of anticommunist discourse. The relations and inferences then 
established are subsequently applied to the work of the white liberal campaign, 
HOPE, Inc. to prevent the closure of Georgia schools threatened by the state's 
Massive Resistance campaigners in order to prevent desegregation. The analysis is 
applied to primary materials - campaigning literature and correspondence - gathered 
in the archives at the Library of Congress. 
It was possible, if necessary, to conduct a quantitative analysis of this information. 
One such approach would be to select in advance a number of key words and phrases 
representing the themes that I was looking for, for example: Communist, 
Communism, Communist Party, Anticommunism, Militant, Socialist, Socialism, Left, 
African American, Black, Colored, Negro, White, Anglo-Saxon, Caucasian, 
Integration, Segregation, Color Bar, and Racial. Recurrent terms could then be 
located relative to certain contexts and determine whether or not there was a 
persistent set of associations, images, meanings and gaps or silences. Another 
approach might have been to search for concordances in the text, and subject these to 
the same type of analysis. The rationale for accumulating numberic, quantitative data 
would be to test hypotheses concerning the possibly casual relations between the 
variables, and then develop explanations based on proposed generative mechanisms 
behind these causes. However, while such data could be useful if handled sensitively, 
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such a rationale would fall into a number of obvious traps. First of all, the implied 
model of verification (or non-falsification) is based in part on the idea that generative 
causal mechanisms should produce constant conjunctions. As mentioned earlier in the 
chapter, this is not a realistic expectation in the social sciences. This can be explained 
in the following way: 
"Things possess powers in virtue of their intrinsic structures, powers that may or 
may not be exercised. If they are triggered they can be in play as mechanisms, whose 
effects may or may not be actualised, depending on the play of countervailing 
mechanisms." (Archer, Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson & Norrie, 1998: 9) 
Given this, social scientists need to be open to other ways of testing hypotheses. It 
is also useful to register the fact that numbers are not necessarily more objective than 
other types of data. The determination of search parameters, of what constitutes a 
useful datum, is researcher-led, and reflects the preoccupations and preconceptions 
held by the researcher. Any determination as to the meaning of any patterns 
discovered likewise reflects the concerns of the researcher. Furthermore, translating 
discourse into data in this way implies a model of language in which there is a self-
evident relation of meaning to word, operating as the 'manifest content' of the text, 
which is simply not compatible with post-Saussurean linguistic theory. And, given 
that the research aimed to work out the psychic investments in race and 
anticommunism, which may or may not be explicit (or 'conscious'), a different mode 
of analysis was required. 
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This is where discourse analysis enters. The core assumption of any discourse 
analysis is that the meaning of a text is organised in a particular way by the 
materiality of language and discourse, that language itself is a material fact which 
actively shapes knowledge rather than merely a transparent medium (cf ‘clear 
writing’) through which knowledge is accessed and conveyed. Language actively 
constitutes the social reality that it describes. Thus, a discourse analysis looks for 
meaning in the materiality of the text. If I had been seeking to understand a discourse 
as a mode of power, to find the discursive regime, the rules governing what can be 
said and what is intelligible within a particular set of statements, then a Foucauldian 
(2002) discourse analysis would probably have been most apt. If the research sought 
to understand the formative role of language in the organisation of coercion/consent, 
and the establishment of moral authority, it would also have been possible to continue 
the analysis in a Gramscian vein using the work of Hall et al (1978, 1980), Laclau 
(1977), Volosinov (1986), and Fairclough (2001). However, to reiterate, the research 
operates on the premise that agents have subjective investments in the discourses they 
partake of, that not all of these are necessarily explicit or conscious, and that they will 
play an important role in explaining political behaviour. 
This is where a psychoanalytical approach, and specifically a Lacanian 
psychoanalytical approach, is useful. (Lacan, 2006; Fink, 1997) For while Lacanian 
analysis comes with its implied metapsychology, its own model of subject-formation, 
and a host of other assumptions, it is the mode of analysis which most permits an 
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open-ended scrutiny of a text. Because of its emphasis upon the letter of discourse, 
what is literally said rather than what is supposedly 'meant', it pushes against the rush 
to understanding wherein discourse analysts may be tempted to give too much 
credence to their own prejudices and intuitions. Yet even while giving the fullest 
attention to the letter of what a discourse says, and while taking it very seriously, 
Lacanian analysis still makes it possible to take a critical approach by virtue of the 
attention it gives to the non-coherence and non-sense of a text. There are some 
methodological difficulties in this which have been dealt with in Chapter One. These 
include the fact that what one analysing is a piece of text, not the speech of an 
analysand. The discourse analyst is in no position apply most of the usual repertoire 
of Lacanian techniques of probing the meaning of a given statement, nor are 
interpretations verifiable against a subjective response. The text can give no response 
and generate no further material. Nonetheless, in following the logic of a text closely, 
while registering the regularities and variances, the gaps and silences, the slips, 
deletions, confusions, ambiguous formulations and other points at which the subject 
seems to be saying more than intended, it is possible to limit the extent to which the 
analyst must impose a judgment on the text while at the same time opening up layers 
of meaning and associations which would not be disclosed in a quantitative analysis. 
In some ways, the analysis conducted in Chapter Six is pivotal to the findings of 
the research, because beyond the 'how' is the 'why'. That is, beyond showing that the 
defence of Southern segregation during the Cold War made extensive use of 
anticommunist thematics and apparatuses, and beyond illustrating the ways in which 
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this was effective in cohering segregationist blocs and disorganising anti-
segregationists, the research aims to work out why anticommunism was so 
ubiquitously accepted as an appropriate framework for interpreting Civil Rights, why 
it summoned so much loyalty and galvanised political realignments capable of 
structuring political prospects long after Massive Resistance was concluded, what 
subjective needs it might have served, and how this might have been both conducive 
to, or counterproductive with regard to, the ends of Massive Resistance. 
Research Narrative and Shortcomings 
In the interests of reflexivity, I will conclude this chapter by situating the structure 
and methods of this research in the context of my overall intellectual project, and the 
limitations this imposed. The initial spark for this research was produced during my 
research for a book which I began composing in 2006 (Seymour, 2008). In the course 
of conducting a genealogical excavation of the archives of liberal and left ideological 
justifications for empire, I had encountered an intriguing problem. In the mid-
twentieth-century, traditional colonial and white-supremacist discourses were 
displaced by a new language. The old languages of empire and of segregation 
gradually, over time, gave way to a new language. Just as colonialism yielded to 
America’s ‘free trade’ empire (Panitch & Gindin, 2003), de jure segregation gave 
way to de facto segregation on a new geographical and political basis (Massey & 
Denton, 1993), and the old gold and silver payrolls typical of Jim Crow production 
processes gave way to new wage systems and seniority structures that essentially 
preserved a racialised system (Vitalis, 2000, 2002), so the language justifying empire 
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and racial inequality shifted. The new language was often market-based, implying 
that racial inequalities were meritocratic. (Jewell, 2010) Alternatively, biological 
racism gave way to a culturalist discourse, thus suggesting that racial inequalities had 
arisen from cultural differences. In each case, I noticed that anticommunism appeared 
to play an important mediating role, from Southern Africa to the Southern United 
States. 
The historical relationship between Cold War anticommunism and the defence of 
white-supremacy, particularly segregation in the U.S. South, is sufficiently well-
established to be subject to tense historiographical debates. (Berg, 2007; Arnesen, 
2010; Marable, 2007; Woods, 2004; Lewis, 2000) Yet the conclusions one reaches in 
these debates are manifestly underdetermined by the data. And they point to a series 
of questions which must be posed on a different terrain. First, how could 
anticommunism possibly be of use to the defence of white supremacy? What is the 
affinity there? How could segregationists have believed, with apparently so little 
reason, that their opponents were — indeed, had to be — communists? What, to put it 
another way, was so disturbing about the spectre of communism to white-
supremacists? What role did anticommunism have in organising the strategic 
responses of white-supremacists to challengers?  These were questions demanding a 
sociology and not just a history. So, in the curve of my own work, I tried to enact the 
necessary shift, from a historical investigation to a sociological analysis. 
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 Actually implementing this shift was a far bigger challenge than I expected. The 
creative process of bringing the work into being required that I develop a theoretical 
background that I had hitherto lacked. Given the marxist, anti-racist political 
commitments informing the research, I sought in the first instance to find a way of 
carrying out the work in a way that would build upon and enrich the historical 
materialist perspectives that I was already grounded in, while allowing me to cope 
with and do justice to the full complexity of the material. Fortunately, whatever the 
limitations of marxism, it has produced a rich body of social theory dealing with 
ideology, the state, social classes and race, the themes through which I decided to 
explore the subject, from the Marx of the Eighteenth Brumaire (1967) to Gramsci 
(Hoare & Smith, 1971), Poulantzas (1978, 2014), Althusser (2014) and Hall et al 
(1978). In particular, I decided that the Gramscian idea of ‘hegemony’ offered an 
extremely productive way of structuring my research questions. In looking at the 
intersections, or interdependence, of race and anticommunism at a given historical 
moment, I would look for the possibilities that this fusion offered in securing a form 
of class leadership through a combination of incentives, ideology and coercion. 
Related to this was the concept of the ‘historical bloc,’ in which a ‘complex, 
contradictory and discordant ensemble’ of superstructures is articulated in a specific 
conjunction with ‘the ensemble of the social relations of production’. This concept 
allowed me to comprehending how class forces might be related to one another in a 
given situation, organised within a certain complex ‘geo-economic unity,’ and 
embodied in a particular set of ‘apparatuses’ and ‘philosophies’. (Sassoon, 1987: 121) 
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The second challenge was to locate an appropriate area for empirical research. 
Given that segregation was to a large extent a mode of labour control and surplus-
extraction, and given my particular interest in class formations, I decided I wanted to 
look at how race and anticommunism might be brought together in the organisation 
of labour processes, in order to test Gramsci’s observation that, “hegemony begins in 
the factory”. Condensed in the workplaces of the South were a multitude of laws, 
political alliances, cultural practices and methods of surplus-extraction which were 
critical to the changing modes of class domination. I therefore estimated that in the 
course of poring over secondary literature and finding appropriate archives, I would 
alight on one or two ‘chronotopes’ (Bakhtin, 1981), concrete situations in which 
would be concentrated many of the general tendencies at work in the South 
throughout the period. In fact, an historical work of this kind had already been carried 
out in relation to tobacco workers in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. (Korstad, 2004) 
I decided that the logical first site of investigation would be the North Carolina textile 
industry, the single largest industry in the period, the core segregated industry, 
employing black workers only for menial occupations, and practising paternalism 
toward white workers. It was also politically influential: the mill owner Roger 
Milliken was Nixon’s finance chairman in 1968, a strong supporter of Pat Buchanan, 
and a funder of Strom Thurmond. Southern politicians worked hard to reach out to 
the ‘mill vote’. The textile industry was also culturally significant, a source of 
resonant mythologies. Billy Graham, for example, appealed to the old ‘mill hands’; 
and it was a prominent target of unionisation efforts by CIO as the Cold War began, 
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and later the subject of federal de-segregation campaigns. (Minchin, 1999: 8-12; 
Boswell, Brown, Brueggemann & Peters Jr., 2006: 155-88)  
 In fact, neither the primary nor secondary materials which I researched provided 
sufficient material to justify continuing with the case study focus on textiles. I found 
a great deal of interesting material pertaining to the historical period. I located letters 
to and from key public figures, important newspaper articles, campaigning 
documents, union records, company data, and speech transcripts. What I did not find 
was significant evidence of either communism or anticommunism being a major 
consideration in the organisation of labour processes in the textile industry in the 
period covered. I did not find my ‘chronotopes’. My initial response to this was to 
consider changing focus and looking at another industry, such as tobacco, and this 
resulted in a further period of secondary research. I might alternatively have looked at 
the CIO’s ‘Operation Dixie’. However, in my theoretical single-mindedness, and lack 
of flexibility, I had not considered that my early research decisions – to focus on 
labour processes and took for a case study in the textile industry – were themselves 
faulty. They were faulty because the secondary research told me that the major bouts 
of anticommunism in the textile industry was during the strike waves of the 1930s. 
And they were faulty because, while I might find instances where anticommunism 
had played a role in beating back union organisation in the immediate post-war 
period, that wouldn’t help me to illustrate or explain the period that I was most 
interested in, the years between 1954 and 1965, during which communism was 
relatively weak and yet anticommunism flourished in the Southern states. Rather like 
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the canary in the cage, I evinced much activity, but little progress; expending more 
energy on frantically not getting anywhere than on actually completing the work. To 
be absolutely frank, with the mounting theoretical deadlocks and empirical absences 
and the seemingly impossible problems, I grew to hate this work. It took far too long 
to simply unlock the cage door.  
  
The only way forward was to treat the apparent obstacles as stepping stones. For, 
the evidence that I had accumulated in my archival research was in fact significant, 
even if not in the way that I had hoped for. I had accumulated a mass of primary 
evidence about the HOPE, Inc. campaign against school closures in Georgia, an 
important ‘moderate’ white-led struggle against Massive Resistance. In the course of 
ongoing researching Massive Resistance as a social movement, the full importance of 
the campaign began to become clear to me. And ironically, it was the experience of a 
severe personal crisis that proved to be the most productive moment, even though it 
prevented progress for some time, in that it resulted in an experience with a Lacanian 
analysis which was intense, profoundly moving, and creative. I had already 
considered using Lacanian ideas, but they were no longer dry, academic concepts. In 
deploying them, I have kept in mind two problems: first, Lacanian psychoanalysis is 
emphatically not devised with social criticism in mind; and second, my personal 
investment in these ideas, while a productive force in the work, was also a limitation 
to be worked around if I was to maintain the necessary rigour. Even so, they did 
allow me to pose questions in a slightly different way. Rather than immediately 
looking for ‘rational kernel’ in segregationist behaviour, I was forcibly reminded of 
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the inescapable centrality of the irrational in social behaviour, the limits of 
knowledge, and the futility of theoretical mastery. Chapter Six, applying Lacanian 
discourse analysis to the HOPE campaign, is an immediate product of this working 
through, and thus contains a performative, evocative substratum. It is where, for the 
first time, I discover myself in the middle of the work, immersed it in it right up to 
my neck.  
 Within the theoretical framework thus established, albeit loosened and modified 
through the years of developing the research, with the case study, with an analysis of 
both primary and secondary literature from a range of sources and online and offline 
archives (including biographies, letters, newspapers, company files, leaflets, 
membership cards, histories, sociologies and economic works), and with the political 
and personal investments registered above, I was able to answer the research 
question. And I present the argument through a series of historical studies of different 
aspects of hegemony in the conjuncture in question, looking at the particular effects 
of Jim Crow and anticommunism in different registers. Given the experience of 
producing this work, I would suggest three key ways in which a project of this kind 
could be embarked upon differently, and better. First, the research design should have 
been led by the evidence of the secondary material. That is to say, with a considered 
reflection on the patterns disclosed in the extant literature, and with a degree of 
flexibility as to my theoretical concerns, I would have been able to select a more 
promising case study and appropriate archives to research. Second, were I reviewing 
this material now, my first emphasis would not be in rationalising this problematic 
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compound of white-supremacist anticommunism. Certainly, such an approach can be 
useful in that it resists the temptation to dismiss the problem (as merely a form of 
delusion); but rationalising a problem is only slightly better than dismissing it. 
Concretely, this means that the historical materialist problematic, while I think it is 
appropriate, would have been supplemented by a psychoanalytic approach in a much 
more sustained way throughout the work. Third, it seems to me that, in some ways, I 
have tried to do too many things, to theorise a complex set of relations from the 
international to the discursive, and within too broad a time-frame. I now consider that 
a narrower spatial and temporal focus would, ironically, have allowed me to think 
through a more complex range of topics. Finally, my preference for a certain level of 





The Strategic Pertinence of Race and Anticommunism in the Cold War: The 
Southern United States in the Imperialist Context 
This chapter situates the South, the anticommunist struggle, and the defence of 
white-supremacy, in a global context. This is partially necessitated by the fact that 
anticommunism was in the first instance structured by international events, viz. the 
Russian Revolution, the post-war expansion of the USSR and the proliferation of 
Communist states. Such events, linked to a communist movement that was in principle 
internationalist and opposed to the entire system of national states, had ramifications 
for the global order that Washington sought to build. It is also important because of 
the arguments that will be addressed later in the thesis, concerning the extent to 
which the Cold War presented an unprecedented political opportunity structure for 
civil rights, and hastened the end of Jim Crow. Using two key concepts, ‘uneven and 
combined development’ (Trotsky) and ‘hegemony’ (Gramsci), and employing insights 
from the discipline of International Relations, I develop a framework for 
understanding the structural logic of the global intersection of anticommunism and 
white-supremacy. I suggest, first, that as the US assumed global dominance, it faced 
a range of problems posed by the tendencies theorised as ‘uneven and combined 
development’: above all, the struggle of the colonised against the colonisers. The 
political management of these problems was not purely coercive, but contained 
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elements of what can be characterised as a ‘hegemonic’ strategy. Cold War 
anticommunism, I maintain, supplied part of that hegemonic strategy, helping the US 
to lead, maintain and reform an imperialist international system, and allowing it to 
maintain a de facto alliance with colonialism and a confraternal relationship with 
white-supremacist regimes for as long as it was effective. It allowed the effects of 
white-supremacy to be perpetuated on a new basis, while helping to overwrite race 
and empire as the major axes of global geopolitical arrangements. It also integrated 
the segregationist South into a Cold War “historical bloc” in which Southern state 
leaders played a critical role, as anticommunist enforcers and as militarists.  
Prologue: The Cold War and the Colour Line in the Southern US, Australia 
and South Africa 
This is a study of race and anticommunism in the U.S. South. The dimensions and 
relations which I am attempting to draw out are particular to a conjuncture and a 
social formation, a localised set of social relations particular in time and place. And 
yet, throughout its existence, race has been – as W E B Du Bois argued – a global 
“color-line”. If “the problem of the twentieth century” was “the problem of the color-
line – the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in 
America and the islands of the sea” (Du Bois, 2007: 15), how did it impact upon, and 
how was it impacted upon by, that other perennial twentieth century problem, that of 
capitalism and the communist challenge? Dudziak (1988; 2000) argues that Cold War 
imperatives propelled the changes that swept the American southlands in the post-war 
 108
era, as America sought to reconcile its global democratic mission with its internal 
politics. (See also Krenn, 1998)  Whatever the merits of that argument – discussed 
further in Chapter Eight – the fate of the South, from the slave trade to the 1898 war 
to the Cold War, is inescapably bound up with the international order. Therefore I 
begin by situating the South in its geopolitical context, in a global white-supremacist 
system in which the poles of power were shifting and the leadership of the dominant 
capitalist states passing from Europe to the United States. 
In 1950, three racial states embarked upon legislative and legal processes intended 
to contain  communism. On 17th July, the Suppression of Communist Act (Union of 5
South Africa, 1950) came into effect in South Africa. On 20th August, the Australian 
government introduced the Communist Party Dissolution Bill “to provide for the 
Dissolution of the Australian Communist Party and of other Communist 
Organizations, to disqualify Communists from holding certain Offices, and for 
purposes connected therewith”. And on 4th December, the US Supreme Court began to 
hear the case of Dennis v United States three months after the U.S. Government had 
passed the Internal Security Act (ISA), requiring that communist organisations 
register with the Attorney General, and establishing the Subversive Activities Control 
Board. 
The legislation in each case demonstrated marked differences. The US 
government never attempted to outlaw the Communist Party, much as it targeted the 
 This is in part the story of anticommunism in the British Empire. For a detailed account of that 5
phenomenon, see Smith, 2015.
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party for repression. In the case of Dennis v United States, the Supreme Court upheld 
a Party leader Eugene Dennis’s conviction for conspiracy, but it was the alleged 
activity and not the membership that was outlawed. The Australian legislation was 
focused specifically on the Communist Party of Australia, being premised on much 
hyped ‘revelations’ about the party and its supposed fifth-columnism and influence in 
high level positions. The South African laws not only outlawed the Communist Party 
of South Africa, but also defined “communistic activities” broadly so as to include 
organisations, publications and periodicals promoting “Marxian socialism” of any 
hue, and awarded broad powers to the Governor General to outlaw any organisation 
deemed communist. Moreover, there are differences in the legal responses in each 
state. In the US, the Supreme Court reinforced anticommunism, while in Australia, 
the High Court did not. (Wiecek, 2006: 535-578; Waghorne & Macintyre, 2011: 
85-87; Cain, 1994: 149; Morris, 1988: 100-101)  
The context in which anticommunism unfolded in each state was also profoundly 
different in many respects. The most important difference in the period in question is 
that the United States was the globally dominant capitalist state for most of the 
twentieth century, while Australia and South Africa were medium-sized economies 
historically dependent on investment from British capitalism.  The US was a mass 
exporter of consumer goods, and a net exporter of capital, while South Africa and 
Australia were only modest exporters of consumer goods and net importers of 
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capital.  In the US, Wall Street was politically dominant, while in Australia and South 6
Africa, financial capital supporting the manufacturing and mining industries came 
largely via the City of London. Politically, the traditions and trajectories of white-
supremacy in each state were quite diverse, with settler-colonialism being differently 
articulated to ‘blackbirding’, slavery, segregation and genocide. And while all three 
states had strains of white labourism emerging from colonial white-supremacism, 
which could sustain an anticommunist politics in the workers’ movement, only in 
Australia had the beginnings of a white labourist regime begun to coagulate by 1911. 
In South Africa, white labourism was subsumed into Afrikaaner nationalism, while in 
the United States it was incorporated into New Deal liberalism. (Lloyd, 2002; Dilley, 
2012; Maddison, 2006: 101 & 358-359; Yudelman, 1984; Marx, 1998) 
Nevertheless, there are certain conditions that they have in common. In all three 
cases, a colonial pattern of capitalist development predominated, with the “frontier” 
being the chief metaphor through which primitive accumulation was organised, while 
white supremacy formed the basis of state formation. In each case, anticommunism 
was linked to contiguous or prior radicalisations, anxieties about the capacity of states 
to cope with conflict and dysfunction and a drive toward the centralisation and 
concentration of political power. In these states, anticommunism was peculiarly 
intense and was imbricated with the defence of racial systems in remarkably similar 
ways as part of a wider conservative political strategy. For example, in Australia, 
 Thus, already by 1913, the US exported $2.38bn worth of merchandise (at current prices), 6
compared to $382m in Australia, and $342m in South Africa. Whereas the United States was a 
major gross exporter of capital ($3.514bn in 1914 at current prices), the Australian and South 
African economies were heavily dependent on foreign investment ($1.8bn and $1.65bn 
respectively in 1913).
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intelligence services were particularly concerned with communist activism among 
Aboriginals and Torres Strait islanders, and the agitation against the White Australia 
policy. Southern US politicians held that US civil rights organisations represented the 
cuspate end of a communist conspiracy intent on global dominion. In South Africa, 
the protection of the racial order was inscribed in anticommunist legislation, which 
defined communism so as to include “any doctrine or scheme … which aims at the 
encouragement of feelings of hostility between the European and non-European 
races” of South Africa. This would partially explain why the major opponents of 
anticommunist legislation included not just the South African Communist Party, but 
also the African National Congress. It would also explain how South Africa’s white 
rulers regarded the ANC as the local auxiliary of a Moscow design to take over the 
region’s South African mineral treasures. Anticommunism, enforced through 
“physical violence, civil ordinance laws, incarceration, sackings and injunctions 
against strike action”, took aim at a “vague conglomerate of hostile causes”. To be 
depicted as a “Red” was to be externalised and “Othered”; while the rebellion of the 
racially oppressed was construed as an outcome of “Red” plotting. Finally, 
anticommunism was entangled with an imperialist “civilising mission”, including in 
the Cold War era when a new international orientation of power was emerging with a 
powerful and territorially vast ‘Communist’ state one of its two major powers. (Marx 
1999; Kwon 2010, 37-38; Lewis, 2004; Fischer, 2002; Fischer, 2005; Fischer, 2006; 
Clark, 2008; Kiernan, 2002; Broughton, 2001; Foley, 2012; Clohesy, 2010; 
Macintyre, 1998: 4; Borstelmann, 1993: 138, 149-150 & 155; Onslow, 2009; Woods, 
2004; Lewis, 2000; Lewis, 2004; Borstelmann, 2001) 
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This is the context in which the parallels in the legislation can be understood. The 
formal rationale for such legislation as was adopted was in each case quite similar.  7
The goal of communism was to establish “a despotic system of government” (SoCA), 
a “totalitarian dictatorship” (ISA), a “dictatorship of the proletariat” (CPDA). 
Communist Parties were part of a “world-wide revolutionary movement” (ISA), a 
“world communist revolutionary movement” (CPDA), using “the promotion of 
disturbance or disorder” (SoCA), “force, violence, intimidation or fraudulent 
practices” (CPDA), and “treachery, deceit, infiltration into other groups 
(governmental and otherwise), espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and any other means 
deemed necessary” (ISA) to achieve their goals. Most similar were the South African 
and Australian laws which went to the extent of declaring “the Communist Party of 
South Africa to be an unlawful organization”, outlawing “other organizations 
promoting communistic activities” while “prohibiting certain periodical or other 
publications” and “certain communistic activities” (SoCA), and providing for “the 
Dissolution of the Australian Communist Party and of other Communist 
Organizations, to disqualify Communists from holding certain Offices, and for 
purposes connected therewith” (CPDA), respectively. The overlaps between these 
cases are not merely happenstance. There is evidence that the respective governments 
collaborated in their anticommunist policies. As Smith (2014) writes, “Letters from 
 It is worth stressing that even the existence of an anticommunist culture and the pervasive 7
nature of Cold War paranoia in racialised contexts were not by themselves sufficient to push 
governments into adopting such legislation. Rhodesia, despite having a strongly anticommunist 
culture since the 1920s (Lowry, 2009; Deventer & Nel, 1990), did not introduce such 
legislation. According to the UK Foreign Office’s Rhodesian Political Department, “the 
Rhodesians decided that they had sufficient powers under the Unlawful Organisations Act and 
the Law & Order Maintenance Act to make a Suppression of Communism Act 
unnecessary.” (Quoted in Smith, 2015)
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the Australian High Commission in Cape Town show that the Malan government [of 
South Africa] passed on the draft legislation to the Menzies government before the 
Dissolution Bill was introduced in Australian Parliament”. A letter from the 
Commission to the Australian government dated 3rd March 1950 passed on details of 
legislation under consideration made available by the “Union Government … for 
your strictly confidential information” and requested “particulars of any Australian 
Government measures directed to the same object”. (Stirling, 1950) 
Most fundamentally, I maintain, the overlaps described here are structured by the 
international. Even where anticommunism is directed at domestic class opponents, 
these latter are situated within a texture of international relations wherein they are 
understood be potential agents of a competitor state – indeed, of a ‘world’ 
revolutionary movement. For example, in Australia the Liberal Prime Minister Sir 
Robert Menzies insisted that the bill he was attempting to pass was not an industrial 
bill but one specifically aimed at “treason and fifth-columnism”. The axis upon which 
he proposed to defend the bill was the “defence of democracies”, which communist 
“peace” agitation obstructed as part of an “international conspiracy against the 
democracies”. Banning the Communist Party was about ensuring that they could not 
occupy key positions in order to sabotage the country in the event of conflict with the 
USSR which for all intents and purposes was deemed to be already under way. 
(Menzies, 2004: 249-253; Cain & Farrell, 1986; Sheridan, 1986). This rationale was 
consistent with the general thrust of state-led anticommunism in the United States 
and South Africa, linking the supposed conspiratorial nature of communism to an 
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external threat, by means of the figure of the ‘fifth column’. ‘World communism’, 
integrally linked to if not directed from the USSR, necessitated organisation at the 
international level. 
  
That is why the struggles over white-supremacy in which communists and 
anticommunists partook, should not be understood in domestic isolation, but rather 
should be interpreted as part of the fabric of the international system at the time. 
While the Cold War superpower struggle entailed the deployment of a liberal-
democratic discourse on the part of the United States and its allies which conflicted 
with the white-supremacist norm, challenges to white-supremacy also threatened to 
undermine the integrity of Cold War strategic alliances particularly where they were 
linked to the emerging series of anti-colonial struggles. This chapter will therefore 
begin the research by looking at the international level, and situating the Southern 
United States within it. I will argue that the relationship between the Cold War and 
the ‘color line’ was not purely incidental, but rather followed a structural logic 
embedded in the international order of the time. Deploying an historical sociology 
building on insights from the discipline of International Relations, I will:  
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i.) identify what I argue is the strategic logic of the intersection of race and 
anticommunism in the Cold War in relation to the management of crises produced by 
‘uneven and combined development’ ;  8
ii.) relate the international dimension to national and regional levels of spatial 
management (to be more thoroughly examined in Chapter Four);  
iii.) query the conceptual integrity of the Cold War, challenging its ‘spurious unity’ 
so that the complex and contradictory effects of this struggle on the politics of the 
Southern states can be more adequately accounted for.  
Taking these steps will not only help situate Southern anticommunism in its 
necessarily global context; it will also explain something important about the forms 
that anticommunism took in that context, and its changing efficacy as the Cold War 
narrative was displaced by anticolonial success. 
Introduction: One, Two, Three, Many Cold Wars. 
 In the traditional histories of the Cold War (eg Gaddis, 2007), race was largely 
expunged as a factor. Du Bois had argued that despite its absence from dominant 
explanations, the racial order, as manifested in colonialism and other forms of 
 The classic formulation of this historical ‘law’ is to be found – in full-blooded, gung-ho, 8
teleological form – in Trotsky’s History of the Russian Revolution: “The laws of history have 
nothing in common with a pedantic schematism. Unevenness, the most general law of the 
historic process, reveals itself most sharply and complexly in the destiny of the backward 
countries. Under the whip of external necessity, their backward culture is compelled to make 
leaps. From the universal law of unevenness thus derives another law which, for the lack of a 
better name, we may call the law of combined development—by which we mean a drawing 
together of the different stages of the journey, a combining of the separate steps, an amalgam 
of archaic with more contemporary forms.” (Trotsky, 2008: 5)
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expansionism, was the infrastructure of the world system behind the crisis of the 
European state system culminating in World War I. In a similar fashion, the world 
system after 1945 must be interpreted in view of the tectonic shifts in its racial order. 
The absence of race from explanations of the Cold War must therefore be rectified. 
This chapter will demonstrate that one of the ways in which race has been 
simultaneously repressed and its effects sustained in the international order is through 
the deployment of anticommunism in the Cold War. 
 The history of anticommunism is enfolded within a history of race. In two great 
waves of US anticommunism, the first immediately following the Russian 
Revolution, and the second following the defeat of the Third Reich, race figured 
centrally in the understanding of communism and in the organisation of its 
suppression. The rise and breakdown of the anticommunist consensus was, when it 
came, intricated with the overthrow of the colonial world system and the concomitant 
upsurge of civil rights activism. The modes of repression, and the techniques of 
ascriptive denigration deployed in each case were contiguous. As Heonik Kwon put 
it, “[b]eing a white person or person of color was a major determining factor for an 
individual's life career for a significant part of the past century, but so was the 
relatively novel color classification of being ‘Red’ or ‘not Red’ in many corners of the 
world, including the United States and South Africa” (Kwon 2010, 37). 
  Anticommunism did not, however, abut white supremacy in an uncomplicated 
manner. Brewing conflicts over race were effectively suppressed by Cold War 
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anticommunism for a period of approximately a decade following World War II 
(WWII). However, in the global conflicts over communism, the US needed to project 
a beneficent liberal and egalitarian image in order to secure a multi-racial alliance in 
favour of US-led liberal capitalism. As a result of these pressures, which increased as 
national liberation movements acquired momentum, US administrations felt 
compelled to adopt racial reforms, however gradually (‘with all deliberate speed’) 
(Dudziak 2000; Borstelmann 2001; Marable 2007).  
 To make full sense of this question, however, it is necessary to query the integrity 
of the concept of anticommunism, as revisionist historians of the Cold War have 
done. While most Cold War histories focus on the contest over Europe, a growing 
number of scholars challenge this emphasis, drawing attention to the hot wars around 
colonialism and race. They unpick the spurious unity of the category of “the Cold 
War”, and in doing so draw attention to the diverse logics unfolding in Indonesia, 
Vietnam, the Congo, Italy and Greece, and so on (see, for example, Horne 2007; 
Horne 1985; Eschen 1996; Westad 2007; Kwon 2010) There are a variety of distinct 
processes subsumed under “the Cold War” and “anticommunism”, even when the 
focus is limited to the American variety of anticommunism: the geopolitical contest 
with the USSR; the organisation of a coalition of anti-socialist states under an 
American-led alliance; the engagement with, and often war against, emerging popular 
and anticolonial forces in the “Third World”; and the suppression of domestic 
radicalism. 
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Hegemony, and Uneven and Combined Development 
 To interpret these various manifestations, this chapter will at points deploy the 
Gramscian concept of hegemony. This must be applied with care. The concept of 
hegemony is arguably one specifically crafted for the national terrain, where a 
particular relationship between “state” and “civil society” obtains. Nonetheless, there 
is sufficient philological evidence to suggest that Gramsci himself envisioned 
hegemony having some international applications. And the internationalisation of 
production, commerce, “civil society” and states themselves, strongly suggests that it 
can have relevance beyond the level of the national. Indeed, international relations 
are necessarily imbricated with the national. They, as Gramsci put it,  
intertwine with these internal relations of nation-states, creating new, unique and 
historically concrete combinations. A particular ideology, for instance, born in a 
highly developed country, is disseminated in less developed countries, impinging 
on the local interplay of combinations. This relation between international forces 
and national forces is further complicated by the existence within every State of 
several structurally diverse territorial sectors, with diverse relations of force at all 
levels (Gramsci 1971, 182). 
Gramsci further argued that the relationship between a dominant nation and an 
oppressed nation cannot be purely military in character, since it relies on “the state of 
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social disintegration of the oppressed people, and the passivity of the majority of 
them”. 
 The consolidation of hegemony in one state, particularly the leading imperialist 
state, could not but produce certain effects not only in the international order but in 
the internal organisation of other states. The practices – ideologies, apparatuses, 
production methods – through which hegemony is achieved in dominant states can be 
swiftly disseminated within other states, albeit producing different effects. This 
insight can be grounded in Leon Trotsky’s concept of “uneven and combined 
development”. Insofar as the existence of many states is grounded in a tendency 
toward uneven development (of ecological systems, social forms, and productive 
resources), they also exhibit the pattern of combined development, wherein distinct 
social formations interpenetrate – a tendency sharpened once the capitalist mode of 
production, with its universalising tendencies, takes root. Imperialist states have 
indeed actively taken up the mission of spreading and developing capitalist property 
relations in the regions they dominate, a mission that during the Cold War went under 
the rubric of liberal internationalism buttressed by “modernisation theory”. This is 
precisely the “geopolitical management” of uneven and combined development of 
which Justin Rosenberg speaks. (Ives & Short 2013; Allinson and Anievas 2009; 
Gilman 2003; Schmitz 2006, 12-13; Rosenberg 1996 as quoted in Anievas 2014) 
 It is important, however, to distinguish between hegemony as a state of affairs, 
and hegemony as a strategy. As Stuart Hall points out, hegemony in the former sense 
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is “a very particular, historically specific, and temporary ‘moment’ in the life of a 
society. It is rare for this degree of unity to be achieved” (Hall, 1986). Nonetheless, 
hegemonic strategies are constantly deployed and are arguably the “normal” mode of 
political domination in capitalist democracies (Poulantzas, 1978). Further, hegemonic 
practices should not be reduced to those which secure ideological consensus. Consent 
and coercion are usually different moments in a unitary hegemonic project, such that 
consent is permanently structured by violence (Thomas, 2009; Poulantzas, 2014: 69). 
  Conceiving of hegemony in this way permits us to understand that hegemonic 
practices can – within limits determined by the conjuncture – be organised across 
borders so that, for example, a dominant imperialist power can seek to organise 
popular consent for its “historic mission” across a range of allied states by means of 
ideology, material incentives and strategic repression. And such was the position of 
the United States of America as it assumed global dominance. US planners, informed 
by the work of the geographer Isaiah Bowman, sought to organise US power on the 
basis of a hierarchy of national states open to capitalist investment, gradually 
displacing direct colonial authority as the mode of domination (Smith 2004). 
However, the risk of a too-rapid displacement was either that national development of 
postcolonial states would take a form that was directly hostile to US capitalist 
penetration, or – more ominously for the US – that the very class systems through 
which they would be able to organise their imperialist dominance would be 
overthrown. 
 121
 Managing this dilemma required hegemonic struggle in the following ways: 1) 
US state planners had to secure a consensus among elites for significant military and 
other imperialist investments in order to contain anticolonial independence 
movements and expand US strategic power into former colonial territories; 2) this 
power bloc then needed to organise the consent of diverse class strata within the US 
for this same strategy, while simultaneously disorganising and repressing opposition; 
3) internationally, the American state had to penetrate the national states of allied 
ruling classes and to win the support of particularly European ruling classes but also 
subaltern populations for the same agenda; 4) the violent suppression of anticolonial 
rebellions was usually accompanied by attempts, to varying degrees, to achieve 
consent from certain constituencies.  
 The dominant idiom through which hegemonic practices were secured at key 
points in the twentieth century was anticommunism. The signifier, ‘Communism’, 
came to stand for many complex problems and dysfunctions, globally and 
domestically, at the level of politics, economics and ideology. It stood for what didn’t 
work, what was antithetical. In Chapter Six, I will develop a theory of the fantasmatic 
kernel of this ideology, and the way in which it relates to white-supremacy. Here it is 
sufficient to note the overdetermined nature of this signifier: it stood in this context 
for something much more than the particular historical experiences which had been 
named by the term. The obverse of ‘Communism’ in the dominant ideology was 
‘Freedom’, a “tendentially empty signifier” which was able, precisely on account of 
this emptiness, to unify “contradictory subject-positions”, so that “common nuclei of 
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meaning” were “connotatively linked to diverse ideological-articulatory domains”. 
Domestically, this enabled a process of “transformism”: the “partial absorption and 
neutralisation of those ideological contents” through which resistance to class 
domination were expressed (Hall 1983; Laclau 1977). It provided a language in 
which, in global terms, the defence of racial hierarchy was commensurable with the 
legal norm of national self-determination. It undergirded a missionary American 
nationalism which connotatively linked Americanism to democracy, against what 
Mary Dudziak calls the “negative ideograph” of “totalitarianism”. The opponents of 
white supremacy were belaboured as bearers of the “totalitarian” bacillus, both in the 
United States itself, and in its imperial zones of intervention (Fousek 2000; 
Foglesong 2007; Dudziak 2000; Borstelmann 2001; Lewis 2004; Woods 2004). 
First Wave: Anticommunism as an American Racial Practice 
The first wave of anticommunism in the United States, 1917-1919, arose in 
response to the Russian Revolution but swiftly became a struggle over much more 
than that specific “ruptural unity”. (Althusser, 2005: 99) ‘Communism’ became the 
name for a host of enemies, and troubles, while anticommunist practices extended 
from the local to the national to the international. 
In the first instance, the Russian revolution posed a potential threat both to an 
extant colonial world order, and to an emerging world order of national states. It was 
in the context of facing this challenge that the doctrine of Wilsonian “liberal 
 123
internationalism” was developed. Wilson was a conventional white-supremacist, pro-
Klan, Democrat politician for the duration of his career until that crisis. He had 
supported the American colonisation of the Philippines on the basis of racial 
doctrines, and had routinely intervened in Latin American states. He did not believe 
that non-whites were capable of self-government, viewing this as essentially a 
cultural state achieved through millennia of breeding. And while his administration’s 
propaganda arm was to exhort colonised peoples to support the Entente Powers in 
World War I on the basis of hinted promises of independence, Wilson had no 
intention of allowing such goals to be realised. Hence, his pointed rejection of Japan’s 
“racial equality” resolution at Versailles. The world order of nation-states depended 
upon a colonial periphery. At this point, the truth of Wilson’s “self-determination of 
nations” was self-determination for whites. This situation inevitably framed the 
comprehension of the ‘communist threat’ on the part US state personnel and the 
administration’s organic intellectuals. The American attempt to manage the 
‘contradictions’ arising from the uneven and combined development of capitalist 
relations, contradictions whose fusion had produced the Russian jacqueries, logically 
relied upon the traditional imperialist and racist means of such management. The 
encircling of Russia at Versailles, the intervention on behalf of the reactionary White 
Army in Siberia – the first but not last violation of the principle of “self-
determination” – and the policy of non-recognition of the Soviet government were all 
embedded in just this discourse.  (Vitalis, 2000; Manela, 2007; Curry, 1954; Pestritto, 
2005: 32-5; Thorsen, 1988; O’Reilly, 1997; Smith, 2004: 115-155)  
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 One of the Wilson administration’s key anticommunist intellectuals was John 
Spargo, a former Marxist from Britain and neoconservative avant la lettre, who 
supported the US intervention in WWI. Spargo joined the American Alliance for 
Labor and Democracy, a pro-war labour organisation affiliated with the government, 
and was sent on speaking tours by the administration’s Committee for Public 
Information. He authored much of the administration’s propaganda, and drafted its 
policy of non-recognition of Soviet Russia. He was if anything utterly disappointed 
by what he saw as the government’s lack of commitment in its military engagements 
in Siberia. Spargo’s chief argument about the Bolshevik revolution was that Russia 
was a backward civilisation, unable to handle the problems of radical self-
government. The result was that a weakened “Slavonic” race, otherwise a natural ally 
of the “West”, would find itself in a global racial nexus between “Teutons” and the 
“semi-Oriental” Japanese monarchy – an orientation “full of peril” for democracy. 
Spargo was far from seeing communism as being a simple racial conspiracy, in the 
sense imagined by Lothrop Stoddard, but as one of the most progressive Wilsonian 
intellectuals he could not help but interpret its effects in the context of a global racial 
order in which white domination was co-extensive with the development of 
democracy. To this extent, he anticipated one of the mandarins of Cold War discourse, 
George F Kennan. (Ruotsila 2006; Seymour 2008, 105-6; Seymour 2009)  
 Domestically, the Wilson administration pursued a path of countersubversive 
terror. This should not be opposed to the consensual, ideological strategies of the 
administration, such as George Creel’s ‘conscripting’ and ‘goose-stepping’ of public 
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opinion behind America’s war effort. (Pfannestiel, 2003: 2) As Poulantzas (2014: 
66-71) argues, terror is an important element in the construction of consent., while we 
might add that terror is most effective when part of a repressive, authoritarian 
ideological climate. Countersubversion has a particular historical role in the 
formation of American nation, as the presumed conspiracies of Freemasons, 
Catholics, Mormons, African Americans, the “yellow peril”, and of course “Reds”, 
have serially aroused movements in defence of “Americanism”. (Melley 2002; 
Slotkin 1973; Davis 1960). The anticommunist moment drew on these traditions. Just 
as radical Reconstruction was resisted and segregation imposed in the South by Klans 
allied to the dominant planter class and linked to the formerly dominant Democratic 
Party, so America’s first bout of anticommunist repression in the period from 
1917-1919 involved the deployment of parapolitical “civil society” organisations in 
alliance with business groups organised around the nexus of state power. In the latter 
case, the rise of militant imperialist sentiment in the US under Woodrow Wilson was 
linked first to hysteria about treacherous African Americans in sympathy with 
Germans, then subsequently about “Reds” stirring up domestic disorder. (Gaughan, 
1999; Ellis 2001) In the context of war, the administration had sought to incite 
nationalist and chauvinist fury against the ‘Hun’, and construct a notion of 
‘Americanism’ worthy of irrational devotion. Groups such as the International 
Workers of the World or the Socialist Party, who opposed the war and the patriotic 
frenzy, were deemed by conservative Americans to be the worst subversive enemy 
since the final military defeat of the Native Americans, who needed to be 
exterminated. Communism was thus not merely an overseas unpleasantness, but the 
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most recent incarnation of a series of subversive, anti-national conspiracies. It was 
not uncommon for civil leaders to argue that antiwar views should be suppressed, if 
necessary by firing squad, while the national press squealed for investigations, and 
agents of the repressive apparatuses such as the Bureau of Investigation denounced 
socialism as a German import. (Pfannestiel, 2003: 3-12) 
The dominant key of the ensuing anticommunist offensive was nativist and racist. 
American race theorist Lothrop Stoddard saw in Bolshevism the death of “white-
world supremacy”. Robert Lansing, George Simons, and military intelligence 
credited the fraudulent thesis of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion to explain the 
success of the Bolsheviks. The Sedition Act (1918) was used pointedly against 
“aliens”, while J Edgar Hoover used his position in the Bureau of Investigation to 
raise alarm over the alleged propensity of African American leaders toward 
communism. Communists had “done a vast amount of evil damage by carrying 
doctrines of race revolt and the poison of Bolshevism to the Negroes”. The Lusk 
Commission established in 1919 to look into radicalism “argued that there was ‘not a 
single system of Anglo-Saxon socialism, nor a single system of Latin race socialism’. 
The only scientific system of socialism was ‘of German-Jewish origin’”. This was a 
particularly portentous accusation after the feverish anti-German propaganda that 
shadowed US entry into the First World War. Civil society and vigilante organisations 
such as the American League, the Daughters of the American Revolution, war 
veterans groups, and bodies of Minute Men, often funded by business blocs led by 
local Chambers of Commerce, were organised around nativist thematics. (Stoddard, 
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1920; Wood, 2004: 86; Gaughan, 1999; Foglesong, 2007: 58; Heale, 1990: 60-96; 
Kovel, 1997: 14-22) 
In this, the first phase of anticommunism, the national and the international were 
articulated in a single, complex, multifaceted process of countersubversive struggle. 
The struggle was prosecuted multifariously on the axes of class, nation, empire and 
race, but the signifier ‘Communism’ gave a name to the diverse problems and 
obstacles faced by American state planners and ideologues, and lent them a coherence 
they would not otherwise have had. 
Second Wave: The Cold War, American Nationalism and the South 
 After 1945, the relationship between anticommunism and the racial order became 
more complex. The old world order, dominated by European powers with their 
industries, their military strength and their colonies, had been obliterated in two 
world wars. It gave way to a new bipolar world divided between the leadership of the 
US and USSR, in which the US was by far the more powerful state. Both states, 
having sustained military attacks, had an interest in military expansion – overland in 
the case of the USSR and overseas in the case of the US. (McMahon, 2003: 2-15) But 
expansion meant something quite different in each case. The USSR was certainly 
keen to maintain a cordial relationship developed with the ‘great powers’ during the 
war, largely because it aspired to be one, and its goals were relatively conservative. 
The US aspired to something more like global dominance, although it sought to 
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achieve this as much through hegemonic practices, in the Gramscian rather than 
traditional IR sense, as through sheer violence. 
 In declaring a Cold War against the USSR, premised on the need for 
‘containment’ of the latter’s totalitarian drive to the West, the US declared itself to be 
not just another imperialist power, but precisely an alternative to the old imperialisms 
as well as to the ‘evil empire’ in the East: the leader of the ‘Free World’. This meant 
that the rise of anticolonial struggles, often influenced or led by communist parties, 
demanded that the US engage in a complex series of operations. While its global 
interventions were often in defence of racial hierarchies that were perceived to be 
efficiently anticommunist (Borstelmann 2001; Schmitz 1999; 2006), the logic of 
defending worldwide “freedom” against its negative “totalitarian” ideograph placed 
limits on this and also penetrated the domestic sphere. Just as American capitalism 
was internationalised and penetrated rival and allied states, restructuring their 
productive and political systems (Panitch & Gindin, 2012; Rupert, 1995), so 
America’s domestic social relations became an international issue, and segregation 
“became international in scope” – a fact that its opponents were able to exploit. 
(Woodward, 1966: 131-132) 
 According to Dudziak (2000), this meant that the world on which America wished 
to operate became a panopticon of sorts. Egregious abuses would be witnessed by 
world opinion, which the US would be unwise to ignore if it wished to assemble a 
multinational – and necessarily multiracial – alliance against communism. The need 
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to fortify the American model as an attractive one for decolonising populations thus 
pressured the US into reluctantly adopting civil rights legislation. And there is 
evidence that US state personnel regretted the image that its domestic racism 
projected to the wider world. As Richard Nixon put it, following a visit to the newly 
independent state of Ghana in 1957, “We cannot talk equality to the peoples of Africa 
and Asia and practice inequality in the United States” (Borstelmann, 2001: 54-55, 75 
& 109). 
 However, this is only part of the truth. Southern industry and politicians were also 
by far the most committed and militarily aggressive component of the Cold War 
anticommunist bloc in the United States. Although the South possessed its own 
traditions of militarism, Southern support for American militarism abroad had not 
always been as robust as it came to be during the Cold War. The overcoming of 
sectional divisions following the colonial turn of 1898 and particularly the 
aggressively expansionist administration of Wilson, a Southern Democrat, had helped 
consolidated the South’s commitment on this front. Another factor was the growing 
dependency of the Southern economy upon military investments during the Cold War, 
consolidating transformations beginning with the New Deal. If the New Deal’s 
programmes intended to reduce farm acreage and mechanise production kick-started 
those changes, World War II itself had utterly transformed the South, shrinking its 
rural economy and demographic and expanding its urban and industrial base. 
(Gaughan, 1999; Andrew Jr., 2001; Sosna, 1997: xiv-xv; Cobb, 1997) 
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In the period following World War II, military spending was much higher than it 
had ever been in peacetime. In 1948, US defence spending as a percentage of GDP 
was less than 5%. By 1952, the height of the Korean War, it had soared to 13%, after 
which it slowly dipped, but never fell below 5% again, and remained well above pre-
war levels. Defence contracts became a crucial mode of economic intervention and 
political management, helping to soften the blow of recessions, stimulate local 
economies and attract credit to legislators involved with them.  The twelve Southern 9
states accumulated a vastly disproportionate share of military contracts, so that by the 
early 1970s, the South provided the Pentagon with 52% of its ships, 46% of its 
airframes, 42% of its petroleum, and 27% of its ammunition. One of the effects of 
this was to modernise the region’s class structure, producing a new layer of middle 
class professionals and technicians who gravitated toward what became Goldwater 
Republicanism, and industrialise its economic base. This transformation had complex 
effects, in that it both stimulated staunch, anticommunist militarism in the areas 
enjoying these investments and simultaneously, where it contributed to 
modernisation, tended to undercut the social basis for Massive Resistance when it 
came – although less because of any tolerance for integration than because of an 
unwillingness to embrace ‘extreme’ measures to defend segregation. The Federal 
government was resented by these layers when it invested in welfare as much as 
when it intervened against segregation, but gratefully received when it invested in the 
military. As Strom Thurmond put it, “Defense business means better employment, 
 In the early 1990s, it was estimated that every $1bn in defence expenditures created 9
between 25,000 and 55,000 jobs, alongside a range of indirect economic benefits. (Mintz, 
1992: 17)
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bigger payrolls, and general economic improvement”. In the coming years, 
belliferous resistance to any form of reduction in military investment would become a 
speciality of Southern congresspersons. For example, the Limited Test Ban Treaty 
was nothing but a means to enhance the Kremlin “design for” and “supreme 
objective” of “world domination”. (Clayton, 1976; Krell, 1981; Markusen et al, 1991; 
Mintz, 1992: 105; Frederickson, 2010; Frederickson, 2013; Brenes, 2012: 187-190) 
 Another reason for the Southern enthusiasm for Cold War militancy was the 
extraordinary usefulness of anticommunist ideology for baiting liberal politicians 
whose commitment to segregation was weak. Even as early as 1950, a young Jesse 
Helms, working on the senatorial campaign of Willis Smith in North Carolina, baited 
his liberal opponent, Frank Portner Graham, as a Communist shill, and a proponent of 
race-mixing. Smith won. It would later, as discussed in Chapter Five and Chapter 
Seven, provide a repressive repertoire of counter-subversive practices which were 
replicated in the South – notably in the form of ‘mini-HUACs’ – and helped obstruct 
the emerging civil rights movement. This, the all-round Cold War pugnacity of 
Southern segregationist politicians, carried a particular weight in US politics because, 
in the post-war period Southerners had disproportionate power. Senator Richard 
Russell, the hardline anticommunist and segregationist, was “the most powerful man 
in the Senate” according to the Christian Science Monitor, and the power of the South 
was felt in its obstruction of civil rights and anti-lynching legislation. In fact, as will 
become clearer in Chapter Five and Chapter Eight, these uses of McCarthyism to 
crush the Communist and ‘fellow traveling’ left aligned with the interests of the 
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South, insofar as Communists were among the most radical elements of an emerging 
civil rights movement.  Meanwhile, the Southern attack on black left-wing activists, 
through organisations such as the House UnAmerican Activities Committee (HUAC) 
and the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS), targeted those who were 
likely to align with the anticolonial movement, and to oppose American-led wars as 
an expression of imperialism. (Borstelmann, 2001: 52-53, 65-66; Gentry, 2003; 
Rupert, 1995; Schrecker, 1999: 161; Smith, 2010: 33-39; Sensing 1964; Lewis, 2004: 
10-29; Braden, 1980; Marable, 2007: 17; Munro, 2015)   
This does not mean that Southern politicians were necessarily the most available 
for the “liberal internationalist” project of remaking the world in the image of 
American capitalism. Southern politicians often expressed scepticism of 
Washington’s specific interventions. (Fry, 2002; Fry, 2015). Nonetheless, the Cold 
War, legitimised by anticommunism, permitted the assembly of an ‘historic bloc’, 
which was broad, and incorporated the segregated, one-party South into its core. This 
was the material infrastructure of that form of missionary American nationalism 
which went under the rubric of “liberal internationalism”. It was because such diverse 
constituencies could be cohered around a shared mission, because the repressive teeth 
of the state needed only to be applied to a select minority of opponents, that the US 
ruling class could successfully project such power overseas. By using 
anticommunism to defend white supremacy inside US borders, it could also use 
anticommunism to seize control of white supremacy abroad. 
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Second Wave: Anticommunism and Decolonisation 
 The post-WWII world system was one overwhelmingly dominated by the United 
States. The US pioneered a global architecture of international legal institutions, and 
trade institutions informed by New Deal thinking. (Rupert, 1995; Gowan, 2003a) The 
US was in a position to extend a new system of dominance based on a “protectorate 
system” in the capitalist core extending to Western Europe and an arc of power in 
south-east Asia, while gradually attaining strategic control of the colonial territories. 
Within the protectorate system, consent to US domination was achieved partially on 
the basis of its demonstrated military supremacy, above all its occupations of West 
Germany and Japan, and partially on the basis of material incentives (Marshall Plan) 
and anticommunist ideology. American war planners, with the assistance of the 
geographer Isaiah Bowman, elaborated a strategy of carefully shaking loose some of 
the colonial possessions of Old Europe and opening them to US capital. Control of 
productive resources, Bowman suggested, was far more important than territorial 
control (Gowan, 2003b; Smith, 2004). 
 However, the handling of colonial breakdown was necessarily delicate so far as 
US planners were concerned. Initially, the US had hoped that the United Nations 
which it had played such a crucial role in organising would be able to take control of 
the “dependencies”. However, citing the exigencies of anticommunist struggle, the 
US increasingly sought to conserve the colonial authorities. Here, it was the ruling 
class intellectual George Kennan who crystallised the emerging strategic thinking. 
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Just as Spargo had supplied much of the rational for Wilson’s anticommunist stance 
some decades before, so George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” provided the crucial 
ideological lynchpin for America’s anticommunist foreign policy. Kennan’s 
intransigent hostility to the USSR was inescapably bound up with his sense of the 
global racial hierarchy, and the US role in it. He distrusted African Americans and 
Jews, and was repelled by “most Third World Peoples – Asians, Arabs, Latinos and 
Africans – whom he tended to lump together as impulsive, fanatical, ignorant, lazy, 
unhappy, and prone to mental disorders and other biological deficiencies”, and had 
written in 1938 that the US should be turned into a "benevolent despotism" of upper 
class white males, excluding women, immigrants and blacks from the franchise 
(Kovel, 1997: 53; Borstelmann, 1993: 40).  
 In his early Cold War writings, particularly his “Long Telegram” and his more 
famous article “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Kennan argued that the Russian 
Revolution had overthrown "the Westernized upper crust" of the Tsarist elite, and 
revealed a population Orientalised by a century of contact with “Asiatic hordes”. 
Russia had thus became “a typical Oriental despotism”, engaged in a remarkable 
conspiracy against “Western civilization” and the colonial system. He anticipated that 
Russia’s strategy would be to violently weaken or overthrow or subvert Western 
influence “over colonial, backward, or dependent peoples”. The only answer was for 
Americans to accept the “moral and political leadership” that, at any rate, history had 
plainly intended for them (Kovel, 1997: 39-63; Roark, 1971; Borstelmann, 2001: 50). 
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 Were Kennan’s mandarin musings merely indicative of his own prejudices, they 
might be unremarkable. However, what they in fact demonstrate is that the 
anticommunist discourse of American elites was already linked to the preservation of 
white-world supremacy. As David F Schmitz (2006) has shown, the underlying 
assumptions of white superiority were an important component of policymaking in 
the Cold War, even under the much-admired liberal Kennedy administration. Their 
most urgent fear regarding the colonial world was “premature independence”. This 
was linked to the belief that those insufficiently tutored in the art of self-government 
by their white masters – those “immature and unsophisticated” people, as the 
National Security Council described Africans in 1957 – would be easy meat for 
communist takeover. Thus, the vital strategic concepts for US planners were 
“eventual self-determination,” “evolutionary development” and so on. In practice, 
this turned out to be a rationale for supporting the colonial powers. (Schmitz, 2006: 
13; Krenn, 2006: 79-80) As a result, the US acted as a vital prop for European 
colonial allies, above all the British Empire. As William Roger Louis and Ronald 
Robinson write: 
Marshall Plan aid and eventually the Mutual Security programme met the 
otherwise prohibitive charge on the balance of payments of sustaining British 
power overseas up to 1952 and at need thereafter … From 1949 onwards, the 
Pentagon joined the War Office in the traditional imperial Great Game of securing 
the Indian sub-continent’s frontiers from Kabul and Herat to Rangoon and 
Singapore (Louis and Robinson, 2004: 154). 
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 The strategic rationale for this was to assist allies in the struggle against 
communism, and to forestall its triumph in the colonial states. The intellectual 
framework for this approach was supplied by “modernisation theory”, an attempt to 
rival Marxism as a theory of historical development and to demonstrate that 
communism was a “disease of the transition to modernity”. As Schmitz writes: 
one of the leading modernization theorists, member of Kennedy’s national security 
staff, and national security advisor to President Johnson, Walt Whitman Rostow, 
argued, the revolutionary process of modernization in the Third World was when 
these nations were most in danger of falling to communism. The ‘weak 
transitional governments that one is likely to find during this modernization 
process are highly vulnerable to subversion’. The communists were the 
‘scavengers of the modernization process’ who knew that once the ‘momentum 
takes hold in an underdeveloped area – and the fundamental social problems 
inherited from the traditional society are solved – their chances to seize power 
decline’. … Dictatorships, therefore, were necessary in the Third World until the 
modernization process had developed enough to allow ‘these societies [to] choose 
their own version of what we would recognize as a democratic, open 
society’ (Schmitz, 2006: 12). 
 Aside from those arenas where the US chose to embark on direct, violent 
repression, and those where it used repression by proxy, the institutions of 
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international civil society formed a critical terrain of anticommunist struggle for the 
US government. Through Marshall Plan aid and the export of Fordist production 
methods linked to a “productivist” ideology, the American state successfully 
mobilised US labour, as represented by the AFL-CIO, into helping organise its 
hegemony within Europe. Its illicit intervention in the affairs of European Left and 
labour movements is well documented, as is the wider attempt to orchestrate a 
cultural and ideological consensus in favour of an orientation toward “the free world” 
(Rupert, 1995; Wilford, 2003; Carew, 1987: 69; Saunders, 2000). 
 Beyond Europe, the attention of US planners to developing hegemonic strategies 
was limited. For example, the continent of Africa had barely featured except as an 
appendage of Europe in US discussions during the early years of the Cold War. 
“Security” interests on the part of the US were minimal, although American capital 
salivated over the potential market (Metz, 1984). As anticolonial nationalism 
matured, however, the US increasingly came to the conclusion that it would have to 
intervene in order to forestall communist influence, and that organised labour could 
be a key vector for building US hegemony in the colonial world. Nixon’s report 
following his 1957 tour of Africa urged the Eisenhower administration to focus on 
building trade union relations. British trade unions were drafted into the official 
attempts to quarantine the emerging African labour movements against a rising Pan-
Africanism, giving the AFL-CIO the opportunity, working through the anticommunist 
International Congress of Free Trade Unions, to expand US influence. They 
increasingly called for a policy of national independence, partially in competition 
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with British unions for influence, whom they felt were too soft on communists, and 
partially because they feared that without such a pro-active policy “communist” and 
Pan-African sentiment would prevent the US from assuming the dominant role 
(Carew, 1996; Zeleza, 1984). 
Crisis and Breakdown: The ‘Geopolitical Management’ of South-east Asia 
 The region of south-east Asia had long been a source of fascination for American 
race thinking, and a testing bed for its imperial projects. From the annexation of 
Pacific islands to the anti-immigration laws and purges, to the colonisation of the 
Philippines, the US attempted to subordinate parts of “the East” on the basis of its 
extant racial ideologies and techniques, and open it up for investment. Japan’s state-
led “modernization,” a classic instance of uneven and combined development and its 
political management (Allinson and Anievas 2010), was understood by Americans as 
simply the application of “white man methods” by people who remained “savages” 
and “barbarians” as WWII propaganda had it. (Quoted in Krenn 2006, 67) In 
America’s post-war flush of success, it organised its domination of south-east Asia by 
reconstructing the Japanese state along “American” lines in part, it seems, to bring 
the “martial” spirit of the Japanese “race” under control – and by supporting a 
network of clients and colonial allies (Jacobson 2001; Dower 1987; Seymour 2008, 
80-90, 111-117 and 130-142). 
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 The Cold War was bracketed at either end by two major anticommunist wars, 
both in south-east Asia, and both “race wars” in the sense of being strategically bound 
up with the management of crises in white-world supremacy, and in the sense of 
being ideologically permeated by a racist “common sense”. The first major 
anticommunist war that in Korea was at least in part a race war in this tradition.  It 
was a constant theme of Soviet propaganda during this war that the US war was 
driven by the same racism as that by which African Americans were oppressed – but, 
unfortunately, this was not just propaganda. For President Truman, the Koreans were 
“the inheritors of Genghis Khan and Tamerlane, the greatest murderers in the history 
of world”. General McArthur bristled with stereotypes about “the Oriental” and his 
natural propensity to “follow a winner”. General Willoughby lamented that civilised 
Americans were being killed by “simple coolies”, “half-men with blank faces”. To 
another official, North Koreans were “half-crazed automatons”. (Deane, 1999: 29-30) 
Such views formed part of the “common sense” of imperialist statecraft. 
 However, such views were not a major part of the justification for war. The case 
for intervention was based upon the need to defend a Southern anticommunist 
dictatorship against the North Korean forces allied to the USSR. This was essentially 
a war about how Korea would modernise. The country was undergoing a social 
revolution of sorts, and many Koreans admired the USSR as a model of how to, as 
Milovan Djilas put it, “skip over centuries of slavery and backwardness”. (Westad, 
2007: 21; Armstrong, 2003; Cummings, 1981) That was plainly not the path that the 
United States intended and, by deploying anticommunism as the main legitimising 
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argument for intervention, the US successfully organised a hegemonic coalition 
within the United States, and elaborated the most extensive deployment of hegemonic 
operations beyond. It secured a consensus among elites, bypassed the potential 
obstruction of a Dixiecrat-Republican congressional coalition which otherwise would 
have opposed the state-building powers assumed in the context of the war , won a 10
broad coalition of popular support, galvanised an alliance of states, and obtained a 
legal basis through the United Nations. (Bell 2004; Sandler 1999; Mayers 2007; 
Casey 2008). The US thus intervened to divert Korea’s “modernization” process 
away from the communist route. It was not able to entirely extirpate the revolutionary 
movement which had taken power in the north of Korea. However, in defending its 
southern regime, its strategy of supporting authoritarian client regimes in those states 
it deemed not yet ready for full self-government was consolidated (Armstrong, 2003; 
Cummings, 1981; Deane, 1999). 
Insofar as there was opposition within the US to the Korean War when it was 
launched, it was marginal. Beyond the hard Left, incorporating both Communists and 
Trotskyists, some pacifists and women’s groups, and the isolationist Right, “the vast 
majority of Americans simply accepted the war ... as one further consequence of 
global leadership in the fight against Communist aggression.” Even much of the 
progressive and socialist Left, from Henry Wallace to Norman Thomas, supported the 
war, while the Trotskyist Max Shachtman took the idiosyncratic position of opposing 
 Dixiecrats tended to restrict their criticism of Truman to his handling of the war rather than 10
the decision to excecute it. Senator Richard Russell’s investigation of the firing of General 
MacArthur is characteristic in this respect.
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the war, while supporting British involvement because it had a Labour government. 
The Trotskyist Socialist Workers’ Party berated Stalinism in North Korea, but 
nonetheless held that the war was one of “aggression by US imperialism against a 
colonial people”. The Communist-led opposition was weakened and isolated by its 
loyalty to the USSR at just the point that Stalin’s idea of ‘peace’ looked very much 
like imperialism. Indeed, the sharp U-turn made by Communist Party USA (CPUSA) 
from its wartime ‘patriotism’ toward a reconstituted ‘Marxist-Leninism’ in struggle 
against US imperialism was visibly determined by Soviet foreign policy interests. As 
such, and with a febrile anticommunist culture at work, Soviet-aligned international 
efforts to oppose the US intervention through the World Peace Council, though 
enjoying significant international support, made little impact in the US. Fellow 
travellers on the African American Left such as W E B Du Bois, were relatively 
isolated in taking an antiwar stance – the NAACP, on whose board Du Bois still sat, 
voted to support US efforts to “halt Communist aggression in Korea”. They also 
came under attack from the government. Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote to 
rebuke the Peace Information Center for hosting Du Bois, while HUAC issued an 
attack on the peace campaign, claiming that it existed to “confuse and divide the 
American people” in the interests of the enemy. Ultimately, when popular discontent 
with the war did emerge, it was channelled not into support for a popular movement, 
but into Eisenhower’s presidential campaign. Further, the ideological shape of the 
opposition was often an even harder anticommunism than that of the administration: 
Truman either hadn’t gone far enough, or had failed to prevent the initial Communist 
aggression. (Sandler, 1999: 9; Mayers, 2007: 298; Seymour, 2008: 134-5; Shephard, 
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2005: 18-19; Casey, 2008: 75, 139, 205-206, 292-293 & 334-335; Starobin, 1972: 
205-211; Isserman, 1995: 3-31; Wittner, 1993: 184-185; Stueck, 1997: 124; Hall, 
2005: 94; Carew, 2008: 56-57; Horne, 1985: 128-132)  
 The second major anticommunist war, in Vietnam, was likewise part of a racist 
praxis, linked to the maintenance of white-world supremacy. The war began as a 
complex manoeuvre in defence of French colonialism (with the ultimate goal of 
supplanting it). The US sent a total of $3.6bn in aid to the French client Bao Dai until 
1954. This was linked to the official perception of Vietnam as a “medieval country”, 
which colonialism was dragging into modernity. However, as before, the racial 
dynamic was at an ideological level commuted through the discourse of 
anticommunism. Accordingly, the Vietnamese revolution was interpreted as a 
manifestation of a desire to be modern – essentially, to be American – expressed in a 
pathological form as “communism”. The job of the US was to help Vietnam – by 
crushing its revolution – back onto the right track (Krenn 2006, 89-93).  
 As the French withdrew, the US reverted to its pattern of supporting an 
anticommunist client dictator, and shifted its weight behind Ngo Dinh Diem. Diem 
was encouraged to build up a repressive apparatus, killing thousands and jailing over 
150,000 people. The Kennedy administration, belligerent and operating on the 
assumptions of still regnant Cold War orthodoxy, dedicated itself to the development 
of an effective counterinsurgency program. One expression of this was the “Strategic 
Hamlet Program”, similar to the American use of concentration camps for civilians in 
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the Philippines. In under two years, 16,000 such “hamlets” appeared across South 
Vietnam. This was eventually accompanied by aerial attacks and a build-up of troops 
eventually reaching half a million. The escalation was justified in part by racism in 
both the mandarin and demotic registers, with “modernisation theory” providing the 
former, and the “mere gook rule” supplying the latter (Gettleman, Franklin, Young & 
Franklin, 1995: 295; Kolko, 1994: 80-2; Gerson, 2007: 130-166). 
 In this war, Southern, segregationist politicians played an important role in 
supporting the White House’s policy on militantly anticommunist grounds than 
during the Korean War. This was in spite of opposition that these same politicians 
expressed in its early stages, partially on pragmatic grounds and partially on the basis 
of Southern isolationism. However, the anticommunist consensus was already brittle 
by the time the US was seriously engaged in Vietnam, precisely because the success 
of the anticolonial movements and the rise of the civil rights struggle in the southern 
US combined to disrupt the binary of communism vs anticommunism. Certainly, a 
consensus initially held among policymaking elites and allied intellectuals regarding 
the nefarious reach of communism. Labour was broadly in favour of war, and such 
popular criticisms as did emerge were initially muted (Fry, 2015; Small 2002; Tomes 
1998; Levy 1994, 47-51). Even so, the broad, integral unity of diverse classes and 
class sectors that had been successfully organised around anticommunism was 
weakened. 
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 As ever, race did not stop at the water’s edge. The civil rights movement, when it 
did emerge, was intimately tied to anticolonial struggles, and its radicalisation in the 
early Sixties would owe much to their success. The example of India’s independence 
struggles had exerted a profound effect on African American struggles. In the case of 
Martin Luther King, it was Gandhi’s doctrine of non-violent resistance that he 
adopted for the US civil rights movement. “We have found them to be effective and 
sustaining – they work!” (King, King Jr., Carson, Holloran, Luker & Russell, 2005: 5; 
Horne 2008). In 1960, the same year that sit-ins and freedom rides began, a host of 
independent African states came into being: Congo, Benin, Togo, Cameroon, 
Somalia, Niger, Mauritius, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Chad, the Central African 
Republic, Gabon, Senegal, and Mali. The emerging “New Left” paid attention. The 
famous Port Huron declaration of Students for a Democratic Society in 1962 
celebrated the “revolutionary feelings of many Asian, African and Latin American 
Peoples” and the “social sense of organicism characteristic of these upsurges” against 
which American apathy stood in “embarrassing contrast” (Westad, 2007: 106).  
 By 1963, the Organization of African Unity had been formed to represent the 
interests of the newly independent states, a move which would inspire Malcolm X to 
co-found the Organization of Afro-American Unity the following year (X, 1964). The 
‘solid South’ crumbled under this pressure. Segments of the US ruling class, 
including business leaders of the “New South”, viewed segregation as a burden. 
Local state leaders such as Ben West of Nashville were persuaded to oppose 
segregation; others – “pragmatic segregationists” – began to adopt a strategy of 
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implementing racially laden family, crime and welfare policies rather than open 
segregation (Marable, 2007: 67; Woods, 2004: 218-24; Eyes on the Prize 3: Ain't 
Scared of Your Jails (1960-1961); Crespino, 2007). 
 The successes of the civil rights movement provided an infrastructural basis for 
the emerging antiwar movement in the US: a tactical repertoire (civil disobedience), a 
layer of leaders (many antiwar activists having been educated in CORE, or the 
SNCC), and a body of intellectual experience in the realities of white supremacy and 
its centrality to the American system. And when civil rights activists began to 
challenge the US war in Vietnam, they regarded it not as an anticommunist issue, but 
as a race issue. The growth of the antiwar movement, linked to a wider search for 
racial justice, dis-embedded significant popular layers from the anticommunist 
coalition, and began to assemble them into a new, radical coalition which ultimately 
embraced 6 million participants and 25 million sympathisers. In this context, and in 
view of the effective military resistance of the Vietnamese National Liberation Front, 
even the consensus among elites and state-aligned intellectuals did not hold 
(Gettleman, Franklin, Young & Franklin, 1995: 296-304; Zaroulis and Sullivan, 1984: 
27-32; Small, 2002: 5-6). As social struggles escalated, anticommunism could no 
longer link diverse constituencies in a single bloc. The old anticommunist bloc 
disintegrated, some of its elements shaken loose and redistributed into new civil 
rights and antiwar coalitions. The Cold War ‘historic bloc’ was finished, consumed in 




 The Cold War represented a particular transitional moment in the geopolitical 
management of the uneven and combined development of capitalism, in which an 
emerging norm of national self-determination embodied in the legal superstructure of 
the United Nations conflicted with the established norm of white-world supremacy. 
The US ruling class was strategically committed in the long run to replacing formal 
colonial control of non-white states with a hierarchy of self-determining states with 
the US at its apex. Further, it was invested in hegemonic practices designed to win it 
global allies in the struggle against communism, including its claim to oppose 
empires and its insistence that Russia was the most menacing imperialist power. This 
also raised questions about its domestic racial system, which was a significant 
impediment to its ability to win allies in the Third World. However, the domestic 
class system relied upon the maintenance of white supremacy. Further, the US state 
leaders did not merely doubt the capacity of non-whites for self-government: they 
had an interested opposition to national self-determination if it was claimed by forces 
that might be hostile to American capitalist penetration. Finally, their key global allies 
and accomplices in power were themselves the colonial powers.  
 Cold War anticommunism did not resolve all of these conflicts, but it provided a 
framework within which they could be managed for a period of time. It ensured the 
hegemony of the US ruling class domestically. It consolidated a “historic bloc”, a 
broad alliances of classes and groups organised around an ideologically defining 
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mission, that of resisting communism. This suppressed brewing domestic conflicts 
over segregation for a period of time, and provided an infrastructure of consent for 
US geopolitical management, necessary for extensive military investments and 
deployments. It further provided the bedrock upon which the US could then cultivate 
allies, and seek to deploy hegemonic strategies within allied states. Ultimately, 
anticommunism supplied the narrative ballast for the deployment of outright violence 
where US strategists deemed it necessary. 
 However, the Cold War “historic bloc” had always been predicated on an unstable 
unity, its global reach dependent in part upon the tacit, or explicit, acceptance that 
white supremacy was preferable to the perceived threat of communist rule. The 
bargain was that apartheid, colonialism and Jim Crow would be tolerated so long as it 
meant defending the institutions of democracy elsewhere. The accelerating break-up 
of the colonial system was ruinous to this logic, and hastened the fall of the “solid 
South”. It broke the chain of equivalents linking anticommunism and democracy, and 
that associating democracy with whiteness. The ability of anticommunism to cement 
hegemonic alliances in defence of racial hierarchy had been lost. As a strategy for 
managing the problems of uneven and combined development, it was viable only so 
long as it could defend white supremacy in the United States by interpreting and 
organising social antagonism along the axis of communism vs anticommunism. Once 
this binary was disrupted by anticolonial and civil rights struggles, the result of 
mobilising anticommunism in defence of white supremacy was no longer the 
sanctification of the latter, but the clear discrediting of the former. 
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 In this chapter, I began by identifying an ‘overlap’ between three social 
formations, three racial states, wherein structurally quite similar practices of 
anticommunism were deployed at the zenith of the Cold War, and deployed in similar 
ways to red-hunt in anti-racist movements as part of a wider conservative political 
strategy. I linked this overlap to, among other things, a structural logic, that of an 
international system undergoing serial transitions: transition from pre-capitalist 
structures to either capitalist or possibly socialist modernity in many states; transition 
from colonialism to a legal norm of national self-determination; transition European 
to American dominance. Anticommunism, made possible at the international level by 
the appearance of a powerful state describing itself as communist, enabled the 
management of these transitions, the political control of decolonising societies, the 
suppression and disorganisation of opponents, and the centralisation and 
augmentation of political power both in the US and among its allies. This was the 
context in which the South both acted and was acted upon in the Cold War. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Geo-Economic Unity of ‘Jim Crow’ Country 
This chapter outlines the transformations and transitions taking place in the 
South, during the period following World War II. It deals with this on two levels; the 
spatial-economic matrix of production, and the territoriality of state power. Jim Crow 
was a particular way of territorialising state power in the management of production, 
and this chapter argues that the crisis of the spatial-economic matrix in which Jim 
Crow was formed, while it had been developing for some time, was accelerated in the 
Cold War period. The social basis of Jim Crow had been eroded by the crisis in 
cotton, New Deal programmes and the industrialisation accelerated by war. One 
means of adapting to this was to accept gradual, piecemeal reforms of the Jim Crow 
structure, and this did happen to an extent before Brown v the Board of Education. It 
was also reflected in the conservative-adaptive strategies of ‘practical 
segregationists’ in the years after that decision. Another means was 
countersubversion, which also necessitated the redeployment of state apparatuses in 
relation to a new, emerging right-wing coalition, and ultimately brought the Southern 
states into conflict not only with civil rights actors, but also with the courts and the 
Federal government. Anticommunism thus appears here both as a means of 
managing and suppressing the effects of transitional processes, and as a means of 
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cohering a new social basis for the operation of state power and the pioneering of 
new representational strategies. Out of these struggles emerged a new ‘spatio-
temporal fix’ for Southern capitalism. 
Introduction: the violent birth of Jim Crow. 
In 1898, a notorious putsch in Wilmington, North Carolina, asserted white 
supremacy with compulsory effect. The Tar Heel state had been built upon African 
American slave labour, overwhelmingly concentrated in tobacco plantations. Within 
fifteen years of the end of the Civil War, and the fall of slavery, a new economic 
paradigm was emerging, centred on industrial textile production.  
This corresponded to a new racial management of labour as, beginning in the 
same period, Southern states began to develop a form of segregation colloquially 
known as ‘Jim Crow’ in order to suppress black political participation and control 
black labour. While firms operated a strict ‘colour bar’ denying black workers access 
to ‘skilled’ occupations, states implemented racial ‘separation’ laws and worked to 
deprive African Americans of access to the vote. In North Carolina, this 
subordination of African Americans was helped along by paramilitary organisations 
called the ‘Red Shirts’, who targeted black political meetings. 
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 The economic logic of disenfranchisement was expressed by a Mississippian of 
the era: “If the Negro is permitted to engage in politics, his usefulness as a laborer is 
at an end. He can no longer be controlled or utilised.” But it also had important 
political and ideological effects inasmuch as it bound white workers to white 
managers, the latter perceived as the racial allies of the former. To have a ‘skilled’ 
textile occupation was a racial ‘privilege’ in this sense: such were the ‘wages of 
whiteness’. (Wood, 1986: 118; Brattain, 2001: 47; Roediger, 1991)  This shift was 
ratified at the highest level of politico-legal authority. By 1896, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Plessy vs Ferguson had given a legal mandate to segregation. It was also 
coterminous with a new phase in race-making as, in 1898, the year of the massacre, 
the US had begun to build an overseas colonial empire, seizing territorial possessions 
from Spain.  
 The major challenge to the emerging system of white supremacy came from the 
Populist movement, based on a biracial alliance off farmers and workers, which 
sought to resist the growing power of the region’s capitalist class. (Hahn, 2006) 
North Carolina’s People’s Party was launched out of the Farmers’ Alliance in 
September 1892, and rapidly made significant advances so that, by the 1894 election, 
they had formed an electoral coalition with state Republicans known as Fusion and 
were able to take control of the state house. Though the white-led wing of the 
Populist movement was dominant, it was articulated with a well-organised African 
American current, and a thriving black civil society infrastructure; and though it was 
dominated by landowners, it mobilised a mass of landless poor. (Hahn, 2006; Ali, 
 152
2010) Wilmington was a particular stronghold of Fusion candidates as the city had an 
African American majority which had successfully taken positions in the state, the 
judiciary and the business class. However, by 1896, the movement was already 
beginning to subside. This was in part because of a Democratic Party strategy which 
in Gramscian terms could be categorised as ‘transformism’. That is, by offering their 
own version of Populist policies such as free silver, the party of the dominant classes 
shook loose elements of a subaltern coalition, neutralising their oppositional content 
and incorporating them into a pro-capitalist and white-supremacist politics. 
 Such was the context in which the Wilmington coup could take place. The 
occasion for it was the local elections of 1898. White Democrats fought the election 
explicitly on the basis of violent white supremacy. The local Democratic newspaper 
called for the lynching of a thousand African Americans each day, in order to deter 
black men from making sexual advances toward white women. (Hossfeld, 2005: 5) 
The dominant tone was that black people were a threat, not just to the sanctity of 
white women, but to the position of white workers, and to a whole civilisational 
edifice purportedly safeguarded by white supremacy. The threat could only be 
extirpated with brutal repression. Alfred Waddell, a local politician, exhorted white 
voters on the night before the election: 
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“If you find the Negro out voting, tell him to leave the polls, and if he refuses, kill 
him, shoot him down in his tracks. We shall win tomorrow if we have to do it with 
guns.” (Franklin, 1998) 
 The resulting collapse in turnout among African American voters provided the 
opening for conspiracy planned by local Democrats to overthrow the city council 
under the rubric of the ‘White Declaration of Independence’. Remaining Fusion 
representatives were driven out of office immediately, many of their supporters either 
shot or forced out of the city and put on trains. Additional trains were put on to 
facilitate the ensuing exodus of African Americans from the city. The McKinley 
government refused to reverse the coup d'état, and over the next two years a series of 
Jim Crow laws were implemented in the city and state-wide to keep African 
Americans away from the polls. (Hossfeld, 2005: 5-6) Thus was entrenched a 
politico-legal and economic order, in which the different ‘levels’ of the social 
formation were organised around white supremacy. 
 In this case, a number of processes were condensed in which a new ‘geo-
economic’ unity in the South was established. In the gendered, racist explosion of 
countersubversive violence, an emerging pattern of productive relations and its 
relationship to territory, political authority and representation was consolidated. In 
this chapter, we encounter that ‘geo-economic’ unity in a state of crisis, and see 
where Jim Crow (as the dominant politico-legal order) and anticommunism (as the 
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mode of countersubversion) converge in the organisation of political authority, space 
and productive relations. Here, the emphasis is on representing the unity of the South 
as a “differentiated geo-economic organism” (Gramsci), a conjunction of matrices of 
production, political authority and the resistant realities of territory. This chapter 
proceeds through different moments of the problem of the South’s ‘geo-economic’ 
unity. 
 I begin by attempting to demystify a problem posed by the defenders of Jim 
Crow: that of ‘states rights’. This requires unpacking the assumptions behind 
‘sovereignty’ and its relationship to territorial power, and in fact delving into the very 
nature of ‘the state’ itself. Assuming I explain this aright, my next step is to 
investigate the relationship between modes of production and the organisation of 
space, with specific reference to the development of the capitalist mode of production 
in the US South amid its particular geographical features. This discussion will focus 
specifically on the industrial transformation of North Carolina, as the most 
economically advanced, ‘progressive’ state in the South. Following this, I look at the 
relationship between territorial political authority and production processes in the 
South, especially since Jim Crow practices fulfilled a “dual function as a means of 
political subordination and a method of labor control and allocation”. (Korstad, 2003: 
57) Finally, I look at the implications of all this for modes of political representation 
in southern states, and the role of anticommunism in conserving these in the post-war 
era. 
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The Materiality of ‘States Rights’. 
Out of the vast range of human social capacities – possible ways in which social 
life could be lived – state activities more or less forcibly ‘encourage’ some whilst 
suppressing, marginalising, eroding, undermining others. Schooling for instance 
comes to stand for education, policing for order, voting for political participation. 
Fundamental social classifications, like age and gender, are enshrined in law, 
embedded in institutions, routinised in administrative procedures and symbolised in 
rituals of state. Certain forms of activity are given the official seal of approval, others 
are situated beyond the pale. This has cumulative, and enormous, cultural 
consequences; consequences for how people identify (in many cases, have to 
identify) themselves and their 'place' in the world. … We call this moral regulation: a 
project of normalising, rendering natural, taken for granted, in a word 'obvious', what 
are in fact ontological and epistemological premises of a particular and historical 
form of social order. ... Centrally, state agencies attempt to give unitary and unifying 
expression to what are in reality multifaceted and differential historical experiences 
of groups within society, denying their particularity. (Corrigan & Sayer, 1985, p. 4) 
 "My fellow citizens, we are now an occupied territory. In the name of God, whom 
we all revere, in the name of liberty we hold so dear, in the name of decency, which 
we all cherish, what is happening in America?” Governor Orval Faubus’s lament, in 
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response to the deployment of 101st Airborne in May 1957, to enforce school de-
segregation in Little Rock, Arkansas, signalled his political reinvention. From being a 
‘moderate’, baited by opponents in the Democratic right as a ‘leftist’ and even a 
‘communist’, typical of a takeover of the Democratic Party by the “pinks” and 
“subversives” as Strom Thurmond put it, he became a southern nationalist and 
McCarthyite.  
 This volte face was conducted under sustained pressure from other Southern 
leaders such as the stalwart anticommunist, segregationist and millionaire plantation 
owner, Senator James Eastland of Mississippi, and Governor Marvin Griffin of 
Georgia, who demanded Southern unity in the face of what they decried as a march of 
power to Washington. Segregationists had long argued that an assault on ‘states’ 
rights’ was being supported by communists anxious to usurp the resulting power of 
the centralised state. Senator Eastland’s charge against Faubus, not substantially 
untrue, was that he was a ‘border state’ governor who compromised with the 
Washington elites. By contrast, Eastland boasted that he used his power in 
Washington, particularly on the civil rights subcommittee, to subvert the law: “Yes … 
[I] became the boss of the committee that had all the civil-rights bills. And ever since 
then, the CIO and these organizations have been yapping and yapping that I was 
arrogant and high-hatted with them, and so I was; and they said I broke the law, and 
so I did.”  
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 As importantly, Eastland used his position as chair of the Senate Internal Security 
Subcommittee (SISS), and later the Senate Judiciary Committee of which SISS 
formed a powerful subcommittee, to investigate individuals and organisations 
involved in attempting to de-segregate education for communist affiliation. The goal 
was to persuade Congress to defend states’ rights and to furnish the South with the 
repressive power to crush the civil rights movement. Faubus availed himself of the 
fruits of these investigations when he alleged that Lee and Grace Lorch, opponents of 
segregation who had been involved in supporting the Little Rock Nine, were 
communists. (Woods, 2004, pp. 72-3; Clark, 1976; Brown, 2002; Onufriu, 2007; 
Sieroty, 1956) 
 Faubus’s appeal to the discourse of states’ rights implied a particular conception 
of state power and its organisation. For, while the statement invoked the memory of 
Union troops stationed in the South during Reconstruction, implying that the Federal 
government was at war with Southern states, we can surmise that Faubus was sincere 
when he later said that he “had no intention of challenging the federal union”. This is 
because the liberal-constitutionalist image of “federal union”, central to the discourse 
of ‘states rights’, was of a decentralised, competitive pooling of sovereignties under a 
covenant. According to this juridical conceit, the states of the Union retained all 
sovereign powers which had not been delegated to the central state – an important 
aspect of the legal resistance to Brown vs. the Board of Education (Lewis, 2004, pp. 
33-4)  
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 So, to approach the role of Southern states in conserving Jim Crow, and 
particularly the position of anticommunist practices within this, we must first account 
for the particular political regime in the United States, through which the southern 
states had been able to develop as sites of power and resistance: the federal 
constitutional republic. It has been argued that a territory as vast and differentiated as 
that covered by the United States called for some form of federal regime. (Wood, 
2004, p. 127) Yet, the administrative division of large and differentiated territories 
varies enormously, while federal structures are present in relatively small national 
states. The interpretation that treats federalism as a function of scale and 
differentiation is related to the liberal-constitutional (i.e. juridical) image of the 
central state being the sum of pooled sovereignties deriving from local formations.  
 I will reject this image. The state, as such, is an illusion, a “mythicized 
abstraction” attributing an artificial unity to an ensemble of institutions and 
techniques. (Corrigan & Sayer, 1985, p. 7; Foucault, 1994, p. 220) It is more useful, 
at a certain level, to speak of ‘the state effect’ or the ‘the state idea’ – that is, of our 
comprehension of ‘the state’ as an end-product of a series of historical processes, in 
the sense described by Foucault: 
“The state does not have an essence. The state is not a universal nor in itself an 
autonomous source of power. The state is nothing else but the effect, the profile, 
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the mobile shape of a perpetual statification or statifications, in the sense of 
incessant transactions which modify, or move, or drastically change, or insidiously 
shift sources of finance, modes of investment, decision-making centres, forms and 
types of control, relationships between local powers, the central authority, and so 
on. In short, the state has no heart, as we well know, but not just in the sense that it 
has no feelings, either good or bad, but it has no heart in the sense that it has no 
interior. The state is nothing else but the mobile effect of a regime of multiple 
governmentalities.” (Foucault, 2008: 77) 
 There is a “misplaced concreteness” (Alonso, 1994) implied by the definite 
article, ‘the state’, in which the state could be mistakenly comprehended as an 
organism, object or instrument. This reification of the state has etymological origins 
in the English Revolution, wherein the term ‘state’ developed as a negative, critical 
term in contrast with the ‘society’ of free individuals. (Williams, 1983, pp. 292-3) 
This state-society dichotomy is reinforced by the juridical conception of the state as a 
sovereign legal entity, which lends ‘the state’ its concreteness, its definite boundaries, 
its institutional determinacy. For in this perspective, the state is seen to be reducible 
to its ‘public’ core, such as a deliberative chamber, police, courts and the armed 
forces. However, this is a mystification. The state covers much more than its public 
core; its presence is felt in a wide array of relations and institutions, some of which 
are formally ‘private’; its ‘strategic field’ organises ‘sites of power’, some of which 
are apparently autonomous from politics.  (Poulantzas, 2000, pp. 36-7) The fact that 
this mystification is also that to which defenders of Jim Crow habitually turned in the 
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defence of white supremacy, makes the analytical imperative to see beyond it all the 
more urgent. 
 The materiality of ‘states rights’ must reside somewhere other than in the 
‘sovereignty’ of local states, and I will argue that it rests in the specific relation of 
Southern states to the national state. Poulantzas (2014) argued that the state consists 
of a set of material practices and institutions in which are condensed the class 
relations prevalent throughout the social formation in which it emerges. This takes a 
number of forms. First of all, the state is situated within a social division of labour 
characterised by a fundamental cleavage between intellectual (executive) labour and 
manual (menial) labour, as ‘intellectual labour’ incarnate. That is, while capital 
monopolises knowledge in the organisation of production processes, the state 
monopolises political and administrative knowledge concerning the organisation of 
society as a whole. Secondly, the state’s material frame of reference reproduces the 
spatio-temporal order of capitalist society within itself, producing at a politico-legal 
level the ‘effect of isolation’ that competition between dependent producers enacts in 
productive relations, in a sense that is “terrifyingly real”. At the same time, it 
incorporates isolated subjects into a corporate body, a people/nation. (Poulantzas, 
1978) Thirdly, as a form of legal organisation, it embodies axioms for what Corrigan 
and Sayer call the “moral regulation” of social life, its axioms materialised in the 
state’s simultaneous monopolisation of public violence. It thus produces the 
“ontological and epistemological premises” of the social order in which it has arisen.  
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 Finally, as a territorial body it organises the space in a quite different pattern to 
that of the feudal state, in which the labourer is fixed to the land and the unity of the 
terrain is secured through the sovereign as the incarnation of the deity. In the 
capitalist state, the labourer is freed from the land, but is instantly enmeshed in a grid 
of spaces, sites of production and reproduction. The territory is thus divided into a 
matrix of serial, imperfectly ‘homogenous’ temporal spaces produced by the division 
of labour into abstract, equivalent units of labour-time. This matrix is continually 
marked by new closures and segmentations, fresh re-territorialisation, and is limited 
by a moveable frontier demarcating insides and outsides. The capitalist state is also 
capable of internalising those frontiers, creating spaces within itself for the 
management of the non- or anti-national – concentration camps within Europe being 
the supreme incarnation of this logic. (Bretthauer, 2011; Poulantzas, 2000; Corrigan 
& Sayer, 1985) These practices organise every aspect of social life, from production 
and exchange, to education, family and sociality, ensuring the simple reproduction 
and extended reproduction of capitalist productive relations. What is specific to these 
practices, however, is the way in which they carry out this organisation as a form of 
“moral regulation”, that is, as the symbolic organisation of social life and the 
production of forms of subjectivity and affect presupposed by the capitalist mode of 
production. These practices, in sum, are nothing other than “politically organized 
subjection,” embodied in institutional sites of power distributed through the spatio-
temporal matrix. (Corrigan & Sayer, 1985) 
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 In light of the above, the local state in a federal formation must be seen as a “site 
of power” within a unified and centralised state field, an administrative space 
“containing certain institutions materializing certain apparatuses”, a “specific and 
historically determined realization of the relations of force between the classes within 
the totality of the social formation designated by the [national] state.” Whereas liberal 
theory would posit a decentralised model of power structured around inter-state 
competition, the above would indicate that local state autonomy is “subordinate to 
central state authority”. (Legare, 1982) This is not to say that local state autonomy is 
therefore illusory. Rather, it represents a particular distribution of power within the 
field of the national state. And to the extent that this relative autonomy is substantive, 
a consequence is that local states materialise not only the relations of forces within 
the social formation as a whole, but also the balance of political and class forces 
pertinent to the local situation that it governs. Nor is it to say that inter-state 
competition has no bearing on the role of the local state. On the contrary, it is 
precisely through the local state’s dependence on the central state (for investment and 
capital allocations, but also for legal powers) that such competition is expressed. 
Further, the localisation of these sites of power, and their appearance as “a small-
scale spatial analogue of the central state”, has an important function in the state’s 
organisation of hegemony. The division of the state into territorial units with local 
forms of representation is crucial in permitting the re-division of class antagonisms 
into geographical antagonisms. Nor is this re-division merely at the level of 
representation. The more powerful local states will tend to be those with the dominant 
class forces geographically clustered in them, and as a result will tend to be better 
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equipped to compete for resources and support within the central state. The relations 
of local ‘sites of power’ to one another and to the centralised state apparatus – that is, 
the precise organisation of their unity – will reflect spatially organised relations of 
class domination and subordination. Finally, the local state plays a very important 
role in the central state’s legitimation function, incorporating local populations into 
manageable processes of governance, while also permitting the displacement of crises 
accumulated in the central government onto local states. (Dear & Clark, 1981) 
 This understanding of the state more readily explains the conduct of the Federal 
government and southern states in relation to segregation, and the anticommunist 
practices deployed in its defence.  Southern states were, on the one hand, dependent 
on the central state for the legal, political and ideological weapons that it deployed in 
the defence of segregation. The anticommunist arsenal, ranging from the ideological 
practices of the state, including loyalty oaths, the ideology of ‘Americanism’, and the 
representation of communism as a clear and present danger to national security, to the 
HUAC structure and the committees of investigation, was primarily organised in the 
central state. Further, only with the indulgence of the President, Congress and 
Supreme Court was it possible for segregation to be imposed and perpetuated. On the 
other hand, the regional organisation of white supremacy created the vertical 
solidarity among whites that made the South such a solid component of the Cold War 
hegemonic bloc. Southern politicians seeking to defend their system were not reticent 
in reminding lawmakers in Washington of the South’s pronounced patriotism, 
militarism and vigilant policing of the sources of popular opposition to this bloc. 
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The territoriality of southern capitalism 
 A common image in the theorisation of space and territory is that of ‘two 
powers’, capitalist and territorial. This dyad manifests itself today in theories of the 
‘new imperialism’ developed by Harvey (2003) and Arrighi (2009). However, it also 
appears in sociological work on the relationship between states and economies. For 
Lefebvre, the relationship between the state and space has to be constituted along 
several axes.  First, there is the production of a national space itself, a national 
territory that bears the marks of human generations, classes, political forces, etc.  Of 
course, the capitalist state by no means coincides with the nation – but as we will see, 
this is beside the point.  Capitalist states organise territory as national space.  Second, 
the state constitutes within the territory a matrix of institutional spaces appropriate for 
a social division of labour, and the imperatives of political dominance.  Each of these 
spaces, from the borough to the post office to the police station, condenses a system 
of social expectations and responses, which become so 'natural' and 'obvious' that 
they are never articulated.  Third, the state composes a 'mental' or imaginary space, a 
set of representations through which people live their relationship to the people-
nation, the state and the territory. 
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  According to Lefebvre, the spatiality of the state constantly comes into conflict 
with "the pre-existent economic space that it encounters", "spontaneous poles of 
growth, historic towns, commercialized fragments of space that are sold in 'lots'": 
"In the chaos of relations among individuals, groups, class fractions, and classes, 
the state tends to impose a rationality, its own, which has space as its privileged 
instrument. The economy is thus recast in spatial terms – flows (of energy, raw 
materials, labor power, finished goods, trade patterns, etc.) and stocks (of gold and 
capital, investments, machines, technologies, stable clusters of various jobs, etc.). 
The state tends to control flows and stocks by ensuring their coordination. In the 
course of a threefold process (growth – i.e., expansion of the productive forces – 
urbanisation, or the formation of massive units of production and consumption; 
and spatialisation), a qualitative leap occurs: the emergence of the state mode of 
production (SMP) (Le mode de production étatique). The articulation between the 
SMP and space is thus crucial. It differs from that between previous modes of 
production (including capitalism) and their manner of occupying natural space 
(including modifying it through social practice). Something new appears in civil 
society and in political society, in production and in state institutions. This must be 
given a name and conceptualized. We suggest that this rationalization and 
socialization of society has assumed a specific form, which can be termed: 
politicization, statism."  (Lefebvre, 2002: 85) 
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  This concept of the 'state mode of production' strikes me as theoretically 
extravagant, stretching the concept of the mode of production beyond breaking point. 
Nevertheless, the thrust of this is clear: there are two spatial logics of power, one 
spontaneous, random, commercial and capitalist, coming 'from below'; the other 
planned, ordered, rationalised, non-capitalist, coming 'from above’.  Equally, some of 
the inspiration for this distinction may have to do with the work of the geographer G 
William Skinner, and the sociologist Charles Tilly, who extrapolated from Skinner's 
conclusions.  Tilly wrote: 
"G. William Skinner portrays the social geography of late imperial China as the 
intersection of two sets of central-place hierarchies ... The first, constructed 
largely from the bottom up, emerged from exchange; its overlapping units 
consisted of larger and larger market areas centered on towns and cities of 
increasing size. The second, imposed mainly from the top down, resulted from 
imperial control; its nested units comprised a hierarchy of administrative 
jurisdictions. Down to the level of the hsien, or county, every city had a place in 
both the commercial and the administrative hierarchy. Below that level, even the 
mighty Chinese Empire ruled indirectly via its gentry. In the top-down system, we 
find the spatial logic of coercion. In the bottom-up system, the spatial logic of 
capital. We have seen two similar hierarchies at work repeatedly in the unequal 
encounter between European states and cities.” (Tilly, 1990: 127) 
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  Again, it seems that the spatial logic of capital is identical with the spatial logic 
of commerce, a spontaneous system of flows, coming from below, 'bottom-up'; while 
the spatial logic of the state is rationalising, ordering, coercive, 'top-down'.  Two 
spatial logics, two types of power, each so distinct that, for Lefebvre at least, the 
state's type of power even rises to the level of being a mode of production.  
  
As against this approach, and the better to conceptualise the relationship between 
territorial authority and production in the ‘Jim Crow’ South, I want to suggest that 
there is nothing particularly special about territory. Territory is one moment in the 
organisation of a social formation, one of the physical realities organised under a 
mode of production, or under several articulated modes of production. I will argue 
that the capitalist mode of production has a distinctive ‘territorial logic’ which found 
particular forms in the US South. The ‘territorial logic’ of a mode of production is, of 
course, actualised in terrains marked by the certain resistant physical realities. 
Geographical features such as mountain ranges, plains, and fast-flowing streams, 
make certain associations and certain types of power more likely than others. Thus, 
for example, the shift toward textile production in North Carolina was facilitated by 
the abundance of rapid flowing streams, hardwood forests, and inexpensive land. 
(Bennett & Patton, 2008: 96) 
 Nonetheless, capitalism doesn’t merely impose a new organisation on territorial 
entities which otherwise remain essentially the same; it rather takes hold of and alters 
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their materiality.  This is true of all the spatial units that occur under capitalism. 
Castells (1977), in his denunciation of ’urban theory’ for presuming that the urban 
retained the same content, the same meaning, through centuries of change, pointed 
out that urban space meant something quite different in medieval Europe; towns and 
cities represented a different spatial organisation of the social division of labour. 
  In Marx’s terms, the social division of labour is distinct from the technical 
division of labour, in that it arises from social functions related to class.  Under the 
feudal mode of production, the social division of labour is organised around 
personalised bonds between the feudal lord and the peasant or serf.  The major form 
of extraction was directly political – the ruling class took tribute by means of 
coercion – and this tended to produce both a parcellisation of political authority and 
disarticulation of space.  The rural-urban divide, the patchwork of spaces ranging 
from estates and small towns to great commercial centres and ports to walled cities, 
condensed a particular social division of labour.  In the countryside, the producer was 
bound to the soil working for nobles of various rank on estates of varying size with 
porous frontiers and no clear boundaries.  Towns varied greatly in size and function; 
some were enclaves of relative commercial freedom, particularly port towns 
connected to world markets; smaller towns were usually abutments to large feudal 
estates.  Their inhabitants did not live off the land and produce tribute, but rather 
lived off petty commodity manufacture, or various types of trade serving the luxury 
consumption of the feudal ruling class.  (On the rural-urban divide in the middle ages, 
see Hilton, 1992).  The major form of ideological dominance being religious, there 
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were overlapping frameworks of sacred and secular power, the church acting as 
landlord, tithe collector, and symbolic guarantor of the unity of the state as the body 
of Christ.  This specific articulation of economic, political and ideological power was 
also the basis for the checkered system of miscellaneous polities, from communes  to 
city-states to empires.  So, the territorialisation of political power under feudalism, 
based on bonds to lord and land, was such that spaces tended to be irregular, 
reversible, turned in on themselves (though bonds to lord and land) yet 
simultaneously open (through extensive migration across intersecting boundaries). 
  Where the capitalist mode of production took root, however, producers obtained 
their famous dual freedom, from both lord (bondage) and land (the means of labour); 
they were drawn into relations of production mediated through exchange, selling their 
labour power to capitalists who procured it as just one element in a productive 
process intended to produce a profit.  However, as Poulantzas (2014) pointed out, this 
did not entail deterritorialisation; such a schema relied on a naturalist image in which 
territory was assumed to have a continuous meaning, connotatively linked to 
‘rootedness’ in determinate plots of land.  Rather, the capitalist division of labour 
entailed a different type of territorialisation.  Production, circulation and exchange 
now demanded a spatial matrix of imperfectly homogenised sites, segments of space 
each carefully delimited by clear frontier marking insides and outsides and linked to a 
social division of labour – factories, hubs, supply chains, shopping centres, terraces, 
conurbations, condominiums, and so on.  So while the movements of money, capital 
and labour would tend to push beyond these spaces, they must cross frontiers in order 
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to do so.  This system of boundaries is necessary to organise the labour force, the 
distribution and storage of goods, communications, transport, consumption, 
residences, and so on.  It is necessary to help regularise an already anarchic system of 
production and minimise its dysfunctions: for example, they help impose a general 
sedentarisation on the labour force (Scott, 2002) that makes its supply more 
predictable and its constituents intelligible. 
  The specific combination of cooperative and competitive relations in the division 
of labour also has effects on the spatial matrix.  Production, distribution and exchange 
must necessarily take place in a cooperative manner, meaning that capital units are 
locked in a relation of interdependence.  This will produce a tendency toward 
clustering, as functionally associated capitals reduce their distance from one another: 
it makes sense, for instance, that large manufacturing enterprises would tend to 
cluster in industrial estates near large workforces with access to main road; or that 
commercial enterprises would cluster on high streets in pedestrian and motorist 
accessible centres where consumption can take place.   (On the ‘clumpy’ distribution 
of capitals, see Ashman, 2006). On the other hand, this cooperative effort is 
structured by competitive accumulation.  Some capitals will succeed better than 
others, and over the long-term there will be a concentration and centralisation of 
capitals, which themselves attract chains of supporting industries, producing spaces 
(towns, cities, even countries) which work as privileged centres of productive capital, 
and by extension other spaces that are underdeveloped and neglected. 
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  Political authority under capitalism, rather than being directly embedded in those 
sites through a chain of significations linking land to labourer to lord, acquired a 
formal separation or relative autonomy from them.  Indeed, part of its role was to 
help constitute this new spatial matrix by standing in a formal sense ‘outside’ it, while 
‘intervening’ constantly.  The scare quotes are necessary, because it is clear that in no 
real sense does the state have an external relationship to the spheres of production or 
exchange.  This is where the state-derivation approach (Holloway & Picciotto, 1978) 
produces an important insight: breaking with the fetishised notion of the state, with 
the legal, constitutional image of the state as simply an external guardian of civil 
society, it treats the state as a social relationship, actively involved in the constitution 
of the totality of social relationships in part by separating off aspects of them and 
deeming them ‘political’ as opposed to ‘economic’.  This is consistent with Corrigan 
and Sayer’s important argument that ‘the state’ is a ‘mythicized abstraction’; it is 
through the state relation itself that the social categories are produced to give it its 
seeming legal and institutional determinacy. 
  Still, despite the above, and despite the spatial metaphor deployed, this ‘standing 
outside’ adverts to a real political relationship which is the state’s relative autonomy 
from social classes.  As Offe put it, this relative autonomy is necessary to capitalism 
because only a “fully harmonious economic system that did not trigger self-
destructive processes of socialization could tolerate the complete positive 
 172
subordination of the normative-ideological and political systems to itself."   (Offe, 
1984: 49) 
 It is the fact that capitalist production is not a self-sufficient system, that it has 
inherent crisis tendencies, and arguably the fact that is articulated with other systems 
(ecological, biological, etc.), which makes it so inherently unstable and requires a 
state with the freedom to provide a spatio-temporal fix. (Jessop, 2008)  Another 
relevant feature of capitalist production is the ‘isolation effect’ it produces in social 
classes.  Because it is a system of competitive accumulation among many producers, 
and because capital is constitutively divided into fractions, the capitalist class finds it 
impossible to constitute its political dominance over the popular classes without the 
state, which cannot therefore be an ‘instrument’ or ‘tool’ for the capitalist class as 
such.   So the apparent extrusion of political authority from the organisation of the 
spatial matrices of production, circulation and consumption is actually nothing other 
than the formal separation of the political from the economic; the state remains 
deeply involved in and articulated with the processes of capital accumulation, 
constituting the segments of space through its schools, police, armed forces, councils, 
parking authorities, free enterprise zones, etc.  And through its action it seeks to unify 
and homogenise those spaces; but how? 
  In the capitalist mode of production, the dominant form of ideology is no longer 
religious but political; in normal circumstances, the capitalist state presents itself as a 
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popular, representative state (even if not always democratic).  It does so firstly by 
binding itself to a nation, an ‘imagined community’, usually with a shared language. 
But to represent the nation as such, it must dissolve classes at an ideological level 
into individualised subjects, who are then cemented together through the state; the 
dominant ideological form this takes is legal; the law produces the ‘free and equal’ 
subject of the bourgeois nation-state.  This is connected to the enclosure of a 
‘national’ space, which is obviously by no means a natural space (though of course 
national expansiveness is necessarily responsive to natural resources, and the spatial 
matrix of production is warped around them).  Just as the segments of space at the 
level of factories, bureaucratic offices or towns are circumscribed by a clear frontier 
as part of the logic of organising the social division of labour, so the state constitutes 
the national space by erecting a frontier around it, a system of exclusion and filtered 
admission (of labour, goods, etc) which is operated on behalf of the nation.   
  Not only that, but the state effectively operates a system of internal borders, 
whereby those who are deemed non-national or anti-national can be confined, 
brutalised, hyper-exploited, etc. – this can range from detention centres for asylum 
seekers to concentration camps; from Jim Crow laws restricting movement to secret 
prisons.  This too has a certain relationship to the social division of labour, insofar as 
the latter is partially constituted by politics and ideology.  An example would be the 
stratification of labour forces according to principles of race, nationality, religion, 
gender, ethnicity, and so on, in a way that enhances the political dominance of capital 
over labour and increases the rate of exploitation of all workers over the long-term. 
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(Allen, 2012)  As Roediger and Esch’s (2012) account of ‘race management’ 
demonstrates, this is not something that simply takes place at the level of the state; 
such strategies are implemented and experimented with directly in productive 
enterprises.  But the state also develops strategies for the control of labour forces, for 
example by obstructing the mobility of some workers to discourage migration at 
some points or render migrant workers insecure at others, or implementing material 
incentives in a gendered way so as to preserve a family structure in which women 
perform the labour of reproducing labour (ie maintaining a household, raising 
children, feeding male workers etc).  The system of both internal and external 
frontiers is part of the organisation and disciplining of the pyramid. 
  This directs one’s attention to what the legal concept of the border, as simply an 
arbitrary political cleavage separating nation from non-nation, obscures: the fact that 
the frontier is a set of social (economic, political, ideological) relations, mediated 
through the state, between the contending classes bound by it; between the many 
capitals based within it and those beyond it; between national oppressed and 
dominant groups, and those beyond the nation; and between social formations unified 
by respective national states, whether imperialist or non-imperialist.  The 
transgression of frontiers also represents one moment in a given social relationship, 
be it oppression (refugee flows), exploitation (labour migration), social resistance and 
class struggle (breaking out or breaking in), or imperialism (invasion, bombing). 
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  In the study of state formations, territoriality is something that one almost takes 
for granted. But the spatial aspects of state formation, comprising the differentiation 
of the geographical terrain, the distribution of natural resources, the clustering of 
productive activities around advantageous nodal points, and the social, temporal and 
spatial divisions of labour that are possible within this space, have profound political 
consequences. Thus, space cannot be considered separately from the productive 
relations (economic, political and ideological) that produce its matrices. The capitalist 
mode of production imposes its own spatial logic, therefore, but the precise 
organisation of spaces depends critically on the balance of class and political 
struggles. 
The geo-economic unity of Jim Crow country 
 Based on the above, I can make some preliminary remarks about the organisation 
of segregation in the South, in the course of which I will indicate the general role of 
anticommunism in this.  Segregation involves the state operating in all of its material 
capacities: deploying its monopoly on administrative (political, legal) knowledge to 
constitute productive relations along the lines of a racial bifurcation; producing the 
‘effect of isolation’ and the composition of a people/nation through the conjunction of 
‘property rights’ with white nationalism and ‘states’ rights’; engaging in “moral 
regulation”, upholding norms relating to family, education, work and sociality along 
strictly racial and patriarchal lines, with violence an ever-present determining force; 
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and constituting territorial spaces with a sharp ‘internal’ frontier separating the white 
national from the (black, communist) non- or anti-national. It is one aspect of the 
territorial activity of the state, the spatial organisation of productive relations, that I 
now want to elaborate on, taking my cue from Gramsci’s enjoinder of the study of 
“regional situations”, meaning “a differentiated geo-economic organism”. (Jessop, 
2008, p. 102) 
 The specific pattern of Southern state formation (and re-formation) was 
determined by such a “geo-economic” unity of spatial and productive relations. This 
regional situation, which I will briefly describe below, was one in a state of crisis and 
re-organisation by 1945. And it is in the context not only of this conjunction of 
elements, but above all its crisis, that we will interpret the recourse to tightening 
segregation measures, as well as anticommunist repression, a process which we will 
see in motion in the periodisation in the next chapter. In the moment of their 
formation, Southern state forms (not just federal states, but municipalities) were 
created by these slave plantation and farm owners, initially both capitalist and non-
capitalist, and were impregnated by the imperatives governing their reproduction. 
(James, 1988) The practice of ‘Jim Crow’ by these states acted on traditional patterns 
of racial separation, and added a new element. ‘Jim Crow’ laws, developed initially 
as a ruling class response to Populist political insurgency on the part of workers and 
poor farmers, did not merely politically disempower African Americans, but also 
intervened to suppress competitive market conditions in the purchase and sale of 
labour power, largely be controlling the movement of black labour and denying it 
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access to certain – usually ‘skilled’ – occupations. In implementing such restrictions, 
the state also produced an isolating effect on the southern labour market, depressing 
the average regional wage through racialised pay differentials, while at the same time 
producing a material substratum for consent among white workers through the 
fractionalisation of workers along racial lines, and the relative seniority and 
advantage that white labour would enjoy over black labour. (Roback, 1984; Post, 
2011; Lee, 2008: 7-8; Legassick, 1974; Minchin, 1999; Minchin, 1997; Vitalis, 2000; 
Wolpe, 1980; Honey, 1993: 29 & 151)  
 Coterminous with this development was the emergence following the 1880s 
Cotton Mills Campaign of textiles as the major southern industry, superseding 
tobacco. This campaign involved an attempt to attract manufacturing investment to a 
region that was low on capital, where the capitalist mode of production had taken root 
late, and where the comparative advantages were the terrain and a plentiful, low-
waged labour supply. Until that point, the major growth industry in the post-Civil War 
period was tobacco. In North Carolina, the size of the tobacco industry in 1880 was 
six times what it had been in 1870. Tobacco production, though based on farm labour, 
was rapidly urbanising: a process linked to the extinction of small producers as 
tobacco capital was subject to the logic of centralisation and concentration. Textile 
production, when it took off, was at a similar scale. (Wood, 1991; Bennett & Patton, 
2008: 88) 
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 The mills were small compared to those which had previously developed in the 
New England region. Mainly organised around small towns in the Piedmont area, 
where the terrain was ideal for textile production, they were supported by the many 
small power plants linked to the states rivers system, supplied with ample labour 
from the Piedmont farms, and connected by the development of railways in the 
region. These towns were, in their inception, ‘proto-industrial villages’, in which mill 
houses were surrounded by the features of rural life, such as chicken coops and 
pasture. The mill towns across the Piedmont were connected by familial, 
occupational and cultural ties into “an elaborate regional fabric”, producing a 
complex collective and regional identity. The physical and social geography of the 
towns was, argue Hall et al (1992: 506), a compromise between modern capitalist 
organisation and the traditional ‘way of life’ of the workers. The interstitial condition 
of the industry in this phase contributed to one of its most important features: the 
dominance of paternalism. Whereas the textile industry in the United Kingdom had 
developed on the basis of a proletariat completely separated from the means of 
production, in the United States it developed in relation to family farming. This 
created localised patterns of resistance which in most cases did not produce class-
wide struggle, and which were contained through “paternalistic production 
apparatuses”. Feudal remnants, of the type associated with labour tenancy and 
sharecropping fused with the rationalising techniques of Fordist production. Until the 
Fifties, textile production took place overwhelmingly within small, labour-intensive, 
single industry ‘company’ or ‘mill’ towns. Employers did not simply regulate labour 
processes, but effectively were the local government of the towns, imposing their 
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own regulations and even their own morality (cf ‘thrift’, ‘honesty’, and 
‘temperance’). They also stood as the ‘protectors’ of their workers, extending 
‘favours’ and vowing to safeguard them against threats such as racially impure 
migrant labour.  
 It would be mistaken to treat this paternalism as in some sense ‘false’ or merely 
manipulative. Textile capitalists, such as Charles Cannon of Cannon Mills and 
Everett Jordan of Sellars Manufacturing and the US Senate, were often genuinely 
well-remembered by both colleagues and workers as ‘loved’ father figures. Jordan, 
for example, was characterised by a fellow textile manufacturer Edward L Gruber as 
“a very generous man … if he ran into somebody, whether they be black or white, 
and especially black—Everett, If he knew somebody was having trouble at home, or 
something like that he would go out of his way to see how he, or his company, could 
do something to be helpful.” (Bulla & Gruber, 1985) Likewise, his employee of thirty 
years, Thomas Ellington, recalled that “I worked for him for 35 years, and he was a 
fine fellow to work for … people in that mill really loved Mr. Jordan. I never heard 
anybody at all criticize him. … When I bought the house from him, he told Miss 
Alice to let me pay for it any way I wanted to—$5 a week. And that's the way I paid 
for it.” His generosity could be extended to the company’s African American 
workforce as well: “he took all the colored people up to the store and they all sat 
down and ate”. (Bulla & Ellington, 1983) 
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 These sorts of practices can be understood as part of the answer to Gramsci’s 
riddle, “hegemony begins in the factory”. The discourse of paternalism stipulates that 
the strong have a responsibility to care for the weak, while taking for granted the 
relation of dominance implied in this. This taken-for-grantedness of class and racial 
domination meant that capitalists who showed genuine humane concern for ‘their’ 
workers, and who could demonstrate that the bodily and social needs of labour were 
taken-into-account, enjoyed an enhanced political and ideological domination over 
the workforce. Such practices made these capitalists all the more effective opponents 
of trade unions, and advocates of segregation. These then were the characteristics – 
absent ‘high wages’ – of what become known as ‘Fordism’, and which Gramsci 
interpreted as a form of ‘passive revolution’ – a conservative-adaptive process in 
which elites attempt to rationalise and modernise the productive and reproductive 
basis of society without violent social struggles. (Buynum, 1928; Gilman, 1956; 
Gullickson, 1991; McLaurin, 1971: 45-49; Gramsci, 1971b; Burawoy, 1984: 36) 
 Because of the low wages upon which the industry depended, the ideal productive 
unit was the family, with children drawn into the labour force long after the 1914 
child labour laws forbidding work before the age of 12. Indeed, mills employed many 
more women and children than adult males. The logic of this was not simply that low 
remuneration encouraged families to send children to work – rather, the availability 
of children for work as a result of labour management policy depressed the wage rate 
for adults. Textile firms specifically tailored their recruitment policies to select large 
families, generally drawn from the farms. These families were situated close to one 
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another in the production process, the better to foster familial authority, with tasks 
divided according to gender roles in which men were more fit for jobs with authority, 
skill and strength, and women more fit for jobs involving patience, nimble fingers 
and otherwise little skill. The families were housed in arrangements spatially divided 
according to racial and employment status: managers enjoying superior 
accommodation, and the small number of African American ‘menial’ labourers 
allotted by far the least auspicious housing.  This pattern of small town development 
was also facilitated by the state-level focus on ‘balanced growth’ strategies in which 
urbanisation was off-set by the encouragement of rural development, with 
manufacturing developed in towns rather than large cities where possible. (Bennett & 
Patton, 2008: 97-99; Wood, 1986; Weinberg, 2003; McHugh, 1988; Gullickson, 
1991) 
 The labour force was thus maintained as a predominantly white body by the state, 
and subject to routine familial and political intervention and surveillance by the 
employers, while African Americans were habitually relegated to the least 
advantageous segments of the geo-economic space. In effect, they were being 
separated not just from the means of production, but also from the resources essential 
to their own reproduction – not just as a labour force, but as a class force. This 
process of accumulation-by-dispossession was thus politically structured as the 
imposition of an internal frontier, similar in its territorial-organizational aspects to the 
creation of ‘homelands’ in apartheid South Africa. Significantly, the emergence of 
urbanization and the mill towns played a key role in the development of a spatially 
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rigid segregation. In this sense, segregation can be understood in part as a set of 
policies designed to cope with the problems posed by the proletarianization of the 
southern labour force, and the uneven process of industrialization and urbanization. 
(Burawoy, 1984, p. 36; Kayatekin, 2001; Carlton, 1994; Lee, 2008, pp. 7-12; 
Legassick, 1974; Davies, 1976; Massey, et al., 2009) 
The crisis of the Southern geo-economy 
 The elements of crisis for the southern geo-economy were always present, but as 
the industry attempted to modernise in the interwar period, embarking on a ‘better 
equipment’ campaign that was also aimed at extracting greater productivity from each 
worker, these became more salient. The incongruity of paternalism, in which the 
capitalist situated himself as the protector of a family of workers, with the methods of 
‘scientific management’ needed to boost production became more obvious. Life was 
always hard for mill town inhabitants, the social and spiritual investments of the 
employers providing minimal relief, but this period saw the hardening of class 
divisions. The class struggles in the industry beginning at the end of the Twenties 
were bitter and violent, and it was in this context that the Communist Party began to 
build support in the industry while simultaneously campaigning against its segregated 
character. For example, communist involvement in the Loray strike committee in 
1929 partially ensured its commitment to biracial representation, despite the 
relatively few black workers at the mill. The presence of communists enabled the 
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employers and more conservative sections of opinion to externalise the antagonism, 
arguing that if agitators could be arrested, tried and locked up or driven out, these 
communities would be restored to peace. Indeed, anti-communist workers could be 
organised into vigilante gangs to attack strikers. 
 The Depression sharpened class polarisation, as mills began a wave of aggressive 
lay-offs and wage cuts. Moreover, the industry’s turmoil left it pleading for state 
intervention which, when it came in the form of the National Recovery 
Administration (NRA), included concessions to mill workers such as higher wages, 
the abolition of child labour and the establishment of the right to organise. The 
resulting surge in union organisation, as employers routinely flouted NRA 
regulations, culminated in the general textile strike of 1934, the largest in American 
history. The strike was marked by violence and the potential for violence. On the one 
hand, some workers recall that those trying to cross the picket line were “taking their 
life in their hands”, as mill worker Eva Hopkins put it, by defying their fellow 
workers. (Hopkins & Tullos, 2006) On the other hand, the management encouraged 
scabbing workers to assault union organisers. Such was the case described by a mill 
worker, Geddes Elam Dodson. During the strike wave of 1934, flying pickets tried to 
visit the Dunean mill in Greenville: 
 “They had brought big boxes of new picker sticks up there and put them there in 
the weave room. And they had told us, "Now if them flying squad goes to sticking 
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their head in them windows, start cracking heads, and the company'll stand behind 
you." [Laughter] I was fixing looms, and one of my women weavers got to crying. 
I said, "Now listen, gal, don't you cry. If they start sticking heads in them 
windows, you help me start cracking heads like they told us to do." [Laughter] But 
whenever they thought the flying squad was going to break the National Guards' 
line, the captain or whatever he was over them told them to load their guns, and 
every one of them guns clicked at the same time. And he says, "Anybody crosses 
the line, shoot him down." That's what kept them out. They had a line of National 
Guards down there, all the way down the side of the mill. … I joined a union one 
time, and I seen I was wrong, and so I just fell out and turned agin them whenever 
I seen what was coming up to me. I had a family, and I had to work for them and 
all that. And I knew the trouble my brother-in-law had got in over here at Mills 
Mill when they had that strike over there.” (Dodson & Tullos, 2006) 
 The strike was broken, and employers embarked on the beginnings of a 
reorganisation of their relations with labour, the better to break unionism. 
Paternalistic practices went into decline, textile companies moved toward 
corporatisation, New Deal policies were reversed across the South, and the mill town 
system itself was eventually abandoned as a relic that encouraged collectivism among 
the workers. The mill towns were sold off, and textile manufacturers specifically 
cited the need to employ workers on a more individual, geographically scattered basis 
in order to resist the propensity of workers to organise. (Glass, 1992; Irons, 2000; 
Hall et al, 1992: 498-537) 
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 By 1945, the southern geo-economy was experiencing a profound, transitional 
crisis. It continued to lag behind the rest of U.S. capitalism. Its ability to produce and 
realise surplus value, moreover, had been shattered by the effects of the cotton 
recession from the 1920s. The Depression, the accompanying political turn to the left 
in the U.S., and the workers’ rights enshrined in the New Deal, had produced new 
forms of working class militancy such as the textile workers’ general strike in 1934. 
Despite the success of the employers’ against that offensive, and the relative lack of 
unionisation by the 1940s, some industrial centres of the south – including 
Birmingham, Alabama; Laurel, Mississippi; Memphis, Tennessee; and Atlanta, 
Georgia – had experienced union growth during the war. The CIO unions were 
therefore optimistic about the prospect of using New Deal reforms and their own 
enhanced political and economic clout to force Southern industry to unionise. (Irons, 
2000; Roscigno & Danaher, 2004; Barlow, 2003, pp. 35-6) 
 Different forms of state action were deployed to remedy the crisis. Local states 
engaged in extensive economic intervention, such as subsidising planters. In the post-
war era, they pursued a path of ostensibly broadening the region’s industrial base, but 
within an overall policy of retaining the region’s comparative advantage in low 
labour-costs. To this end, Southern states almost all supported the Taft-Hartley Act, 
and implemented right-to-work laws mandated by it. State troopers were used to 
protect strike breakers, and in North Carolina a strike court sentenced unionists and 
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their supporters to hard labour. They also tightened up the legal and spatial 
restrictions of Jim Crow. Employers in labour-intensive industries such as lumber, 
and the anti-New Deal businesses represented in the Southern States Industrial 
Council, lobbied for the introduction of regional differentials in the minimum wage, 
allowing them to reduce the cost of labour. If the development of relatively large 
regional and inter-regional firms and the scalar expansion of textile plants led to 
many employers being prepared to accept a moderately increased wage bill for the 
sake of productivity, the overall emphasis was on keeping wages low. Finally, the 
Cold War itself provided a means toward industrial modernisation, to the extent that it 
militarised a large sector of the Southern economy – which far surpassed the national 
average in the contribution that postwar military expenditures made to its 
employment and income – and absorbed a great mass of workers who had previously 
been employed in declining textile industries. (Wood, 1986: 159-61; Schulman, 1991: 
79-87; Frederickson, 2010; Jewell, 2010) 
 There were limits to such strategies. The general appeal of Southern elites to 
northern investors and managers was the offer of cheap labour and a light regulatory 
touch. This, however, tended only to succeed in attracting labour-intensive industries. 
Governors, development boards and legislatures attempted to upgrade their tactics, 
recognising that the development of infrastructures and racial peace were essential for 
the development of high technology, capital-intensive industry. However, neither they 
nor the ‘progressive’ business elites they were allied with wished to challenge 
segregation if it could be avoided. Traditional class paternalism, while it founded 
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Southern resistance to unionisation, as in Operation Dixie, and to some extent 
constrained the emergence of the welfare state, was increasingly unsustainable. 
(Cobb, 1982; Chafe, 1982, 1991; Peters, 1994; Alston & Ferrie, 1999) 
 A complication for Southern elites was that the balance of political forces 
registered in the materiality and form of local states, where they enjoyed unparalleled 
dominance, was at odds with that registered in the national state. By the 1930s, under 
the pressure of Depression and a range of insurgent social movements, centrally a 
militant labour movement (Bernstein, 2010), the central state was beginning to pursue 
measures designed to modernise/rationalise the productive system, expand state 
capacity, and legitimise itself. The central state thus implemented programmes under 
the rubric of the New Deal which, though ‘racially laden’ in such a way as to 
(Katznelson, 2006) and taken advantage of to benefit local manufacturers by 
Southern legislators, potentially threatened the South’s traditional forms of social 
control. New Deal reforms had encouraged liberals to organize for the abolition of the 
poll tax, for instance. While none of the anti-poll tax bills passed in Congress, 
numerous states did repeal their own poll tax. Later, war-time national mobilisation 
subsidised the mechanisation of plantations while at the same time encouraging 
urbanisation through the spread of New South businesses. (Frederickson, 2013; Cobb, 
1997) The effect of this was to address the crisis at the expense of the South’s 
traditional forms of social control.  
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 These processes also undermined the paternalistic model of industrial relations as 
higher wages undermined the cost-effectiveness of mill towns, tenant farmers became 
day labourers, and the industrial working class expanded. During the war, a quarter of 
the rural population of the South had left the plantations and farms for jobs in 
northern and southern cities, thus further eroding the basis of segregationist power. 
The great exodus of African Americans to the cities also produced a spatial re-
organisation of southern segregation, so that its level of operation shifted from the 
state, county and city level to the level of the neighbourhood.  (Honey, 2004; Lee, 
2008: 7-12; Engerman & Gallman, 1986: 851; Johnson, 2010: 96-98; Wood, 1986; 
Massey, et al., 2009; Massey & Denton, 1993)  
 However, the turn to the right in the central state also undercut the basis for 
challenges to white supremacy. During the war, the federal government had supported 
unionisation in the South. But this support was withdrawn after 1945, leaving unions 
to struggle against local states and employers. Further, the emergence of a national 
‘Red Scare’ in 1947 provided Southern states with the weapons needed to face down 
immediate challenges to the social order. Importantly, it helped to hold off the 
emergence of an African American movement against segregation. As Marable put it:  
“The democratic upsurge of black people which characterized the late 1950s could 
have happened a decade earlier … most of the important Supreme Court decisions 
that aided civil rights proponents had been passed some years before. … Yet the 
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sit-ins, the non-violent street demonstrations, did not yet occur; the façade of 
white supremacy was crumbling, yet for almost ten years there was no overt and 
mass movement which challenged racism in the streets. … The impact of the Cold 
War, the anti-communist purges and near-totalitarian social environment, had a 
devastating impact upon the cause of blacks’ civil rights and civil 
liberties.” (Marable, 2007: 18) 
 Cold War anticommunism arrived in the South as a politics of transition and crisis 
management. Just as its class relations and social geography were being re-organised, 
and the material basis for segregation and thus the cheap labour on which the region 
relied was being transformed, Southern states were gifted a series of political, 
ideological and legal means by which to disarm popular, labour and radical 
challenges. Just as the spatial grid of plantations and mill towns which had formed 
the basis for segregation was being unsettled, with new industries re-territorialising 
the region’s productive and commercial surfaces, Southern states were in a position to 
ensure and rigidify the segregation of those spaces with a new arsenal of statutes, 
state codes and city ordinances. Opponents of segregation could be red-baited, 
cowed, divided, beaten and imprisoned. But the turn to anticommunism cannot be 
seen purely as a ruse. It was an integral part of a system of representations, a 
discursive formation that was rooted in Southern political traditions. 
 190
Representation in the Southern state 
“What is the State? It is the Democratic party . . . Whenever there were political 
questions involved, . . . we looked to the interests of the party, because they are the 
interests of the State.” —Judge Thomas J. Semmes, delegate at Louisiana’s 
constitutional convention, 1898. (Mickey, 2008) 
 It is impossible to address the crisis of Jim Crow without relating it to the position 
of representative democracy in the capitalist state. Here I will talk about 
representation in two related senses: 1) the party political representation of classes 
and class alliances; 2) the semiotic and discursive representation of class conflicts 
and ‘race’, as well as of their party political representation – the representation of 
representation. (Jessop, 2002; Hall, 1997; Foucault, 2002). 
 A capitalist state is “in a minimal, non-evaluative sense, always a régime of 
national representation”. This is true in both of the senses mentioned above. The 
‘nation’ – construed as the adult population, often with varying types of (racist, sexist, 
ideology- or class-based) exclusion in operation – is either given party political 
representation in a parliamentary-democratic system, or is ostensibly represented 
through its incarnation in an authoritarian dictatorship. This regime also discursively 
represents the people/nation to itself as a particular kind of (historically produced) 
unity, and further represents its own representation of the people/nation. (Therborn, 
1977; Poulantzas, 2000, p. 65)  
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 The form of representations made by the Southern state, and the Democratic 
Party, during the Cold War was neither straightforwardly democratic, nor dictatorial. 
In Therborn’s typologies, among the range of bourgeois regimes available, the US in 
the period of Jim Crow can be characterised as ‘democratic exclusivist’ in that the 
adult franchise co-existed with a cluster of exclusions structured around race (on the 
basis of poverty, illiteracy, criminality and so on). This sort of regime is to be 
distinguished from democracy in its normal sense, pertaining to a fully elective 
parliamentary regime with no exclusions among adults. In this sense, capitalist 
democracy was achieved by the majority of core OECD economies by 1920, but not 
in the U.S. until circa 1970 when the federal government enforced the spirit of the 
Fifteenth Amendment and the letter of the Voting Rights Act. The consolidation of 
democracy in the non-exclusivist sense, as the sina qua non of normal, stable 
capitalist rule in the United States, was largely the result of the outcome of World 
War II, the subsequent Cold War (in which the conflict between the democratic 
legitimation function of the state and the practice of white supremacy was intensified 
under global surveillance of the ‘leader of the free world’), and the break-up of the 
colonial system culminating in the Vietnam War.  (Therborn, 1977; Dudziak, 2000)  
 The point here is to situate the Democratic Party’s representative role in the South 
in relation to the typology of ‘democratic exclusivism’. If the state constitutes, in its 
institutions, a “material condensation” of the balance of political and class forces in 
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the social formation in which it has taken root, then the ‘line’ that emerges at any 
given moment is the result of an interplay between the institutional ensemble, its 
spatio-temporal matrix and the class antagonisms which cut across both. These 
factors determine the calculable range within which it is possible for given classes to 
assert their interests within the state.   
 This ‘strategic selectivity’ of the state, as Bob Jessop describes it (Jessop, 2008), 
has a peculiar form in the South. The local state, I have said, incarnates the balance of 
forces both within the wider social formation and within the local situation pertinent 
to it. It does the latter to the extent that it enjoys autonomy, which derives from the 
distribution of power within the national state. The type of ‘democratic exclusivism’ 
practiced in the South thus emerged from a constellation of forces involving: i) the 
spread of capitalist property relations in the agrarian south and the expansion of a 
planter capitalist class; ii) the defeat of Republican and Populist forces through a 
combination of political terror (the disorganisation of dominated classes) and co-
optation of populist themes on a racist basis (‘transformism’); iii) the political 
exclusion of African Americans (and many poor whites); iv) the assertion of 
unchallenged Democratic Party dominance within the southern state as the necessary 
form of the political dominance of planter capitalists; v) the Northern reaction against 
immigrants, and the spread of new white supremacist doctrines concurrent with a 
colonial turn, leading to a new concord with the South. (Weston, 1972: 1-15; James, 
1988; Hahn, 2006; Jacobson, 2001)  
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 In this sense, the ‘Democracy’ was co-extensive with the state’s organisation of 
planter rule, and its disorganisation of the dominated classes through racial 
oppression and the incorporation of white workers into the polity on the basis of a 
discursive formation organised around racial-populist and, often, ‘progressive’ 
thematics. The major Democratic-allied institution of parapolitical terror, the Ku 
Klux Klan, upheld this discourse and the ‘progressive’, ‘liberal’ candidates – William 
Jennings Bryan and Woodrow Wilson – that expounded it. The most effective 
Southern politicians tended to be those, like Senator Theodore Bilbo of Mississippi or 
Senator Huey Long of Louisiana, who combined paternalistic reformism with a 
commitment to Jim Crow, and who used a popular vernacular or affected 
grammatical errors such as Governor George Wallace of Alabama. (Jeansonne, 1994; 
Morgan, 1985; Lowndes, 2005) The people/nation was thus represented to itself as an 
“Anglo-Saxon democracy”, its relation to its party representation one of transparent 
race embodiment, its unity assured by a shared collective history projected back over 
an indefinite period. This was in contrast with a north-eastern, industrial Republican 
bloc numerically bloated by recently arrived immigrant voters. By reason of the same 
logic, African Americans were effectively non-nationals, and their (‘alien’, 
‘Bolshevik’) allies, anti-nationals. (Horsman, 1981; McVeigh, 2009: 90-91)  
 The southern state also represented the people/nation through its legal axioms and 
its application of scientific-technical (administrative) knowledge. (See Scott, 1998) 
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The people/nation emerges in this sense as a series of data, represented in statistics 
purporting to show, for example, a higher rate of illegitimacy, sexual disease and 
criminality among African Americans. Jim Crow can thus be seen as a form of 
governmentality (Foucault, 1994) which applies racial knowledge in its techniques, 
produces racial subjects, and whose index of legitimacy is its ability to continually 
reproduce and protect the white nation from its internal enemies. However, the spread 
of Democratic influence in the North throughout the 1920s, partly due to the sizeable 
number of immigrant Catholic workers, and the strategic shift of the national 
Democratic Party’s social base to incorporate organised labour during the 1930s, 
introduced what, in my periodisation in the next chapter, I will consider the first real 
fissures in the ‘Democracy’. The decline of cotton industries after WWI had 
stimulated a wave of mass migration of African Americans to the industrial north, 
which didn’t stop until the 1960s. The exacerbation of class antagonisms throughout 
the South during the Great Depression resulted in the Communist Party USA making 
its first breakthroughs among class conscious black workers, sharecroppers and cash 
tenants. And the emergence of monopoly capital demanding a centralisation of 
national state authority, further de-stabilised the system of Jim Crow representation. 
(Barlow, 2003: 35-36; Kelley, 1990: 34-56; Solomon, 1981) During the post-war era, 
when the alliance between the Democratic Party, monopoly capital and organised 
labour was consolidated, the balance of power gradually shifted away from the South.  
 The modes of representation adapted accordingly. Southern planter and textile 
capital mobilised through the state to outflank liberals, using the anticommunist 
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dispensations of the Cold War to witch-hunt ‘integrationists’. Southern politicians 
known to occupy the Democratic Party’s ‘progressive’ wing reacted to the crisis of 
the South by moving sharply to the right: Strom Thurmond, Orval Faubus and George 
Wallace became standard-bearers of a New Right rooted in the protection of ‘states’ 
rights’ and a commitment to reverse the interventionist, welfare legislation that had 
empowered the opponents of segregation. It is not that the old representational 
strategies were discarded, nor that anticommunism was in itself a novel factor. 
Anticommunism had long been interpenetrated with regional and national forms of 
nativism and white supremacy. (Kovel, 1997: 14-22; Heale, 1990: 60-96; Foglesong, 
2007: 58)  
But while liberal, paternalist policies of the sort associated with Wilson had once 
been seen as the most effective retort to radicalism and socialism, they were now 
regarded as handing the communists a more effective weapon of struggle than 
communists themselves were capable of devising. The elements of the old discursive 
formations were rather re-articulated, given a new unity under the dominance of 
anticommunism, which was the sign and sanction of a Southern party of order. This 
form of representation corresponds to a form of governmentality, of statecraft, which 
can be called crisis management. 
Conclusion 
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 In this chapter, I have focused on theorising the changing social geography of 
Southern capitalism. I have attempted to diagram a particular set of relationships 
between the development in the South of the capitalist mode of production, the 
reorganisation of social space that this entailed at the level of individual productive 
apparatuses and at the level of the state, the state forms arising from the balance of 
class and political forces produced by this productive matrix, the state interventions 
deployed to manage this geoeconomy, and the stabilisation and then ultimate crisis of 
this ‘spatio-temporal fix’. In this view, Jim Crow emerges as a form of ‘passive 
revolution’ through which, by organising on the basis of white supremacy bound to 
paternalistic practices, the emerging Southern capitalist class was able to modernise 
and rationalise Southern technology, demography and politics in relation to capitalist 
imperatives. Anticommunism, in this connection, assumes prominence as a form of 
countersubversion when ‘passive revolution’, and thus the ability of Southern elites 
to retain the initiative while reorganising and updating the matrices of production and 
reproduction, is threatened. In the next chapter, the juridico-political moment of this 
process – and particularly the role of anticommunism in organising state responses to 
the crisis of Jim Crow, is given a more sustained theorisation. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Law, Violence and Hegemony in the Deep South 
This chapter takes the Poulantzian insights into ‘the state’ which I have developed 
in the previous chapter, and applies them to the problem of the relationship between 
legitimacy and violence in the struggles over anticommunism and civil rights. If, as 
has been argued, the state is the central element in the organisation of any 
anticommunist struggle, it was also a crucial terrain of both Civil Rights and Massive 
Resistance struggles during the Cold War. Somehow, moreover, the Federal 
institutions of the state which started from a position of breaking up the incipient civil 
rights coalition with the apparatuses of countersubversion, ended up despatching 
armed forces to several southern states, from Arkansas to Alabama, in order to force 
Southern authorities to comply with civil rights. Here, the Poulantzian critique of the 
Law/Terror couplet could hardly be more apt. The deployment of state-monopolised 
violence in the reproduction and moulding of the social body was directed, codified 
and legitimised as law. The central concept of this chapter is that the state, being a 
formation of institutions, apparatuses and practices produced by a particular form-
determined condensation of the balance of class and political forces, is subject to 
processes of deformation and reformation. Southern states, as ‘sites of power’ within 
the ‘centralised unity’ of the American state, were subject to similar processes, 
particularly in the period bracketed between 1945 and 1965. And law was the 
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privileged terrain on which the outcome of these processes was decided. Therefore, 
this chapter will begin by sketching out a theoretical interpretation of law and its role 
within the state, that extends the analyses developed previously. It will then develop a 
periodisation of the processes in which deformation was resisted, deflected, initiated, 
and accelerated, and reformation initiated, accelerated and consummated in 
response. It will situate the fluctuations of segregationist and civil rights struggle 
within these processes, and determine the role of anticommunism in them. 
Introduction: the ‘rule of law’, from segregation to civil rights 
Law was the main idiom and practice through which segregation was secured, and 
subsequently abolished. Following Brown vs the Board of Education, in particular, 
the ‘rule of law’ was a strategic cynosure in the discourses of both Massive 
Resistance and Civil Rights activists. This was not a straightforward matter for any 
participant in the struggle. If white elites exhorted resistance to the Supreme Court’s 
decision on Brown, they did so in the name of some more foundational legal tenets 
which they said were being trampled on. Thus, for Senator Byrd of Virginia, Brown 
constituted an “illegal demand”. For Senator Eastland of Mississippi, the Court had 
“disregarded the law” and “destroyed” the constitution, and as such could not be 
obeyed. The ‘Southern Manifesto’ offered a condensed summary of the relevant 
jurisprudence, as understood by segregationists, and concluded that the Supreme 
court had substituted “naked power” for the law, on behalf of their own “personal 
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political and social ideas”. In the context of the civil rights struggle, segregationists 
would often invoke a legal discourse against activists whom they said had come to 
break the law. (Wilkinson III., 1978; Southern Manifesto, 1956) Indeed, for civil 
rights activists, it was often the ‘rule of law’ that had brutalised African Americans. 
Yet, insofar as they sought to challenge the law, they did so by invoking legal 
principles, as well as jurisprudence, which they said were being violated by 
segregation laws. A central strategic justification for this approach was that the law 
itself is beholden to a fundamental ambiguity between its formal commitment to 
equity and its substantive enforcement of injustice. The moral force of the law was 
precisely its claim to equitably treat all cases. This very ambiguity may have been 
one reason why the legal apparatuses deployed against civil rights activists in the 
South were initially developed with the explicit remit of containing the threat of 
communism. Thus, when Mississippi congressman John Rankin took a leading 
position in the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) in 1947, his 
immediate focus was on combatting black civil rights activism. He attributed black 
radicalism to “the tentacles of this great octopus, communism, which is out to destroy 
everything” and, in a variant of what Kovel (1997) calls ‘black hole anticommunism’, 
HUAC under his watch relentlessly conflated the goals of the civil rights mainstream 
with those of communist ‘conspiracy’. Later, as the nationwide anticommunist sweep 
waned, Southern states created “little HUACs”, such as Mississippi’s State 
Sovereignty Commission (SSC), to pursue the same essential strategy. (Woods, 2004: 
27-8 & 95-6; Prechter, 2009) Yet, whatever validity this observation contains, it only 
opens further questions. Why were agents located in the repressive legal apparatuses 
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– Attorney Generals, judges, police chiefs – generally the most belligerent in 
pursuing these strategies? Why did they use a legal idiom at all? And why use an 
anticommunist legal idiom? 
 The ‘rule of law’ appears, at first, as a particular type of congealed violence. That 
is, the violence immanent to civil society intercourse has been extruded, monopolised 
by the state, and condensed within the state’s apparatuses as law. The figure of the 
‘night watchman’ state lurks in this image. Set apart from the society, it guards the 
perimeters and frontiers, monitors the circulation of people and goods, and upholds 
‘the rules of the game’. It acts ‘under law’: that is, it implements the rules and 
mediates between rival claims based on a chain of logical-deductive reasoning from 
founding axioms, case history, and so on, to application. As such, the law also 
restricts its scope of action, constraining it within a predictable range of actions 
permitted by the constitution, code or common law.  
A mainstay of white supremacist resistance to desegregation was that decisions 
such as Brown vs the Board of Education subverted the ‘rule of law’ by deviating 
from the US Constitution. It was a legal assault on property rights quite at odds with 
established jurisprudence, and was thus introducing a ‘totalitarian’ deviation in US 
traditions. Senator Eastland demanded an investigation into the “subversive influence 
behind the desegregation” wherein communists were trying to “graft into the organic 
law of the land” teachings “which can be traced to Karl Marx”. The greatest danger, 
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according to the conservative youth organisation, Young Americans for Freedom, was 
the blurring of the distinction between public and private spheres. Civil rights 
legislation would treat the private property of traders as public accommodations, thus 
effectively abolishing the distinction when it came to commerce. This “leftist” ploy, 
in redefining the terms “public” and “private”, was doing nothing less than creating a 
“right to trespass”, erasing property rights where they were needed most – in the 
market. Likewise, the People’s Association for Selective Shopping in Atlanta, a 
citizens’ lobby aimed at boycotting desegregating businesses, denounced the 
“Communist inspired lawless racial agitators” who would destroy the “American 
Free Enterprise System”. (Bloom, 1987: 95; Moore, 1963; PASS, 1963) 
Segregationist thought has often sought its buttresses in Constitutional traditions, 
against which its opponents appear as agents of, not just a profoundly alien political 
doctrine but above all a perverse and illegal legal doctrine.  
 Not all political struggles invoke and involve the law in this way.  The constant 
presence of the law in the making and unmaking of racial power in the South, and the 
constant recourse to legal argument in mediating the rival claims in the period of 
Cold War and Civil Rights, is indicative that something quite unusual was taking 
place. The ‘rule of law’ was a privileged token of struggle, but in what sense? I will 
advance the following guidelines for interpreting what follows : 11
 These observations are the product of an engagement with Thompson (1977), Pashukanis 11
(1924), Poulantzas (2000), Miéville (2006), Gilroy (1982), Gilroy & Simm (1985), Althusser 
(2014), and Corrigan & Sayer (1985).
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1. Law is the dominant form of the dominant ideology. If, as Althusser argued, 
ideology comprises “material actions inserted into material practices governed 
by material rituals”, this entails that any action, from a punch to a prayer, could 
be an ideological action. There is thus no necessary opposition between 
violence and ideology. The law is where the dominant ideology is concretised 
in practices which are permanently articulated with and structured by the 
political violence which secures its dominance.  The main form of this 
articulation is the ritual – what Poulantzas referred to as the “theatricals” of 
fear – wherein violence is withdrawn from view but is nonetheless 
determinant. Insofar as legitimacy and coercion are mutually constituting in 
law, law is a productive and not merely repressive factor. In its organisation of 
the social body, it both induces certain actions or statements (informing, giving 
testimony, giving pledges of allegiance), and constitutes particular types of 
subjects, and social roles (white, black, criminal, citizen, traitor, patriot). 
2. Law in a modern capitalist state is indeterminate. While jurisprudence is 
elaborated seemingly according to a logical-deductive chain, a system of 
axioms deriving from first principles which lends some predictability to the 
system, there are two sources of indeterminacy in the chain of reasoning. The 
first is the structure of language itself, wherein the slippage of signifiers 
guarantees a degree of polysemy and room for ‘tort’. The second is the 
normative structure of capitalist modernity, wherein the norms upon which 
legal axioms are founded are often tendentially contradictory (for example, the 
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individual’s right not to be tortured, as opposed to the state’s right to punish). 
In this situation, the only determinacy to the legal process is contributed by 
state-monopolised physical violence. 
3. Law is a form-determined juridical condensation of the relations of forces in 
the social formation that it rules. It is form-determined insofar as the 
materiality of the law and its languages impose limitations on the types of 
legal statements that can be made in any given context. This gives it a 
structural or strategic selectivity, in that the form of law will tend to favour 
certain class, gender, sexual, racial or national outcomes over others. But it is 
also a condensation of relations of force insofar as legislation, Court 
appointees and elected or appointed legal positions are susceptible to the 
mediated pressure of political struggles and of ideological ferment. 
The purpose of these guidelines is to enable certain patterns and relations in the 
unfolding of a concrete situation, which I will now anatomise, to be discerned. 
Prolegomenon: De-formation initiated. Fissures in ‘The Democracy’ (1944-5) 
 The ‘all-white’ primary contests in Southern elections had been one of the key 
means by which African Americans were excluded from politics in Jim Crow states. 
In fact, as the paladin of liberal anti-racism Gunnar Myrdal pointed out, the 
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organisation of Southern politics excluded a large number of whites, favouring an 
effectively oligarchic form of politics empowering landowners, industrialists, bankers 
and merchants, with a share of this de facto political power enjoyed by inter-regional 
and Northern firms with investments in the region. (Piven & Cloward, 1979: 188) 
 But by the Second World War, the conditions for the erosion of this system were 
established. The growing economic base of African Americans had created 
opportunities for political and particularly legal mobilisation. At the same time, the 
Democratic Party’s social base had undergone a radical shift. Under FDR, the 
Democratic Party established a base in the industrial working class for the first time. 
Some of the platform of progressive legislation intended to consolidate this base, had 
to address the problems of black workers. “However discriminatory its 
administration,” Klarman writes, “the New Deal at least included blacks within its 
pool of beneficiaries”. The incorporation of black advisors, albeit without direct 
political authority and some concessions in the way of racial quotas within the Public 
Works Administration housing projects, indicated the influence that a growing 
number of northern black voters could exert. (Mickey, 2008; Marable, 2007; Hine, 
2003; Klarman, 2004: 110-1) As we will see, this shift was permanent, and would be 
a decisive factor in Truman’s pivotal 1948 presidential candidacy during which the 
Cold War consensus was established. 
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 The legal opportunity to attack the ‘all-white’ primary had come from the 
precedent set by the conviction of Patrick Classic for falsifying primary returns. The 
NAACP saw a chance to force the Supreme Court to uphold the legal rights of black 
voters. As usual, local judiciaries were obstructive. The Texas federal grand jury held 
a hearing at which only four witnesses were allowed to testify, and could not be 
convinced that any constitutional provision was being breached. But the judgment of 
the Supreme Court in the conviction of Classic proved that the primaries were not 
merely matters of voluntary association, but rather constituted a “delegation” of state 
power to the parties running the primaries. In this sense, the Democratic Party’s 
action, in excluding black voters from participating in primaries, was “the action of 
the state” – and was thus unconstitutional. (Hine, 2003: 238) 
 This decision should not be treated as a logical deduction from precedent. Rather, 
as Klarman emphasises, the Supreme Court had to make a decision as to what forms 
of involvement in the constitution of ‘civil society’ the state of Texas should be 
deemed responsible for. Past Supreme Court decisions had upheld white primaries. 
The sudden turnaround owed itself more to the political context than to legal logic. 
FDR’s reconstitution of the Supreme Court judges was one factor. The courts 
discarded the traditional ‘non-intervention’ (ie from a specific intervention in favour 
of property rights) in favour of the radically ‘interventionist’ state that was emerging 
under FDR. But a more pressing factor was the transformation of political alignments 
during World War II. The ‘war for democracy’ produced an ideological opportunity-
structure which civil rights activists could leverage against the racist one-party 
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system in the South. More than this, it provided an organisational opportunity. 
National mobilisations have historically provided a critical aperture for democratising 
movements, and the enhanced leverage that African Americans could exert during 
World War II, (and perhaps again during the Vietnam War) was evident in the way in 
which Roosevelt bowed to pressure to implement a Fair Employment Practices 
Commission to address racist discrimination in employment and prohibit 
discrimination in the thriving defence industry, and Congress debate the repeal of poll 
taxes. (Klarman, 2004: 198-199; Sitkoff, 1978: 216-217; Therborn, 1977)  
 Black civil rights activists, presented with this opportunity, did not prevaricate. 
The National Progressive Voters League was founded in Arkansas to mobilise a 
“newly enfranchised” electorate. The ensuing increase in black voter registration 
across southern states, rising from a quarter of a million in 1944 to a million in 1952, 
provoked efforts to circumvent Smith vs. Allwright that presaged ‘Massive 
Resistance’. For example, Governor Olin Johnston of South Carolina convened the 
state legislature in order to throw out all laws pertaining to party organisation, the 
implication being that the Democrats could run their operation as they saw fit. This 
subterfuge was outlawed by the Judge Waring of Charleston in 1947, which signalled 
the beginning of the end of the all-white primary. (Davis, 2000: 17; Bartley, 1999: 
7-8) Yet, the increase in black voter registration still left the vast majority of African 
Americans un-registered. The gains that were achieved, moreover, were significantly 
reversed in the years after 1952. 
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 The year after Smith vs. Allwright, the House Un-American Activities Committee 
(HUAC) became a standing committee of the House of Representatives. In the years 
that followed, the ‘Popular Front’ left would disintegrate, and the Democratic Party 
would consolidate its new popular base. Challenges to southern segregation would 
wilt under the pressure of constant state surveillance, investigation and intervention. 
For the next decade, despite Truman’s cautious adoption of some civil rights reforms, 
no serious blow would be landed to the system of white supremacy. (Marable, 2007: 
17-27) 
Part I: De-formation resisted. The Dixiecrat revolt and the defeat of the 
‘Popular Front’ left (1946-8) 
 The state, Corrigan and Sayer punned, states. But it does not state with a single 
voice. Rather, it contains an “amalgam of separate and often competing institutions, 
bureaucracies and political parties”. It produces not a unified discourse, but “several 
discourses that are adapted to the various classes and differentially incarnated in its 
apparatuses according to their class destination”. (Corrigan & Sayer, 1985, p. 3; 
Schrecker, 2002, p. 25; Poulantzas, 2000, p. 32) The consolidation of an 
anticommunist politics at the inception of the Cold War thus did not involve a single 
set of directives, ordinances, representational strategies or alliances. Rather, from the 
interplay of institutions (both those belonging to the ‘public’ core of the state, and 
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those understood as ‘civil society’ but properly operating within the field of the state) 
and the class struggles condensed within them, allowed a ‘system of alliances’ to 
emerge under a general ‘line’. This anticommunist ‘line’ unified a majoritarian bloc 
while dividing and disrupting oppositional, subaltern forces, shaking loose vulnerable 
elements and either co-opting or penalising them. The name of this type of class-
democratic politics, and of the state’s central role in organising it, is hegemony. 
(Poulantzas, 1978; Gramsci, 1971) 
 And the moment of 1946-8, from the ‘Iron Curtain’ speech and ‘Long Telegram’, 
inaugurating the Cold War, to the 1948 presidential election campaign producing a 
surprise victory for ‘Vital Centre’ liberalism, was a hegemonic moment. It represented 
the shattering of the ‘Popular Front’ Left, the ascendancy of anticommunist politics as 
the horizon of acceptable dissent, a temporary settling of accounts with the South 
broadly in the latter’s favour, and the emergence of a relatively stable coalition of 
classes and fractions under the dominance of Fordist monopoly capital.  The state’s 
intervention was crucial at each stage. President Truman’s loyalty oath programme, 
ordered in 1947, constituted the widest ranging government investigation to date, 
urging that all state employees be interviewed and tested for loyalty. The result was 
that hundreds were fired for presumed disloyalty on the basis of anonymous evidence 
which could not be refuted from people whom the defendants could not cross-
examine. By 1950, up to 40% of American workers were either under investigation or 
subject to loyalty oath.  (Robin, 2004: 15; Greenberg & Watts, 2009: 18-19) 
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 HUAC’s investigations were being given wide latitude by the Supreme Court. 
Unfriendly witnesses who refused to testify were cited for contempt, and the Court 
did not favour them. In the hugely symbolic case of the Hollywood Ten, a number of 
screenwriters and directors who refused to testify, citing a violation of their First 
Amendment rights. Several of the witnesses actually ended up in prison. The legal 
and political situation was thus so arranged that the committee could stage its rituals 
of unmasking, exposure and censure unimpeded. Even the disapprobation of the 
White House produced a belligerent response, accusing the administration of failing 
to obviate the necessity of the committee by informing people of the danger of 
communism. (Greenberg & Watts, 2009: 18-19; Schrecker, 2002: 65-6; Clark, 1976) 
HUAC’s central target, the Communist Party USA (CPUSA), which had been the 
most dynamic sector of the Popular Front left, attempted to rally its old allies against 
Truman’s escalating contest with the USSR. However, it was compromised in a 
number of ways: i) by the sudden swerves in its political strategy and alliances as it 
subordinated domestic policy to the survival of the USSR, culminating in the 
jettisoning of Popular Front alliances and a restoration of ‘Marxist-Leninist’ 
orthodoxy after WWII, just when it needed its old allies; ii) its support for the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, after years of campaigning as an ‘anti-fascist’ organisation; 
and iii) its uncritical support for the USSR despite its territorial aggrandisements. If 
communists campaigned for ‘peace’ and the cessation of Cold War hostilities, the 
American state waged war for ‘freedom’ and argued that the communist promise of 
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peace was hollow in light of the overland expansion of the Soviet Union. (Lieberman, 
2010: 32; Otanelli, 1991: 159-206; Isserman, 1993)  
 The result was that the CPUSA was increasingly isolated at the moment of the 
state’s escalating war on the party. Anticommunist legislation was thus effectively 
used to isolate the party in its spheres of influence, such as in the left-wing trade 
unions. Here, the Taft-Hartley Act played a critical role. Although aimed at 
obstructing union organisation as such, it also required that union leaders file an 
affidavit stating that they were not in the party. Such measures were used not only by 
the state but by anticommunists within the trade unions. (Schrecker, 2002: 59-62; 
Rupert, 1995) Alongside HUAC, one of the major organisational loci for 
anticommunist repression within the national state was the FBI, a division of the 
Justice Department with a history of leading parapolitical red-hunts and engaging in 
actions of dubious legality in the pursuit of ‘aliens’, ‘radicals’ and ‘subversives’. The 
Bureau was formed in anticommunist struggle, its political culture inflected with the 
nativist chords of post-WWI reaction. Its role as a political intelligence addendum to 
the White House arose from the centralisation and rationalisation of state authority in 
the ‘Progressive Era’. The FBI’s role was to provide federal agencies involved in the 
suppression of communism with a flow of information, with ‘field notes’ from 
investigations given a particular spin in the FBI’s internal ‘assessment’ to lend weight 
to shaky charges. Like HUAC, the FBI considered the government’s stance on 
communist subversion overly lenient, and used its strategic position to force the 
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administration into adopting a harder stance. (Schmidt, 2000; Schrecker, 2002: 28-30; 
Walker, 2011: 115)  
In the South, anticommunist rhetoric and action focused on the threat posed by 
union organisation and civil rights agitation to the sustainable reproduction of the 
region’s class and political system. Thus, Georgia Governor Herman Talmadge 
alleged that the CIO’s gains in the South were being driven by a ‘subversive’ 
campaign to organise an African-American voting bloc that communists could then 
use against the South. Operation Dixie, although focused on an overwhelmingly 
white textile industry and thus not directly challenging white supremacy, was treated 
in a similar way. The collapse of the organising drive owed itself largely to the effects 
of the rivalries and anticommunist purges produced by the Cold War crackdown.  But 
even relatively moderate civil rights reform, such as the Fair Employment Practices 
Commission was deemed “a communist inspired conspiracy to undermine American 
unity”. Here, again it could be tempting to treat anticommunism as a ruse, a proxy for 
the ‘real’ goal of protecting white supremacy. In fact, the ‘real’ goal was rarely 
concealed, except inasmuch as ‘separate but equal’ was in some sense an adequate 
subterfuge. The insertion of communism as a quilting element in a chain of 
equivalents linking welfare, unionisation and civil rights reform to ‘subversion’ did 
no more than take the institutions of the central state at their word. If the pressing 
domestic and international issue was communist subversion, working through the 
traditional organisations of labour and the Left, it followed that the same could be 
true in the South. Much of the information to support such judgments came from 
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federal bodies such as the Justice Department, or HUAC, which assisted the struggle 
against the Southern Council for Human Welfare (SCHW), a civil rights organisation 
formed under the impetus of New Deal reforms, by declaring it a “deviously 
camouflaged Communist front organization”. By 1948, the lineaments of the national 
anticommunist consensus had been fully absorbed and weaponised by Southern state 
leaders, who alleged that Truman’s moderate civil rights reform agenda was being 
driven by international communist pressure. (Lewis, 2004: 22-23; Clark, 1976; 
Frederickson, 2001: 49; Roediger, 2008: 193; Davis, 1999: 86-93) 
 Both the defeat of the ‘Popular Front’ Left, and the temporary truce with the 
South, were crystallised in the 1948 presidential election. In it, Truman’s bid as a 
Cold War liberal was challenged from two wings of the Democratic Party. Henry 
Wallace, representing the social democratic, anti-racist, and anti-anticommunist wing, 
stood as a candidate for the Progressive Party. Strom Thurmond, a former New 
Dealer who was committed to defending white supremacy as the local form of class 
compromise, and ‘states’ rights’ as a particular form of distribution of power within 
the state allowing the South to preserve its perceived advantages, stood for the States 
Rights Democratic Party. While Wallace’s remit was to realign Democratic politics to 
the Left, and oppose the rush toward hostility with Russia as a “position of ruthless 
imperialism”, Thurmond’s role was to articulate the efforts by conservatives within 
the ‘Democracy’ to marginalise progressives and New Deal liberals, not just in the 
Southern party but – by upsetting Truman’s re-election bid – in the country as a 
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whole. (Frederickson, 2001; Barnard, 1985: 95-96; Yarnell, 1974: 32-33 & 87-90; 
Kovel, 1997, pp. 43-49; Schrecker, 1999: 158-167) 
 Democratic strategists relied heavily on anticommunism to coordinate Truman’s 
manoeuvres against his opponents and to reconcile a series of highly antagonistic 
subject-positions among his intended base. The Democratic strategy, outlined in the 
‘Clifford memorandum’, sought to “identify [Wallace] in the public mind with the 
Communists”, compelling liberals and moderate socialists to take sides against 
Wallace’s ‘appeasement’. Norman Thomas accused Wallace of condoning “human 
slavery under Stalin”, and the radical pacifist A J Muste described him as “the 
instrument and captive” of the CPUSA, the ADA attacked his willingness to work 
with communists. The Dixiecrats, not possible to red-bait, were accused of 
undermining America’s international standing, the same argument that would be 
presented to the judges considering the case of Brown vs. the Board of Education. 
Most southern voters remained stolidly Democratic. The Dixiecrats were strongest in 
the plantation counties, the Black Belt areas, and those state where white workers 
were the most disenfranchised – Alabama, Mississippi and South Carolina, three 
states that retained the poll tax. Although the Dixiecrats hardly received more votes in 
total than the Progressive Party (both fell just short of 1.2m), the geographical 
concentration of their support ensured that they carried four core Southern states – 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and South Carolina. (Yarnell, 1974: 87; Lieberman, 
2010: 52; Johnson, 2010: 113; Woods, 2004: 37; Goldzwig, 2008: 61-70; Mayers, 
2007: 297) 
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 The outcome showed that the Dixiecrats were well-organised, well-placed in 
relation to their ability to take hold of local state machineries, and already had a 
substantial popular base from which to build. The argument that there was a 
conspiracy to subvert the Solid South was given a spurious concreteness by the 
national Red Scare and the policies of anticommunist repression aimed at exposing, 
denouncing and punishing the conspiracy in myriad daily rituals. Anticommunism 
attributed the factors undermining Jim Crow to a seemingly plausible, coherent 
agency, replacing multi-causal with mono-causal explanation, displacing critical 
scrutiny from its injustices onto those mobilising against the injustices. It also 
reinforced the South’s claim to Americanism – indeed, to a purer and more militant 
Americanism than any which prevailed in other regions. The Dixiecrats increasingly 
linked their defence of white-supremacy to a critique of the liberal state: civil rights 
measures were the first step toward a “federal police state,” Thurmond warned. 
(Crespino, 2007: 50-51; Frederickson, 2001: 7)  
 Aside from bolstering the South’s representative strategies, anticommunism also 
provided some techniques of statecraft. Whether the body involved was SISS, 
HUAC, the FBI or the local state police, the Red Scare transposed the normal state 
representation of the population as data in a field of calculable (scientific-technical) 
intervention, into an alternative representation as ciphers, cryptographical data 
available for interpretation through a set of investigative techniques, bureaucratic-
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legal rituals of inquisition, quarantine (‘blacklisting’) and correction through 
punishment. In the years directly following the election campaign, the States Rights 
Democratic Party was wound up, and its supporters returned to the Democratic Party 
– although, elements of the money and the political machinery, as well as leading 
personnel involved in the party, would later become available for Massive Resistance 
campaigns. (Moye, 2004: 69) The balance of opinion among Southern Democrats 
continued to shift to the right. For the time being, the racial status quo was preserved, 
with Cold War anticommunism supplying the rationale and technical repertoire 
sustaining its conservation.  
Part II: De-formation deflected. The Liberal State, the Cold War and the 
stabilization of the anticommunist ‘line’ (1949-53) 
 The zenith of anticommunism in the Cold War era was reached in the years 
immediately preceding Brown vs the Board of Education. The moment for organised 
labour to resist had passed, and their attitude was increasingly docile. The passivity 
on the part of organised labour was matched by a similar complacence among 
professional associations. Civil rights organisations which did not carry out ritualistic 
self-purging, began to be red-hunted (detailed in Chapter Eight). Southern 
segregationists were arguably the major beneficiaries of this trend. It was not just that 
the administrative-repressive techniques refined in Washington DC could be adapted 
for the South, though this did happen. For example, the city of Birmingham, 
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Alabama, menaced communists with $100 fines and 180 day jail sentences for every 
day that they remained in the town. Rather, Southern politicians began to be able, 
through their disproportionate dominance in the elected chambers, to direct the 
central anticommunist apparatuses to their own ends. (Schrecker, 2002: 83, 101; 
Braden, 1964) 
 After 1948, HUAC had a new southern chair, the Georgia congressman John 
Wood. Under his leadership, it embarked on a series of “Hearings Regarding 
Communist Infiltration of Minority Groups”. Just as Southern panellists had 
dissuaded the committee from investigating the re-appearance of the Ku Klux Klan in 
the South after its formal post-war disappearance, on the grounds that “the KKK is an 
old American institution,” now they directed HUAC to investigate the KKK’s targets 
and victims, and their advocates. Often, the basis upon which organisations were 
targeted was information coming straight from the government itself. For example, it 
was the Attorney General who, in 1947, insisted that the Civil Rights Congress 
(CRC) which was founded the previous year, be included in the ‘List of Subversive 
Organisations’ as a ‘Communist front group’. Thus, as the CRC organised legal 
defence campaigns for Willie McGee, and the Martinsville Seven, and later mobilised 
around the murder of Emmett Till, it was targeted by anticommunist investigators. 
Indeed, going after the CRC served many purposes, in that, to the extent that the 
‘Communist front’ charge was justified, it was the main group fighting cases brought 
under the Smith Act and the McCarran Act, and defending those singled out by 
HUAC. Embedded in the logic of the McCarthyites, here, was a ‘good Negro/bad 
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Negro’ dichotomy. That is, HUAC insisted that the majority of African Americans 
were loyal and being badly represented by the few malcontents, such as Paul 
Robeson, who heaped contumelious insults on the nation. The ex-Communist and 
black labour leader Manning Johnson was one of those to provide testimonial basis 
for this dichotomy. Johnson’s testimony, accusing the CPUSA of using civil rights as 
a decoy for subversion, suggesting that they aimed to provoked armed insurrection, 
riots and so forth across the South, corroborated the most recalcitrant southern 
nationalists in their belief that the source of all agitation was communist conspiracy. 
Similar testimonies implying that the whole civil rights movement was a communist 
front, equipped Southern politicians with the political and ideological rationale they 
needed for unyielding resistance. (Woods, 2004: 36-8; Newton, 2010: 102; Horne, 
1987; Horne, 1990: 134-135) 
 In 1950, the newly elected Senator Joseph McCarthy, a mid-Western conservative 
who enjoyed the backing of Southern oil, made headlines by flourishing his infamous 
‘list’ of 205 communists in the State Department. In fact, there was no list, and the 
number was improvised on the spot. Later, he reduced the number to 57, but still 
declined to produce details. In a less publicity-conscious mode, Senator Pat 
McCarran of Nevada assembled the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS), 
stuffed with political allies such as Senator Eastland. SISS did not develop a 
reputation for vulgar theatrics as did HUAC. Its rituals were more restrained, as 
befitted the upper chamber. Yet the logic behind its targeting of individuals was not 
the less convoluted, nor the less determined in its attempt to depict the workings of a 
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communist conspiracy at the heart of government. Legal decisions undertaken in this 
period also expressed the prevailing balance of forces in favour of segregation. In the 
case of Briggs vs. Elliot, a three-judge District Court in South Carolina upheld the 
doctrine of ‘separate but equal,’ maintaining that the poor quality of schools for 
African Americans could be remedied within the existing legal architecture. (Fried, 
1991; Bennett, 1988: 293-4; Fitzgerald, 2007: 42-43; Bloom, 1987: 94; Martin, 1986: 
126-31) 
 Anticommunist measures had a chilling effect on the civil rights movement. The 
NAACP, while it continued to lobby for the integration of the South, was intimidated 
by the scale and ubiquity of the investigations into communism. It distanced itself 
from supporters such as W E B Du Bois on the grounds of the latter’s sympathy for 
the USSR, and upheld a vigorously anticommunist, Americanist politics. It is unclear 
whether the NAACP in this format represented the liberal anticommunist wing of 
civil rights, or “the left-wing of McCarthyism”, as Manning Marable described it. 
Just as the labor movement was de-radicalised, so were mainstream civil rights 
organisations. The effect was not just on whom they could ally with, but also on what 
sort of tactics they were prepared to countenance. For example, when the Congress 
for Racial Equality (CORE) embarked on “Journeys of Reconciliation” (precursors to 
the 1960s “freedom rides”) to test desegregation on southern buses, the NAACP 
leadership energetically opposed the move. Thurgood Marshall warned: “a 
disobedience movement on the part of Negroes and their white allies, if employed in 
the South, would result in wholesale slaughter with no good achieved.” The CORE 
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for its part was profoundly disabled by its fear of red-baiting. It did everything 
possible to distance itself from communism, and announced that it would not work 
with “Communist-controlled” groups. The result was that CORE saw its growth 
slowed to a near standstill and its organisation reduced to a shell. (Marable, 
2007:17-27; Fried, 1991: 165) 
The deployment of ritualised terror by state apparatuses during the early Cold War 
era was effective insofar as, to be summoned and accused was to be guilty. To take 
the Fifth Amendment was often to lose one’s job. President Harry Gideonse of 
Brooklyn College, an anticommunist witness before SISS, explained: “a witness who, 
as an officer of the city of New York, pleads self-incrimination as an excuse for not 
answering questions about what he does in his official capacity, has automatically by 
that very plea, as he spoke those words, discharged himself.” (SISS, 1953) The 
concerted action of repressive and ideological state apparatuses (understood here not 
as distinct but as mutually articulated apparatuses) produced a form of moral 
regulation, a set of norms and social classifications, through which this 
anticommunist bloc was constantly constructed and maintained, its opponents divided 
and cowed. The rituals and hierarchies of HUAC and SISS produced the social 
categories of deviant, alien, subversive and, the obverse, loyal, ‘good American,’ 
citizen, patriot. Through such means it produced consent, a consensus. But the nature 
of these actions, the ever-presence of politically organised violence as a determining 
factor, the basis of consent in political terror, undermines any attempt to understand 
hegemony strictly in the terms of a consent-coercion dichotomy. “Physical violence 
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and consent do not exist side by side,” Poulantzas (2000: 80-81) argued, “like two 
calculable homogeneous magnitudes, related in such a way that more consent 
corresponds to less violence. Violence-terror always occupies a determining place not 
merely because it remains in reserve”. The breakdown of anticommunist terror, 
concurrent with a crisis in the unity of the state apparatuses, was consubstantial with 
a breakdown in consent. 
 Of course, this incorporation was not effective only through repression and 
ideology: the state-organized “material substratum” of consent was the welfare state 
and corporatist bargaining through which wages would rise in line with productivity 
increases. But the efficacy of the anticommunist bloc depended on the conjunction of 
repression, ideological domination and material concessions. This reached its peak 
during the Korean War. This was not just because the U.S. government successfully 
persuaded most of the population that the war was exclusively the result of 
communist aggression, thus leaving the opposition parcelled out among a tiny cluster 
of communist, ‘fellow travelling,’ Trotskyist and pacifist groups and intellectuals who 
are castigated inside and outside of HUAC for their troubles. It was that at this 
moment, labour was most closely integrated into the corporatist alliance with the state 
and Fordist monopoly capital in the context of national mobilisation. It was at this 
moment that the AFL-CIO, drawn into the radius of the imperial state, becoming one 
of the means of state action with regard to overseas labour and a vital vector for the 
promulgation of anticommunist and imperialist ideology, in return for a relatively 
privileged position within a global division of labour. That this incorporation was 
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strictly subordinate is indicated by the role of the chief executive of General Electric 
in organising the mobilisation, and his way of steamrollering labour. Nonetheless, the 
political importance of labour in this coalition did produce concessions that were 
essential to the management of the bloc. (Casey, 2008: 75 & 200-202; Levy, 1994: 
50)  
 Despite the complaints of some southern industrialists and planters, New Deal 
concessions had stabilising effects throughout the social formation, north and south. 
The problem for the dominant classes in the South, however, was that the “material 
substratum” of their rule – white supremacy, organised through localised sites of 
power and articulated with spatial-economic matrices of production – was already 
entering into a crisis, and insofar as it was an impediment to US hegemonic practices 
in the Cold War, was increasingly incompatible with the extended (international) 
reproduction of monopoly capital. 
Part III: De-formation resisted, re-formation initiated. Brown vs. the Board of 
Education and consequences (1954-60) 
 By 1954, the hard, conservative edge of the national anticommunist campaign led 
by McCarthy and Eastland was beginning to disintegrate. The possibility of any 
‘threat’ to American capitalism by the Communist Party USA had always been 
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remote, but even its ability to play a constructive role in a ‘Popular Front’ left had 
been dismembered by this point. In addition, the anticommunist doyens began to 
over-reach. McCarthy would be censured by the Senate in that year, following a year 
of televised hearings in which he attacked senior members of the establishment 
including, by implication, President Eisenhower. Ultimately, he lost control of SISS. 
In the months before the Supreme Court handed down its verdict on Brown vs the 
Board of Education, moreover, SISS, with Senator Eastland playing a leading role, 
experienced a public embarrassment arising from its investigation into the influence 
of communism in the Southern Conference Educational Fund (SCEF). The fund, set 
up in 1946 as a subsidiary of the Southern Conference on Human Welfare (SCHW), 
had assembled a coalition of liberals, New Dealers, leftists, southerners and other 
anti-segregation activists, with the aim of turning opinion against segregation. Its 
parent organisation, SCHW, had been effectively harassed by HUAC. Senator 
Eastland, leading the charge, directed SISS to begin investigations of SCEF in the 
hope of digging up involvement in ‘Popular Front’ organisations. The hearing was a 
failure for Eastland, inasmuch as the attempt to depict leaders such as Aubrey 
Williams of the National Youth Association, and Virginia Durr (known for her 
involvement in anti-poll tax campaigns), floundered on unconvincing testimony from 
an ex-Communist and state informer named Paul Crouch. Most of the Southern press 
was unconvinced, and Eastland himself had to admit that he not been persuaded by 
the testimony. The investigation had only succeeded in giving the targeted 
organisation some positive publicity. This was not the last such failure in connection 
with the SCEF. (Woods, 2004: 44-47; Mills, 2015; Griffith, 1987) 
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 The national Supreme Court was compelled to decide in the matter of the 
segregation of education by the intense legal and political campaigning of the 
NAACP, supported by the Truman administration which, in its last weeks, submitted 
an amicus curiae to the court underlining the international ramifications of any 
decision. (Dudziak, 2000: 90) The court, in finding that de jure segregation was 
incompatible with equality and thus unconstitutional, left unsolved the problem of de 
facto segregation. In effect, it left open the possibility of allowing schooling to be 
operated on a geographical basis, which would leave most schools segregated since 
neighbourhoods were segregated. Indeed, this was arguably a weakness of the 
mainstream civil rights approach of the NAACP which, in choosing its fights on the 
terrain of state-mandated segregation, tended to avoid those complaints which 
adverted to the forms of discrimination practiced without legal compulsion. (Raskin, 
2004: 157-8; Goluboff, 2007) Nonetheless, it reversed the trend since Plessy vs. 
Ferguson, in which the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of segregation. It 
struck a seemingly fatal blow to the legal order of the South’s ‘Jim Crow’ system. 
The ramifications of this decision were not immediately obvious. In the year 
following the first decision on Brown vs. the Board of Education, wrote C Vann 
Woodward, “neither side showed its hand fully … It was a period of wait and 
see.” (Woodward, 2002: 151-2) In the immediate period after the court’s decision, 
Southern states sent delegations to the court to argue the case for “gradualism 
approaching infinity”. They maintained that immediate de-segregation would result in 
chaos. African Americans were a source of sexual disease and illegitimacy, and the 
 224
integration of their children would lead to white parents rejecting the school system. 
Racial strife and bitterness would ensue. The intention behind these evocations was to 
frighten the judges into allowing the Southern states the maximum leverage in 
complying with the law, so that at most a token compliance would be enforced. In the 
second decision, pertaining to implementation, the court introduced the famous 
phrase “with all deliberate speed”, allowing that deliberation would be necessary as 
administrative problems were overcome. It did not set a date for compliance, 
intervene to support actively compliant district judges, or opt to approve only those 
plans that would result in substantial integration, but instead allowed that de jure 
segregation could continue indefinitely. (Wilkinson III., 1978; McKay, 1956) 
 As in Smith vs Allwright, the legal basis of the Supreme Court’s decision was 
secondary to political considerations, reflecting the imperatives imposed by Cold War 
imperialist politics. Thus, the charge from segregationists that they had been dealt a 
blow by a “political court” (Eastland quoted in Crespino, 2007: 18) was not entirely 
without foundation: the historical and social premises built into the “law of the land” 
as segregationist understood it had been politicised. However, the nature of this 
politicisation was profoundly ambivalent: Brown II effectively enabled the South to 
make at most token gestures toward compliance for several years. The letter of the 
law, and particularly the form of words “with all deliberate speed”, was structured in 
such a way as to accommodate white southern (dominant class) interests. Even so, the 
pressure for de-segregation to be implemented as the U.S. sought to construct a form 
of global hegemony, incorporating former colonial states into a broad pro-American 
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front, continued to grow. Vice President Richard Nixon, returning from a visit to 
Ghana in 1957, insisted that: “We cannot talk equality to the peoples of Africa and 
Asia and practice inequality in the United States”. The relationship between the 
global contest with the USSR, and domestic anticommunism became more 
complicated in these years. The death of Stalin in 1953 and Khrushchev’s ensuing 
glasnost had tended to moderate Cold War pressures. The invasion of Hungary in 
1956 may have resuscitated them, but it also hastened the crisis of the CPUSA, 
leading to a mass exodus of members. The stabilisation of American capitalism and 
the weakening of its domestic foes meant that fervent countersubversion was no 
longer a national obsession, and indeed might tend to undermine America’s global 
position. Southern leaders nonetheless considered civil rights laws to be a 
capitulation in the face of communist propaganda. Governor Talmadge of Georgia, 
writing in You and Segregation, 1955, urged no surrender to Moscow: “Who cares 
what Reds say? Who cares what Pravda prints?” Georgia Senator Richard Russell 
similarly begged: If communists support racial integration, what greater proof could 
there be of its immorality? (Klarman, 2004; Isserman, 1989: 29-31; Borstelmann, 
2001: 108-109)  
 Within two years, a clear majority of southern legislators had signed the Southern 
Manifesto, which accused the Supreme Court of abusing its power, and committed 
signatories to opposing de-segregation by “all lawful means”. Over the three years 
following the decision, 136 pieces of state legislation were ratified in order to 
facilitate resistance to de-segregation. In almost every city in the South, there was a 
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White Citizens’ Council committed to defending Jim Crow. The reticence of the 
central state in implementing Brown vs. the Board of Education encouraged local 
states to escalate their resistance. For example, in North Carolina, the initial strategy 
was to devolve responsibility for pupil assignment to local school boards in order to 
compel the NAACP to challenge segregation on a board-by-board basis. However, 
within a year, the local state had adopted a more confrontational stance, deciding to 
shut down public schools ‘threatened’ with de-segregation and offer funding to white 
students who wanted private tuition. Aside from these measures, there proliferated a 
range of apparatuses, State Sovereignty Commissions  and other investigative 12
bodies, often at the instigation of local right-wing coalitions such as the White 
Citizens’ Councils, with Attorney Generals backing them up, whose remit was to go 
after alleged communism in the civil rights movement, using a combination of the 
investigative and interrogative techniques which had been deployed in HUAC and 
SISS, and by the FBI. Their powers and reach differed from state to state, but even 
the Arkansas State Sovereignty Commission was so extensive in its powers that it 
was described by the Arkansas Republican, and future governor, Winthrop 
Rockefeller, as an “Arkansas Gestapo”. Similar language was used about the 
Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission – a “cotton-patch Gestapo” – which was 
empowered, in strikingly open-ended language, to “perform any and all acts and 
things deemed necessary and proper to protect the sovereignty of the state of 
 There is strikingly little information available on many of these bodies. The chief reason for 12
this is a concerted effort by local states to suppress or destroy the information. The Mississippi 
State Sovereignty Commission is one exception. Many in the state legislature argued, when 
the Commission was finally wound down, that the its documents should be burned rather than 
classified on the grounds that they would “dishonor many Mississippians” when made public, 
including “people sitting right here in this chamber”. In the end, the documents were classified 
and declassified in 1998. The Louisiana State Sovereignty Commission’s documents were 
burned shortly after the institution was closed. (Katagiri, 2001: xiv, 227-228; Butler, 2002)
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Mississippi, and her sister states” from Federal encroachment. After 1959, this 
expanded to include comprehensive efforts on behalf of white citizens and law 
enforcement agencies to investigate supposed agitators, leak about them to the press, 
gather blackmail material, and support efforts at grassroots white resistance to 
integration. More broadly, the Commissions played a critical role in putting together 
political networks of the region’s Right on the basis of their anticommunism and 
segregationism, and supporting – either licitly or illicitly – the activities of the 
emerging White Citizens’ Councils which existed to rouse middle class white 
vigilance against civil rights as a communist threat. The scale of the resistance to 
desegregation was in some respects analogous to the extraordinarily wide-ranging 
federal anticommunist programmes in the late 1940s. Yet it was also more popularly 
based, incorporating small businesses, Protestant churches, middle class 
professionals, and a growing layer of evangelists. As C Vann Woodward describes it: 
“During 1957, 1958, and 1959 a fever of rebellion and malaise of fear spread over the 
region. Books were banned, libraries were purged, newspapers were slanted, 
magazines disappeared from stands, television programs were withheld, films were 
excluded. Teachers, preachers, and college professors were questioned, harassed, and 
many were driven from their positions or fled the South. The NAACP was virtually 
driven underground in some states.” This was a hugely effective response in the 
short-term, drastically reducing the rate of school de-segregations, and – following 
the civil rights movement’s breakthrough in Montgomery, Alabama (see Chapter 
Eight), there was no significant increase in the rate of civil rights actions until 1960. 
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(Lewis, 2004: 30-1 & 124-6; Clark, 1976: 115; Irons, 2010; Katagiri, 2001; Reed, 
1997: 186; Butler, 2002; Woodward, 2002: 165-7; McAdam, 1983) 
 Yet while some were preparing an ‘extremist’ resistance to the integration of 
public schools, some local politicians took Brown vs. the Board of Education as a cue 
to begin re-formation. ‘Practical segregationists’ such as Governor J P Coleman of 
Mississippi, Governor LeRoy Collins of Florida, and Governor Luther Hodge of 
North Carolina, tried to avoid noisy, violent confrontations which would be bad for 
business. Coleman, concerned to maintain social peace and defend Federal 
legitimacy, sought to find ways to formally comply with the Supreme Court’s ruling, 
while introducing a set of racially-laden measures that would maintain as much of the 
old system of white supremacy as possible. The old structures of de jure racial 
discrimination could be reinvented as a de facto system of white supremacy, coded in 
the language of moral and public health reform – so that discrimination in welfare 
entitlements could be introduced in terms of disincentivising ‘illegitimacy’. ‘Practical 
segregationists’ also took the opportunity to modernise, rationalise and, above all, 
expand the power of the local state. Through such means, they sought to control 
outbursts of white violence which would rebound badly in the national political 
terrain, and restructure welfare and family law in ways that rationalised racial 
oppression, parlaying it into the discourse of benevolent governance. (Walker, 2009; 
Crespino, 2007; Walker, 1998) 
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 Increasingly, particularly after the legal strategies of Massive Resistance began to 
fall apart at the turn of the Sixties, anticommunism was of less use to the ‘practical 
segregationists’ than to the ‘massive resisters’. The latter outflanked the ‘moderates’ 
in the relatively weaker state formations, based in predominantly rural and agrarian 
economies (Alabama, Mississippi), and situated in the Black Belt where black voters 
could potentially be powerful. The former, however, consolidated their strength in 
industrialised and urbanised states (North Carolina, Tennessee) with strong, 
centralised state apparatuses, and generally positioned outside the Black Belt. They 
sought to represent themselves as reasonable figures accommodating onerous 
demands, without necessarily conceding their legitimacy. The initial discovery of 
anticommunism had been a bonus. As Clark (1976: 115-116) argues, the failure of the 
Dixiecrat revolt had demonstrated that “the old blatant racism” was no longer 
sufficient by itself, any more than was an appeal to states’ rights, to excite the 
majority of white opinion. However, “when the traditional fears of racial change were 
linked to the relatively new fears growing out of the Cold War, the overwhelming 
majority of whites responded”. Yet, long after the CPUSA had been isolated by 
McCarthyism, its membership further depleted after the Twentieth Congress and 
Khrushchev’s disclosure of the crimes of haut Stalinism, there was little of 
communism’s historical influence left to bemoan. As state after state abandoned 
Massive Resistance, only an embattled and increasingly isolated minority could 
sustain the claim that the highest reaches of government had been infiltrated by 
communism. To this extent, if anticommunism was a politics of crisis management in 
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the Jim Crow South, its persistence only indicated the paucity of locally available 
solutions and a failure in state initiative and capacity. 
Part IV: Accelerated de-formation and re-formation, massive resistance, sit-
ins and freedom rides (1960-65) 
 Under President Kennedy, Cold War anticommunism was briefly given a new 
lease of life, inasmuch as he entered the White House determined to roll back the 
influence of communism in the hemisphere, by which was meant Cuba. In running 
for the White House, Kennedy had sought and obtained the support of the most 
belligerent segregationists. Among his supporters was Governor Patterson of 
Alabama, a hard-line anticommunist and segregationist whose endorsement of 
Kennedy made NAACP leaders uneasy. Patterson was closely involved with 
Kennedy’s plans for the Bay of Pigs invasion. (Horne, 1986: 296)  
 In the fevered atmosphere of Bay of Pigs and the Cuban missile crisis, a revival 
of Red Scare hysteria might have been anticipated. In fact, the civil rights movement 
suddenly experienced a dramatic growth, while giving rise to the first tributaries of 
the ‘New Left’. This was in part because of the setbacks inflicted on Massive 
Resistance, as state laws shutting down public schools or introducing pupil placement 
plans (wherein pupils were assigned to schools by a panel, on the basis of criteria that 
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while not explicitly racial, where ‘racially laden’) were struck down by the courts. 
(See Chapter Seven). It was also in part due to the tactical innovation of sit-ins, in 
which civil rights activists concentrated their forces at a particular vulnerable point in 
the armour of segregation. (McAdam, 1983) There had also been a decisive shift in 
the balance of juridical forces in the period of ascendant Massive Resistance. Aside 
from Brown, the Supreme Court made a number of crucial decisions consolidating 
the political turn away from hardline anticommunism. The most important of these 
was Yates v the United States (1957), in which the Supreme Court reversed the 
convictions of Communists imprisoned under the Smith Act, thus effectively 
neutralising the Act. A number of other decisions, in Jencks v United States (1957), 
Mesarosh v United States (1956), and Watkins v United States (1957), weakened 
anticommunist laws like Taft-Hartley, and rebuked the proceedings of HUAC. And 
finally, an overarching structural factor was the global crisis of white supremacy, 
prompted by insurgent anti-colonial movements often under a communist or 
anticapitalist rubric – the global ‘colour line’ was eroding. In the year 1960 alone, 
fourteen newly independent, formerly colonial states came into being: Congo, Benin, 
Togo, Cameroon, Somalia, Niger, Mauritius, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Chad, 
Central African Republic, Gabon, Senegal, Mali. (Bush, 2009; Horne, 1991; Horne, 
1986; Du Bois, 2008; Lichtman, 2012: 91-92, 94-96)   
Here, then, was an overdetermined political moment, a “ruptural unity”. 
(Althusser, 2005: 99) The crisis of ‘Massive Resistance’ in the South was met by an 
opposite and eventually overwhelming escalation of the civil rights movement. The 
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tactics of sit-ins, in which African Americans would occupy premises or seats 
reserved for whites, and freedom rides, in which civil rights activists would cross Jim 
Crow barriers on public transport, began to exhaust the capacity of Southern states to 
effectively respond. Either they were compelled to meet the demands of the 
movement, or smear and harass them, or physically assault them. Only the first of 
these worked, as had happened following the sit-ins in Nashville, Tennessee when 
Mayor Ben West was persuaded to publicly oppose segregation, while businesses 
negotiated the end of segregated custom with protesters. Legal harassment was 
widespread, certainly. In the three years following the sit-ins at the Woolworths lunch 
counter in Greensboro, North Carolina, approximately 20,000 people were arrested 
for participating in similar protests. But the threat of arrest did not impede the spread 
of this tactic. Outright brutality, which was common in many Southern redoubts, was 
anticipated by the tactic of non-violent civil disobedience, and in fact planned for, as 
it would illustrate the severity of the Jim Crow system to a wider public.  
 Parapolitical violence, in the form of Ku Klux Klan attacks, bombings and 
lynchings, were another element of the state’s response. (The precise way in which 
the state was involved is addressed and theorised in Chapter Seven). Though formally 
private, civil society organisations, the Ku Klux Klans of the South were integrated 
into the state through covert hierarchies and networks. They thus participated in the 
state’s administrative and technical expertise, its monopoly on public violence, while 
helping to deploy it to resolve bureaucratic, population problems in ways that could 
be disavowed.  But the use of terror, over the longer term, tended to rebound badly 
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and lose its efficacy. The period of the “historical primacy of terror as a means of 
social control” in the South was being brought to a close. (Piven & Cloward, 1979, p. 
182; Chalmers, 2003; Eyes on the Prize 3: Ain't Scared of Your Jails (1960-1961), 
1990; Marable, 2007, p. 67; Carson, 1996; Newton, 2010) 
 What was important about these tactics was that they were pointed at a strategic 
cleavage within state power, deliberately attempting to leverage it. While 
conventional social movement studies focus on the communicative, ‘non-violent’ 
aspects of civil rights struggle, Frances Fox Piven reminds us that the key to the 
movement’s strategy was to activate “disruptive power”. (Piven & Cloward, 1979, 
pp. 181-263; Piven, 2006) The repertoires of such disruptive power, as much as their 
ideological forms, were propagated through a global assault on the colour line: 
anticolonial struggle, and particularly India’s successful fight for independence. For 
Martin Luther King Jr., it was Gandhi’s doctrine of nonviolent resistance that he 
adopted for the US civil rights movement. “To other countries I may go as a tourist,” 
he once said upon visiting Delhi, “but to India I come as a pilgrim.” About the 
specific methods of Gandhi, he cited the example of the Montgomery Bus Boycott: 
“We have found them to be effective and sustaining—they work!” (King Jr., 2005; 
Horne, 2008) 
 As the traditional ideological supports of Jim Crow weakened, anticommunism 
was still occasionally useful as a proxy means for battling Jim Crow. The North 
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Carolina General Assembly, though it governed a well industrialised Southern state 
which experienced relatively little of the violence that other Southern states had, 
responded to the successes of the civil rights movement by embarking on a new 
anticommunist crackdown focused on Universities. On 26th June 1963, the Assembly 
rushed through a law banning anyone who was a known member of the Communist 
Party, or who was known to advocate overthrow of the United States Constitution, or 
who had invoked the Fifth Amendment in respect of communist or "subversive" 
connections, from speaking on North Carolina campuses. Its passage was expedited 
by the conservative Senate President Clarence Stone, who led a troupe of 
reactionaries determined to prevent desegregation. But the law was widely opposed 
within the state, including by Governor Sanford and much of the local media, and 
arguably provided a mobilising tool for the radical left - as when Herbert Aptheker 
and Frank Wilkinson addressed large crowds just outside the campus in Chapel Hill. 
 The last stronghold of traditional, Southern racial anticommunism, was perhaps 
Alabama. There, the least centralised state administration co-existed with the least 
developed industrial base. Alabama had fewer means by which to accommodate the 
end of Jim Crow than most states, and a greater interest in resisting it. As a 
consequence, its responses were more violent, authoritarian and, as figured in the 
speech of its Governor George Wallace, more conventionally anticommunist. The 
state’s Department of Public Safety, based on information supplied by the FBI, 
labelled Martin Luther King Jr. and his allies among the “Left-Wing Pro-Communist 
Groups” menacing the social order. A local Peace Commission report charged that 
King was responsible for sixty communist front groups, yet another that he was under 
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the direction of the Communist Party. Wallace himself volubly rebuked the 
“Communist conspiracy” at the heart of the “so-called civil rights movement”. Yet 
here, King and his allies knew that the state’s response was dysfunctional, that the 
anticommunist offensive was so bound up with paranoia, so incapable of compromise 
or accommodation, that the mere invitation to accommodate by peaceful means was 
liable to provoke violence, force the federal government to react, and thus further the 
crisis within the state.  
 The Selma-to-Montgomery marches of 1965 organised principally by the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) in response to the repression of 
voter-registration, was a tactic devised in recognition of this. The first demonstration, 
on 7 March 1965, was assaulted by police, with tear gas and billy clubs as it crossed 
the Edmund Pettus Bridge. The event, rapidly dubbed ‘Bloody Sunday’, aroused not 
only popular anger but also dismay on the part of border state Southern Democrats 
such as Texas Senator Ralph Yarborough. In amplifying divisions within the ‘Solid 
South’, the tactics of the Alabama state also provoked Federal intervention. Not only 
that, but the boldness and presence of the SCLC aroused the involvement of local 
black sharecroppers for the first time, despite the threats that they had  with the result 
that the third and last Selma-to-Montgomery march was protected by a federalised 
National Guard and permitted 25,000 marchers to finally march the distance to 
Montgomery unmolested by the state or parapolitical militias. (Woods, 2004, pp. 
218-24; Vaughn & Davis, 2006, pp. 201-235) The mobilisation of masses inside the 
sphere of Jim Crow was thus intended to force change from outside Jim Crow. It 
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leveraged the divisions within the US ruling class, creating such disruption that 
thousands of businesses across the South de-segregated long before any legal 
mandate, and compelled the Federal government to act. The result, where local 
government did not adapt, was a profound degeneration in local state capacity, and 
the accumulation of further antagonisms (‘contradictions’) within and between 
central and local state apparatuses. 
  
 This, and the logarithmic growth of civil rights campaigns leading to the 300,000 
strong March on Washington in 1963, produced two distinctive kinds of response 
from the central state. One was that the FBI under Hoover intensified its campaign of 
harassment, disruption and subversion of civil rights leaders. For example, from 1963 
until his assassination in 1968, Martin Luther King Jr. was the target of a “systematic 
program of harassment … by means both legal and illegal” intended to neutralise him 
as an effective civil rights leader. The power previously accumulated by Hoover’s 
bureaucratic office in the context of providing political intelligence to the White 
House and leading counter-subversion campaigns, played a significant role in this. 
For the majority of his staff were unconvinced of any significant communist presence 
in the organisation for the March on Washington. Yet, Hoover’s insistence to the 
contrary was sufficient to have reports re-written, conclusions revised and a 
“substantial” communist menace confected. On the basis of such fictions, and more 
substantial ones besides, the FBI continued to disrupt the civil rights movement’s 
operations, leaking red-baiting smears to the media and generally acting as a 
powerful alibi to an embattled south. (FBI, 2007, pp. 1-5; Lewis, 2004, pp. 68-72) 
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Yet, as would be anticipated by the above remarks on the consent-coercion couplet 
above, the very efficacy of popular organisation in breaking down the traditional 
means of state repression and terror was also a factor in disintegrating the efficacy of 
anticommunist white-supremacism. 
 The second response was that of the executive, under President Johnson. While 
he had initially been party to Kennedy’s strategy of continuing the course of 
moderate, cautious reform, the extent of disruption compelled a more radical 
approach. With cross-party backing, he pushed Congress to introduce a legislative 
programme to effectively overthrow Jim Crow, beginning with the Twenty Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution, outlawing the poll tax and the Civil Rights Act, 
outlawing segregation, in 1964. In August 1965, a Voting Rights Act was passed, 
providing Federal protection for African Americans who wanted to register to vote. 
Although it would take some time to compel Southern states to implement these 
changes, the Supreme Court signalled its intent by upholding the power of Congress 
to protect African American citizens in this way. (Capozzi, 2006)   
 This response was explicitly prompted by ongoing, repeated crises in the South, 
culminating in Selma’s ‘Bloody Sunday’. But an implicit context was the Vietnam 
War, which was already prompting an antiwar movement integrally related to the 
civil rights struggle. The Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the 
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) which the former had helped build, 
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and Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) were among the organisations involved 
in civil rights also opposing the Vietnam War. These organisations represented a 
militant component of the New Left that was in formation, and which threatened the 
Democratic Party’s national organisation. As an internal report of the liberal, 
anticommunist Democratic organisation the ADA had put it, the Party’s support for 
voting rights would result in “quick recruitment by the Democratic Party, which will 
mean quick scuttling of the Freedom Democratic Parties and SNCC 
control.”  (Gettleman, et al., 1995: 299; Neale, 2004: 127-9; Dittmer, 1995: 294; 
Sitkoff, 1981)  
 But not only did such developments threaten the Democratic Party and its 
particular representational strategies (the attempt to keep segregationists on board 
while satisfying African American demands). The Vietnam War required a national 
mobilisation of young men, drafted on the basis of anticommunist struggle and the 
protection of Americanism, as well as the acquiescence of a wider public. The fact 
that large numbers of Americans had fought in battles that had, for them, a great deal 
in common with those of the ‘Third World’, in the course of which they had 
developed tactics designed to overcome state resistance rather than simply be morally 
persuasive, presented a tremendous obstacle to this. The longer the crisis of Southern 
segregation went on, the greater the dilemma would become. Johnson’s intervention 
can thus be interpreted as an attempt to resolve the brewing crisis of authority and 
construct a new hegemony under Democratic Party leadership. Yet, the very attempt 
to do so while retaining the segregationists as a core, conservative element of the 
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party machine, exacerbated the crisis of authority. As Cleveland Sellers of the SNCC 
put it, “Never again were we lulled into believing that our task was exposing 
injustices so that the ‘good’ people of American could eliminate them … our struggle 
was not for civil rights, but for liberation.” (Sellers & Terrell, 1990: 111) 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Discourse: Reds and race in popular and elite discourse 
This chapter approaches the subject of race and anticommunism from a radically 
new starting point, that of Lacanian discourse analysis. Thus far, I have approached 
the intersections of these two registers mainly as a strategic matter, in terms of its 
contested functionality in sustaining white-supremacy against challenges. In this 
chapter, I am more interested in locating the psychic investments in white-supremacy, 
and where anticommunism might fit in. This is necessary because without such an 
account, there is a danger of over-rationalising racist anticommunism. Particularly, 
there is a risk of over-stating the strategic utility of anticommunist terror, and 
violence, and underestimating its non-rational sources. It is also a useful approach 
insofar as it involves scrutinising the language of white-supremacist anticommunism 
in some detail, and following its logic and non-logic, rather than assuming that it is 
already understood. Therefore, making use of some of the resources of whiteness 
studies, and particularly the psychoanalytic approaches of Fanon and Seshadri-
Crooks, I embark upon an analysis of some specimens of white-supremacist 
anticommunist discourse, and locate what I argue is a fantasmatic kernel of 
enjoyment in white-supremacist language. I further argue that where the historical 
basis and fundamental contingency of whiteness is exposed, the ensuing anxiety 
produces a space in which a specifically racialised anticommunism can emerge. In 
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this discourse, communism emerges as a ‘monstrous’, racially ambiguous figure 
which can be the subject of fantasy projection.  
Taking Them At Their Word 
I began this research with the conviction that the language of anticommunism in 
the context of Massive Resistance must be treated very seriously. To ‘flatten’ the 
discourse, to treat it as either a shallow instrumentalisation or a hollow delusion, 
would be to risk missing what was truly interesting and instructive about the 
ideological aspect of their struggle. For example, if segregationist protesters at the 
Little Rock capitol suggested that ‘Race Mixing is Communism’, we must at least 
make space for the possibility that it meant something subjectively important.  This 
chapter consists of an extended foray into discourse analysis in which I aim to take 
the Senators and shopkeepers, Klans and councils, planters and protesters, fully at 
their word. 
To do this, I am shifting in this chapter from a terrain largely coordinated by 
Gramsci, Althusser and Poulantzas, to a Lacanian terrain. In principle, there is much 
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in both Althusser and Gramsci that I could bring to bear in the analysis of discourse.  13
Therefore, to slip from the problematic of historical materialism to that of 
psychoanalysis is such a profound shift in register that it will require some 
explanation. The purpose of deploying a psychoanalytic reading is to help me do one 
thing above all, and that is follow the texts scrupulously and attentively, paying close 
attention to what is actually said. It is the obvious, the surface of speech, that 
Lacanian analysis is concerned with – rather than with what is assumed to be behind 
or beneath it. Lacan warned analysts not to try to ‘understand’ too quickly, for if they 
did so they would generally only find meanings congruent with their own lived 
reality. In that sense, analyst and analysand would be communicating on a purely 
imaginary plane, in which speech as a medium functioned like a two-way mirror, 
each participant only finding such meanings as he or she was already prepared to 
find. Instead, Lacan suggested that analysts should position themselves on a different 
axis, the symbolic axis, that governed by the logic of language itself. They should 
“listen for sounds and phonemes, words, locutions, and sentences, not forgetting 
pauses, scansions, cuts, periods, and parallelisms”. For it is in paying ‘free-floating’ 
attention the formal properties of speech that one notices the parapraxes, missed 
syntagms, mixed metaphors, deletions, litotes, compromise formations, absences, 
 In Reading Capital, Althusser et al excavated what they argued was the logic of the 13
symptom embedded in historical materialism. This resulted in a unique epistemology and 
practice of reading, concerned with knowledge as a production, and theory (and implicitly all 
texts) as the product of a conjuncture and thus riddled with contradictions and symptomatic 
gaps. On top of this, Althusser offered an original approach to ideology and subject-formation, 
coining the highly productive concept of ‘interpellation’. Gramsci, meanwhile, emphasised the 
formative materiality of ideological superstructures, and the centrality of language to the 
formation of political domination. Through his understanding of ‘common sense’, he stressed 
the role of lived experiences and traditions in the formation of ideology. In drawing attention to 
the way in which discourse was accented with, bisected by, the lived experiences of distinct 
social classes and groups, he underlined how the achievement of any form of unity, particularly 
hegemonic unity, was a necessarily complex negotiation wherein linguistic practices had to be 
made to act as a kind of social cement.
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catachreses, constant associations and slurred statements. And it is there, in the non-
sense, the non-logic, that there can be found an auspicious deposit of meaning 
generally overlooked. That deposit is, of course, the work of the unconscious. (Van 
Haute, 2002; Miller, 2011; Fink, 2014a; Pavón-Cuéllar, 2010; Lacan, 2006: 394) 
I invoke Lacanian psychoanalysis in this context with some caution. Lacan’s 
concepts were designed for use in a clinical situation, in which the suffering subject is 
finding ways to speak the unspeakable. The role of the analyst in this context is to 
hear the gaps through which the unconscious Other is speaking within the 
analysand’s discourse. A great deal of his work which is applicable to discourse is 
only of use in the clinical situation with its dynamics of transference and resistance. 
In this context, interpretation is one means among others – punctuation and scanning 
– to produce more material. Hence the generally oracular, elliptical quality of 
Lacanian interpretations which are intended, not to make sense, but to “make waves”. 
(Lacan, quoted in Fink, 2007: 81) To attempt to apply the same methods to a 
transcript, let alone a structured piece of writing or a work of propaganda that may 
have been collectively laboured over, would appear to be futile. No confirmatory 
material can be generated. There is no analysand to affect. Unlike in the clinic, we 
have no choice but to ‘understand,’ since there is no other criterion of success. 
There is, moreover, a gulf between the subjective or inter-subjective level of 
psychoanalysis, and the broader ideological structures to which we hope discourse 
analysis might give us access. Psychoanalysis is concerned with the particular. In this 
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vein, Paul Verhaeghe (2008) contrasts psychoanalysis, which begins with the general 
(diagnostic categories, registers of analysis) and reaches toward the particular (the 
symptom, the fundamental fantasy), with medical practices which begin with the 
particular (symptoms), and proceed toward the general (diagnosis and prescribed 
cure). A precondition for any successful analysis is that the analysand can be situated 
in relation to one of the major diagnostic categories – neurotic (obsessive or hysteric), 
psychotic, or pervert – but this doesn’t indicate the treatment so much as provide 
broad guidelines for proceeding with further analysis. For example, in the treatment 
of a neurotic, the analyst’s mission is to weaken their ego, their already-too-strong 
sense of self, to put their desires into question (and thus into motion). In the treatment 
of a psychotic, such an approach would be potentially disastrous. In that case, the 
analyst seeks to strengthen the ego, and to help create an anchor in meaning around 
which they can organise their relationship to reality. 
Lacan himself expressed scepticism about the attempt to analyse neuroses and so 
on at the social level: ‘mass psychology’ is not very useful when individual agents, 
rather than societies, experience symptoms. (Lacan & Granzotto, 2004) He also 
classed psychoanalysis as a ‘conjectural science,’ suggesting a distance from the 
‘exact sciences’ (Lacan, 2006: 732). His use of tropes from game theory, set theory 
and so on constituted an attempt to close that gap, but it seems to remain wide open. 
This being the case, what sort of epistemic violence might be wrought by taking these 
already tentative conceptual operations out of their context and trying to make them 
work abroad? If I want to derive any general conclusions from my reading of the 
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diaries, newspapers, propaganda sheets, speeches, letters and other texts of 
segregationists, surely it would be more appropriate to use a Foucauldian or 
Gramscian – that is to say, historical and genealogical – mode of discourse analysis? 
And yet, beginning with Freud’s writings on art and war, psychoanalysis has often 
furnished us with analyses of collective, trans-subjective phenomena. There are today 
a number of influential or at least authoritative psychoanalytic readings of ideological 
‘symptoms’, of cultural formations, and particularly of race. (Bhabha, 1983; Davids, 
2011; Fanon, 2008; Hook, 2004; Hook, 2005; Kovel, 1997; Seshadri-Crooks, 2000; 
Žižek, 2008a; Žižek, 2008b) One can be sceptical of the extraordinary range of 
phenomena which analyses, originally devised for the clinic, are being used to 
explain – particularly as there isn’t even an abundance of proof that they are even 
‘true’ in their original setting. Still, to leave matters there would be to dismiss a range 
of extraordinarily sophisticated and suggestive writing in quite a summary way. And 
such abstinence would be supererogatory.  
Recall that for Lacan, there is no subjectivity without the Other, in relation to 
which the unconscious is formed. Sedimented in the unconscious is precisely “the 
deposit, the alluvium, the petrification” (Lacan, quoted in Soler, 2014: 27) of group 
experience – nation, race, gender, sex, and all of the historically produced, mortified 
and transfigured realities which constitute the group. In the highly specific chains of 
significations that constitute each particular subject, one finds their relation to the 
symbolic order and ideological imaginary. In a 1955 seminar, Lacan gives the 
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example of a writer whose cramp was related to the fact that in Koranic Law, theft 
can be punished by the amputation of the hand – a traumatic fact for the subject 
whose father had been accused of being a thief. In effect, refusing to understand the 
relation between theft and amputation, he cut off his own hand. (Lacan, 1991b: 
129-130) His discourse was no doubt highly particular, but also impossible to 
extricate from, or analyse without reference to, the social structure, the judicial order, 
and the prevailing moral discourse. Thus, as Palacios (2009: 20) puts it, “The fact that 
Lacan ‘translated’ Freudian psychoanalysis to the language of linguistic structuralism 
makes the transition and interaction between individual selves and social selves very 
smooth: they are both ‘sewn’ by the signifying operation of language.” What 
Lacanian analysis can gives us a unique access to, then, is the subject’s relationship to 
the social link, to the space which is usually called ideology. 
There are also, irrespective of the ‘truth’ of Lacanian psychoanalysis, advantages 
to deploying it in this context. In the first instance, the unique Lacanian take on 
meaning allows me to combine a hermeneutics of suspicion with an approach that 
takes the subject’s discourse seriously. It makes it possible to read the text in a critical 
fashion without making the untenable assumption that the reader knows what the 
author ‘really’ meant to say.  Because subjects give a bad, incomplete and 14
contradictory account of themselves, while simultaneously offering explanations to 
 This, of course, has limits outside of a clinical context. For, the number of meanings that 14
could be attached to just one statement through association is potentially limitless: the 
analysand would usually decide what to associate the terms to. In the analysis of discourse, 
unavoidably, I must select some meanings based on an interpretation of the historical context. 
This is where ‘understanding’ necessarily creeps back in and limits the production of new 
knowledge. The only thing one can do about this is take it into account and discount for it.
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conceal the lack, we can take subjects fully at their word, without necessarily 
believing a word they say. We can “hold on to this dialectic, this movement between 
fragmentation and integration” which is integral to the subject’s discourse. (Frosh, 
2014: 20) Secondly, this approach does not seek to flatten or reduce the discourse by 
ironing out ambiguities and contradictions, but treats them as points of 
enlightenment. This is made possible by an approach to subjectivity in which the self-
contained subject driven by biologically given needs (self-preservation) linked to 
rationally ordered preferences, is decentred, displaced by the split subject, whose 
statements are likely to be polysemic, even to the point of expressing contradictory 
feelings and desires. That there may be more than one thought formation going on at 
the same time, that indeed it is not always clear which subject is speaking, is a 
necessary corollary of psychoanalysis. (Van Haute, 2002). This gives us the chance to 
make space for several, contending thoughts expressed in a seemingly simple 
statement. Thirdly, the core of psychoanalysis is the patriarchal family and its normal 
dysfunctions. This gives us a unique way to speak of race in relation to sex and 
reproduction. So I maintain that with appropriate caveats, and with due sensitivity to 
the context of their operation, it is both possible to deploy psychoanalytic readings in 
the analysis of discourse and ideological formations, and advantageous to do so. 
For the purposes of this discussion Parker’s (2005, 2014) “seven theoretical 
elements,” identifying some coordinates of a Lacanian approach to discourse, will 
orient me in analysing the texts which I want to look at. These do not constitute, and 
will not be deployed as, a methodological schema, a series of ‘steps’ that I can take to 
 248
exhaustively analyse a text. Rather, they can act as starting points for a flexible 
inquiry, some being more productive than others. These elements can be summed up 
schematically here as:  
i) the primacy of the formal quality of a text over its apparent or intended 
meaning;  
ii) the importance of ‘quilting points’, or ‘master signifiers’ which guarantee the 
structure of a text when the relation of signifier to signified is otherwise apt to 
slide;  
iii) the agency of the unconscious in discourse, where the unconscious is “the 
discourse of the Other”;  
iv) the structuring of discourse by its relation to knowledge, specifically what the 
Other is ‘supposed’ or hypothesised to know;  
v) the way in which speaking subjects are positioned by language relative to 
another;  
vi) the emphasis on contradiction, dissent, and deadlocks of perspective, rather 
than consensus, as the condition of possibility of speech;  
vii) interpretation that operates on the surface of speech, rather than attempting to 
divine the internal world of the speaker. 
Any analysis has to be guided by a reflexive understanding of the discourse of the 
analyst. Lacan identified ‘four discourses’ – the discourse of the master, the hysteric, 
the university, and the analyst. (Lacan, 1991c) It will not be necessary here to enter 
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into a detailed account of these, or the mathemes diagramming their structure. It is 
sufficient for our purposes to say that of the four discourses Lacan described, only the 
discourse of the analyst was one of non-mastery. The discourse of the master is 
overtly concerned with domination, and with the production of knowledge only 
insofar as it will make things work. The discourse of the hysteric is one in which the 
subject puts the master signifier to work, producing knowledge about itself in order to 
expose its lack. The position of mastery remains, but is usurped by the hysterical 
subject. That of the university is more covertly a discourse of mastery since, while it 
appears to privilege knowledge for its own sake, the knowledge it is concerned with 
is that whose authority is the pedagogue.  
The discourse of the analyst is concerned with something else. The analyst tries to 
occupy the position not of the master-signifier (master discourse), not of knowledge 
per se (university discourse), but rather of something more enigmatic – object a, the 
object-cause of desire. In practice, this means listening for the effects of the 
unconscious. In the context of an analysis of discourse, the analyst has to refrain from 
interpolating themselves as the bearer of the real knowledge about the text. As will 
become plain, however, this emphasis on the structural features of discourse, and the 
ways in which it can position subjects, is not purely reflexive. These cartographies 
offer a useful schema of the dilemmas of those invested in the signifier of 
‘whiteness’, and threatened with its loss of potency. 
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The ‘white unconscious’ of privilege. 
“It must be remembered that the white group of labourers, while they received a 
low wage, were compensated in part by a sort of public and psychological wage. 
They were given public deference and titles of courtesy because they were white. 
They were admitted freely with all classes of white people to public functions, public 
parks, and the best schools. The police were drawn from their ranks, and the courts, 
dependent upon their votes, treated them with such leniency as to encourage 
lawlessness. Their vote selected public officials, and while this had small effect upon 
the economic situation, it had great effect upon their personal treatment and the 
deference shown them. White schoolhouses were the best in the community, and 
conspicuously placed, and they cost anywhere from twice to ten times as much per 
capita as the coloured schools. The newspapers specialised on news that flattered the 
poor whites and almost utterly ignored the Negro except in crime and ridicule. 
 “On the other hand, in the same way, the Negro was subject to public insult; was 
afraid of mobs; was liable to the jibes of children and the unreasoning fears of 
white women; and was compelled almost continuously to submit to various 
badges of inferiority. The result of this was that the wages of both classes could be 
kept low, the whites fearing to be supplanted by Negro labour, the Negroes always 
being threatened by the substitution of white labour.” – W E B Du Bois (1965: 
700-701)  
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Du Bois’s famous formulation concerning the “public and psychological wage” of 
whiteness has become the basis upon which a range of critical approaches to race 
have been developed, above all ‘whiteness studies’. While the study of “white skin 
privilege” had been initiated by marxist intellectuals working in the New Left of 
Sixties America, the idea of ‘whiteness’ as an object of study, as a problem to be 
explained, came into its own in the 1990s. (Allen, 1994; Allen, 1997; Kolchin, 2002) 
Has too much emphasis been placed on the ‘psychological’ element of the 
formulation, and none sufficiently on the ‘public’ – or, as it might otherwise be stated, 
‘social’? Many of the most significant studies of ‘whiteness’ have focused on the 
cultural and cognitive claims that it entails. (Hale, 1998; Jacobson, 1999; Jacobson, 
2001; Jacobson, 2008; Krikler, 2005; Lipsitz, 1998; Roediger, 2007) Yet, the social 
compensations of whiteness for white workers, as listed by Du Bois, are not 
insignificant: deference, access to public goods and resources, access to the state, and 
a sympathetic media.  
However, it is significant that Du Bois does not draw any dichotomy between the 
‘public’ and symbolic ‘psychological’. He does not draw up two sets of books, with 
criminal justice listed under ‘public’ and deference listed under ‘psychological’. It is 
each to the extent of the other; the ‘wage’ which is allocated in the form of access to 
public goods has a clear ‘psychological’ dimension; the ‘wage’ which is 
‘psychological’ has a social dimension. If, as Allen (1994, 1997) argues, the long-
term effect of the system of ‘white-skin privilege’ is to exert social control as a mode 
of class domination over both black and white workers, to reduce the bargaining 
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power of both black and white workers, and if ‘race management’ (Roediger & Esch, 
2012) secures the loyalty of white workers to a system in which they produce a 
surplus that is exploited, their advantage is relative not just to the situation of black 
workers, but to their purview. In a certain, relatively immediate, short-term 
perspective, white workers can be invested in deference, seniority rights, the colour 
bar and so on which, in the perspective of class analysis and in light of ‘the actuality 
of communism’ (Bosteels, 2011), might appear to be nothing more than the absence 
of special penalty, or at best minimal compensations for subordination and 
exploitation. 
The point here is not to query whether these privileges are therefore ‘real’. 
‘White-skin privilege’ is at least as real as its effects, as real as the investments in it. 
But this does compel us to ask what privilege offers those who choose to invest in it. 
Having just said that it is in part a matter of perspective, it appears that there is 
nothing self-evident in the workings of privilege, no straightforward reason why the 
currency in which the ‘public and psychological wage’ is paid should be accepted, no 
reason why ‘whiteness’ should be introjected so readily, no reason why other 
‘interests’ relative to a given social field shouldn’t come first, the question of what 
privilege does for its subjects stands out more than before. One way to answer it is to 
approach the problem as a matter of political strategy. As Corey Robin (2011) argues, 
one of the distinguishing features of conservatism’s popular appeal is that it offers 
some of the subaltern classes a share in mastery: a purpose for which race is ideal. 
Even where this mastery is largely symbolic – the majority of whites in the 
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antebellum South did not own slaves, for example – race has a compelling ability to 
summon cross-class solidarities. However, in this chapter I am less engaged in trying 
to explain the strategic utilities and functions of race than in exploring the psychic 
investment in race for white subjects, and the possible relevance of anticommunism 
in safeguarding that investment. 
The argument of this chapter will therefore take the approach of Seshadri-Crooks 
(2000) as its starting point. Beginning on a problematic inaugurated by Fanon, of 
what it means to desire whiteness, Seshadri-Crooks argues that whiteness offers, in 
what can be counted a typically conservative ideological gesture, the fantasy of 
organic wholeness, promising a phallic fullness of being and plenitude of enjoyment. 
The signifier ‘Whiteness’ promises to supplement the lack in being which sexual 
difference introduces. Yet at the same time, it also limits this jouissance by reinstating 
difference as hierarchy, limiting and thus conserving the domain of sameness. In this 
view, race is a regime of visibility, which “organizes difference and elicits investment 
in its subjects because it promises access to being itself. It offers the prestige of being 
better and superior; it is the promise of being more human, more full, less lacking”. 
The enjoyment in the fullness of being offered by racial solidarity, ‘whiteness’, is – 
like all jouissance – excessive. There is something horrific in the fantasy of 
wholeness, wherein difference is eliminated, such that difference must be resurrected 
at another level as somatically marked racial difference. (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000: 7) 
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The status of ‘Whiteness’ as determinant here is, in a sense, counterintuitive. If 
race is, in its essence, racism, then it would appear to be only non-white groups who 
are raced, with whiteness appearing as effect rather than cause of this process. Such, 
at any rate, would seem to be the default in the racial culture of the United States. As 
Barbara Fields wrote in a highly regarded essay, “Americans regard people of known 
African descent or visible African appearance as a race, but not people of known 
European descent or visible European appearance. That is why, in the United States, 
there are scholars and black scholars, women and black women.” And moreover, 
“people in the United States do not classify as races peoples of non-European but also 
non-African appearance or descent, except for purposes of direct or indirect contrast 
with people of African descent”. (Fields & Fields, 2012: 115) This is to say, in effect, 
that there is only one race in American racist ideology: the black race.  
Taken too literally, this position appears to be overstated. Whether in law, science, 
or political discourse, it is not uncommon to find people of European descent 
classified as races in American history. That the subject of whiteness has historically 
been contested – with Anglo-Saxonism the initially dominant strain later giving way 
to Caucasianism – is evidence first of how the framing of race was contingent on the 
politics of slavery and immigration, and second of how incoherent race ideology 
necessarily is, rather than evidence that the white race is inexistent in American 
history. (Krenn, 2006: 1-19; Horsman, 1981; Jacobson, 1998) And where the race 
system enters into crisis of any sort, ‘the white race’ often appears with a strident 
assertion of its rights and the imperatives of race solidarity. Nor is it obvious that 
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“white racial consciousness” (Roediger, 2007: xxi) is ultimately reducible to 
consciousness of the black race and its proximity. Nevertheless, it is immensely and 
profoundly interesting that in the binaries of traditional racial ideology, ‘blackness’ 
has been placed on the side of biology, animality, sexuality and nature (Fanon, 2008: 
124-128), whereas ‘whiteness’ has been placed on the side of culture, civilisation, and 
thus the ability to transcend race. Likewise, in contrast to the abundance of 
significations attached to ‘blackness’, which is a marked category, ‘whiteness’ is so 
often an unspoken default, a semantically empty, unmarked remainder. To be white is 
to be the race-of-no-race, to be convinced that one’s whiteness has no bearing on 
one’s interests and actions. (Brekhus, 1998; Dyer, 1997; Murray, 1998)  
There is therefore something enigmatic about ‘Whiteness’. The puzzle is not that 
it appears but that it disappears so quickly and yet is still somehow active. It is true 
that American racial ideology holds that, “virtually everything people of African 
descent do, think, or say is racial in nature” (Fields & Fields, 2012: 116) while the 
actions of white people are assumed to have in some sense transcended race. But if it 
also happens that, “any situation” involving Euro-Americans and African-Americans 
“automatically falls under the heading ‘race relations’” (Fields & Fields, 2012: 117), 
such a turn of phrase at least implies that there is more than one race present. Indeed, 
if race is – like class and gender to this extent – inherently a relational system, the 
existence of a black race presupposes a white race, at least as a structural location. 
Even if it is a paradoxically non-raced race, it is a necessary part of the structure of 
race. 
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The point about ‘Whiteness’ therefore seems to be this: inasmuch as it is strangely 
absent from discourse yet still determining, inasmuch as these absences have a 
structural effect within the discourse, it makes sense to speak of a white unconscious. 
‘Whiteness’ in this sense is, in Seshadri-Crooks’s terms, “an unconscious signifier, 
one that generates a combinatory with its own set of inclusions and exclusions that 
determine the subject. To be raced is to be subject to the signifier 
Whiteness.” (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000: 24-25) But what does it mean to be ‘subject to’ 
this signifier – or, to be more precise, master-signifier? To be a subject, in a sense, is 
to be a ‘bearer’ of something. (Kesel, 2009: Loc. 295) For Lacan, this something is 
nothing other than the order of linguistically mediated social relations: hence, the 
symbolic order. The subject bears a comprehension and ‘memory’ of itself provided 
by the symbolic order, by chains of signifiers. To be a subject of race is to be subject 
to a logic of differences in the symbolic order which overwrite and ‘race’ bodies. 
This introduces an important cleavage, taking Seshadri-Crooks’s account away 
from that of Fanon. Fanon’s analysis of race is situated plainly on what Lacan would 
call the imaginary. Indeed, Fanon specifically refers to Lacan’s account of the mirror-
stage to suggest that racial identification for “the white man” involves the imaginary 
misrecognition of “the black man” as the Other, that which cannot be assimilated and 
can therefore only be the target of aggressivity, a “phobogenic object, a stimulus to 
anxiety”. (Fanon, 2008: 117, 124) This focus on the gaze, the scopic drive, as the 
means by which racist identity is established, has become influential in postcolonial 
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theory. Bhabha (1994) interprets Fanon through this Lacanian optic, focusing on the 
splitting or alienation of the subject on the imaginary plane. To leave it there, 
however, would risk simplifying Lacan’s account of the imaginary. As we have seen, 
imaginary identification is already situated by the symbolic register. We can add that, 
a condition for admission to the symbolic order is not just the introjection of a 
paternal prohibition, but also the ability to identify with what Lacan called a ‘unary 
trait’, a specific attribute of an Other (say, the little boy who carries a miniature 
version of his father’s briefcase) which stands in for them without effacing their 
alterity. (Lacan, 2014: 21-22, 40) This unary trait, in other words, is a signifier, and 
this mode of identification is symbolic identification. While, for Lacan, the imaginary 
is filled with narcissism and aggressivity, which it is easy to identify as the dominant 
modes of colonial domination (Ryder, 2005), it is in the field of the Other that the 
subject is constituted, and it is in the symbolic order that is the locus of unassimilable 
Otherness. And it is here that whiteness and blackness are ‘marked’ as racial 
difference. To overlook this necessary aspect would risk treating whiteness or 
blackness as brute somatic facts, and the racial visibility of the body “as an 
ontological necessity”. It would also risk giving an account of language as being 
tendentially free from race. (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000: 30-32) Seshadri-Crooks’s 
argument can be understood here, not as a straightforward rejection of Fanon’s 
interpretation of the raced body as a phobic object of the scopic drive, but as a re-
stating it in more thoroughgoingly Lacanian terms. 
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There remains, before I introduce the question of anticommunism into this 
schema, the problem of anxiety. The racial gaze is an anxious gaze: what does it 
show? Seshadri-Crooks takes from Lacan’s Seminar X the problem of the remainder, 
that part of the “libidinal cathexis” which escapes both image and symbol, and 
appears only “in the form of a lack”. (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000: 36-37; Lacan, 2014: 
38-39) This lack is what Lacan refers to as the phallus, a claim which positions him 
against Freud’s interpretation of anxiety as a threat to the body, such as castration. 
For Lacan, the true cause of anxiety is when something uncannily “appears at the 
place where the [phallus] should be”. (Lacan, 2014: 42) The anxiety of race, argues 
Seshadri-Crooks, is induced when Whiteness occupies the space of the phallus as 
object of desire: it is thus a phallic signifier, and the plenitude of enjoyment that it 
promises can be characterised as phallic jouissance. This fullness of being, the 
closing of the gap and the jouissance it is supposed to engender, is strictly speaking 
impossible. There is therefore something inherently uncanny and anxiety-inducing 
about the gap being occupied in this way. The signifier of whiteness enables a fantasy 
image to be staged which screens off this traumatic impossibility, but the anxiety 
remains: and this is the point at which desire must be restored through the production 
of another lack, that induced by racialisation. The signifying chains linked to 
Whiteness produce, as their remainder in the real, the uncanny visible racial body. 
(Seshadri-Crooks, 2000: 37-38) 
What happens when the anxious racial gaze confronts an ambiguously raced 
body? Or when whiteness loses its ability to act as a symbolic guarantee, its 
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contingency exposed? This inflamed anxiety produces the space in which a 
specifically racialised anticommunism can emerge. 
When ‘Race Mixing is Communism’: the Red as nemesis of Whiteness 
 What happens when white meets red? There has long been an anxiety in 
American racial thinking that communism represents an attack on race from, in a 
sense, within. The anxiety is expressed exactly as if the existence of communism has 
already given the lie to Whiteness, by exposing its historicity. The Harvard-educated 
eugenicist Lothrop Stoddard’s polemic against The Rising Tide of Color Against 
White World-Supremacy – published at the peak of Wilsonian anticommunism – does 
not hesitate to hymn the ‘white race’ at its ostensible moment of peril, but it does not 
begin its attack on the “menace of Bolshevism” there. Rather, it looks to the collapse 
of the social distinctions that Bolshevism would produce, resulting in “the death or 
degradation of nearly all persons displaying constructive ability, and the tyranny of 
the ignorant and anti-social elements”. The fate of “the race, summarily drained of its 
good blood” and lurching into “the depths of degenerate barbarism” is, we are given 
to understand, bound up with the future of its classes. The Bolshevik war on “the 
classes” produces “incalculable” “racial impoverishment”, “the most gigantic triumph 
of disgenics ever seen”. But worse, “Bolshevism is, in fact, as anti-racial as it is anti-
social”, in that “the very existence of superior biological values is a crime” (Stoddard, 
1920: 219): 
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“Bolshevism has vowed the proletarianization of the world, beginning with the 
white peoples. To this end it not only foments social revolution within the white 
world itself, but it also seeks to enlist the colored races in its grand assault on 
civilization. The rulers of Soviet Russia are well aware of the profound ferment now 
going on in colored lands. They watch this ferment with the same terrible glee that 
they watched the Great War and the fiasco of Versailles—and they plot to turn it to 
the same profit. … Every nationalist aspiration, every political grievance, every 
social discrimination, is fuel for Bolshevism’s hellish incitement to racial as well as 
to class war. … Bolshevism thus reveals itself as the arch-enemy of civilization and 
the race. Bolshevism is the renegade, the traitor within the gates, who would betray 
the citadel, degrade the very fibre of our being, and ultimately hurl a rebarbarized, 
racially impoverished world into the most debased and hopeless of mongrelizations.” 
(Stoddard, 1920: 220)  
The dialectic of this argument is interesting. Bolshevism here is characterised 
almost as an Iago-like malevolence, motiveless malignity, pure vindictive chaos: it 
seeks abominable ends with “terrible glee” and by means of “hellish incitement”. 
Nothing of Bolshevism’s drive is, or can be, attributed to real social ills which it may 
be addressing. Nothing of it must be allowed to survive: it must be crushed beneath 
an “iron heel”. This “moral splitting,” as Kovel (1997: 47) characterises such 
gestures, between ‘civilisation’ and its nemesis, as characteristic of the projection 
which Fanon identifies in racial scapegoating (Fanon, 2008: 113-114), and in this 
case licences ferocious libidinised violence.  
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Yet, what is Bolshevism really charged with here? It is an attack on being itself. 
First, it is as if, by its very founding act of identifying and naming “the classes”, 
Bolshevism has already taken something from whiteness. The promise of full, 
superior being in whiteness, the promise of organic wholeness, is undermined when 
Bolshevism is seen by dint of its pursuit of class struggle to be putting the lack back 
into whiteness, exposing its historically determined substratum. Whiteness, in the 
name of “superior biological values” – those of the “superior white stocks” of Nordic 
blood (Stoddard, 1920: 253) – demands the constitution of class hierarchies as its 
necessary foundation, a fact which must be repressed if Whiteness is to be effective. 
Secondly, having drained Whiteness of its phallic power, Bolshevism is accused of 
engaging, by means of its attack on race, by means of ultimate “mongrelization”, in 
the all-out annihilation of being, a total loss of being which is labelled “racial 
impoverishment”.  
It appears, then, that Bolshevism has become identified with the phobic object 
itself through a particular chain of equivalences. In Stoddard’s account, it is the 
‘rising ride of color’ and the death of civilisation it portends that Bolshevism comes 
to embody. Equivalence, or identification at the symbolic level, is to be scrupulously 
distinguished from identification at the imaginary level. For, while Stoddard 
characterises Bolshevism as an operation beginning among whites, the introduction 
by his eugenicist colleague Madison Grant’s to the text goes so far as to emphasise 
that the Russian revolt was in fact one of the “half-Asiatic Slavic peasantry” against 
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the “Nordic aristocracy” that ruled it. (Stoddard, 1920: xxviii) Other racialisations 
were available: the view of Wilson’s Secretary of State, Robert Lansing was that 
Bolshevism represented a Jewish racial conspiracy against civilisation.  So, the fact 15
that Stoddard specifically identified Bolshevism as a disintegrative force within 
whiteness, its attack on class being the principle upon which whiteness is first 
harmed, must be taken to be significant. 
A similar structure of moral splitting, projection and libidinised violence in 
defence of the phallic jouissance of race can be seen in a later anticommunist 
conjuncture. Secretary of State George F Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram’, a key document 
from February 1946 which provided the intellectual and ideological framework of US 
Cold War policy, and ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’, an article from the following 
year expounding the same themes, can be understood as examples of race thinking in 
the same key as Stoddard’s. The Princeton-educated Kennan was not a race theorist 
of Stoddard’s type. His categories were those of international relations, and he 
alighted on the categories of “Anglo-Saxon”, “Asiatic”, and “oriental”, when he did, 
in order to comment on their ostensible cultural and political defaults, rather than 
their supposed evolutionary-biological foundation. Where Stoddard’s is a ‘naturalist’ 
racism, Kennan’s is ‘historicist’. But, like Stoddard, he produced a profoundly 
ideological, manifesto-like, exhortative account of the imperialist world-system at a 
 Lansing suggested, first, that the truth of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion was evidenced 15
in the Russian revolution, and second that “Jews” were largely responsible for the propaganda 
war on its behalf.
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moment when white world-supremacy was in question, and when communism in 
some way stood for the threat to whiteness.  
In the ‘Long Telegram’ (Kennan, 1946) and in ‘The Sources of Soviet 
Conduct’ (Kennan, 1947), Kennan offers a characterisation of Soviet policy-making 
that is remarkably like Stoddard’s in several ways. First, he represents the USSR as 
utterly irrational by the standards of “Anglo-Saxon” civilisation, conceding not even 
the smallest kernel of legitimacy to the Russia’s position. Second, he identifies this 
irrationality in relation to race and class, in ways to be further outlined below. Third, 
he identifies its reach in innumerable possible frontiers and zones of plotting, 
particularly where there are “grievances, whether economic or racial”, or where the 
power of the white world over “colonial backward, or dependent peoples” can be 
exploited, and “resentment” stoked until “Soviet dominated puppet political 
machines” can take power. Ultimately, the USSR is understood as autotelically 
eliminationist, dedicated to the destruction of all rivals and total world-domination. 
This is every bit as catastrophist a prospect as that placed before us by Stoddard. 
This eliminationist bent is blamed by Kennan on a number of factors ranging from 
internal regime necessities to Marxist dogma. However, as one proceeds through and 
compares the texts, it appears that the apparently fleeting reference to racial 
categories is more productive than it would immediately appear in ‘The Long 
Telegram’. In the latter, there is one direct reference to “oriental secretiveness and 
conspiracy” on the part of the Russians, which punctuates the ‘background’ that 
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Kennan offers to Soviet policymaking. The punctuating position of this observation, 
despite it not being at all elaborated on, indicates that it is perhaps more important 
than other parts of the text. And indeed, one finds it to be mirrored directly in ‘The 
Sources of Soviet Conduct’ which expatiates on “the Russian or the oriental mind”, 
geared by the history of “nomadic” rivalries in its territory toward “caution, 
circumspection, flexibility and deception”, and the “Russian-Asiatic world” whose 
“fanaticism” is opposed to “Anglo-Saxon traditions of compromise”. Similar 
references, as Borstelmann (2001: 50) points out, pepper Kennan’s other lectures and 
articles in which, like Stoddard’s colleague, Grant, Kennan fancied that the Russian 
revolution had been in part a racial revolt, overthrowing “the westernized upper 
crust” of the old ruling class, revealing Russians to be “a 17th-century semi-Asiatic 
people” evidently profoundly barbarised by a “century-long contract with Asiatic 
hordes”. 
 The reference to “oriental secretiveness and conspiracy” in the ‘Long Telegram’, 
retroactively also alters the sense of a previous passage in which Kennan invokes a 
“traditional and instinctive” Russian insecurity complex relative to the West. In the 
same way, similar references in later texts perform a retroactive transformation of the 
meaning of certain terms. The commentary on the Russian “mind” or “psychology” is 
linked directly to an Orientalisation, wherein “fanaticism” stands in once again for 
unreasoning malevolence which is “impervious to logic of reason” but “highly 
sensitive to logic of force” (on the trope of ‘fanaticism’, see Toscano, 2010), and 
produces this conclusion: “they have learned to seek security only in patient but 
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deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and 
compromises with it.” Thus, the key ground on which Kennan establishes the 
impossibility of peaceful co-existence, and the necessity of the most profound distrust 
and tireless struggle to control the enemy, is that of race. As Kovel (1997: 46-47) 
points out, ‘The Long Telegram’ is the very image of the Soviet enemy that it 
produces: it “becomes what it beholds,” “denies objective truth to meet its inner 
needs” and in effect proposes the same policy of “endless intervention and subversion 
imputed to the Russians,” without explicitly saying so. 
In one of his most telling tropes, Kennan compares “[w]orld communism” to “a 
malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue,” necessitating attention to the 
“health and vigor of our own society”. It would be straining to depict this somatic 
metaphor as self-evidently racial: there has long been an ideological tradition of 
representing society by means of a corporeal metaphor. Kennan did, in other writings, 
advert to the principles by which “our society” might be deemed healthful: if the 
founding fathers “disapproved of democracy for a population predominantly white, 
Protestant and British, faced with relatively simple problems, would they not turn 
over in their graves at the mere thought of the democratic principle being applied to a 
population containing ten million Negroes and many more millions of Southern 
Europeans to whom the democratic principle is completely strange?”  (Kovel, 1997: 16
53) Kennan’s Anglo-Saxonism, like Stoddard’s Anglo-Saxon Nordicism, was not 
 Or, as Grant’s introduction to Stoddard (1920: xxxii) had suggested, “Democratic ideals 16
among an homogeneous population of Nordic blood, as in England or America, is one thing, 
but it is quite another for the white man to share his blood with, or intrust his ideals to, brown, 
yellow, black, or red men.”
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only racist but sustained in relation to an anti-democratic elitism. However, the point 
is that communism is identified here, in respect of civilisation, as a purely 
disintegrative principle, a force which has no constructive capacity whatsoever. 
Both Stoddard and Kennan situate themselves in the discourse of the master. 
Adopting a tone of scientific rigour and realpolitik (Kennan distinguishes his position 
from that of “hysterical anti-Sovietism”), their goal is to make knowledge produce 
something for the master, in this case an expertise in the management of world affairs 
that is effectual. The jouissance in their discourse is found precisely in the brutal and 
dispassionate statement of (eugenic or geopolitical) ‘facts’. Here, in both cases, we 
see that the signifier ‘communism’ is overdetermined. It is represented as both an 
obsessively integrative and fanatically disintegrative project; a ruthless bid for world 
domination by a patient, manipulative, powerful agitator and global stirrer, and a 
reckless, levelling attack on the foundations of civilisation; simultaneously a master 
and a slave; clever and irrational; internationally expansionist and autarkically 
enclosed; tightly disciplined and despotic and yet anarchic and subversive; both a 
ruinous enemy of empire, and an empire in itself; both white and Asiatic. This is 
where it is true but not sufficient to say that the argument involves a form of moral 
splitting and projection. The representation of Soviet behaviour is not simply an 
inversion of American behaviour, or even that recommended by Stoddard or Kennan. 
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There is something about it that is uncanny, which bears no relevance to any social 
reality, and which as such adverts to the operation of fantasy.  17
Fantasy, whether conscious or unconscious, is a powerful image which ‘stages’ an 
unconscious desire. Lacan, however, insists that the image assumes its place in 
relation to the symbolic order. The fantasy of total dominance, limitless enjoyment, 
mastery without boundaries which features in white-supremacist ideology, only 
becomes a racial fantasy insofar as it is positioned by as such by the symbolic order. 
It is “an image set to work in the signifying structure”. (Lacan, 2006: 532) The 
master-signifier, ‘Whiteness’, begins the chain of significations that puts the image to 
work as a fantasy of racist domination: the full and unimpeded access to and control 
over black life and death. Like the ‘primordial father’ who enjoys limitless and 
lawless access to and enjoyment of all women (see Žižek, 2008b: vii-x), the white 
master here operates on the premise of total power: if black people are allowed to 
exist at all, it is an act of white benevolence. They are thought to owe everything to 
whites.  
This is the white-supremacist fantasy in its initial phase. Following Freud (2001: 
179-204), I will suggest that fantasy can proceed through various phases and 
permutations, with different levels of disguise and displacement. When the initial 
fantasy is unconscious, it can only be recovered as a construction of analysis, made 
 Indeed, strictly speaking, projection is an operation of fantasy which, like any other 17
fantasmatic image, fulfils its function of warding off the traumatic reality of castration. “It is 
because it wards off this moment of lack [manque] that an image assumes the role of bearing 
the full brunt of desire: projection, an imaginary function.” (Lacan, 2006: 549)
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possible by the return of the repressed. The explicit kernel of fantasy in the discourse 
of Stoddard and Kennan, respectively, is different. Stoddard avails himself of the 
language of eugenics to openly extol dominative principles. However, he does not 
suggest that domination should be utterly without limits, and indeed insists that it is 
for the advantage and furtherance of the “colored” masses that white rule must be 
perpetuated. Kennan refers only obliquely to the subordinate – “backward” 
“dependent” – position of non-whites. Despite his racial denigration of the Russian 
masses, he insists that the American relationship with them is one of friendship. He 
does not explicitly defend colonial rule, but only notes the Russian propensity for 
trouble-making in these zones. In one case, the fantasy is of communism threatening 
vigorous and competitive racial domination, sustained by race solidarity among 
whites, and underpinned by Social Darwinist principles. In the other, it is of 
communism threatening tactful, mandarin white rule legitimised by cultural and 
civilisational achievements. 
How, then, is the ultimate subjection of both authors to this white-supremacist 
fantasy of limitless enjoyment visible? First, it is evident in the exclusion of any 
claim on the part of anti-colonial and anti-racist struggles, whose existence is spoken 
of only in the terms of nebulous ‘grievance’ and ‘resentment’. They are seen through 
the lens of mastery, as technical problems posed by the race-management of uneven 
and combined development, disruptions to an otherwise orderly hierarchy run 
benevolently by whites. Everything is stated as if black people have no cause to 
resent domination, and owe everything to whites, including their lives. Their agency 
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is secondary; the only real agents can be some other would-be master, some other 
imperial pretender. As such, there is nothing inherent to the situation, other than their 
own good will, which could prevent white people from enjoying limitlessly. Second, 
this fantasy incorporates communism as a symptom of its own impossibility. The 
signifier ‘communism’ is richly overdetermined and, as such, signifies something 
terribly ambiguous, a whiteness thwarted and gone awry, turned satanic and drawn 
into the camp of the ‘backward’ rebels. The mechanisms of overdetermination and 
displacement are particularly evident in the fact that ‘communism’ attracts elements 
of stereotypes usually associated with both the dominant and the dominated in global 
affairs. Structurally, this is remarkably similar to antisemitic fantasy, such that the 
recurring overlap of antisemitism and anticommunism may not be coincidental. 
(Žižek, 2008a: 140-144) Like the ‘Jew’ of antisemitic discourse, ‘world communism’ 
is a symptom which embodies all of the intolerable excesses of an imperialist, white-
supremacist world system. In its ambiguity, it stands outside its hierarchies and can’t 
be assimilated: peaceful co-existence is impossible. As such, the impossibility of 
enjoyment without limits is not regarded as something intrinsic to the situation, but 
rather as the result of an external, diabolical force. 
I want to suggest that these examples anticipate a common structure found, with 
their own distinct modulations, in Southern segregationist anticommunism. A useful 
starting point would be the protesters outside the state capitol in Little Rock, 
Arkansas in 1959, whose message was fairly concise and can thus be unpacked 
relatively straightforwardly. The protesters bore placards, and American flags. (It is 
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perhaps symptomatic that one historical account saw these as Confederate flags. 
Coskey, 2005: 147) The placards said, ‘Race Mixing is Communism’ and pleaded, 
’Stop the Race Mixing March of the Anti-Christ’. Others said ‘Governor Faubus Save 
Our Christian America’, and ‘We Want Americanization Not Red-ucation’. The 
protest was organised by, among others, the Capital Citizens’ Council, which 
distributed a leaflet warning: ‘The Negro’s Ambition – A Mongrel American Race’. 
Amis Guthridge, a businessman who had previously played a key role in trying to 
agitate against desegregation in the Delta town of Hoxie, called on “patriotic citizens” 
to join the protest against “federally dominated tyranny”. (Jacoway, 2008: 343-344) 
 It would be tempting to rationalise these, perhaps along the following lines: i) 
segregation is based on distinctly American values, above all Christianity; ii) 
integration is equality, artificially imposed by the central government, which is 
inconsistent with American values, particularly its foundational republicanism and 
‘states rights’ discourse; iii) by dint of the inter-dependent nature of social 
hierarchies, an attack on segregation threatens all of the vital hierarchies which define 
American national life. But this would be, in a sense, the opposite of analysis: it does 
not follow the text to the letter. The slogans, whatever we may think they ‘mean’, 
actually say ‘Race Mixing is Communism’ and ‘Stop the Race Mixing March of the 
Anti-Christ’. It is not that ‘race mixing’ might lead to communism. It is not that 
Christian values might be undermined if communism takes hold. The chain of 
equivalents is stated very clearly: ‘race mixing’ is communism, and is the work of 
‘the Anti-Christ’. The stars n stripes, in a way, is its own message: it functions here as 
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the master-signifier, anchoring and overdetermining the discourse. In particular, in 
this case, it structures the discourse in an hysterical way. While articulating a 
southern nationalist claim against “federally dominated tyranny”, the protesters make 
clear that they consider the federal government a fake master, not the real 
embodiment of America. 
With these elements, it is possible to reconstruct the fantasy structuring the kernel 
of enjoyment in this discourse. ‘Race mixing’, as concretely represented in the 
integration of Southern schools and the dismantling of segregation, once again can be 
driven by no legitimate claims. Further, African-Americans are assigned no agency in 
the process of integration; they may be considered troublesome, or in need of 
protection from communism (both in some instances, as we shall see), but here they 
are symptomatically absent. They are deleted. Communism once again occupies the 
position of antithesis, the worldly form of ‘the Anti-Christ’ which threatens the 
American nation, and is responsible for all the chaos. For all that it is evil, perverse, it 
appears here as the only real agent capable of challenging white power, representing 
as it does something not just racially ambiguous but anti-racial – ‘race mixing’. The 
fantasy disguised here, is of a stable, perpetual world peace underpinned by white-
supremacy, without real challenge, without ever incurring any real antagonisms from 
within. It stages the desire for limitless domination over black lives, limitless 
enjoyment and disposal of them, being without boundaries in whiteness. Communism 
as ‘the Anti-Christ’, the exogenous destabilising element, allows the fantasy to take 
its own impossibility into account. (Žižek, 2008a: 142) 
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The hystericisation of segregationist discourse can be linked to a shift in the 
structure of the fantasy, perhaps first signalled by ‘The Southern Manifesto’. 
(Southern Manifesto, 1956) Drafted in early 1956 by the segregationist Senators 
Strom Thurmond and Richard Russell, the Manifesto – formally dubbed the 
‘Declaration of Constitutional Principles’ – declared the position of the Southern 
political elites as they embarked on the strategy of ‘Massive Resistance’ to the 
integration of public schools. Fundamentally, the Manifesto contends that far from 
remedying an injustice, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Brown vs the 
Board of Education, had substituted “naked power”, “naked judicial power” for 
“established law”, the “established law of the land”, the established “constitutional 
doctrine” developed “in the North – not in the South” and “re-stated time and again”. 
Judges had placed “personal political and social beliefs” before the law, and in so 
doing had threatened a social peace “heretofore” characterised by “friendship and 
understanding” “between the white and Negro races”, an amity “created through 90 
years of patient effort by the good people of both races”. This was a case of “outside 
meddlers” and “outside agitators” engaged in “judicial usurpation” and bringing 
“revolutionary changes” which would create an “explosive and dangerous” situation. 
An immediately striking aspect of the Manifesto is that it specifically does not 
explicitly refer to communism, even though both if its drafters were hardened and 
skilled anticommunist pugilists, known for their association of civil rights with 
communism. The suppression of this reference does not, however, mean that the 
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space which might be occupied by communism disappears. Rather, the authors of the 
Manifesto make themselves very clear: there would be social peace but for meddlers 
and agitators who have usurped the place of the law. They recognise no injustice to be 
remedied, and African Americans are not taken seriously as agents of their own 
struggle. The entire combustible situation is laid at the feed of the agitators, who in 
attacking segregation are attacking the foundations of American civilisation. 
However, the suppression of this reference is perhaps linked to shifting mode in 
anticommunist discourse. Whereas in the cases of Stoddard and Kennan, the authors 
situated themselves in a discourse of mastery, the Southern Manifesto adopts the 
hysteric’s discourse. Far from putting knowledge to work in order to resolve 
problems of governance and dominion, they are on the defensive, and master-
signifier of the Constitution is put to work in order to expose the master as a fake, as 
lacking, as usurping the role. They are anxious, too, to demonstrate their fidelity to 
the position of mastery – they occupy it, in fact, claiming to be the true advocates of 
patriotism even as an anxiety-inducing gap opens up between their fervent southern 
nationalism and their loyalty to American nationalism. They are thus in the position 
of levelling hysterical questioning and demands at the most senior legal institution in 
the land, while also deferring to its office. The careful extrusion of any explicit 
reference to communism in the Manifesto, even while its place is held open by proxy, 
could perhaps be explained (away) by noting that anticommunist discourse has often 
had recourse to the sorts of insinuation made possible by the slippage of signifiers. 
However, there are two alternative explanations available, for which space ought also 
be made. First, the moment when the master’s discourse slips into that of the hysteric 
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is an anxious one, and one that a group of powerful Southern politicians may wish to 
disguise. To explicitly accuse the highest court in the land of being influenced by 
communism would not be stately or masterful. Second, in the anxiety associated with 
losing mastery, there need be no automaticity in generating a new single, coherent 
fantasmatic projection. The ideological elements may take time to find their new 
structure and determination. 
These discursive patterns, the fantasmatic structure they help articulate, and the 
desire staged therein, will now be explored more thoroughly and open-endedly than 
hitherto with a concrete example. In the course of my empirical research through the 
archives, I happened upon the files and correspondence of the Southern Regional 
Council. Among the extensive records kept were documents pertaining to a campaign 
by a Georgia-based organisation called HOPE Inc., which sought to oppose the state’s 
Massive Resistance efforts without explicitly aligning with integration. In exploring 
these documents, I will not be looking to extract a particular theme, viz. race and 
communism. The point will be to really work through their logic, and see how the 
ideological field in which they work is structured. 
An case study: HOPE Inc., the white unconscious and the spectre of 
communism. 
In 1955, the General Assembly of the state of Georgia, responding to Brown vs the 
Board of Education, voted to withdraw all state funding for any school authority 
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which embarked on integration. In anticipation of this fight, the Assembly had 
already passed laws allowing for privatisation, wherein groups of private citizens 
could open segregated schools with public money. Later, the Assembly legislated that 
the governor was required to close any school system which integrated its pupils. 
This, part of a campaign of Massive Resistance, was given a considerable boost in 
1948 when gubernatorial candidate Ernest Sandiver won on a promise that “No, not 
one” black student would enter a white school. (Mertz, 1993) The state’s religious 
Right added its support to Massive Resistance in January 1959, when evangelical 
ministers set up the Evangelical Christian Council to stand against desegregation. In 
March, 53 of its members issued a manifesto denouncing integration as “Satanic, 
unconstitutional and one of the main objectives of the Communist Party.” (Harmon, 
1996: 109)   
Nor was the position of the evangelicals marginal: anticommunism offered the 
state many resources for attacking the civil rights coalition. Georgia was a member of 
the Southern Association of Investigators, which collected information on perceived 
agitators. The Georgia Bureau of Investigation modelled its activities in this period 
on those of Hoover’s FBI, and spent much of its time gathering intelligence on 
communists – supposed or actual – in the civil rights movement. Its attorney-general, 
Eugene Cook, who led the state’s legal battle against desegregation, used the 
anticommunist Floyd Act to persecute civil rights activists as ‘subversives’, and 
identified the NAACP as “South-hating white people with long records of affinity for, 
affiliation with, and participation in Communist, Communist-front, fellow-traveling 
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and subversive activities, organizations and causes”. Senator Talmadge of Georgia 
had, a year after the first Brown decision and while still Governor and embarking on 
his senatorial campaign, published a pamphlet entitled You and Segregation, 
identifying desegregation as a communist conspiracy against states rights. (Woods, 
2004: 62-63, 93-94; Harmon, 1996: 84; Roche, 2010: 23; Pratt, 2005) Those opposed 
to segregation had occasionally appealed to anticommunist discourse themselves, as 
when the editors of the University of Georgia’s undergraduate weekly, The Red and 
Black, declared in 1953 that Governor Talmadge’s pro-segregation exhortations 
would “cause the death of democracy by the hands of its own leaders”. “With 
Communism knocking at the Negro's back door,” they suggested, “we cannot afford 
to let educational segregation barriers stand.” Yet the fact that the editors were 
compelled to resign, rather than enjoying a degree of legitimacy conferred by 
anticommunist credentials, indicates the sheer inefficacy of such an appeal. (Pratt, 
2005: 31; Daily Tar Heel, 1953) 
By 1959, the movement and its supporters in the General Assembly were 
threatening to close down the entire Georgia public school system. This overlapped 
with a rising tide of civil rights opposition. 1960 saw the first sit-ins, making 
headlines in Greensboro, North Carolina, and the launching of the Student Non-
Violent Coordinating Committee. The following year, ‘freedom rides’ began. In 
Georgia, the civil rights movement was largely clustered around the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference and Martin Luther King, who moved to Atlanta in 
1960, and the NAACP. King’s high profile arrest in October 1960, while participating 
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in a sit-in alongside students, led to a reluctant but ultimately profitable intervention 
from the Kennedy campaign, freeing King while gaining his endorsement and thus a 
degree of support from the black electorate that was larger than Kennedy’s final 
margin of victory. (Kuhn, 1997; Hampton & Fayer, 1995: 67-71) 
 But the threat to public education also began to generate some resistance from 
professionals, particularly those associated with knowledge-production. In December 
1958, an organisation of 160 scientists based at the Communicable Disease Center 
issued a public plea, “vigorously” opposing “any plans which will result in abolition 
of the public school system”. (Hughes, 1958) Faculty members at Oglethorpe 
University, a liberal arts college, condemned the “dangerous folly” afoot. (Atlanta 
Journal and Constitution, 1959) Faculty groups at Emory University, Georgia Tech 
and Georgia Scott College added their dissent. (Lassiter, 2013: 66) This was not, by 
and large, articulated as a defence of integration. Rather, the major concern was that 
the closure of public schools would have grave implications for the development of 
the state’s technological and industrial base. 
Such concerns shaped the development of one of the major, ‘moderate’ white-led 
opposition movements in the state, Help Our Public Education, or HOPE, Inc. 
(hereafter HOPE). HOPE was a campaign whose sole aim was to keep the public 
schools open, in compliance with the law. The campaign drew many of its supporters 
from the League of Women’s Voters, and its inner core comprised both civil rights 
supporters and ‘liberal-minded’ segregationists. The organisation cooperated closely 
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with the Southern Regional Council (SRC), a non-denominational coalition of white 
Southern liberals opposed to segregation, especially through the biracial Georgia 
Council for Human Relations set up by the Council in January 1959. But in its own 
activities it refused to take any explicit position on segregation. In correspondence 
with newspapers or supporters, or soliciting the aid of businessmen, politicians and 
opinion leaders, HOPE focused on the practicalities of campaigning, offering only 
technical and pragmatic reasons to oppose the closure of schools. In a public 
advertising campaign, it proudly identified itself as the “only rallying point of 
moderate opinion on the school crisis,” while highlighting the possibility of “drastic 
economic losses”. It concluded by asking members of the public to take a stand “on 
the side of law, order, and public schools”. Moreover, and controversially for some of 
its early supporters, it admitted only white members – a decision which one of its 
energetic organisers, Harry Boyte, described as a “segregationist line”. The rationale 
was that the people with the power to change Georgia state policy were white people, 
and that the aim must be to mobilise a white public with a strong segregationist 
current. (Lassiter, 2013: 66; HOPE Inc., 1959a; HOPE Inc., 1959b; Mertz, 1993)  
The effects of this campaign are difficult to gauge. The Massive Resistance 
campaign in Georgia was overwhelmingly dominated by the political legislature, 
rather than – as in other states such as Mississippi and Alabama – driven by the 
efforts of the middle class ‘grassroots’. As such, it was within their gift when the 
crisis reached an untenable pitch to embark on a course of adaptation in alliance with 
local business elites, abandoning de jure segregation in favour of de facto 
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segregation. The major policy instrument through which this was achieved was the 
Sibley Commission, appointed by Governor Vandiver to investigate the schools issue 
and make recommendations. The Commission heard evidence from a wide range of 
witnesses, from the NAACP to the Citizens’ Council, from business to politicians. 
Sibley attempted to tilt the balance in favour of his preferred solution of ‘token 
integration’ – meaning that it would accept the order of the US District Court judge 
Frank Hooper that the schools would be desegregated while implementing measures 
to ensure that in practical terms segregation continued. But when a strong majority 
persisted in supporting resistance to desegregation, he ignored the balance of witness 
input and made his own recommendations to the Governor. When the crisis spread 
into the university system in 1961, Vandiver quickly expedited the implementation of 
Sibley’s recommendations, thus beginning the dismantling of de jure segregation. 
(Roche, 2010; Hornsby, Jr., 1982) 
How did HOPE’s campaign contribute to this outcome? Given that the threat to 
public schools presented a crisis which threatened to divide the segregationist bloc in 
two, it is at least arguable that HOPE’s discourse was well crafted to maximise the 
split and thus help create new opportunities to weaken segregation. Yet the relative 
timidity and silence of anti-segregation white liberals in this period may also have 
impeded even the adaptation that was reached, by contributing to a climate in which 
alternatives to the status quo were unthinkable. (Roche, 2010) It is possible, 
moreover, that HOPE’s legalistic strategy backfired in numerous ways. First, it was 
difficult to maintain an omertà on the most important aspect of the entire struggle. 
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The campaign presented an argument to the wider public which radiated around a 
central aporia, a gap, a symptomatic hole in meaning. Suppressing the key issue in 
order to avoid polarising white opinion left a fissure in the discourse which could 
only be filled by fantasy. Second, deference to the legal Other, as the subject-
supposed-to-know, depends on not acknowledging its constitutively relational, open-
ended and contested character. As such, had the Georgia legislature found a way to 
implement a legal and effective form of segregation with wide public support, they 
might have been disarmed. As has already been shown, the segregationists can hardly 
be faulted for inattention to the law, or for failing to argue that their own position was 
that of “the law of the land,” the Constitution. Arguing on the same ground was 
always a potential hostage to fortune. Third, and as will become apparent, this 
legalism was racially freighted in ways that the campaigners might not have wished. 
The focus in the ensuing analyses will not be on whether HOPE’s strategy was 
ultimately vindicated or reproved by history, but on the effects of its discourse, which 
can be seen in its publicity, its letters of appeal, and in the responses from a range of 
figures in business and politics. 
The law and the white unconscious of liberal anti-racists. 
The strategy of HOPE was to defer to the law. No matter what one thought of 
segregation, “law” and “order” were non-negotiable tenets of American politics, and 
the Supreme Court had decided. The only remaining issue was to ensure that 
everyone was informed of the facts – however much they be liked or disliked – and 
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given the means to comply with the law. As such, their discourse oscillated between 
one of outright mastery-by-proxy (in the form of appeals to unquestionable precepts), 
and one of covert mastery (in the form of university discourse, wherein knowledge 
occupies the position of mastery). Here was a looming problem of governance, 
something which threatened the smooth functioning of the system, and the task was 
to put knowledge to work in providing solutions. As a HOPE activist put it to a 
correspondent, they would “not enter into the controversy of segregation vs. 
integration”. They would only say that if ensuring “public schools operating legally” 
meant “desegregation in some placers” then it should be accepted. (Pauley, 1959) The 
chairman, in a letter to the Atlanta Journal, likewise disdained to engage in an 
“emotional reaction” to Brown vs the Board of Education, opining instead that the 
constitutionality of “separate but equal” schools had been settled, would not “go 
away”, and that the only remaining choice was between public schools and 
segregation. (Boyte, 1959) Many of those they corresponded with appeared to share 
this broad emphasis. Representative Ralph McClelland of Fulton County wrote to 
HOPE stating his agreement with the campaign’s goal, arguing that anyone “who has 
made any study at all, or has even casually followed the report of developments in the 
newspapers, knows what the law now is (as much as we may dislike it)”. 
(McClelland, 1959) 
Loretta Chappell, an activist from the United Liberal Church working with HOPE, 
expressed some of the strategic rationale for refusing a position on segregation and 
simply urging compliance with the law. The “overwhelming majority” of “the Atlanta 
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community” and “our state” comprised “the group between” integrationists and “die-
hard segregationists”. The involvement of “too many liberals may actually retard the 
movement,” whereas those who advocated reluctant, even pained acquiescence with 
the law might “have more weight, with the majority of Georgians”. (Chappell, 1959) 
It is an open question whether “the overwhelming majority of Georgians” inhabiting 
the perceived middle ground in this view included only white Georgians, since the 
1960 US census recorded that 28% of the state’s residents were African American 
(Bureau of the Census, 1961). There is at least some evidence that the middle ground 
targeted by HOPE campaigning may have been engaged on the basis of their 
presumed racial identifications. For example, a letter sent to each local president of 
United Church Women in February 1959, points out that the public school system had 
enrolled 892,460 children in 1955, of whom “609,138 are white and 283,322 are 
colored. With wholesale closing of public schools, which race would suffer the 
most?” (Southern Regional Council, 1959)  
In fact this letter, which appears early in the campaign, is not characteristic. In 
most cases, HOPE’s appeals, as well as its interactions with its supporters, make no 
mention whatsoever of race, even where its practical recommendations are centrally 
about race. For example, when the Legislative Committee set up by HOPE with the 
aim of lobbying the Georgia legislature wrote to state representatives for support, it 
suggested that the “alternative” to privatising the school system was “to accept such 
minimum desegregation of schools as the Federal Courts may require”. (Turvey, 
1959) This would be compatible in principle with what was called ‘token 
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integration’, or with the policy of pragmatic ‘restructured’ segregation that the state 
eventually undertook. But race was not mentioned. Its presence as a structuring 
relationship in the text was silenced. The fact that race appears as an absence in 
HOPE’s discourse, a relationship which is repressed but which nonetheless structures 
the discourse allows us to see it as the unconscious of the text.   
How does the white unconscious of the text position them in a fantasmatic 
structure? Symbolically, as white middle class liberals writing to white state 
personnel, they position themselves as pragmatic collaborators in the resolution of a 
policy problem. Having excluded black people from their organisation, black agency 
appears nowhere in their discourse. Indeed, they represent themselves as being an 
embattled – but enlightened – minority attempting to manipulate and nudge a 
truculent white majority. It is possible that they regarded themselves, by such means, 
as creating opportunities for more radical forces, but this is not what appears in their 
discourse. The animating prospect toward which all their efforts are geared is for a 
“reasonable compromise” for the benefit of all, based on good information. As such 
the jouissance in their discourse appears to be invested in the almost Fabian fantasy 
of the benevolent administration of gradual, consensual reform by an educated, 
professional white caste.  The unconscious desire which this fantasy stages, albeit 
with some disguise, is a different kind of enjoyment without limits; the right of the 
intelligent, educated white to rule without boundaries. 
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The hystericisation of segregationists 
The effects of this approach can partially be appreciated by scrutinising the 
correspondence that the organisation received in reply to an appeal (HOPE, 1959b) 
issued by the campaign, asking for statements of support and funding, as well as 
some related documents. 
Notably, only one of the correspondents who agreed with HOPE mentioned 
anything about race. This was a letter from Representative McClelland (1959) who 
referred obliquely to “what the law now is (as much as we may dislike it)”, described 
the obstacle posed by the state’s “segregation laws”, and quoted the provision for 
“[s]eparate schools” for the “white and colored races”. Other correspondents 
concerned themselves with practicalities, and general statements of approval of 
HOPE’s mission. (Smith, 1959; Mackay, 1960) In one case (Lokey, 1959), a HOPE 
supporter wrote to assure a friend that the campaign was run by “decent, high type 
folks” who merely brought “the true facts” to light, and showed that “the destruction 
of the public school system” was “no answer” – though he did not say, to what 
question. Perhaps the most elaborate and passionate support for HOPE was offered 
by C D Carley of Carley Trailer & Equipment Company. (Carley, 1959) Carley’s 
express concern was about class, not race: the poorest would be “the ones to suffer 
the most” from privatization, and their ongoing poverty would reinforce the region’s 
historical impoverishment linked to a period when it was, he said, “practically in 
economic bondage to the banking centres of other sections of the country”. Aside 
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from Carley, the correspondents who wrote to support HOPE mirrored its discourse 
of mastery/knowledge, treating the matter as a practical one involving hard facts 
which had to be accommodated. Their rhetorical strategies matched and compounded 
the tactical conservatism of the campaign. Where the hard facts of state level politics 
could be said to pose an obstacle to progress, they were encouraged (McClelland, 
1959) to defer to them. 
The correspondents who declined to support HOPE reacted quite differently. Far 
from cautious, their speech was powerfully affected, marked by vivid disturbances 
and inconsistencies. Jack Crowder of the shirt-makers Cluett, Peabody & Co, Inc., 
was the first to reply to HOPE, declining to extend his support to the campaign. The 
logic of this refusal is troubling in its ambiguity. In the letter, Crowder explains that 
he is “not an integrationist” and “would much prefer to see our schools open an a 
segregated basis”. However, he contends that integration is probably unavoidable, 
and notes that a private schools system is only viable for a minority, not for “the 
multitude”. Neither “private schools” nor “token integration” can be “the answer”. 
Integration will happen “within the next five years”, being forestalled by “a year, or 
maybe two” with some resistance. “Therefore,” he concludes, “in view of my feelings 
expressed above, I do not feel I can contribute to the support of Hope, Inc., because I 
do not feel this is the answer.” (Crowder, 1959) 
In principle, Crowder’s position was fully compatible with the aims of HOPE, and 
the logic of his rejection represents something of a puzzle. In the letter to which 
 286
Crowder was responding, the campaign had not mentioned integration at all, and 
instead focused narrowly on “the object of maintaining the system of public 
education”. (HOPE Inc., 1959b) The phrase “the answer” from Crowder’s final 
sentence turning down the appeal, seems to echo his earlier statement that the main 
alternatives to a fully integrated public schools system were not “the answer”. This 
appears to make his conclusion a non-sequitur, and suggests that there is a cut 
somewhere in the text, where one layer of meaning gives way to another. That is to 
say, there appears to be more than one thought structuring his reply. There is no way 
to parse from the letter precisely what this is. The “this” which is not “the answer” in 
view of Crowder’s express feelings could be any of the following possibilities which 
he has listed: i.) integration, which is inevitable but which he disapproves of; ii.) 
“private schools”, which are unworkable; iii.) “token integration”, which also cannot 
work. That is, either he takes HOPE to be a covertly integrationist organisation, or he 
has inverted its position and taken it as a Massive Resistance organisation, or he 
thinks it is invested in an unworkable ‘token integration’ tactic. Or alternatively, if we 
cut the ribbon of text in a different way, it could simply be that “this” letter is not “the 
answer” which HOPE was looking for. Rather than trying to work out what Crowder 
really ‘meant’, it might be more useful to note the overdetermination of the terms 
“this” and “the answer”: Crowder leaves them undecided. And this allows us to make 
some space for all of these conflicting thoughts making a claim on his text. The fact 
that Crowder does not decide on a particular meaning is significant in itself, and 
indicates some possible confusion and ambivalence about what HOPE is trying to 
achieve. 
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Whatever Crowder’s suppositions, at least some of the campaign’s targets for 
appeal appear to have been unsure of, and suspicious about, the purposes of HOPE. 
This is supported in the reply from K E Edwards Jr., president of the Georgia Arts 
Supply Company. (Edwards, Jr., 1959) Edwards begins by referring to the letter from 
HOPE, dated 20th February, “in which you state that if you do not hear from me that 
you will presume that I approve of your organization’s aim and yet I do not find in 
this letter of yours where your aims are stated”. The letter had in fact said, “we will 
assume, if we do not hear from you, that you do not approve of the organization’s 
aims”. [Emphases added] (HOPE Inc., 1959b)  
Edwards carries out two deletions, which have the effect of positioning him as a 
subject relative to his correspondent. By re-stating HOPE’s message, he attributes to 
it a form of aggressivity, an intent to violate him by involuntarily drafting him into 
their cause. This aspect of his discourse is situated on the imaginary axis and clearly 
constitutes a form of projection. He also reduces the number of their aims to one, 
only for the plural form to reappear as a query later in the sentence. The slippage here 
takes place on the symbolic axis. How this is so can be seen in the ensuing passages. 
Edwards identifies one ‘aim’ that he gathers from their text (“you are in favor of not 
destroying public education in Georgia”) before specifying the absence where further 
‘aims’ should be elaborated (“you do not state how far you would go in protecting 
public education”). Edwards goes on to express surprise that the organisation does 
not state its aims in the letter: “Why don’t you, in a letter of this type, outline your 
 288
exact aims?” This challenge is, as we have seen, not entirely without foundation. 
However, the deletion and then restoration of the plural form of ‘aims’ is linked to an 
accusation which has been repressed and returned in reversed form – whereas 
Edwards states that HOPE accuses him of agreeing with their aims, his text accuses 
them not just of having unspoken aims, but of having unspeakable aims, which he 
could not possibly agree with. This positions Edwards in the discourse of the hysteric, 
demanding that the master produce knowledge about itself, in order to expose its own 
lack. In effect, he poses the classic hysteric question: ‘yes, you are saying all this, but 
what is it you really want?’ 
Edwards then speculates as to the nature of this lack, the unspoken and implicitly 
unspeakable aims, by warning of what he sees as the danger of integration. In a state 
where “40% of our population is Negro … we can certainly look forward to the 
amalgamation of our races if they are mixed in our schools. … [A]ll we have to do is 
look at Cuba, Puerto Rico and other Central and Southern American countries and we 
can easily see just exactly what will happen to our races if we mix them”. These 
references – “Cuba”, “Puerto Rico”, “Central and Southern American countries” – are 
not given further elaboration. It is assumed that these signifiers belong to a shared 
symbolic order, a shared racial knowledge. The Other is ‘supposed to know’. The 
entire discourse being structured around the question of knowledge, and more 
specifically the gaps in Edwards’s knowledge, he relies on the Other to supplement 
his own lack, the better to continue to expose the lack in the master. The genre of 
speech which Edwards appeals to can be named as ‘history’. Having some access to 
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this, it is possible to be lured into supposing that we know what he really meant to 
say. Again, however, it is necessary to resist the urge to decide what Edwards may 
have ‘meant’. Rather, the invocation of this shared racial knowledge adverts to 
something significant in itself: without explicitly addressing it, it alludes to the race 
relation structuring the correspondence. For this is knowledge which is supposed to 
be shared by white people: and that appears to be part of the cause of his anxiety. His 
question, as to how “anyone with intelligence” can favour integration given their 
shared understanding, could be re-stated: ‘how can any white person want this?’ 
Other correspondence struck a similar note. In June 1959, Representative 
Talmadge B Echols of Upson County replied to a letter received from Frank B 
Roberts, the chairman of the local Kiwanis Club. (Echols, 1959) Roberts had drawn 
attention to a speech made by the superintendent of Dekalb County school system 
opposing the closure of public schools. Echols remarks in his letter that “a large 
segment of our good people of Georgia” are being “brain-washed” by “out-of-state 
forces” such as “your metropolitan newspapers”, the NAACP “and their fellow 
conspirators”, the Ford Foundation, “and the leftist influence in my own Methodist 
Church”. Why, Echols wonders, don’t correspondents such as Roberts direct their fire 
at those instigators, rather than at the Georgia State Assembly? Echols, like Edwards, 
zeroes in on the ambiguities and hesitations in the discourse of those defending public 
schools. Is the superintendent for “equal and separate schools” or for public education 
“over any other consideration”. “In other words, is he for mixing the races in our 
schools or not?” More to the point, “are you for mixing races in our school, which 
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will lead to the eventual mongrelization of the races?” “I’m not willing,” he adds, 
“for my children and the younger white children of my State to be forced to 
associated with a people whose moral standards permit about a third of their children 
to be born of illegitimate physical unions.” Invoking “conditions worse than death”, 
he uses a martial language, urging Georgians who may feel “up against a stone wall” 
to “stand fast before the onslaught”. 
In a further correspondence, Echols replies to a letter addressed by the campaign’s 
Legislative Committee to members of the legislature appealing for support and 
assistance in forming a platform supporting the continuation of public schools on the 
basis of a “reasonable compromise”. This compromise, as noted above, was to 
involve the minimum necessary compliance expected by the Federal courts. (Turvey, 
1959; Echols, 1959b) Echols once again adopts a hystericised subject-position, 
swerving between accusations, (“you want capitulation”, “If you are looking for 
Quislings look in your own back yard”), exhortations to defend segregation, (“On this 
question of integration of the races in our schools there are only two sides – for or 
against.” “Let’s you and I and other well-meaning Georgians join ranks, stiffen our 
spines and fight the good fight for the preservation of our rights”), and demands for 
information, (“I would like you to answer a question for me either yes or no. Are you 
in favor of mixing children of the white and colored races in our public schools?”). 
Once again, he also attempts to anticipate and repudiate HOPE’s possible answers to 
his questions, invoking both the letter of the law (“the way the English language 
reads” as against the way the Supreme Court has “misinterpreted it”), and the norm it 
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is supposed to product (the “freedom to choose our associates”, “earnestly to be 
desired by negro and white alike”).  Finally, he expresses some disavowed 
schadenfreude in the “racial tension, strife and struggle” affecting some states which 
were “supposed to have reached Utopia in their race relations”. “I deplore the strife,” 
Echols insists, having already depicted it as a possible asset in the struggle against 
desegregation, but suggests it is the “inevitable harvest” of “unnatural race relations”. 
At several points, Echols’s discourse presents a puzzle. It is formatted, in many 
respects, like that of the other instances of Southern segregationist anticommunist 
discourse mentioned before. As in previous instances, there is no acknowledgment of 
any real antagonism indigenous to the Southern racial formation which could be 
propelling the drive to integration. Everything is the work of “outside agitators” 
“conspirators”, “leftist influence” and “brainwashing”. As in previous instances, 
integration constitutes moral and civilisational decline – “a fate worse than death” – 
which can only be the work of the mad or wicked. And yet, despite the obvious 
manicheanism (“there are only two sides”), and despite his complaints about leftist 
conspiracy, he is strikingly unable to decide upon a single scapegoat. One is struck by 
the proliferation of enemies, not their resolution into a single diabolical figure. 
Further, his vatic statements looking forward to sacrifice, anticipating with relish the 
spread of “racial tension, strife and struggle” in other parts of the country, his highly 
affected exhortations to stand firm, indicate that far from simply wanting to thwart 
the challenge to white-supremacy, he has found a way to take satisfaction in the 
prospect of a “fate worse than death”.  
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This signals a mutation in the fantasmatic structure, and a shift in the locus of 
jouissance. The fantasy is no longer straightforwardly that of a peaceable racial 
hierarchy loved by “negro and white alike”, intruded upon by an alien, subversive 
force that will not fit within the racial hierarchy. Rather, it is a fantasy of reckoning: 
of race revenge, and punishment. The language invoking a state of siege, also hopes 
for the provocation of whites into a martial footing. It looks forward to the moment 
when whites across the nation will be convinced of the need to return fire on restive 
black citizens and their fellow “conspirators”, and forcibly restore the old hierarchy. 
The staid politics of ‘reasonable compromise’ advocated by HOPE, even where this 
compromise gave segregationists considerable room for manoeuvre, may have had 
little hope against the thrilling jouissance that such a prospect offered. The question 
tacitly posed by Echols, however, was on which side HOPE would find itself on the 
day of reckoning. 
HOPE’s discourse thus, curiously, had the most profound and overdetermined 
effects on its opponents. It made waves, but far less among its sympathisers than 
among those who rejected it. It provoked anger, suspicion, grief, bafflement, anxious 
questioning and belligerence. It placed them on the defensive. The isolation of the 
issue of public schools as a matter of urgent action, as a commercial and 
developmental interest of the state, threatened to close down the only concrete option 
thus far availing in the resistance to desegregation, thus suggesting that the fight to 
defend segregation was already a lost cause. Echols’s accusation was in this sense 
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well-founded: HOPE had calmly suggested to segregationists that, short of economic 
ruin, capitulation was the only sensible answer. And within two years, most of 
Echols’s fellow representatives had taken the point. 
Conclusion 
In analysing these materials, I have not tried to confirm previously outlined 
patterns by rediscovering them here, although I have assuredly found some of them. 
Nor have I tried, in the first instance, to ‘make sense’ of the materials. My emphasis 
has been on reading for non-sense, absences, non-sequiturs, deletions and slips, and 
then interpreting them in light of the conceptual apparatus unfurled earlier in the 
essay. I have tried to make space for contradiction, for the inhabitation of one 
statement by many thoughts and desires. It would be foolish to deny that the 
knowledge I already bring to bear and am invested in – historical knowledge, 
theoretical perspectives, even a certain political and moral knowledge – will have 
influenced my interpretations. In particular, it was difficult not to judge HOPE’s 
discourse in light of what I know of subsequent events, and in view of my own 
political and strategic dispositions. However, consistent with the Lacanian approach I 
have adopted from the outset, I have tried to keep as far as possible to the letter of the 
texts, to take the authors at their word, and to use the ambiguities and gaps discovered 
therein, as well as the possibilities opened up by the formal properties of the texts, as 
allies against my existing ‘understanding’. Insofar as I have succeeded in this, what 
has been the product? 
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I did not encounter a direct reference to communism in the pro-segregationist 
discourse analysed, but this fact alone signalled something important. It was not 
difficult to locate the fantasmatic space, where the signifier ‘communism’ might 
appear. The fact that ‘communism’ did not fill that space, and yet it still existed and 
was occupied by other signifiers, drew my attention back to the conditions for the 
emergence of racist anticommunism. Previously in the chapter, I have argued that the 
signifier ‘communism’ functions in white-supremacist fantasy much like that of 
‘Jew’, in that it names a symptomal knot which stands for the impossibility of that 
fantasy. It is a symbolically overdetermined projection of the dysfunctions and 
antagonisms internal to white-supremacy 
I also noted that one of the ways in which ‘Jew’ and ‘communism’ were 
structurally similar was in their ambiguous position in the racial hierarchy, being 
somehow neither white nor fully black; at best, a thwarted white; being neither fully a 
master nor a slave, but perhaps a perverse, rebellious or fake master. This racial 
ambiguation, in the hystericised discourse of the segregationists discussed here, is 
what gives rise to the anxiety around which racist anticommunism might (but does 
not necessarily) crystallise. The questions, accusations and exhortations provoked by 
HOPE’s letters bespeak the traumatising realisation that if some white people are 
behaving like ‘Quislings’, demanding ‘capitulation’, or even ‘agitating’ and 
‘meddling’ against white rule, then whiteness contains no guarantees, its dominance 
is historically contingent, and the fantasy that coheres it is impossible. 
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Finally, having not set out to do more than work out whether there was a possibly 
generalisable structure of relations between anticommunist and white-supremacist 
discourse, I found it necessary to isolate in concrete situations distinct modalities of 
white-supremacist fantasy. I have suggested that these are related as phases of the 
same fantasmatic structure. In the fantasies organising the discourses of Stoddard and 
Kennan, there was an important distinction. Stoddard’s white-supremacist fantasy 
was explicitly dominative and biologically determinist. Kennan’s was historicist, 
culturalist and its commitment to racist domination was more tacit. In the 
correspondence discussed above, we see segregation justified on aversive rather than 
explicitly dominative principles. (This distinction is coined in Kovel, 1988). These 
could loosely be treated as approximations in type, which might be found to be at the 
core of specific racial projects (Omi & Winant, 1994): schematically, one might refer 
in this context to the global-supremacist project, the conservative-segregationist 
project, and the ‘colour-blind’ liberal-reformist project. However, Echols’s discourse 
suggests that there are other ways in which the fantasy structure can be modulated. 
For here we saw that, insofar as the anxiety induced by the exposed lack in whiteness 
is not offset by means of a coherent projection which screens off the lack, another 
compensating fantasy can appear. Jouissance in this way can be obtained through the 
fantasy of restoration and punishment visited by an aroused and newly unified white 
population, thus proving once again the limitless mastery of whites and extirpating 
the lack in whiteness with a blood sacrifice. This, of course, requires the prospect of 
annihilation as one of its conditions. Such jouissance presents one of the psychic 
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sources of segregationist absolutism, in which the smallest concession is an 
unnecessary loss of the principle, the thin end of the wedge and, more importantly, a 
deviation from the strategy of bringing matters to a head and forcing a choice. 
This suggests that, methodologically, the phases and variations of white-
supremacist fantasy must ultimately be referred back to the balance of the Other. For 
what we are speaking of here is not just a transformation wrought by the precipitation 
of a new political superego in a new symbolic context, but also the accretion of new 
symbolic configurations in the unconscious. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Social Movements I: Massive Resistance, Countersubversion and 
Parapolitics. 
This chapter considers Massive Resistance as a social movement in defence of 
white-supremacy, organised by anticommunism. Thus far, the main type of agency I 
have focused on is the state. However, this is just one element of the anticommunist 
network, particularly in the South where a panoply of civil society groups, parties, 
churches and paramilitaries implemented anticommunist ideologies in their struggle 
against the civil rights movement. And given the ontology of the state discussed in 
Chapters Four and Five, in which political power emerges as a condensation of the 
balance of social forces, there is a need to give some account of the forces which 
struggle.  
I will first of all develop an original framework for interpreting social movements, 
in engagement with extant social movement theory, which is capable of accounting 
for some of the specific dimensions of right-wing social movements. I focus on three 
types of action: first, perhaps surprisingly, the role of Southern states as an essential 
element in the social movement; second, the role of civic activism of a type embodied 
by the White Citizens’ Councils; and third, the role of what I call ‘parapolitical’ 
action, characteristic of the Klans. In dealing with the Klans, I offer some rudiments 
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toward a theory of the parapolitical. Finally, I conclude with a detailed case study, 
that of Little Rock in 1957, where I apply the principles of analysis which I have 
developed. Throughout the chapter, I will aim to demonstrate the specific role of 
anticommunism in cohering the right-wing social movement, structuring the use of 
repressive practices within it (not just by state actors, but particularly by civic and 
parapolitical actors), and in shifting the balance of social forces in such a way as to 
hold back the advance of the civil rights movement. 
 Social Movements: An Alternative Framework 
Whereas traditionally, ‘Massive Resistance’ had been constructed as a univocal 
and doomed chorus of reactionaries out to resist the inevitable, a growing body of 
literature is dedicated to taking it seriously as a social movement. Lewis (2006: 8) 
compares the movement to “the multi-headed Hydra that had once faced Hercules”, 
for it “developed a wide array of ploys, tactics, mechanisms, and arguments in 
defense of the southern status quo”. Far from being monotonously single-minded and 
strategically moribund, it constituted a complex unity-in-difference, aligning agents 
from diverse classes, social groups, and political identities, with a range of sometimes 
contradictory tactics and strategies, in defence of the status quo. It was, in short, a 
conservative social movement. (See Chapter One for a critical discussion of this 
problem.) 
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Relations, reproduction and struggle 
One might thus say that any theory of social movements presupposes an 
epistemology, whose premises must be stated explicitly in order to avert the 
reification of the empirical. In this research, I have taken a Gramscian problematic as 
my starting point and orientation, while also drawing on Poulantzas and Althusser. I 
have stressed that its concepts are strategic in orientation, and cannot be extricated 
from the political project of socialism without doing some epistemological damage. 
By the same token, precisely because they are the product of a particular project, and 
a particular set of theoretical and political conjunctures, they at best provide only 
flexible starting points for interpreting situations. Here, I will state some premises 
and then elaborate on how they might be relevant to the analysis of social 
movements. 
 First, the most basic social unit is not the individual, which is merely a politico-
juridical effect, but the relation. Relations can be categorised for convenience as 
economic, political or ideological, even though they usually exceed these 
classifications. (A romantic relationship, for example, might operate on all three 
dimensions, and yet not be adequately characterised by them.) The political, 
ideological, symbolic or cultural practices have their own determining, formative 
efficacy, which is not epiphenomenal to or purely derivative of economic practices. 
Second, these relations are organised in a particular mode of (re)production, which 
assigns a dominant or subjugated social position the bearers of these relations. Third, 
consequently, the dominant relations in a given mode of (re)production are 
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antagonistic and potentially conflictual, leaving the social field cross-sected by 
struggles – the entire matrix of social practices is overdetermined by struggle. Fourth, 
the mode of (re)production is never fully ‘realised’. Relations form a complex, open 
and generative structure-in-difference or social formation (not a ‘totality’ ), in which 18
not only the aspects of the structure but also its subjects are each overdetermined and 
assigned particular meanings and effects by their situation in relation to the structure. 
One thinks here of a simple example, how the name of Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, 
the “most simple-minded man in France” once “acquired the most multifarious 
significance” for the French social formation. (Marx, 2000: 321) The social 
formation, in a given conjuncture, is the terrain of action of social forces. Fifth, for 
relations to persist, they must be reproduced, and thus the manner of their 
reproduction, and the productive forces available to sustain their reproduction, is 
decisive in assigning the properties and capacities to the agents who are the subjects 
(or ‘bearers’) of relations. 
 The centring of reproduction is arguably the critical démarche of this historical 
materialist approach (Therborn, 2008: 138). Reproduction theory indicates something 
about the nature of power which Schwartz phrases as follows: “Any system contains 
within itself the possibility of a power strong enough to alter it”. (Quoted in 
McAdam, 1982: 37. Emphasis in original.) And the concepts with which I have 
attempted to organise the exposition of this topic thus far – hegemony, relations of 
 Poulantzas, in his earlier works, had recourse to the language of totality at times. However, I 18
take the view that this was language borrowed, initially by Althusser, from another problematic 
and as such is not useful to the Poulantzian optic. On the complex althusserian legacy 
regarding ‘structure’ and ‘totality’, see Montag, 2013: 15-20
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force, systems of alliances, historical blocs, and so on – define moments in a process 
of reproduction-through-struggle. This is a processual perspective, and as such it can 
help avoid the reification of the category, ‘social movement’. With these premises in 
mind, I propose to apply the following guidelines for the interpretation of social 
movements: 
i) A condition for the emergence of a social movement is that the reproduction of a 
social relationship has been put into question. This already implies something more 
fundamental than opposition to a particular policy, for instance, even though the 
relationship in question is often embodied in that policy. Thus, a social movement 
will be concerned with the conservation, disruption, reform, abolition or expanded 
reproduction of a set of social relations. This provides a first typological principle, 
insofar as we will be able to speak broadly of reactionary, conservative, reformist and 
revolutionary movements. However, there is no reason to assume that the precise 
political character of a movement is ever fully decidable, since that would depend 
upon the nature of the conflict being fully transparent, for which there is no evidence, 
and upon the constituents of the movement being homogenous in their interests and 
purview, something I will shortly rule out. The question of political representation, in 
its various senses, is already implied by this condition. 
ii) A second condition for the emergence of a social movement is the coming into 
conflict of (members of) social groups who are in an antagonistic social relationship 
with one another. This offers a second typological principle, insofar as we can speak 
of those movements instigated and led by dominant groups (“social movements from 
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above”), those instigated and led by subaltern groups (“social movements from 
below”) (Nilsen & Cox, 2013) To these, we can add those which somehow occupy a 
contradictory or middling location between both categories (for want of a better term, 
“social movements from in-between”). However, these are only broadly drawn 
tendencies. In practice, it is not always possible to identify a single leadership or 
assign a determinate social character to a movement. 
iii) A third condition is that, since social movements necessarily contain a 
politicality which consists precisely in its attempt to transform a social relationship 
involving the subjugation of one or more elements of a social formation (Laclau & 
Mouffe, 2001: 163), they must have a reference to political power. Offe (1985) argues 
that a crucial distinction between radical and conservative social movements is that 
radicals aim at contesting the civil society bases of political authority, whereas 
conservative movements seek to restore the “uncontested and noncontingent premises 
(both structural and evaluative) of politics”. This way of putting the point is still too 
invested in the state-civil society schema which Offe explicitly repudiates, and rests 
upon a liberal problematic in which the state constitutes the alienation of humanity’s 
rights and powers. (Poulantzas, 1973: 124-5) Social movements may or may not 
include action in the terrain of the state institutions, and the differential access of 
classes and social groups to the state provides varying opportunities for mobilisation 
(what is sometimes referred to as the ‘political-opportunity structure’, see Tarrow, 
1998) and contrasting repertoires of contention. The fact that there are profound 
differences in the relationship between state power and social movements of the right, 
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and the left, underpins an essential explanatory element of this chapter, viz. the 
‘parapolitical’. 
iv) A fourth condition is that the participants extend beyond those directly 
involved in the antagonistic relationship. The overdetermination of each aspect of a 
social formation by the organisation of its structure means that the attempt to 
transform, conserve or extend a social relationship has effects beyond that specific 
relation. Concretely, one often finds that hierarchies and forms of domination are 
interdependent and mutually sustaining. At the same time, not every subject of a 
given relation necessarily responds in the same way. In Gramscian terms, popular 
’consciousness’ is a ‘contradictory’ formation consisting of the traces of experience 
articulated with the elements of various kinds of ‘common sense’. Hence the social 
movement is necessarily a ‘system of alliances’. This poses the problem of 
identifications and ‘chains of equivalence’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001) wherein 
differently situated agents are induced to join one side of the conflict. This process 
cannot be reduced to an identity of the interests which are computable within a field 
of practices in a given conjuncture (Poulantzas, 1978: 112); rather, since social 
relations have a necessarily ideological (symbolic or cultural) dimension, there must 
be a structure of meaning in which interests and identities can be apprehended. This, 
in social movement theory, is sometimes understood as ‘framing,’ in which social-
structural processes are interpreted through a particular set of discursive coordinates. 
Such an approach can be useful provided it is understood that the meanings which 
help form social movement action often exceed the specific politicality of the 
movement; indeed, social movements as such ‘exceed the political’ (Poulantzas, 
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1979) insofar as they involve networks, forms of organisation, modes of sociality, 
cultural forms and significations that go beyond their political remit, engaging 
participants in a richly complex, organised ‘way of life,’ or several overlapping ways 
of life. These meanings and distinctive identities can anchor their political claims, but 
are deemed to be of value in themselves. Here, one thinks of the churches, clubs, 
unions, women’s groups and fraternal organisations whose identities often form part 
of the fabric of social movements. 
v) A fifth condition is that social capacities arising from the social relations whose 
reproduction is in question, are activated in social conflict. These can take the form of 
class capacities.  However, class capacities – however important in the reproduction 19
of social relations in any class society – are not the only social capacities that can be 
brought to bear. Nor are they distributed evenly throughout classes. Rather, class 
capacities can be concentrated within specific social milieux and networks (Touraine, 
1971), in particular industrial organisations, and so on. Their endowment can also be 
affected by he modality in which class is experienced, be it racial, or national, or 
gendered. This is why it is helpful to refer to a broader category, “disruptive 
capacity,” wherein the contribution that agents make to the reproduction of a social 
formation can be withdrawn, and obstruction put in its place. (Piven & Cloward, 
1988; Piven, 2006: 19-54) Given the disparate appearance of these capacities, and 
their relationship to the formation of identities and ways of life, the specific 
 Therborn (1983) argues that in the capitalist mode of production, these strengths can be 19
comprehended roughly as follows: the bourgeoisie enjoys “market-expanding capacity” – its 
strategic ability to assert power through “incessant capital accumulation” – as its most 
significant strength; the petty bourgeoisie’s key source of power is its relative autonomy from 
other social classes, being dependent neither on employers nor employees; and the working 
class derives its major strength through its collectivity, as its agents are related to one another 
through “increasingly cooperative processes of work”.
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organisation of these capacities will often entail not a unity of effort, but a division of 
labour, both political and organisational, loosely corresponding to distinct 
understandings, interests, capacities and strategies. Here, I would point out that the 
organisational question, which is foregrounded in resource-mobilisation theories, is in 
this account secondary to the political and ideological aspect of coalition forming. 
vi) A final condition is that these social capacities can be convoked in particular 
spatial situations in which economic, political and ideological relations are 
concentrated. There is necessarily a territoriality to the action of social movements. 
As Castells (1977, 1983) has shown, the segmentation of social and political space 
(districts, counties, cities, towns; the urban, suburban and rural) constitutes a way of 
organising production relations, consumption patterns, sociality, social reproduction 
and the antagonisms which structure all of these relations and practices. Insofar as 
social movements arise from these relations, they arise within territorial matrices 
which structure their options and their chances. This is of particular importance when 
we consider movements on behalf of, and against, Jim Crow, a mode of power 
distinguished by its use of the ‘internal frontier’ and its careful mapping of race to 
place. 
This chapter thus proceeds from the argument that Massive Resistance was a 
right-wing social movement, ‘from above’ to the extent that it was white, and ‘from 
in-between’ to the extent that it organised a diverse array of class actors from 
Senators to mechanics under the leadership of middle class notables. Like other right-
wing movements among relatively well-to-do populations (McVeigh, 2009: 197), 
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Massive Resistance is a response to the threat of downward social mobility and a loss 
of privilege. As a movement summoned into existence by Civil Rights, this means 
that its opportunities for organisation were powerfully pre-structured by the extant 
activities of civil rights activists. Its particular strategy with regard to political power 
can be characterised, in Gramscian terms, as ‘countertransformist’ , in that it 20
mimicked the practices of transformism in order to subvert it; constructing a coalition 
that bissects traditional class, party and ideological alignments in order to assail a 
power bloc in crisis and re-polarise first local and then national politics. Massive 
Resistance involved “dense networks” of actors ranging from individuals to clubs, 
churches, unions, and parties, with a distinct identity or family of identities, from 
Christianity to ‘Klankraft’. In geoeconomic terms, whereas Civil Rights was a 
movement of the working class and professional African Americans in the cities, 
Massive Resistance was predominantly a movement of planters, farmers and middle 
class notables based in suburban and rural settings – particularly the Black Belt and 
Delta regions of the South. Finally, in its orientation toward state power, Massive 
Resistance spanned a broad range of practices from the public to the private, from the 
licit to the illicit, from the consensual to the violent. It necessarily depended upon a 
 Gramsci’s historical commentaries on transformism suggest that it was related to processes 20
of ‘passive revolution’. (Gramsci, 1971) Passive revolution incorporated two types of historical 
change. The first was the general type of capitalist transition effected without Jacobin-style 
frontal insurgencies against the feudal state. The second was any major transformation within 
the capitalist mode of production, wherein the relations of production and domination are 
modified to help overcome otherwise potentially deadly obstacles to further accumulation. 
These changes, though progressive from the point of view of rationalising and developing the 
productive forces, were conservative-adaptive from a political point of view, often led by 
reactionary forces, and generally involved as much emphasis on coercion as the development 
of a new ‘common sense’. This latter usage made passive revolution a tendency immanent to 
capitalist modernity as such. (Thomas, 2006) The related political strategy of ‘transformism’ is 
generally understood as a politics of the centre, wherein popular discontents of left and right 
are appropriated and incorporated into the capitalist middle-ground, their oppositional content 
neutralised.
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‘parapolitical’ dimension in the pursuit of its objectives, a dimension that is inscribed 
in the history of counter-subversive practices. 
The task in this chapter is to situation anticommunism as a possible element in the 
formation, cohesion and/or breakdown of Massive Resistance. These are the 
theoretical principles I will bring to bear in trying to isolate just that, first in a general 
anatomy of the movement wherein I will draw some general conclusions about the 
position of anticommunism as an organising principle, and then in a detailed 
examination of the movement in the seemingly ‘moderate’ city of Little Rock. 
The anatomy of Massive Resistance 
 The fact that a mass movement cohered around opposition to civil rights as a 
result of Brown vs the Board of Education, is not something that can be taken for 
granted. It was not immediately clear how unanimous the white South would be in its 
response to the measure. The cohesion of a powerful, reactionary movement to 
catalyse a broad shift to the right to protect racial segregation was prompted in the 
first instance not just by court decisions but, crucially, by African American activism, 
from bus boycotts in Tallahassee, FL and Montgomery, AL, to school board petitions. 
(Lewis, 2000: 44) It was the product of a multi-tiered effort by diverse, 
interdependent constituencies, drawing on the materials left by previous white-
supremacist campaigns, from the first Klan to the post-war Dixiecrat insurgency, and 
those supplied by the apparatuses and ideologies of anticommunism. 
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 It would be a mistake, and contrary to the arguments outlined already, to write as 
if Massive Resistance was “a single homogeneous movement”. (Lewis, 2006: 185) 
Such homogeneity is in principle impossible: we are dealing here with something 
more like an assemblage of heterogeneous elements, processes and objects (Deleuze 
& Guattari, 1987). Yet insofar as the different factions, milieux and power networks 
constituting this movement shared an over-riding strategic goal, it was first to 
intimidate African Americans into retreat, and second to present a Southern ‘united 
front’ in order to convince the majority of Americans, particularly powerful whites in 
the political and legal system who supported integration, that the South would never 
yield an inch on the subject. As Klarman, (2004: 409) puts it: 
“If given a choice, portions of many southern states—northwestern Arkansas, 
West Texas, northern and western Virginia, eastern Tennessee, the city of Atlanta—
were prepared to comply with Brown. But massive resisters in state government were 
determined to eliminate that choice for fear that any deviation from universal 
segregation would make integration appear inevitable, embolden the NAACP, and 
undermine the campaign to convince northern integrationists that the South would 
never tolerate Brown.” 
 This approach exploited a hesitation evident in the Supreme Court’s second 
decision in Brown which, by stressing ‘deliberate speed’, prioritised the scale of 
white resistance as opposed to the harm done by segregation in determining the speed 
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and scope of change (Roediger, 2008: 188). The implementation of this strategic 
perspective necessitated the deployment of a range of techniques, from legislative 
efforts to what Tilly called ‘WUNC displays’ , from moral and ideological appeals 21
to intimidation, economic sabotage, violence and repression. An emergent division of 
labour allowed the different aspects of this effort to be pursued without maximising 
the conflict between ‘respectable’ and ‘extreme’ forms of resistance, a spectrum 
defined between the poles of an insidious ‘minimum compliance’ and systematic 
terror. There were also, as discussed in the last chapter, symbolic and fantasy 
elements ordering a minimal cohesion between the contending factions – although, 
the mere fact that this fantasmatic element involved the canalisation of aggressivity 
by means of a projection constitutes a warning against treating even the cohering 
dynamics as purely productive from the point of view of Massive Resistance. 
In this chapter, I will focus on three types of action which I will interpret under the 
rubric of ‘Massive Resistance’. The first is the campaign by white supremacists at 
various levels of the American state; the second is the campaign of civic activism led 
by the Citizens Councils; and the third is the form of violent parapolitical action by 
the Klans of the civil rights era. I will argue that these strands drew together, in 
different mixtures and different proportions, the classic three elements of the counter-
subversive campaign which Schrecker (2002) identifies as being integral to the 
‘anticommunist network’: the business community, civic activists disproportionately 
drawn from the middle class, and layers of the state.  
 Displays of ‘worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment’ being a constitutive part of the 21
social movement as spectacle. (Tilly, 2004)
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 Broadly speaking, one can speak of three phases of Massive Resistance to Brown 
and civil rights: Phase I (1954-1956) was a period of hesitation, the gradual 
canvassing and consolidation of local responses, and the initial formation of 
Resistance organisations; Phase II (1956-1959) was a period of escalating and 
increasingly effective Massive Resistance during which white ‘moderates’ and 
progressives were relatively quiet, centred on plans to close schools and otherwise 
defy the courts, and shut down the activities of civil rights organisations. In this 
period the Citizens’ Councils and Southern states led the offensive; Phase III 
(1960-1965) was a period of intensified conflict, defeat and adaptation, as school 
closures ended, Council influence waned, and states adopted piecemeal adaptation. In 
this period, the emphasis increasingly fell on a small number of resistant states, and 
the activities of the Ku Klux Klans. 
The recomposition of the state. 
 However counterintuitive it may seem to begin an anatomy of a social movement 
by discussing the state – particularly as it has already been discussed in Chapter Five 
– there is no avoiding the fact that a critical element contributing to the success and 
failures of Massive Resistance was the composition of Federal and local state 
apparatuses. Schrecker (2002) is undeniably correct to identify the state as the teeth 
of any counter-subversive movement, the necessary element that makes its campaigns 
effectual even where state personnel don’t play the leading role. We will see here that, 
even where the dominant forces in Massive Resistance are the most radicalised 
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middle class segregationists, the shift to the right in the state apparatuses and the 
availability of state resources for the counter-subversion campaign was decisive for 
the chances of the movement. At the Federal level, Southern politicians organised to 
use their traditional loci of power to blunt the thrust of desegregation. At the local 
level, they turned their fire on ‘moderates’, often depicted as the equivalent of post-
Civil War ‘scalawags’, colluding in a new Reconstruction drive, and redeployed and 
organised new state apparatuses to target the civil rights movement. In doing so, they 
acted with a degree of concert with the social movements against civil rights.  
The reaction in the Southern states to the threat of desegregation only began to 
come together after a significant lag. Despite the fact that they had seen the decision 
coming, Southern leaders largely failed to cohere any kind of response either in 
anticipation or in the immediate period following Brown, while voters reacted in 
quite distinct ways. For example, while most white Southerners did not accept the 
principle of integration – some 80% opposed the decision of the Supreme Court, and 
up to 90% in the Deep South – the responses of voters, newspapers and politicians in 
the upper South to the law generally speaking differed from those of the deeper 
South. While Governor Talmadge of Georgia and Senator Eastland of Mississippi 
declared for resistance, the governors of Virginia and Arkansas immediately pledged 
themselves to calm compliance with the law. In Virginia, Governor Stanley appointed 
the Gray Commission to develop a desegregation strategy. The Commission’s first 
recommendation, the ‘local option’ Southern politicians made clear their opposition, 
but in terms of practical action they wanted to wait until it was clear how the 
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Supreme Court would proceed and, as Virginia Senator Harry F Byrd put it, “the 
sentiment of the people in various areas of the State” became apparent. Byrd’s private 
stance was significant, given his later fame as a belligerent combatant. Even in 
Alabama, voters in the gubernatorial elections preferred to elect the populist liberal 
Jim Folsom, someone known for his progressive views on race. In Louisiana, the 
populist and racial ‘moderate’ Earl Long had no problem being elected. (Lewis, 2000: 
41; Webb, 2005: 4-5; Klarman, 2004: 395; Klarman, 2005: 21) 
Lewis (2000: 42) argues that “it was not until the Spring of 1956 that anything like 
a homogeneous resistance movement to Brown emerged in the South”.  By this time, 
there were approximately twenty pro-segregation groups operating across the South, 
according to the Southern Regional Council. (Addison Clark, 1976: 152) Perhaps 
decisive in helping to consolidate this into a sharp regional turn to the right were the 
efforts of the political leadership of the South in Congress. This included the use of 
positions in the House UnAmerican Activities Committee (HUAC), chaired by 
southern Democrats for most of the period until 1955, and the Senate Intelligence 
Subcommittee on Internal Security (SISS), run by the red-baiting Senator Pat 
McCarran and then the segregationist Senator James Eastland. Southern politicians 
were generally speaking much more aggressive anticommunists than their northern 
equivalents. Senator Eastland even decided to focus the attention of SISS on the New 
York Times, in a way that even McCarthy might have resiled from, purely on the 
basis of its having endorsed Brown. (Alwood, 2007: 108-109) Leading figures of 
what Bartley describes as the “neo-Bourbon” tendency in the South (see Fairclough, 
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2005: 56), such as Senators Strom Thurmond, Richard Russell, James Eastland and 
Harry Byrd, also cooperated in developing a new segregationist platform and 
mobilised Congressional support for it. Their platform, the ‘Southern 
Manifesto’ (officially, The Declaration of Constitutional Principles), drafted by 
Congressmen from eleven southern states, articulated the bases for opposition to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown. Challenging the legality of the Court’s decision 
in constitutional terms, it accused a conspiracy of “outside agitators” of having 
engineered the decision, leading to “revolutionary changes,” and committed 
supporters to using “all lawful means” to overturn it. Though accessing the language 
of Southern nationalism, above all the rhetoric of secessionist and slave owner John 
Calhoun, they also framed their arguments in terms of American nationhood, within 
which the South – duly protected by states rights – had a privileged claim. (Addison 
Clark, 1976: 151; Egerton, 1995: 621-624) 
 The major, calculated effect of the Manifesto was to provide legitimacy to the 
emerging political struggle against the law and the civil rights movement. As Senator 
Eastland told the white constituents of Mississippi: “You are not required to obey any 
court which passes out such a ruling. In fact, you are obligated to defy it.” The 
declaration of “lawful” resistance failed to induce opposition from Washington DC, 
and was even deemed legitimate by President Eisenhower. Southern states quickly 
increased the pace of their resistance activity, and an “avalanche of legislation” 
shortly befell the region. A struggle against the NAACP was initiated across the 
South, with legal manoeuvres and suppression ranging from fines to firings. A 
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significant basis for segregationists in state legislatures was a long-standing form of 
gerrymandering – the malapportionment of voting constituencies in order to give 
rural areas more power. Governor Long’s efforts to address this in Louisiana simply 
gave the legislature the chance to implement resistance measures. Yet even without 
this, the core of hard segregationism in the Black Belt was sufficient to provide the 
bedrock upon which white-supremacist political machines were built. The support for 
segregation among southern whites was overwhelming: the differences in 
commitment being of degree rather than principle. And there was a reciprocal effect 
of state action on public opinion. The fact that the share of white Southerners who 
believed desegregation to be inevitable fell from 55% in 1956 to 43% in 1957 is 
likely to be in part due to the upsurge in Southern state activism against segregation. 
(Newton, 2014: 104; Mays, 2008: 26-28; Lassiter & Lewis, 1998: 1; Klarman, 2005: 
29-30) 
 There were two major lines of counterattack on the part of Southern states. The 
first was to prepare plans for school closures and privatisation, with the preparations 
beginning relatively early on in Georgia and Virginia, while only beginning in 
Arkansas after the leadership’s sharp right-ward turn in 1957. As Jack Bloom records: 
“state investigating committees pursued the organisation and its members with the 
same tactics and zeal with which the McCarthyites had hunted for Communists”. 
These committees sometimes preceded Brown, as in Mississippi, where the General 
Legislative Investigating Committee (GLIC) was initially launched in 1946 to target 
graft, only later re-deployed as a counter-subversive organisation. In Arkansas, by 
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contrast, the State Sovereignty Commission was set up late in the day as a state 
backlash against integration, driven by the segregationist attorney-general, was 
launched. In many cases, state laws targeted teachers and other public employees, 
requiring them to identify their political affiliations so that they civil rights activists 
could be flushed out. In 1958, at the peak of Massive Resistance, Mississippi 
legislators instructed the GLIC to begin hearings into communist influence in the 
civil rights movement.  The hearings drew on the accumulated expertise of existing 
anticommunist practitioners, such as former HUAC chief investigator JB Matthews. 
But it also took advice from civil society groups such as the Daughters of the 
American Revolution and the American Legion in the extirpation of Communist 
influenced on campuses. (Kuhn, 1997; Mertz, 1993; Bloom, 1987: 109; Crespino, 
2007: 54-57) 
 Even where ‘moderation’ had won the day in decisive gubernatorial races, in 
Louisiana and Alabama, the interaction between growing Massive Resistance 
organisations and right-ward moving legislatures spurred the implementation of the 
same policies. In Louisiana, state senator William Rainach promoted bills to 
circumvent desegregation and launched the Joint Legislative Committee to Maintain 
Segregation. In Alabama, the legislature embarked on a “pupil placement plan” 
already pioneered in Virginia, in which a board of three appointees would determine 
which school each student could attend, with the law so worded as to enable them to 
decide on an exclusively racial basis without explicit racial coding. Indeed, it was 
Alabama’s Massive Resistance which won a famous victory in 1958 when the 
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Supreme Court, in the case of Shuttleworth v. Birmingham Board of Education, 
supported the “pupil placement plan”. At this stage, every Southern state had adopted 
such a scheme, thus suggesting that a way around the problem had been found. A 
critical role was often played by Attorney Generals. In Louisiana, segregationist 
Attorney General Fred LeBlanc had been unsuccessful in campaigning against 
Governor Long’s statewide ticket, but faced few obstacles initiating a court-led attack 
on the NAACP. Long, maintaining an equipoise between the Citizens’ Councils and 
the NAACP, was unwilling to stymy this offensive. In Virginia, Attorney General 
Harrison played a key role in the Byrd Organisation, drove the legal campaign against 
integration and particularly the tactic of school closures. In Georgia, Eugene Cook 
pursued the “Communist, Communist-front and fellow-traveler” organisations he said 
were behind the NAACP. In Arkansas, Bruce Bennett drove the pursuit of the 
NAACP and like-minded bodies under the rubric of hardline segregationism and 
anticommunism. (Fairclough, 2005: 58-60; Stephan, 1980: 73; Klarman, 2007: 95-98; 
Woods, 2004: 62-63) 
By the late Fifties, most Southern states had moved sharply to the right, with the 
defence of segregation the galvanising issue, while racial ‘moderates’ constituted an 
embattled and often silenced minority. All states had committed to at least some 
forms of resistance. Arkansas, a previously ‘moderate’ border state, had become a 
frontline of resistance by 1957, electrifying the whole South, and had closed its 
schools in 1958-59. By 1960, however, the main plank of Massive Resistance was 
essentially lost. The school closures in Arkansas and Virginia had provoked public 
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backlash and legal opposition, resulting in the effective abandonment of resistance. 
This did not take place without tumult and resistance on the part of state officials. 
Leading figures in the Byrd Organisation took the fight to “the Communist, Jews, 
Negroes and so-called liberal Democrats” who were said to be behind integration. 
The threat to close schools in Georgia already appeared doomed, and by 1961 was 
abandoned on the recommendation of the Sibley Commission, despite a strongly 
segregationist public opinion. Several ‘moderate’ states – among them Florida, Texas 
and Tennessee – dropped all semblance of implemented Massive Resistance. In 
Louisiana, the election of the segregationist Governor Davis, and his attempts to 
override court orders with special legislation proved futile. Nor was it just the 
schools. Desegregation in public facilities began to roll out in several Southern states. 
Most famously, the Greensboro sit-ins contributed to North Carolina restaurants 
desegregating. (Lewis, 2004: 144-145; Roche, 2010; Klarman, 2004: 400-404) 
 Increasingly, as the South shifted toward adaptation and ‘practical segregation,’ 
resistance was left to a diminishing core of states. In Mississippi, Governor Barnett’s 
pledge that no school would be integrated as long as he was governor ultimately led 
to the Ole Miss race riot, and the despatch of federal troops to crush it. This began to 
turn the tide in the remaining hold-outs, as South Carolina’s political elites, anxious 
to avoid a similar federal incursion, publicly adjusted to what they had privately 
admitted for some time: that integration was inevitable. There remained Alabama. 
Under Governor Patterson, Alabama pledged to persist with its ‘pupil placement plan’ 
and resist even ‘token integration’ as a “sign of weakness”. But even here, a section 
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of politically powerful businesses and the Attorney General were wearying of the 
state’s reactionaries. Wallace’s 1962 gubernatorial victory, underlined by the 
‘segregation forever’ speech written by Klan leader Asa Carter, was a victory for a 
lost cause. Wallace promised and embarked on repeated but ultimately futile acts of 
defiance. The ’last stand’ of the segregationist core took on an increasingly 
anticommunist register. For example, Wallace’s attempt to prevent the integration of 
four elementary schools in September 1963 was justified as resistance to “Martin 
Luther King and his group of pro-communists”. This was a continual theme: “leftist 
ideology,” “socialist ideology,” “the official Communist Party of the United States,” 
and even “the leaders of world communism,” are all found behind civil rights 
legislation. Fairly typical was the address by Wallace to a gathering of the great and 
the good, reported on by AFL-CIO representative Earl Pippin. “Wallace told us in no 
uncertain terms that it was our duty to strangle the communist movement before it 
gained momentum through the civil rights movement. … ‘They want every little 
white school child to turn to communism,’ he said.”  (Klarman, 2004: 403-406; 
Greenhaw, 2011: 109; Rohler, 2004: 33-34)  
“Manicured Kluxism”: the Citizens’ Councils. 
In July 1954, approximately two months after the first Brown vs the Board of 
Education decision overturned Plessy vs Ferguson, the first White Citizens Council 
was formed in Indianola, Mississippi, in the home county of the segregationist 
Senator James Eastland. 
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The formation of the first Citizens’ Council owed itself as much to the heightened 
activity of local African Americans, already visible long before the rebellion of 
Fannie Lou Hamer, as to the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown. The post-war wave 
of repression and lynchings aimed at putting African Americans ‘in their place’ had 
not impeded the gradual transformation of the region. Voter registration drives taking 
advantage of Smith v Allwright, took place in every state. Between 1947 and 1952, 
the number of African Americans qualified to vote in twelve Southern states doubled 
from 600,000 to 1,200,000, with the result that African Americans began to appear in 
some local elective offices such as school boards and city councils – albeit, this took 
place largely in the states of the Upper South, in the areas outside from the Black Belt 
where black majorities could seriously threaten white supremacy. (Wormser, 2004: 
454; Woodward, 1966: 141-142) 
Lurking in the background of the Council’s formation was a geoeconomic 
structure in which class and race relations were formed. Indianola is located in the 
heart of the Mississippi Delta, “the most Southern place on earth” by history and 
culture. The flat, fecund terrain, flooded over centuries by the Yazoo and Delta rivers, 
had supported the production of considerable wealth, first through cotton plantations 
and a racial slave-based agrarian economy and subsequently through production 
based on sharecroppers and tenant farmers, regulated by a racial caste system. By the 
time of the launch of the Citizens’ Councils, the economy had become a more 
complex and diversified sphere, so that plantation owners were joined by 
industrialists, merchants and bankers. Nonetheless, salient planter-capitalists included 
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such figures as Senator Eastland himself, while the founder of the first Citizens’ 
Council, former paratrooper Robert Patterson, managed a 1,500 acre plantation in 
Leflore County. The geo-economic terrain of the Deep South, and the Delta in 
particular, provided the heartland from which white resistance to desegregation would 
emerge. In part, this can be attributed to a crude demographic factor: the fact that in 
many such areas, African Americans outnumbered whites, or at least represented a 
potentially powerful minority. However, just as important was how these 
demographic factors were linked to local production relations, the racialised class 
structure, the degree of urbanisation and industrialisation, and the political character 
of the state leadership. By and large, the Border States were more likely to be 
urbanised, less dependent on traditional rural class relations, and more likely to have 
a ‘moderate’ political leadership, and thus Massive Resistance was weaker. Arkansas 
presents an interesting exception which will be examined in detail at the end of this 
chapter. (Adams & Gorton, 2004; Cobb, 1994: 96, 213; McMillen, 1994: 6-7) 
Among the charter members of the Citizens’ Council launched by Patterson were 
Arthur B Clark, a Harvard-educated lawyer, Herman Moore, a banker, and a local 
cotton industry manager named D. H. Hawkins. The remainder of the coalition 
consisted of professionals, farmers, merchants, and lone businessmen. The early 
meetings were several dozens strong, and indicated a powerful local backlash which 
would subsequently generalise into a robust regional coalition. (Moye, 2004: 64-65) 
The strength of the reaction among local planter capitalists and their class allies was 
in part due to the fact that they had a certain shared experience of white supremacy 
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formed in an agrarian context, in which black workers represented a demographic 
majority.   Patterson, in setting up the Council, also found an ally in a circuit court 22
judge and member of the fraternal society, Sons of the American Revolution, Tom 
Brady. Brady had given a speech to his local Sons chapter denouncing the first Brown 
decision as a manifestation of “communism”. In a later text, entitled Black Monday, 
he essayed on the intrinsic differences between black and white Americans which 
necessitated their segregation: “You can dress a chimpanzee, housebreak him, and 
teach him to use a knife and fork, but it will take countless generations of 
evolutionary development, if ever, before you can convince him that a caterpillar or a 
cockroach is not a delicacy. Likewise the social, political, economical, and religious 
preferences of the negro remain close to the caterpillar and the cockroach.” (Quoted, 
Evers-Williams, 1996: 111) Along with Brady, Patterson found supporters in a local 
cotton manager, a Harvard-educated attorney, and a banker. Soon, the mayor of 
Indianola joined, along with a string of local notables. (Cobb, 1994: 213-214) 
In short order, the Council added a national television and radio programme – 
‘The Citizens’ Council Forum’ – to its considerable assets. It also found that it had 
influence in the legislatures, for example in the form of Representative Wilma Sledge 
who assured the Mississippi legislature of the Council’s upstanding methods and 
 Industrial businesses, such as those represented by the Southern States Industrial Council 22
(SSIC), tended to be as supportive of efforts to resist desegregation as rural capital, and as 
resentful of Federal ‘intervention’. This had roots in their formative opposition to New Deal 
programmes and the unionisation struggles of the Thirties. However, they were also at odds 
with the agrarian-oriented Democratic leadership and as an organisation they foregrounded 
free market arguments rather than segregationist arguments. This did not prevent leaders 
such as Thurman Sensing appearing at White Citizens’ Councils and Daughters of the American 
Revolution meetings, but the SSIC as a body was vague in its public expressions of pro-
segregation sentiment. (Jewell, 2010; Webb, 2004).
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purpose. William J Simmons of the Mississippi Citizens’ Council enjoyed ready 
access to and influence with the legislature. It found support from the owners of 
Mississippi’s two largest daily newspapers. It picked up funding and influential 
personnel from the remnants of the 1948 Dixiecrat machinery. It recruited from 
among Rotary Club and Chambers of Commerce leaders, from Boy Scout leaders and 
elements of the American Legion, from local Democratic Party chairmen and school 
superintendents. Editorials in local newspapers such as the Indianola Enterprise-
Tocsin exhorted local residents to join its fight against the “socialist aims” of the 
NAACP. In short, the Citizens’ Councils became part of the circulation of political 
and ideological state power, with links to civic, governmental and media institutions. 
Soon, the Council launched its own newspaper, The Citizens’ Council. By 1955, the 
Councils had chapters in every southern state, and soon grew to include 60,000 
members and perhaps ultimately as many as 250,000, mainly concentrated in the 
rural Black Belt where the threat of black political empowerment was most palpable. 
(Moye, 2004: 68-69, 72-73 & 79; Webb, 2005: 4-5; Frederickson, 2001: 233-234; 
McMillen, 1994: 25; Wood, 2004: 143-144; Citizens’ Council: 1955; Klarman, 2005: 
22; Street, 1956) 
The goal of the Citizens’ Councils was to articulate a respectable, mainstream 
opposition to de-segregation predicated chiefly on middle class mobilisation. 
Formally eschewing violence and the explicit supremacism of the Klans, their tactics 
nonetheless included intimidation, their links with local businesses enabling them to 
get African Americans fired for attempting to register to vote. They attempted, in 
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their own words, “to make it difficult, if not impossible, for any Negro who advocates 
desegregation to find and hold a job, get credit, or renew a mortgage.” Council 
members responded to NAACP recruitment by, where possible, firing black 
employees. Their membership, their antisemitism and their racist ideology 
overlapped with that of the Klans. They pursued “white-collar terrorism”, “manicured 
Kluxism”, “the agenda of the Klan with the demeanour of the Rotary 
Club.” (Addison Clark, 1976: 101-3; Payne, 2007: 34-35; Newton, 2014: 105; 
Klarman, 2005: 26; Moye, 2004: 66) 
 There was, as these pithy formulations suggest, a class pertinence to such terror, 
for it was a terror rooted partially in what Marx called the “dull compulsion of 
economic relations” which ensures the “dependence” of the labourer “on capital”. 
(Marx, 1996: 726) Part of the struggle of Massive Resistance was to maintain and 
conserve the dependence of African Americans on whites. As a landowner instructed 
a black family, while driving them off the land, “Your food, your work and your very 
lives depend on good-hearted white people.” (Payne, 2007: 19) These were methods 
distinctly available to elements of planter capital, small businesses and influential 
middle class notables. However, the strategic-rational element of these means need 
not occlude the sadistic and punitive aspects of such actions. The entire Southern 
social order was precariously organised around a symbolic structure in which racial 
etiquette – “decent racial conduct” as the Citizens’ Council would describe it – was 
paramount. Winant (1994: 7) describes how this Jim Crow etiquette required African 
Americans to “remove their hats in the presence of whites, to step off the sidewalk 
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(where one existed) into the muddy street at the passage of a white, and to wait in 
such shops as would serve blacks until all whites had been served, no matter who had 
arrived first”. These, and a “thousand other rules of this type,” constituted a heavily 
structured symbolic order, in which transgression could easily result in an explosion 
of racist violence and lynching. Nor was Council activity entirely innocent of this 
stratum of violence in the movement. Its economic terror often depended on subtle, or 
less-than-subtle, threats. Webb (2011: 47-48) recounts a typical instance in which a 
laundry owner in Jackson, Mississippi was urged by an anonymous caller claiming to 
be from the local Citizens’ Council to fire his African American employee involved in 
civil rights activity. The employer’s refusal was met by the simply threat: “you’ll be 
sorry.” In other cases, Council members advocated violence or participated in riots 
and bombings. (Newton, 2010: 108-109) Flyers distributed at a mass Citizens’ 
Council rally in Montgomery, Alabama in February 1956 gave vent to the outright 
genocidal plea to “abolish the Negro race” using “arrows, sling shots and knives”, 
and affirmed the right of every white person to “the pursuit of dead niggers”. (Phibbs, 
2009: 49) 
It would be a mistake to assume that even this wing of massive resisters was 
ideologically, tactically or strategically homogenous. They were nonetheless saturated 
in the same supremacist culture that pervaded the South. As Fairclough (1995: 167) 
suggests, even the term ‘racist’ doesn’t “prepare one for the depths of disgust, 
contempt and condescension with which whites, to varying degrees, still regarded 
their black fellow citizens in the 1950s”. Such contempt was carefully coded in the 
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official propaganda of the Councils. Indeed, it was their contention that they were on 
the side of African Americans, and this provided part of the legitimising myth of the 
white-supremacist system. Senator Eastland argued the case on national television: 
“Now this doctrine of the separation of the races has been evolved over many 
years by both races. It’s not something that one race has imposed on another race. 
It’s not a badge of inferiority or superiority. … It might interest you to know this, 
now.After the South was defeated, when the white people were disenfranchised 
and could not vote, the first Reconstruction legislature of my state, controlled by 
members of the Nigra race, passed three laws. One, that there be segregation on 
trains and in public transportation. Two, that there be a separate school system. 
Three, they levied a poll tax. Four, they made it a felony for races to inter-marry, 
and made it a life sentence in the penitentiary for one who crossed that 
line.” (Wallace, 1957) 
This was a carefully constructed fabulation: at no point had whites been 
disenfranchised, and it was the white-dominated legislature which had introduced 
segregation statutes aimed at freedmen, which were later overturned by a Radical 
Reconstruction administration. Though the state had a majority of black voters, it 
never had a black majority legislature or a black governor. (Newton, 2010: 43-44) 
Nonetheless, this state mythology condensed a series of what might be called ‘race 
lessons’. The first was that the separation of races was sought and endorsed by ‘both 
races’, and was thus ‘natural’. The second was that if African Americans were able to 
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vote, they would trample over the rights of whites. Therefore, competition and 
domination between the ‘races’ was also ‘natural’. The third, since Eastland also 
claimed that the South was relatively racially egalitarian, was that Mississippi whites, 
in maintaining segregation, were conscientious and fair in ensuring equity, in a way 
that African Americans could not be trusted to be. It followed, therefore, that any 
attack on segregation must be mischievous and, since it would not flow naturally 
from any grievances on the part of black Southerners, must be the work of ‘outside 
agitators’. This, though the notoriously red-baiting Eastland did not mention 
communism specifically here, conforms in its elements to the fantasmatic structure of 
white-supremacist anticommunism identified in the previous chapter. 
And indeed, the Councils foregrounded counter-subversion in the anticommunist 
key as a thematic in their campaigns. The first issue of The Citizens’ Council (1955) 
reported calls for the NAACP to be investigated. It quoted Congressional 
representative Jerry M Hughes urging that the faculty and student body of State 
College in South Carolina be investigated by the local legislature to find out who was 
a member of the NAACP and if they were “misleading the Negro citizens and 
misrepresenting the aims and objectives of the NAACP to the Negro people”. In the 
same issue, it reproduced three articles from “the front pages of the Charleston, S. C., 
News and Courier,” the main daily newspaper in the city, by the editor of the same 
newspaper. The articles claimed that Citizens’ Councils were defenders of ancient 
republican principles of out “to guard both whites and Negroes,” by combating 
NAACP agitators and stymying the “wrath of ruffian white people who may resort to 
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violence” by channelling it in legal ways. The article noted that certain economic 
pressures could be brought to bear, which “could include firing employes [sic], or 
refusing to renew leases for sharecroppers who have followed the NAACP line”, but 
repeated the Citizens’ Council line that this was not organised by the Councils. It 
concluded: “this observer from South Carolina believes that the councils are both 
sound and decent, and loaded with power for good.” (Waring, 1955a, 1955b, 1955c) 
Cartoons featured in The Citizens’ Council depicted the NAACP as a communist 
front, and the South as beset while it slept by ‘red termites’ which needed to be 
gassed by the Council. 
!  
Figure 2. ‘Exposed’ in The Citizens’ Council, Vol 2 No 1, October 1956. 
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Figure 3. ‘While We Slept’ in The Citizens’ Council, Vol 2 No 1, October 1956. 
 The Council’s publications obsessed about communist plotting, from “Red-
Tinged Churchmen” to “left-wing” plots to promote “inter-marriage”. Judge Brady, 
of the Mississippi Citizens’ Councils, denounced the Supreme Court’s “socialistic and 
unconstitutional decrees”, and charged it with having “aided the Communists of this 
country far beyond Lenin’s wildest dreams”. (Citizens Council, 1958: 2) A former 
FBI agent who joined the Citizens’ Council in Mississippi reported that the NAACP 
was “the present-day stepchild of the Communist Party … so heavily infiltrated with 
Communists that they must, of necessity, obey every order and command of the 
Communist Party”. (Citizens Council, 1958: 4) A Citizens Council pamphlet charged 
“that the NAACP is a left-wing, power-mad organisation of destruction that cares 
nothing for the Negro.” (Quoted in Waring, 1955c) Notably, their discourse became 
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more frenzied as, at the end of the Fifties, southern states began to capitulate. No 
longer was it just communists and their confederates. The retreat, far from 
representing the real balance of forces in the country, had to be a product of 
infiltrators, “planted voices,” “massive betrayal,” and “collaborators”. (McMillen, 
1994: 250) 
 By itself this form of anticommunism could perhaps be written off as fantastical 
propaganda. However, it is important to note that the Councils’ efforts to intimidate 
opponents, harassing would-be voters or driving activists out of work, depended in 
part upon their networked integration with state actors in the legislatures, Sovereignty 
Commissions, and Bureaus of Investigation. (Butler, 2002) For example, in 
Mississippi, the Citizens’ Council had played a key role in driving the formation of 
the formation of the State Sovereignty Commission, and enjoyed relatively close 
relations with the Commission, throughout Governor Coleman’s “undeclared war” 
against the Council, whose methods he regarded as counterproductive to the defence 
of segregation, and through most of Governor Barnett’s more hardline administration. 
In Alabama, under the segregationist administration of Governor Patterson, the 
Citizens’ Council had close and regular contacts with the gubernatorial office, and the 
Alabama State Sovereignty Commission provided the Council with $5,000 per month 
for its radio and television department. (Irons, 2010: 37-60; Katagiri, 2001: 27; 
Montgomery Advertiser, 1963) In 1961 it emerged that the Mississippi Citizens’ 
Councils had been provided with information by the State Sovereignty Commission, 
verified by the Bureau of Investigation and with the connivance of the Governor, 
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identifying a range of students as integrationist plants being prepared for a role in the 
“left-wing apparatus”, and specifying a candidate for student editor of The 
Mississippian, who it transpired was a conservative, as such an apparatchik. 
(McMillen, 1994: 253-4) I will return later in the chapter to the effects of 
anticommunism within this movement, but for now it is important to note that 
whatever the strategic functionality of such ideological thematics, their basis in 
fantasy projections does not permit us to assume that anticommunism was 
straightforwardly rational and productive in the terms of Massive Resistance. In the 
case just cited, it is obvious that the information they acted on was not correct, and 
their conduct was counterproductive. 
By 1962, the Councils had largely lost influence, their relations to local state 
apparatuses weakened. Some resorted to headline-grabbing stunts such as ‘Reverse 
Freedom Rides’ in which Southern blacks were invited to emigrate to the North, but 
these were desperate and ineffectual measures. However, the anticommunist struggle 
was continued by other organisations and tendencies, from the John Birch Society to 
the Christian Right. The Committee for Segregation in Georgia in 1963 produced a 
leaflet detailing the plan “backed by the communists and socialists” for “total 
integration to the point of intermarriage”. It identified the origins of the plot in the 
writings of former CPUSA chair, William Z Foster, and hinted that the Kennedy 
brothers, being “ultra-liberals,” had adopted most of this programme. The Rev. Billy 
James Hargis became one of many leading ‘authorities’ in the South on the 
Communist conspiracy, which he said was trying to set blacks against whites – 
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singling out “leftist negro ministers” and Martin Luther King Jr. As the “chief 
agitator” with a “communist front record”. (Webb, 2004; Anti-Defamation League, 
1962; Montgomery Advertiser, 1963; Committee for Segregation, 1963; Clark, 1976: 
129-130) 
This, then, was the ‘respectable,’ middle class leadership of the Massive 
Resistance movement. But it also acquired an another, relatively autonomous 
parapolitical wing, in the tradition of America’s Ku Klux Klans. 
“Klankraft”: the ‘parapolitical’ dimension. 
 “Black power and civil rights are not the true issues in America today. They are 
taken-for-granted means of the international communist conspiracy spreading 
frustration, animosity and ill will.” Robert Shelton, Imperial Wizard of the United 
Klans of America, August 1966 (Cunningham, 2013: 3-4) 
“The Communists Love Me This I Know, for Martin Luther King Tells Me So”. – 
Ku Klux Klan parody, ’Rules for Conduct in Sit-in Demonstrations’ (Georgia 
KKK, 1963) 
 The first Brown decision, apart from precipitating the emergence of the Citizens’ 
Councils, acted as a catalyst for the revival of the Ku Klux Klan. As white 
Southerners stocked up on guns in preparation for a coming civil war, new Klans 
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were launched. The year after the launch of the first Citizens’ Council, in October 
1955, the North Alabama Citizens’ Council broke ranks under the leadership of the 
politician, former Navy soldier, and western novelist Asa Carter, before evolving into 
The Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. Carter had made a name for himself 
attacking rock music, bearing a sign that said: “BE-BOP PROMOTES 
COMMUNISM”. And in the same month as Carter’s break, the U.S. Klans, Knights 
of the Ku Klux Klans, Inc., was launched by an automobile sprayer from Atlanta, 
Georgia named Eldon Edwards. The U.S. Klans was to be the dominant Klan 
organisation in the coming decade, alongside the United Klans of America which, 
after launching in Alabama in 1961 built a powerful presence in North Carolina, and 
identified itself first and foremost as an anticommunist fighting organisation. 
(Newton, 2014: 103-108; Cunningham, 2013; Chalmers, 2007: Loc. 6257) 
!  




Figure 5. ‘Join A Local Unit Now’. United Klans of America membership card, 
verso. (196-?) 
 This revived a long tradition of paramilitary terror in the US, originating with the 
post-Civil War Klans initiated by former Confederate soldiers, and surging in waves 
at critical moments when white supremacy was endangered. Klans were secret 
fraternal organisations dedicated to the combination of public spectacles and 
paramilitary actions against African Americans and their white allies who challenged 
white supremacy. In their original incarnation as apparatuses of counter-
Reconstruction, they were rooted in defeated Southern planters and merchants, linked 
to the Democratic Party, profoundly undemocratic in ideology, and aimed against 
“the unprecedented spectacle of a state in which the Government is arrayed against 
property”. Beginning in locales of strength beyond the Black Belt, their modes of 
terror drew upon Southern traditions of political violence, from slave patrols to 
lynchings. Initially rooted among the propertied, its base began to shift from “the 
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better citizens” to “the pore no’count white trash”.  Meanwhile, they were cohered 23
in part by a secretive, ritualised culture drawing on traditions of other fraternal 
organisations, such as the Freemasons. The Klans were able to effectively terrorise 
the South, up to and including the initiation of military insurgencies, and ultimately 
were only defeated by the deployment of Federal troops. Yet the tempo of their 
struggle also abated due in part to the retreat of Reconstruction, and the de-
radicalisation of local states. When white-supremacy was re-asserted in the form of 
Jim Crow, waves of similar violence were instrumental in its success. (Foner, 1980: 
147-149; Foner, 2008: 576; Roediger, 2008: 110-116; Newton, 2010: 11-12; Foner, 
2008: 576-577; Schaefer, 1971)  
 The basis for the second Klan insurgency, begun with in 1915, signalled by the 
dissemination of the pro-Klan film, D W Griffiths’ Birth of a Nation, was laid in this 
period. There had been, since the late nineteenth century, a reaction against racial 
equality, a turn to a new nationalism, and a drive to legitimise the South’s return to 
white-supremacy in the context of a virulent anti-immigrant politics nationally, and 
new colonial policy launched from Washington. Presidents from Taft to Wilson gave 
expression to the new dispensations. The terrain was thus well-prepared for a national 
revival of the Klan. (Woodward, 1966: 70; Logan, 1954: 96; Taft, 1908; Allerfeldt, 
 Du Bois wrote of the Klan’s popular appeal, and ability to galvanise mobs: “Back of the 23
writhing, yelling, cruel-eyed demons who break, destroy, maim and lynch and burn at the 
stake, is a knot, large or small, of normal human beings, and these human beings at heart are 
desperately afraid of something. Of what? Of many things, but usually of losing their jobs, 
being declassed, degraded, or actually disgraced; of losing their hopes, their savings, their 
plans for their children; of the actual pangs of hunger, of dirt, of crime. And of all this, most 
ubiquitous in modern industrial society is that fear of unemployment. It is its nucleus of 
ordinary men that continually gives the mob its initial and awful impetus. Around this nucleus, 
to be sure, gather snowball-wise all manner of flotsam, filth and human garbage”. (Du Bois, 
1935: 678)
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2006: 162) As McLean (1994: xv) put it, “the Klan of this era was both effect and 
cause of the reconciliation of North and South.” Like the first Klan, the second had 
roots in the South’s tradition of fraternal organisations. Its founder, Colonel William 
Joseph Simmons, was a member of the Woodmen of the World, the Freemasons, the 
Knights of Pythias, and the Odd Fellows. The ‘Klankraft,’ denoting a religious order 
and way of life and solidarity among members, signified by insignia and regalia, were 
similar, with the important addition of the motif of the ‘fiery cross’ introduced in 
Thomas Dixon Jr’s The Clansman, which became the basis for Griffiths’s film. 
(Newton, 2014: 19; Wade, 1998: 183)  
 The second Klan, however, had a different purpose, and extended well beyond the 
states of the South. In the context of a post-war radicalism on the one hand, and 
nativist, racist reaction on the other, the Klan articulated the nationalism, the white-
supremacism, and the Protestant, patriarchal morality characteristic of “the broad 
middle of the nation’s class structure”. (McLean, 1994: xii) Another aspect of its 
mission – like that of other rightist vigilantes and nationalist groups such as the 
Minute Men – was to crush the spectre of ‘communism’ and other ‘foreign 
influences’ . How this threat manifested itself in Klan ideology was primarily in the 24
 “The purpose of the Klan is to capitalize love – to promote goodwill and the spirit of 24
kindness. In opposing to the uttermost the wrongs and evils which are the root causes of the 
woes of humanity, the Klan may seem, to the uninitiated, to be narrowly sectarian, but this is 
not true; its policy is generous, its viewpoint broad and liberal, its tolerance unmeasured, but it 
strikes without mercy or compromise at the pernicious foreign influences which are 
undermining liberty and seeking to dominate American institutions.” Imperial Knight-Hawk, 
16th May 1923 (McVeigh, 2009: 196)
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form of two types of class threat – one of labour militancy , the other of the 25
concentration and centralisation of capital as monopoly. Each menaced the classic 
liberal conception of property, and more particularly the property interests of the 
Klan’s middle class base. Discursively, communism came to signify “all the levelling 
influences Klansmen perceived in the contemporary world”. In 1921, the second Klan 
exploded onto the national scene thanks to a Congressional investigation which gave 
Simmons a platform to air his “100% Americanism” while ultimately taking no 
action against him. By 1925, the Klan had grown from 85,000 members to an 
estimated 5 million, and involved itself in the electoral politics of both Democrats 
and Republicans. (Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 1923; MacLean, 1994: 78, 79, 82; 
Cunningham, 2013: 24-25; Lewis, 2013)  
 The civil rights era Klans were continuous in some respects with their forebears. 
Certainly, the specific articulation of white-supremacism and Protestantism 
inaugurated by Simmons were carried on in the new formations. They were 
ideologically as centred on anticommunism as the 1920s Klan, and as localised in the 
South than the Klan of the 1860s. However, they were much less coherent and 
centralised than previous waves. They were based among wage workers, small 
businessmen and the new middle class residing chiefly in the white, urban areas of 
the southern Piedmont, unlike the more rural Black Belt-based members of the 
Citizens’ Councils. Ideologically, their members differed in their concerns about 
 “Out in California,” explained The Imperial Night-Hawk in May 1923, “the I. W. W.'s are 25
threatening armed revolution and sabotage against the lumber companies while in St. Joseph, 
Michigan trials of communists, it is proved that the Russian Soviet government still continues 
its attempt to forment [sic] revolution in America. So it looks as if there is a very real need for 
a hundred-per-cent-American organization after all.”
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Jews, bankers and hate figures such as the liberal Republican plutocrat Nelson 
Rockefeller, but they were united in the insecurity of their class position and relative 
privilege, which racial integration would threaten. One consequence of the 
fragmentation of the Klans, was a divergence in tactics. Eldon Edwards’s U.S. Klans 
was the best organised such outfit at the time of Brown I, but it was also the one least 
inclined to deploy night-riding tactics, whereas Asa Carter’s outfit was as 
belligerently violent as its founder. The violence of the Klans was not always 
effective. A breakaway from the U.S. Klans set up in North Carolina by Rev. James 
W Cole attempted to terrorise the Lumbee Indians of the town of Pembroke one 
evening in 1958, only to find itself surrounded by hundreds of armed Indians, and for 
Cole to end up in prison for incitement to riot. Nonetheless, a study jointly published 
in 1959 by the Friends Service Committee, the National Council of Churches of 
Christ and the Southern Regional Council documented hundreds of incidents of racist 
terror in the preceding years, including murders, stabbings, beatings, bombings, and 
shootings aimed at homes, schools, Jewish buildings and a YMCA. (Vander Zanden, 
1960; Chalmers, 2007: Loc. 6233-6264 & 6284-6410; Cunningham, 2013: 30-35) 
 One other point on which the new Klans differed from the previous wave was in 
their generally weaker and more regionally concentrated relationships to state power. 
The Klans were no longer a nationwide, mass phenomenon, and the balance of 
political forces at the Federal level had shifted drastically under the impact of Thirties 
radicalism and the war. Yet the regard in which the Klan was still held by elements 
within the state was illustrated starkly when the House Un-American Activities 
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Committee initially decided against investigating the Klan. HUAC member John 
Rankin remarked, “After all, the KKK is an old American institution.” Rankin 
dubbed an anti-lynching bill proposed by Truman “a bill to encourage rape”. The Ku 
Klux Klans even had friends in the upper chamber. Senator Bilbo, asked if he had 
been a member of the Klan, confessed that he was indeed a member of the 
Mississippi chapter. “No man can ever leave the Klan. … Once a Ku Klux, always a 
Ku Klux.” (Newton, 2010: 102-105) However, in the post-war era, with the Klans 
weak and marginal, and international press attention to Klan activity proved 
embarrassing for Washington. Eventually, the FBI’s Counterintelligence Programme, 
dubbed COINTELPRO, would be deployed against the Ku Klux Klan at the same 
time as it sought to disrupt the New Left. (Dudziak, 2000: 34; Cunningham, 2004) 
 There was, however, a long tradition of Klans having close ties to local 
authoritarian state apparatuses. Legal repression had often been outsourced to private 
firms and vigilantes, from mill-town strike-breaking to haut-Wilsonian 
anticommunism to anti-black lynch mobs.  Lynch mob violence was often organised 26
in response to an infraction of white-supremacy, blamed on a subversive conspiracy. 
A 1933 study on the South’s lynch mobs attributed them to the region’s “consuming 
fear of Communism”. During the second Klan, Nancy MacLean writes, police 
departments, courts and municipal governments were “rife with Klan members and 
sympathizers”. (MacLean, 1994: 18) For example, leading member Dr John Galen 
 During a post-war wave of lynching, Senator Theodore Bilbo urged his supporters not to “let 26
a single nigger vote”, hinting at “the best way to keep a nigger from voting”, something done 
“before the night of the election”, a reference which he assumed “red-blooded men” would 
understand.
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Locke enjoyed such good relations with the local political authorities that he was able 
to select the candidate for chief of police in Denver, Colorado. Klan ‘detectives’ were 
used as a subsidiary police force in Madison, Wisconsin, while the NAACP claimed 
that many Detroit policemen were Klan members. The paramilitary-style ‘punishment 
beating’ of a man for neglect of his family was deemed by the mayor and chief of 
police to be a “kindness to the man and his family” and a “blessing to the city of 
Gainesville”. In Richmond, Virginia, the chief of police lauded the patriotism of the 
Klan. Even at this stage, however, the relationship was complicated by the propensity 
of Klan members to engage in often violent criminal activity and sometimes by the 
violent anti-Klan resistance of local communities, which the police were often 
powerless to defend against. (MacLean, 1994: 35-36 & 50-51; Newton, 2010: 98, 99 
& 104; Chalmers, 2007: Loc. 2691, 3710, 4314, 4386, 4595, 4675-4702) 
 In the post-war era, this tradition persisted. For example, the Association of 
Georgia Klans acquired a long-standing Atlanta police officer and former head of the 
Georgia Bureau of Investigation as its leader in 1949. Local police chiefs, especially 
those in the still rural and less centralised states of the Deep South with large black 
populations, such as the notorious Bull Connor of Birmingham, Alabama, or Sheriff 
Julius Harper of Copiah County, Mississippi, were allied to the Klan. An example of 
police complicity is given by minister Ralph David Abernathy, a colleague of Martin 
Luther King, Jr.. During a stay at King’s house in Atlanta in January 1957, he 
received a phone call from his wife, Juanita, in Montgomery, Alabama. Their home 
had been bombed. While she was describing what had happened, a further blast was 
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heard in the distance. She asked an attending policeman what it was. The policeman, 
glancing at his watch, suggested, “That would be your First Baptist 
Church.” (Cunningham, 2013: 9-11, 15, 27 & 35, 38 & 42; Greenhaw, 2011: 33-34; 
Newton, 201: 105) 
 Even where it wasn’t a case of Klan violence supported by local legal/police 
networks, the presence of reactionary white power blocs in local states ensured that 
there was general tolerance of white-supremacist violence. For example, the 
murderers of Emmett Till walked free in large part because of the efforts of police 
chief Sheriff Clarence Strider to undermine the case, the voluntary labour of several 
white lawyers who worked to depict the entire case as an NAACP conspiracy, a 
defence effort funded by local white citizens, and ultimately the dispositions of an all-
white jury. In the aftermath, Sheriff Strider expostulated on television that if “all of 
those people” who had sent him “threatening letters” ever “come down here the same 
thing’s gonna happen to them that happened to Emmett Till.” (Newton, 2010: 
112-113) And even in those more industrialised and centralised states where local 
police forces were less imbricated with Klans, and were inclined to keep tabs on their 
activities, indulgence was often extended. Local police in North Carolina, for 
instance, could show tactic support for the United Klans of America by adopting a lax 
attitude to their activities, as they did for the greater part of their existence despite 
having informants in the group. Even where they claim to have taken Klan violence 
seriously, they also confessed to ignoring symbolic acts of terror such as cross-
burnings as they “didn’t really hurt anyone”. Such decisions were of critical 
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importance.  David Cunningham writes of the “central role played by police officials 
in shaping the klan’s fortunes and impact”. Where police forces did act to curtail the 
Klans, they were largely effective: only their “ambivalent and sometimes 
contradictory” pursuit of the Klans impeded their being shut down much more 
quickly. (Cunningham, 2013: 9-11, 15)  
 There was another, less direct sense in which the Klans were looped into the 
motive forces of state power. The dominant ideological theme of the Klans in the 
Sixties was the battle against communism. As Southern states capitulated, the Klans 
increasingly argued that behind the threat of integration were Jews and communists. 
Bob Kornegay of the United Klans of America was typical in arguing that the UKA 
“don’t hate the niggers, but we are afraid of Communists”. Klan leaders invoked J. 
Edgar Hoover to verify that: “the Communists are behind the race-mixing and 
agitation”. The Klans had been anticommunist since the 1920s, and had attacked 
organised labour in the Thirties as a communist-infiltrated insurgency. But here, their 
arguments were sustained and put into operation as repressive practices by an 
ensemble of state apparatuses  Ideologically, one thing distancing the Klan from the 
mainstream Right, was the emphasis they placed on antisemitism. While the place of 
Communism in Klan fantasies was identical with that of the Jews, so that one was 
indistinguishable from the other, mainstream anticommunists felt the need to enlist 
Judaism into Americanism. Yet even here, the Klan articulated in a direct and explicit 
way the common sense of Southern conservatism, as manifested in HUAC chair John 
Rankin’s antisemitic rants. Moreover, the basic fantasmatic framework identified in 
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the last chapter, in which African Americans are not agents of their own liberation but 
instruments of a subversive plot, provides a vital point of contact between the 
‘unacceptable’ ideology of the Ku Klux Klan, and that of official counter-subversion. 
(Cunningham, 2013: 142, 145; Herzog, 2011: 69; Michael, 2005: 141; Quarles, 1999: 
100-102)  
 In brief, the Klans of Massive Resistance were fragmented but not isolated. They 
were part of a wider stream of armed vigilantism, and acted as a paramilitary force 
within the movement which depended on the indulgence and connivance of state 
authorities. The involvement of elements of the state apparatuses, particularly those 
specialising in repression, in right-wing, counter-subversive social movements is 
common enough to merit some observations here. In Chapter Five, I have outlined an 
approach to the state which concentrates on the emergence of state formations as a 
form-determined condensation of the balance of political forces within a society. I 
stressed, alongside their centralised unity and hierarchised organisation, the necessary 
degree of fissiparousness and non-transparency of state apparatuses. What is 
evidenced here is that, particularly in weak and decentralised states with local 
traditions of vigilantism and lynchings, political forces organised around illicit codes 
of hierarchy and flows of information can colonise local state apparatuses without 
much friction. Where their actions are congruent with established ideological and 
political practices, and where they supplement the powers of the existing power bloc, 
they can be fused into the licit hierarchies through which their actions can be 
facilitated. This way of posing the problem avoids treating the Klan-police networks 
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as either the actions of a few bad apples, or as tools of a unified state project. They 
were as much part of a power struggle within state apparatuses as within the social 
formation organised by the state. 
 This nebulous space connecting and traversing institutionalised state power and 
civil society organisation is the parapolitical dimension of social movement action. 
And it is in this connection that the problem of anticommunism is posed most clearly.  
An anticommunist social movement: the place of parapolitics. 
 Undoubtedly, Massive Resistance was a social movement.  A movement which, 
just like civil rights, linked elements from diverse social classes in a complex “system 
of alliances” (Gramsci, 1971), a broad repertoire of tactics (including displays of 
‘WUNC’, parliamentary actions, civil resistance, legal challenges, and terror), and 
some “common nuclei of meaning” connecting political campaigns and organisations 
situated in distinct “ideological-articulatory domains”. (Laclau, 1977: 160-162) 
 And yet it was also necessarily far from ‘non-‘ or ‘extra-institutional’. Its 
operations spanned the wide arc of practices from the ‘private’ terrain of civil society, 
fraternal organisations, councils and media organisations to the ‘public’ ground of 
political machines, sovereignty commissions, investigative bureaus and governing 
coalitions – and insinuated somewhere in all of this is the problem of parapolitics, 
that is of illicit flows of information and authority wherein the state-civil society 
opposition crumbles. For the Klans, while their characteristic mode of operation is 
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parapolitical, were not alone in occupying this obscure space. As we have seen, 
Council activity also depended upon extending both licit and illicit tendrils into and 
around institutions of state power. By the same token, state power was enlarged and 
extended insofar as civil society and paramilitary forces acted to supplement the 
strategies of state actors. 
 This a mode of action which is particular to counter-subversive, right-wing social 
movements. In a situation of social crisis, it is characteristic of conservative and 
repressive forces to blame an external, anti-social force: ‘outsiders,’ ‘troublemakers,’ 
‘communists,’ ‘Jews,’ and so on. It is also typical for them to treat these forces as 
insidious, conspiratorial, masters-of-disguise. J. Edgar Hoover’s account of the 
communist menace in Masters of Deceit from 1958 outlines this logic: “The 
communist” may be “virtually invisible to the non-communist eye”, but nonetheless 
“he is in the market places of America: in organizations, on street corners, even at 
your front door. He is trying to influence and control your thoughts.” (Quoted, 
Melley, 2000: 2) The pervading fantasy of conservative and repressive political forces 
in such a situation is in the first instance total transparency, the better to ‘unmask’ the 
threat, and in the second instance total license, the better to neutralise it. Insofar as 
the flows of knowledge, resources and instructions necessary to such ends must reach 
behind the back of legitimate-illegitimate, licit-illicit, and legal-illegal behaviour, the 
parapolitical is a tendency inherent in this type of social movement. 
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Little Rock: classes, coalitions and state composition 
How could it be that the industrial capital of a ‘moderate’ border state became a 
frontier of Southern resistance to desegregation? How did a conspicuously Brown-
compliant state become one of the states to close all of its public schools for a year?  
When the Dixiecrats had mounted their revolt against Truman in 1948, Arkansas 
was one of their weakest states. The University of Arkansas had desegregated in 
1948, while several school districts didn’t wait until the second Brown ruling in 1956 
to begin desegregating. Governor Faubus’s predecessor, Francis Cherry, had stated 
blandly in response to Brown that: “Arkansas will obey the law”. When Faubus was 
elected governor in 1954, he was considered a leftist: Cherry had expended a great 
deal of effort trying to expose his ‘red’ roots, to little avail. With a small and 
historically disorganised African American population, Arkansas was not a prime 
candidate for frontline defiance, which tended to be localised in those areas where 
white residents feared being outnumbered and outvoted by black residents – the 
Black Belt. The Little Rock school board had met shortly after Brown and agreed to 
implement desegregation in a phased strategy beginning with the high schools, 
known as the Blossom Plan after the district superintendent Virgil Blossom. Attempts 
to kick-start a Massive Resistance movement had tended to flounder. The three 
Massive Resistance organisations in Arkansas – the Citizens Committee Representing 
Segregation in Hoxie Schools, White America, and the White Citizens’ Council of 
Arkansas – had faced local resistance when they attempted to agitate around school 
segregation. (Frederickson, 2001: 153-154; McMillen, 2007; Reed, 1997: 284; Kirk, 
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1997; Kirk, 1999: 57) So why did everything change with Central High? The answer 
lies in part in the way that class formations and the changing composition of the state 
structured the developing civil rights struggle and resistance in Arkansas, and in part 
in the way in which it was affected by the tempo of struggles within the federal state 
apparatuses.  
The early bases of resistance to desegregation in Arkansas tended to be in the 
Delta. Part of the Mississippi River Alluvial Plain, and similar in many respects to the 
Mississippi Delta, this area was an expansive, rural, cotton-rich region in the east of 
the state, dominated by white planter-capital, with black sharecroppers at the bottom 
of the pyramid producing the agricultural surplus. The region has historically been 
considered ‘the deepest of the deep South’. Rural class relations, based on the 
plantation system, were protected against challenge through terror. The Delta had 
been the site of one of the twentieth century’s worst racist outbursts, the Elaine 
massacre during the race riots and lynchings of 1919, in which approximately two 
hundred African Americans were murdered. The immediate spur of the massacre was 
a moment of racialised class violence. Black sharecroppers, organising for a better 
price for their product from white planters, were meeting under armed guard to 
prevent white vigilante attacks. The arrival of white law officials resulted in a 
gunfight in which one of the officials was killed. This was interpreted as the 
beginning of a ‘Negro uprising’.  It prompted hundreds of whites to assemble in 27
 Insofar as this involved fantasies of blacks plotting to massacre whites, this can be 27
considered an example of the guilt projection discussed in the chapter on ‘Discourse’. Yet there 
is no doubt that a new politicised black movement was emerging, which threatened white-
supremacy.
 347
mobs – ultimately augmented by federal troops – to hunt and kill African Americans. 
(Whayne & Gatewood, 1993; Stockley, 2001; Krugler, 2015)  
Yet, by the post-war period, Arkansas was changing rapidly. The same crisis 
tendencies which were working themselves out across the Southern economy (see 
Chapter Four) were producing a sharp fall in profitability for the Arkansas planters. 
Mechanisation, saving labour costs, was one response had combined with the 
Depression, and the debt crises of farmers to produce an exodus of black workers 
from the rural areas to the cities. The loss of low cost labour was partially staunched 
by wartime planning and federal support. But in the post-war economy, its rate was 
sufficient to cause a terminal crisis of the plantation system, and exacerbated the 
impoverishment of those workers who remained. (Wayne & Gatewood, 1993: 22; 
Woodruff, 1990; McMillen, 1971) 
Nonetheless, the Delta was still more populated by black workers than any other 
part of the state, incorporating large areas of the South’s ‘Black Belt’. These were the 
areas where the white population was most frightened of ‘racial amalgamation’. So it 
was that despite moves to desegregate in other areas of the state, in the Arkansas 
Delta there were few attempts to integrate the student body, and such attempts as 
were implemented met protests. This began in 1955 as the ramifications of Brown I 
fed into local decisions. In March, in the Black Belt county of Pine Bluff, a group 
named White America Inc. arose under the leadership of a local railroad official, L D 
Poynter, to protest desegregation. The group’s leading spokesperson was a lawyer 
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named Amis Guthridge, who would go on to play a critical role in the state-wide 
Massive Resistance efforts. White America was, however, largely ineffectual until 
July when, in a small and overwhelmingly white village in the Delta part of Lawrence 
county, named Hoxie, school desegregation had been successful enough to gain 
national mediation. This prompted the local soybean farmer, Herbert Brewer, to co-
found the Citizens Committee Representing Segregation in Hoxie Schools. 
(McMillen, 2007; Kirk, 1999: 65-66) Although the campaign was unable to mobilise 
more than a minority, it agitated sufficiently to cause the school board to suspend 
classes two weeks early, and engaged in such persistent disruption that the school 
board eventually achieved a permanent court order preventing them from interfering 
in school business. (Lewis, 2008: 8) A more successful campaign was later launched 
in a Delta school district named Sheridan. The subsequent protest from white parents 
resulted in an immediate reversal of the decision, and subsequent resignations from 
the school board. (Kirk, 1999: 58) This does not mean that segregationist agitators 
were necessarily always welcome in the Delta. In Star City, the attempt by the White 
Citizens’ Council to organise a rally to oppose desegregation was blocked after local 
white citizens petitioned against it. (McMillen, 2007: 128) Nor does it mean that 
resistance was exclusive to the Delta region. One of the most significant 
organisations to be founded, in September 1955, was the White Citizens’ Council of 
Arkansas, initiated by former state senator Jim Johnson in the central county of Hot 
Springs, in part building a base for a gubernatorial challenge. It does, however, mean 
that the “common matrix of contradictions” (Castells, 1983: 49) underlying the fabric 
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of the rural Delta and increasingly parts of the capital, skewed the geography of 
resistance. 
Importantly, Little Rock was close enough to these Delta areas that, as workers 
migrated from the crisis-ridden rural geo-economy, new socio-demographic dynamics 
began to change a previously tightly segregated city. Thus, for example, the south and 
east of the city closest to the Delta were also the working class areas with the highest 
black populations. (Williams, 1997) And in the post-war period, for the first time, 
black Arkansans started to become organised. Poor blacks in the east of Little Rock 
were the targeted demographic for the East End Civic League campaign, while 
veterans from the war who were determined to gain full citizenship founded the 
Veterans Good Government Association. The NAACP, which had previously 
neglected the state, was given new life by militant activists such as Daisy Bates. The 
campaigns began to accumulate small, symbolic victories, such as desegregating the 
Library – gains made easier by the state leadership’s desire to avoid federal 
intervention. Most significantly, with the Bates leadership, the NAACP pushed for 
and won the principle that black candidates could not be excluded from Democratic 
Party primaries, and forced the University of Arkansas to accept its first black student 
since Reconstruction. (Kirk, 1997) As such, while the earliest signs of local Massive 
Resistance backlash were to be found in the rural Delta areas, the civil rights 
movement quickly established the capital as the key battleground. Massive 
Resistance, being a counter-subversive movement, tended to follow the patterns 
established by the civil rights movement. Where African Americans were 
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demographically weak and politically disorganised, the support for Massive 
Resistance strategies was limited. To the extent that they enjoyed success and seemed 
to genuinely threaten the segregated structure, Massive Resistance made advances.  
The key year signalling the acceleration of this dynamic in Little Rock was 1956. 
The NAACP had, having attempted to reach agreement with the Little Rock school 
board, concluded that its stance was effectively obstructionist, and that minimum 
compliance was a means of staving off desegregation rather than implementing it. As 
such, they initiated a legal process, taking on Little Rock school district for having 
barred entry to white schools for 33 black students. The first decision in the case, of 
Aaron v Cooper in August 1956, was a victory for the school board, whose plans 
were considered prompt and reasonable. An appeal was rejected in April 1957. 
However, this outcome had by no means been guaranteed and was susceptible to 
reversal (as indeed it was effectively reversed in the 1958 Cooper v Aaron ruling). 
The failure of the case had resulted chiefly from the fact that the NAACP had argued 
against the principle of “with all deliberate speed,” which the Blossom Plan upheld, 
whereas successful NAACP cases had been won on the basis of concrete. State-wide 
developments suggested that change was still underway, as four school districts drew 
up plans to desegregate in September 1957. Public transport had already been 
desegregated in several municipalities. And there were many for whom even the slow 
pace of change allowed by Blossom was already too much, and the prospect of 
acceleration induced profound anxiety. The NAACP’s action had demonstrated that 
African Americans were organised and that the balance of legal forces, even if the 
 351
letter of the law was not always interpreted in their favour, at least favoured some 
degree of integration. (Kirk, 1999: 67-68) These developments encouraged the 
unification of Massive Resistance efforts. In September 1956, the main organisations 
joined under the rubric of the Association of Citizens’ Councils of Arkansas. Even 
unified, they were lacking in resources, numbers and even a publication. Perhaps the 
largest and most vibrant group within the Association was the Capital Citizens’ 
Council based in Little Rock, originally an offshoot of White America, Inc., and it 
had at most 500 members, of whom 200 were not based in the city. And their 
demonstrations, though noisy, were small. (McMillen, 2007; Kirk, 1999: 66) 
Nonetheless, the nucleus of a resistance movement had been formed, linking forces in 
the capital to those in the rural Delta. 
The second decisive factor was the regional solidarity summoned by Brown, and 
the consolidation of a broad Southern front both at the federal and state levels. The 
subsequent string of successes for segregationist candidates across the South 
maximised the leverage of the southern caucus in the Senate, and put pressure on 
‘moderate’ administrations. Massive Resistance strategies in the federal government 
were conducted on the basis that the North was once again on the march to subdue 
the South. Such had been the persistent drumbeat in the period leading up to the Little 
Rock crisis. The Southern Manifesto (1956) issued by Southern congresspersons in 
March 1956, deploying just these thematics, enjoined resistance by all lawful means. 
It was unclear, at this stage, precisely what ‘lawful means’ might include, although 
already Georgia was readying the privatisation of schools. The Eisenhower 
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administration’s attempt to press ahead with moderate civil rights legislation, in the 
form of a bill launched in April 1956 known as H.R. 6127 was regarded, in the words 
of Virginia Senator Harry Byrd, as a humiliation of the South for the sake of 
“collecting Negro votes”.(Finley, 2003: 180) Among the bill’s provisions were Title 
III, allowing the Attorney General to deploy federal troops in order to enforce 
compliance with civil rights laws – which would, Georgia Senator Richard Russell 
complained, “place black heels on white necks” (Finley, 2003: 201) – and Title IV, 
which authorised the Attorney General to institute civil actions in the name of the 
United States government to remedy denial of suffrage, thus ensuring that such cases 
would not be tried by white Southern juries. The southern caucus in the Senate, 
knowing it could not defeat the legislation, acted effectively to blunt its edge by 
removing the, for them, problematic aspects of Titles III and IV. They did not foresee, 
in doing so, that Eisenhower already had the legal right to deploy federal troops. 
As Southern states began shifting to the Right, partially under electoral pressure, 
and initiated a range of strategies intended to help circumvent or defy the Brown 
ruling, Faubus was perceived as the weak link in the chain. He faced the contumely 
of local Massive Resistance groups, and criticism from other Southern Democrats. By 
the summer of 1957, they were using their position to intervene against Faubus and 
support local Massive Resistance efforts. Decisive in this context was the Georgia 
Governor Marvin Griffin and former Georgia house speaker Roy Harris, who spoke 
at a meeting of the Capital Citizens’ Council and let locals know that Georgia would 
not meekly comply with a court order to desegregate. (McMillen, 2007: 133) Faubus 
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had come to office as a New Deal liberal and a ‘moderate’ on race. For some of his 
segregationist opponents, this meant he was both a “rampant integrationist” and 
concomitantly a “communist” (Reed, 1999: 90-91) In fact, Faubus owed his victory 
in large degree to the AFL-CIO’s mobilisation of a biracial working class campaign, 
and pledged to support the agenda of organised labour, including the abolition of the 
poll tax. (Pierce, 2009) He had carefully cultivated black voters, appointed African 
Americans to the state Democratic central committee, and refused to intervene in the 
Hoxie battle to defend segregated schools. He was reviled by Massive Resistance 
groups precisely because his line of peaceful compliance with desegregation set an 
example which countered that of other state leaders, and because it weakened the 
solidity of the Southern front. (McMillen, 2007) 
The third factor in the breakthrough for the segregationist coalition in Little Rock 
was the class dimension which was inscribed in the state administration’s business-
friendly development strategies, and concomitantly its education policies. The 
Blossom Plan for responding to Brown, involving minimum compliance the court’s 
decision, was structured by precisely these class divisions. The superintendent had 
moved slowly, with a view to alighting on a plan that would be acceptable to Little 
Rock elites. He waited until 1956, after the second Brown decision had qualified the 
first with the phrase “with all deliberate speed,” before articulating his plan of 
minimum compliance. While canvassing opinion, he spent most of his time wooing 
capitalists and professionals who resided in the wealthier north-west, ensuring their 
cooperation. He had planned for compliance to begin in 1957, after a new high school 
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had been built in the wealthy west end of town, servicing the rich and politically 
dominant fifth ward. (Jacoway, 1982: 21) This meant that Central High would service 
exclusively working-class neighbourhoods, while the new high school would not 
have to worry about integration. (Kirk, 1999: 69-70). Blossom was distrusted by civil 
rights leaders (Jacoway, 1976) and by Massive Resistance figures. The distrust 
among working class whites in the city was made worse by the perception – 
inaccurate but potent (Williams, 1997) – that the new schools being built in the 
wealthier areas were intended to further shield the rich from integration. 
 This meant that, whereas in previous episodes of Massive Resistance agitation the 
protests had been mounted by middle class notables, in this case there was a large, 
conservative and segregationist contingent of white workers who were outraged and 
ready to join the political battle. The school board, largely elected by middle class 
constituents, appeared to be oblivious of the growing sentiment. The elections to the 
school board that summer saw the success of ‘moderate’ candidates aligned to the 
Blossom Plan. The school board was aware that its plan was opposed by the NAACP 
as too minimal, but was convinced that the Blossom Plan would be implemented with 
the governor’s support. (Jacoway, 1982: 21-22; Hampton & Fayer, 1995: 37-38) 
Faubus, however, had been subtly adjusting his stance in response to the opposition 
for some time. In public, he cleaved to ‘law and order’, endorsing integration right up 
until the beginning of September 1957, but he also began to drop ints that he would 
The account of Representative Brooks Hays, a racial ‘moderate’ with a track record 
of negotiating compromises, held that decisive for Faubus’s reversal was the 
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resonance that he feared the criticisms from Southern leaders were were finding 
among Arkansas whites. He believed that the “overwhelming sentiment” in both 
Little Rock and the wider state was against the integration of the school. Increasingly, 
he complained of a lack of public support form the business class in winning a 
consensus for ‘moderation’. “His political future might well be at stake” if he did not 
pursue a similar course to that of hardline segregationists in other states. (Hays, 1959) 
Thus it was that on 4th September, as the new school year began, Faubus deployed 
National Guards to prevent compliance with the court ordered desegregation of 
Central High. 
 The fourth decisive factor in enabling a Massive Resistance movement to cohere 
was the recomposition of the state apparatus, and the enabling role of anticommunism 
in securing this. Despite the successful crushing of this momentary insurgency on the 
part of the Arkansas governor by President Eisenhower, and despite the considerable 
opposition to Faubus’s posture from relatively progressive forces, including teaching 
professionals and the Arkansas Gazette, the balance of political forces within the state 
shifted decisively to the Right. This inaugurated a period of more entrenched and 
bitter Massive Resistance, which has often been overlooked. (Gordy, 2009) Faubus’s 
move to the right, embracing a populist combination of measures to favour the poor 
and anti-union, segregationist politics (Pierce, 2009), began to be visible in 1956, just 
as former Governor Francis Cherry’s campaigner, Jim Johnson, was building an 
effective base through his leadership of the Arkansas White Citizens’ Council. At the 
beginning of the year, Faubus had told the New York Times that according to his own 
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polling, some 85% of Arkansans were against school desegregation. He was 
unwilling, as a result, to “be party to any attempt to force acceptance of a change to 
which the people are so overwhelmingly opposed.” In fact, the figures were taken 
from an unrepresentative poll of people in eastern Arkansas, where opposition was 
strongest, but the Governor used it as a basis for beginning a shift toward resistance. 
Faubus and Johnson nonetheless began to compete for the segregationist vote. The 
Association of Citizens Councils of Arkansas reported approvingly on the 
suggestions from both Johnson and Faubus, exhorting the General Assembly to 
oppose desegregation, proposing an amendment to the US Constitution preventing 
the exercise of federal power over public schools, and tacitly allowing school boards 
final legal authority to impose segregation. (Kirk, 1999: 66-67; Association of 
Citizens’ Councils of Arkansas, 1956)  
 In their earliest manifestations, and unlike the Citizens’ Councils of the Deeper 
South, Massive Resistance groups in Arkansas did not foreground the battle against 
communism. Their most persistent and vociferously expressed argument was that the 
integration of schools was – as Jim Johnson claimed, using a faked tape of an 
NAACP speech to illustrate his point – the means to “integration in the white 
bedroom”. It was the threat of ‘miscegenation’, often portrayed as the corruption of 
white daughters, which galvanised the earliest activities of white parents against 
integration. In the softer public relations spiel, integration was depicted as a worthy 
but wholly misguided effort to abolish the entire structure of segregation, against 
human nature, and against the interests of “the Southern Negro” who was “the one 
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who will be blown away” by the “racial dynamite” being deployed. (McMillen, 2007: 
128; White Citizens Council, 1955; White Citizens’ Council, 1956) It was in this case 
the reorganisation of the state which put anticommunist teeth on the movement. 
While to the outside world, Faubus’s tilt only became visible after Little Rock, the 
organisation of elements within the state for a counter-subversive thrust against civil 
rights, with anticommunism providing its sharp edge, was apparent in the months 
before. The Attorney General, Bruce Bennett, had been elected in 1956 on a 
segregationist ticket. He was the most active red-hunter in the state, and was 
grooming himself as a potential successor to Faubus. By the spring of 1957, he had 
already persuaded the Governor to sign off on a State Sovereignty Commission, a 
mini-HUAC which was to engage in investigations of civil rights leaders and expose 
‘communism’. In March, Artie Gregory, senator for Pulaski county, attempted to 
introduce a bill to root out ‘subversives’ in the teaching profession. Faubus vetoed it, 
but it made a comeback the following year. By August, the Arkansas General 
Assembly had already implemented a series of measures intended to help obstruct 
desegregation.  (Woods, 1997; Woods, 2004: 72-73; Gordy, 2009: 99) 
 The shift, decisively entrenched by the governor’s intervention at Central High, 
was further consolidated in the Extraordinary Session of the legislature held in 1958, 
which resulted in the passing of the bills, Act 10 and Act 115, which among other 
measures implemented state senator Artie Gregory’s law targeting ‘subversives’, 
required that state employees declare their political affiliations, and prevented 
NAACP members from being employed by the government. Governor Faubus, 
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having previously vetoed Gregory’s bill on the grounds that it was impossible to force 
people to become “patriots” by legal diktat, performed a full volte face on this after 
Little Rock, when he embraced a “blend of coded white supremacy and 
McCarthyism”. Having been red-baited by his predecessor for, among other things, 
his attendance at Commonwealth College, designated by the US Justice Department 
as a communist front, he became a leading Southern red-baiter. Reaching out to state 
conservatives, including Massive Resistance groups such as the Capital Citizens’ 
Council, he sought to solidify his re-election campaign by calling an Extraordinary 
Session of the legislature to pass a series of measures aimed at obstructing 
integration, and outlawing civil rights tactics such as sit-ins. (Woods, 1997; Woods, 
2004: 72-73) 
 It was the appearance of a successful black political leadership which the rulers of 
Little Rock understood to be the most palpable evidence of communist conspiracy. 
During the legislative hearings, Bennett suggested that Little Rock had long been one 
of a number of “predetermined trouble areas” identified by the Communist Party “to 
be developed for trouble purposes”. He argued that: “from 1928 to 1958 an intensive 
communist conspiracy climaxed in Little Rock”. While leading black activists such as 
Thurgood Marshall and Daisy Bates were identified as among those having “an 
almost incredible tie-in with Communist and Communist front organizations,” 
Bennett stipulated that the point of such trouble-making was to “attract and use the 
Negro – not to help the Negro”.  Key witnesses also suggested that several 
educational institutions, up to and including the University of Arkansas, had been 
 359
penetrated by communist conspirators, while civil rights groups such as the Southern 
Regional Council, and activists such as Lee and Grace Lorch, were identified as 
having ties to communism. Beyond the hearings, leading state politicians began to 
bang the anticommunist drum. State Council leader James Johnson asserted that there 
was an “active Communist cell” pulling the strings throughout the Little Rock crisis 
and that he would even produce the “card numbers” of “Communist Organizers”. 
(Dudziak, 2000: 124-125; Woods, 126-127; McMillen, 2007: 128) 
 Communism was positioned, then, not as a comprehensible politics of black 
resistance to segregation, but as a racially obscure ‘outside’ element of which blacks 
are the unfortunate instruments. As we have seen in the previous chapter, such 
arguments are structured around a kernel of white-supremacist fantasy, in which the 
impossibility of the desire for limitless, lawless enjoyment of and disposal of black 
lives is symptomatically embodied by communism. Yet the major target of the new 
laws was not the Communist Party, but the NAACP: they, the Massive Resistance 
right argued, were subversives who posed a security threat. It was their members who 
were first priority in being denied state employment. (Woods, 2004: 74-77) With the 
local state deploying anticommunist techniques to break up the civil rights 
movement, the Massive Resistance organisations began to echo the same concerns. In 
October 1957, Reverend Wesley Pruden of the Capital Citizens’ Council placed in 
advertisement in the local newspapers asking “Can a Christian be a Segregationist?” 
He answered: “Race-mixing in our schools is a Communist doctrine. … Segregation 
has Christian sanction, integration is Communistic.” (Goddard, 2004) What was 
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specifically ‘Communistic’ about integration was that it threatened the destroy the 
southern way of life and produce a deep racial impoverishment, “mongrelization”. 
The CCC, following the lead set by the Attorney General, the governor and the 
general assembly, began to make assiduous efforts to link the NAACP and 
desegregation to communism. The more that the state administration’s repressive 
policies, particularly the purge of ‘subversives’ in the teaching profession, provoked 
civil society opposition, the more the Massive Resistance groups had recourse to 
anticommunism – all those opposed to the purge were nothing other than “left-
wingers”, “fellow travellers” and “Communists”. Even the mild business opposition 
from the Little Rock Chambers of Commerce was put down to their being 
“communist fronters”. (McMillen, 2007: 137 & 139-140; Jacoway, 2007: 274) Such 
indiscriminate charges seem crude, but aside from the fantasmatic kernel which 
enables such discourses to persist, they perform a useful function in enabling the 
counter-transformist, reactionary social movement to function. 
 Ultimately, judged in terms of its avowed goals, the Massive Resistance 
movement in Arkansas was a failure. It did not prevent desegregation, and even 
Faubus’s move, modelled on similar proposals in neighbouring states such as 
Georgia, of closing the public schools for a year in 1958-59 rather than allowing them 
to be integrated, was soon overcome by federal legal intervention. Ultimately, 
although the opposition within Arkansas to Faubus’s extreme move was widespread 
and significant, the balance of political forces within the central, federal state was 
determinant. (See Chapter Five). However, what had begun as some scattered 
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fragments of embattled resistance, had fused into a powerful social movement, 
linking elements of the ‘white working class’ to some well-placed state elites and 
businessmen through the articulating leadership of a core of middle class notables 
using the techniques and resources of middle class protest movements. The geo-
economic and class dimensions of the struggle had worked to their advantage at key 
moments, and had helped to shift the balance of class and political forces condensed 
within the local state apparatus from a cautiously centrist position to the hard 
segregationist right.  
 Anticommunism had worked, not in the initial framing of the struggle, but in 
giving it a precise fantasmatic projection against which the aggression of the social 
movements and the state could be directed, in articulating efforts within and beyond 
the state apparatuses, and in providing a repertoire of political practices and 
significations through which the civil rights coalition could be weakened, divided and 
placed on the defensive. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Social Movements II: Civil Rights, Communism and Anticommunism. 
This chapter concludes the substantial core of the thesis, by examining the role of 
anticommunism in dividing, disrupting and disorganising the civil rights movement at 
key points. It addresses directly the ongoing problem which is usually confronted in 
an historiographical register, but which has been the problem addressed in this 
research in a sociological register: did Cold War anticommunism do more to advance 
the cause of civil rights, by providing an unprecedented political opportunity 
structure, or restrain its development, by disabling its most committed and precocious 
organisational expressions? Here I use the sociology of social movements already 
developed in the previous chapter to draw out and evaluate what I regard as the 
underlying assumptions of the historical debate. Ultimately, I contend that 
anticommunism worked in the period from 1945 to 1954 to disrupt and roll back an 
incipient civil rights movement. I argue that the Communist-led elements of the civil 
rights struggle, however problematic the politics of the Communist Party in relation 
to civil rights, cannot be segmented off and reduced to the influence of the ‘long arm 
of Moscow’ or even the imperatives of the party leadership, but had similar socio-
structural origins to the remainder of the civil rights movement. I argue that 
anticommunism was then redeployed, with some limited success for a period of time, 
against the new Southern civil rights movement emerging from Montgomery, before 
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the breakdown of the national anticommunist consensus and the effective 
neutralisation of anticommunist legislation enabled a successful civil rights upsurge, 
driving the anticommunist hold-outs back to a few core, Deep South states. I 
conclude by examining these dynamics in relation to the movements in Montgomery, 
and Selma. 
Civil rights: the long and the short of it. 
Thus far, this research has focused on the extent to which anticommunism enabled 
the cohesion and co-ordination of responses to civil rights.  Anticommunism, I have 
argued, was more strongly a factor in the unity and preservation of the Jim Crow 
coalition, as it began to come under attack, than it was a solvent. Yet what is the 
relationship between the civil rights struggle, and anticommunism?  
As far as Southern segregationists were concerned, civil rights was not a real 
issue, but a trojan horse for communists intent on weakening the American polity for 
ultimate downfall. Yet many leading civil rights organisations vehemently rejected 
this association. The NAACP, for example, adopted a strongly anticommunist 
liberalism. In doing so, it broke with the communist Paul Robeson, purged one of its 
founding members W. E. B. Du Bois who was at this stage a ‘fellow traveler’, and 
adopted measures to neutralise any influence of communism in their own 
organisation. Leaders of organisations from the National Urban League to CORE 
vociferously exonerated themselves of any connection to communism. (Horne, 2010: 
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154-155; Berg, 2007; Lieberman, 2005: 9-11 & 30) The dominant discourse of 
mainstream civil rights organisations attempted to exploit the democratic elements of 
American anticommunist nationalism. Martin Luther King Jr. argued in 1955 that: “If 
we were incarcerated behind the iron curtains of a communistic nation – we couldn’t 
do this. … We are here because of our love for democracy”. (Quoted, Laville & 
Lucas, 1996: 568) 
Did the anticommunism of civil rights organisations harm their ability to organise 
Much in this argument appears to depend on the framing of civil rights. In broad and 
schematic terms, the debate ranges between the ‘Montgomery to Memphis’ 
timeframe, and the ‘Long Civil Rights Movement’ timeframe. The earlier frame is 
‘King-centric’, in that it focuses on the period of Martin Luther King Jr’s prominence 
in the movement from 1955 to his assassination in 1968, while the latter adverts to a 
deeper social-structural logic, lasting roughly from 1930 to 1970. The earlier focuses 
on the spontaneous, discontinuous emergence of civil rights as a national movement 
in 1954, and attributes its successes largely to communicative, ‘non-violent’ means. 
The latter embeds civil rights in a process of black mobilisation which is always 
necessarily local rather than straightforwardly ‘national’, in which civil rights is 
continuous with black power, and in which there is a diversity of complementary 
tactics ranging from non-violence to armed self-defence. (Kirk, 2004; Fairclough, 
1990; Lawson, 1991; McAdam, 1982; Hall, J. D., 2005; Cobb, Jr., 2014; Korstad & 
Lichtenstein, 1988; Bloom, 1987; Theoharris & Woodard, 2001; Cha-Jua & Lang, 
2007)  
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The ‘Long Civil Rights Movement’ timeframe has the advantage, for this research, 
that it is consistent with the temporalities already described earlier in the thesis 
(Chapters Four and Five) in terms of the structural transformations of the Southern 
economy and state beginning in the 1930s, as well as the wider national changes 
initiated in the period of the New Deal and the associated social movements. But 
what is the evidence of a germinal civil rights movement taking shape in the 1930s? 
There is certainly little evidence of either of the two mainstream parties adopting civil 
rights themes in that decade. Insofar as black voters settling in the urban areas of the 
north began to vote Democrat, it was because of the economic benefits of the New 
Deal – although even these were structured in such a way as to disadvantage black 
workers in the South. (Lowndes, 2008: 13-14; Katznelson, 2006; King & Smith, 
2011: 63-64) Nonetheless, the legal battle for equality in education which culminated 
in Brown was launched two decades before in 1935. This was also the period in 
which the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) emerged, initially representing 
a more radical and less racially exclusive form of unionism than the traditional 
American Federation of Labor (AFL). (To some degree, the difference was made by 
the presence of communists and leftists in CIO unions. See Goldfield, 2006: 80-81; 
Goldfield, 1993). The March on Washington Movement was launched in 1941 with 
the involvement of A Phillip Randolph and Bayard Rustin, which pressured 
Roosevelt into signing Executive Order 8802 creating the Fair Employment Practice 
Committee, supposed to end racist discrimination in federal employment practices – 
thought it was barely enforced. The NAACP experienced a near tenfold surge in its 
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membership during the first half of the forties, rising from 50,000 to 450,000 between 
1940 and 1946. (Horne, 2010: 148; Korstad & Lichtenstein, 1988: 787) By 1944, a 
Supreme Court re-composed for the New Deal era had outlawed ‘all-white’ primaries 
in Smith v. Allwright, resulting in an increase in the proportion of black southerners 
registered to vote from 3% to 20%. (Klarman, 2004: 236) Civil rights had emerged as 
a national issue for the first time, and it was this which produced the Dixiecrat breach 
with Truman. (Sitkoff, 1978; Frederickson, 2001) 
What are the implications of this historiographical debate for present purposes? In 
brief, the ‘Long Civil Rights’ argument, by situating the period of mass struggle 
bracketed between 1954 and 1968 as a movement within a movement, opens up a 
critique of the anticommunist consensus that would otherwise be occluded. Even if, 
following Cha-Jua & Lang (2007), we end up problematising the ‘Long Civil Rights’ 
argument for downplaying the fractures in this historical approach – or, following 
Fairclough (1990: 388), we say that the “seamless web” of history risks becoming 
“homogenized mush” – its far more expansive account of movement-building, its 
account of the structural conditions in which the movement emerged, allows us to 
escape a restrictive view of civil rights struggle as a Cold War phenomenon. In fact, it 
allows one to argue that the de-radicalising impact of the Cold War so de-fanged the 
institutions of the civil rights movement that it delayed its maturation and altered the 
social basis of what did eventually emerge. Thus, left-wing critics of McCarthyism 
such as Marable (2007), MacLean (2006) and Horne (1988, 1991) argue that an 
infrastructure of civil rights, embedded in a progressive left milieu, was developing 
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well before the Montgomery bus boycott, but had been deformed and broken up by 
Cold War anticommunism. As Marable explained, most of the important Supreme 
Court decisions barring Brown had already been taken, and black electoral 
registration was surging in the South, but little capital was made from this. Efforts to 
get a disobedience movement going were thwarted by the civil rights leadership 
terrified of repression. (Marable, 2007: 17-23) These authors echo the views of some 
in the civil rights movement who were themselves targeted by anticommunist 
apparatuses. (Braden, 1964; Braden, 1980) 
The argument has some weight. The anxiety that civil rights could be overcome by 
red-baiting was in evidence early on. The President’s Committee on Civil Rights, 
reporting in October 1947 at the inception of the Cold War, worried that in the “state 
of near-hysteria” about communism, “genuine democrats” risked being crushed 
between the “hysteria and repression”. Nonetheless, and despite Truman’s 
endorsement of the findings of the Committee and recognition of changes that needed 
to be made, the imperatives of repression often came first. Thus, the staunchly anti-
racist Progressive Party’s presidential stance in 1948 was vehemently denounced as a 
communist or ‘fellow traveling’ mobilisation. In the early 1950s, the US government 
confiscated the passports of leading African American intellectuals and celebrities 
such as Paul Robeson, W E B Du Bois, and William Patterson of the Civil Rights 
Congress (CRC), on the grounds that their propensity to speak against American 
racism overseas was “contrary to the best interests of the United States”. Caribbean 
communists Claudia Jones and CLR James were deported, and leaders of the CRC 
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and the Council on African Affairs (CAA) were placed under investigation. The effect 
of this was to encourage civil rights leaders and organisations to fight hard to detach 
themselves from the communist stigma in a way that weakened the most radical and 
internationalist wing of the movement, particularly those who were inclined to be 
critical of Washington’s foreign policy, or to align with anticolonial movements. In 
the case of the NAACP, this meant not only driving out Du Bois under pressure from 
Eleanor Roosevelt, but also launching a ferocious broadside against the CRC for its 
1951 petition, We Charge Genocide. In this, it was pressured by a Board member who 
had been appointed to the President’s Committee on Civil Rights, Channing Tobias, 
who – asked to intervene by the State Department – condemned the “traitorous” 
petition for trying to “discredit” the US government without discussing genocide in 
the Soviet Union. By 1955, the CAA had collapsed under the pressure, and the 
following year the CRC and the National Negro Labor Council also folded. The same 
fate befell the Southern Youth Negro Congress, subject both to red-hunting and terror 
threats from the Klan and Alabama’s Sheriff Bull Connor, and the National Negro 
Labor Council. Even those who acquiesced in the anticommunist crusade were 
stigmatised by Federal and especially Southern state forces as communists, while the 
FBI devoted considerable resources to sniffing out supposed red influence in the civil 
rights movement, including King’s Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
(SCLC). (Ceplair, 2011: 87; Dudziak, 1995: 546; Horne, 2010: 156-157; Anderson, 
2003: 191-193; Lieberman, 2005: 10-14, 28-32; McDuffie, 2009: 92-93; Braden, 
1980: 113; Von Eschen, 1996a & 1996b; Hall, S., 2005: 7-8; Munro, 2015) 
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Nor was it just the civil rights movement that was directly affected by Cold War 
imperatives. The culture of anticommunism ensured that the radical elements of the 
CIO who had played a critical role in assailing racism in the union movement were 
driven out or disciplined. The CIO’s capitulation to anticommunism is particularly 
tragic in this respect. The same red-hunting thematics which the anticommunists of 
the Organization had helped themselves to in their war against the left-wing of the 
union movement redounded against them in their attempt, known as ‘Operation 
Dixie,’ to build an organisation in the South. It was logical that they should do so, 
since the South was industrialising and populous. Moreover, employers often used 
the regional disparities to their advantage, shifting production facilities to the South 
in order to exploit lower cost labour. However, while its stand should logically have 
involved supporting biracial unionism, its desire to avoid being tainted by 
communism meant that it used white male organisers, refused integrated meetings, 
and explicitly framed its arguments in an anticommunist idiom. This did not protect 
them from red-baiting. The Southern States Industrial Council baited the CIO by 
claiming its initials stood for “Christ is Out – Communism is On,” while opponents 
ranging from the AFL to belligerent local press agreed that it was indeed a 
“communist” campaign – accusations which were given some sustenance by the 
activities of HUAC and other red-hunting bodies. Local Klans and other anti-union 
vigilantes were unleashed to terrorise and kill union activists. Taft-Hartley deprived 
union organisers of protections they had hitherto enjoyed, allowing southern states to 
pass ‘right to work’ laws which inflicted a series of defeats on organised labour. The 
CIO’s anticommunism also resulted in the excluding of African American workers 
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from its campaign, which meant that it missed the opportunity to build on the 
changing structure of work and production and forge a new mass, biracial unionism. 
(Marable, 2007: 18-19; Levenstein, 1981; Genry, 2003; Honey, 2004; Zieger, 1995: 
375)  
In the wider context, the civil rights issue was travestied in an attempt to win the 
global anticommunist struggle. Consider, for example, a worldwide propaganda tour 
funded by the State Department, aiming at countering the appeal of communism. The 
organisers, aware that they needed a black woman on the panel, chose a lawyer 
named Edith Sampson. Sampson was no political organiser, but a skilled advocate 
who quickly became a celebrated anticommunist figure in the US media. During the 
tour, it became evident that the major reason the US risked losing the Cold War in the 
Third World was not necessarily the profound appeal of communism, so much as the 
evident racism in the United States – above all the wave of lynchings in the South. 
Sampson could not deny that such oppression existed, but her commitment to 
anticommunist nationalism led her to downplay it. Speaking to an Indian audience, 
she explained that while African Americans did not “have equal rights in all parts of 
the United States” they nonetheless had “advanced further in this period than any 
similar group in the entire world”. This, being addressed to an audience just freed 
from British colonial rule, could be described as hubristic. Sampson went on to 
explain that she “would rather be a Negro in America than a citizen in any other 
land.” The performative implication of such a statement, that being an African 
American conferred more advantage and less disadvantage than being – say – a white 
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European, can only make sense in the context of Cold War propaganda. In a speech in 
Germany, she was quoted as asserting that the condition of African Americans was 
“wonderful,” and that they were “happier in the United States … than they would be 
any place else in the world”. Such comments were not exhaustive of Sampson’s 
interventions, which also called for the US government to take expedient action to 
end segregation. Yet, her ferocious defence of ‘the American way of life’ became “a 
salve for American conscience” and an occasion for the national press, from the New 
York Times to the Reader’s Digest to gloatingly exonerate the United States. (Laville 
& Lucas, 1996: 572-575; Cox, 1951: 362n; Dudziak, 1994; Lentz & Gower, 2010: 
75-76). 
Certainly, this is not the end of the story. As Dudziak (2000), Delton (2013) and 
Laville & Lucas (1996) have argued in different ways, the Cold War context also 
provided a novel political opportunity structure. Delton argues that anticommunism, 
far from being a source of conservatism and reaction, produced a liberal political 
climate that was intolerant of extremes and favourable to social reform. “Far from 
quelling the civil rights movement,” Delton argues, “the Cold War provided 
persuasive justification for its demands” and “provided blacks with real political 
leverage” without which “it is not clear that any reforms would have occurred”. 
(Delton, 2013: 96) Delton’s arguments, though partially framed as a critique of 
Dudziak’s, can be seen as complementing the latter’s contention that the Cold War 
helped liberate African Americans by adding to the pressure on reluctant 
administrations to implement reforms. Laville and Lucas meanwhile point out the 
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framing opportunities provided by the Cold War. “If the government used the anti-
Communist argument to seek [the NAACP’s] cooperation, the NAACP employed the 
same logic to further its program.” And “if African American leaders suspected a lack 
of government support for their agenda, then Americanism could be translated into 
dissent.” (Laville & Lucas, 1996: 585 & 590) As such, even if anticommunism 
divided the civil rights movement and marginalised the radical left, it strengthened 
the mainstream leaderships and improved their leverage. This representation is not 
totally inaccurate. And even radical left scholars whom one would expect to be 
opposed to such a perspective acknowledge elements of it. Thus, for example, Horne 
suggests that: “the agonized retreat from Jim Crow … was an essential component of 
the effort to shore up U.S. national security”. (Horne, 2007: 143; see also Skrentny, 
1998) 
However, while it is useful to make space for the productive aspect of the Cold 
War in shaping civil rights, once again the premises upon which this analysis is 
founded need to be clarified. There are good reasons, for example, to think that 
Delton overstates the role of Cold War anticommunism producing a liberal consensus 
among state actors. For example, she maintains that it was the Cold War context 
which led to the perpetuation of a non-segregationist Supreme Court in the 1950s. 
(Delton, 2013: 114-116) In fact, the recomposition of the state apparatuses began 
under the ‘New Deal’ in response to labour militancy and left-wing mobilisation – 
and it was precisely these mobilisations that anticommunism helped break up. 
(Klarman, 2004; Bell, 2004: 24) However, underpinning these arguments are a 
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number of more fundamental assumptions, not always explicit, which are worth 
spelling out: i) the Cold War was more or less straightforwardly a struggle by a 
democratic United States to ‘contain’ communism and thus protect a liberal world 
order; ii) the African American population’s only major strength resided in its ability 
to persuade white power centres of the justice, or necessity, or inevitability, of the 
changes which it sought; iii) civil rights action was thus fundamentally 
communicative. I have already problematised the first assumption in Chapter Three. 
The term ‘Cold War’ refers to many complex and discrete processes which, while 
ideologically coded in anticommunist language, could only by certain leaps of 
fantasy, be considered relevant to ‘containment’. As such, it is a mistake to see the 
Cold War as unambiguously providing a useful political context. The US attempt to 
develop an informal empire sustained by unprecedented military power necessitated a 
degree of political centralisation and the redeployment of terror/consent, in ways 
which led to the repression of civil rights organisations. It also positioned the US 
government against the anticolonial movements from which the civil rights struggle 
was to draw sustenance. I have also cast doubt on the second and third assumptions in 
the previous chapter. In this respect, I have stressed the role of ideology in coalition-
building, securing the unity-in-difference of heteroclite elements. In this perspective, 
it is not obvious that the advantages of ideological opportunities (those of ‘Vital 
Center’ liberalism) binding mainstream elements of civil rights to slow-moving, 
conservative institutions of the state and media outweighed the disadvantages of 
those opportunities arising from a context in which the civil rights movement’s 
radical wing was systematically crushed.  
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Finally, I have stressed the role of social reproduction, and the questioning and 
disruption thereof, in the formation of social movements. A social movement often 
involves the systematic deployment of what Piven (2006) calls ‘disruptive capacity,’ 
and this was certainly true of the civil rights movement as it developed. African 
Americans were not simply a disposable population, but rather were integral to the 
labour force and productive processes that sustained American capitalism. By the 
post-war period, black workers had been assimilated into unions, and were becoming 
a larger voting bloc in northern cities, while a sizeable and potentially influential 
black middle class had also grown, capable of funding civil rights activism. Their 
disruptive capacity was not minimal. It is at best tendentious, and at worst dismissive 
of black agency as well as the details of history, to proclaim that no civil rights 
reforms were possible without the Cold War. 
What needs to be stressed here is that anticommunism has no positive content in 
itself. If the anticommunist discourse of the Cold War contained liberalising elements 
– of the ‘Vital Center’ variety – this is in part because a particular balance of class 
and political forces had already been established through previous, successful social 
struggles. Insofar as Cold War anticommunism incorporated elements of New Deal 
liberalism, is also worked to restrain its further radicalisation and hold up the pace of 
change. It armed repressive forces, divided and scattered their previously well-
organised opponents, minimised the problems of racial oppression and thus deprived 
civil rights of its normative force, and closed down political opportunity structures for 
 375
black liberation. However, to fully appreciate the role of anticommunism in the 
movement is to have some appraisal of the complex situation of communism, and 
particularly the Communist Party (CPUSA) in and around the civil rights movement. 
For and Against the Communist Party USA 
Just as the civil rights movement did not spring from Montgomery, ex nihilo, in 
1954, so anticommunism in the movement was not freshly minted in 1948. The 
NAACP had long had a difficult relationship with the CPUSA. A Phillip Randolph, 
the radical socialist who vocally denounced communist ‘conspiracy’ in the postwar 
years, had as early as 1941 been happy for the Dies Committee to “destroy every 
vestige of foundation for Trojan Horse and Fifth Column conspiracies against the 
American government.” This was quite a striking stance for someone who had 
himself been the subject of the FBI’s red-hunting, as indeed so many black 
Americans were from the very inception of the Bureau’s existence. Nor was this 
purely confined to the liberal black intelligentsia and leadership. The anticommunist 
register would be heard in the radical black voices of Langston Hughes, Richard 
Wright, George Padmore and Max Yergan, all of whom had experience of the 
Communist Party, either as members or as ‘fellow travellers’. (Marable, 2007: 20; 
Luff, 2012; Schmidt, 2000: 181; O’Reilly, 1987; Anthony III, 2006; Wright, 2005; 
Marable, 2011)  
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As Berg (2007), Arnesen (2012a) and Aldridge (2003) have argued, black 
anticommunism had a basis in the practical experiences of attempting to work 
alongside, within or against the CPUSA. The Communists had played an often 
productive role in leading a Popular Front left and fighting racism. They had built up 
considerable respect in fighting the Scottsboro Boys case, and organising black textile 
workers during the Depression. (Solomon, 1998; Kelley, 1990) Yet, their swerving 
policy on the struggle against the Third Reich, an anfractuous loop from Popular 
Front antifascism, to the anti-imperialism of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, to the patriotic 
antifascism of the war effort, showed that they were too invested in the interests of 
Russia, the ‘socialist state,’ to respond effectively to the desires of American workers, 
black or white. For example, this meant that Randolph’s ‘March on Washington 
Movement’ was opposed by the CPUSA, on the grounds that it encouraged US 
participation in the war. Then, by 1941, when the Nazis invaded Russia, the CPUSA 
abandoned their militancy on the race question in favour of a patriotic front. 
(Arnesen, 2012a; Arnesen, 2012b; Janken, 2006) 
Berg (2007) and Arnesen (2012a, 2012b) have done a great deal to substantiate the 
hypothesis that, far from anticommunism destroying potentially powerful “left-labor-
civil rights coalition,” the coalition was never that strong to begin with, and the 
CPUSA deserves much of the blame for its downfall. Among the Party’s fatal flaws 
were: i) its tendency to anathematise opponents in the leadership of black 
organisations; ii) its prevarications on the race questions; and iii) its slavish devotion 
to the Moscow line. This included the flip-flopping on participation in World War II 
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and the subsequent swerving between the class peace and patriotism advocated by 
Earl Browder and the new militant dispensations demanded from Moscow, which led 
to Browder being ousted in favour of William Z Foster and the abandonment of 
patriotism in favour of a struggle against US imperialism and its Wall Street backers. 
Aspects of this narrative have already been well supported in widely read histories. 
(Starobin, 1972; Isserman, 1982; Ottanelli, 1991) As for the Party’s civil rights 
activism, it had begun to use this to bolster its own base at the expense of the existing 
black leadership following its turn toward supporting the self-determination of the 
Black Belt in 1928. It waged an uncompromising and vituperative war against the 
existing ‘bourgeois’ black leadership, whom it alienated in the process, but did not 
scruple to abandon black liberation when, during World War II, it decided that 
protests against racist discrimination were contrary to the needs of a war they had 
recently derided as imperialist but now defended as antifascist. And such 
organisations as it was able to dominate, such as the National Negro Council and the 
Civil Rights Congress, were reduced to instruments of Party imperatives rather than 
of black liberation. Even the We Charge Genocide petition, which alleged that the 
perpetuation of Jim Crow and the brutalities involved constituted a government 
assault on the life of African Americans which would accord with the UN’s definition 
of genocide, was intended to embarrass the US in favour of its Soviet rival. In the last 
analysis, what finished off the CPUSA was not anticommunist repression, but the 
invasion of Hungary and Khrushchev’s revelations about Stalin’s crimes, both of 
which triggered mass departures from the Party. There are strong elements of truth in 
all of this, and the criticisms of the CPUSA are often well-founded.  
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However, there remains a few limitations to this type of approach. First, for all 
that Cold War black anticommunism did not emerge from a vacuum, nor it is safe to 
say that there was therefore no novelty in it, and no damage done therein. The truth is 
that there were not huge ideological gaps between the CPUSA and African American 
leaders in the pre-war period. Even Walter White supported the Party’s reform 
programme, suggesting only that the NAACP was better placed to actually achieve it. 
(Janken, 2006) Second, it would be crude in the extreme to reduce the CPUSA’s turn 
toward support black self-determination in 1928 to Third Period dogma or an attempt 
to instrumental black grievance. There was always a complex relationship between 
the CPUSA and African African freedom struggles, but as Lang (2009) points out, 
part of the Party’s shift at that point owed itself to the influence of black members 
such as Cyril Briggs, Richard Moore and Otto Huiswood, as well as the wider milieus 
of black socialism and left-Garveyism. Third, while the NAACP had reason to be 
irritated with the Party’s behaviour particularly during their management of the 
Scottsboro Boys case, it is difficult not to detect a whiff of sour grapes in some of 
their complaint about, in Roy Wilkins’s words, “the Reds”. Wilkins simultaneously 
accused the CPUSA of being instrumentally-minded, using the Scottsboro Boys as 
“martyrs,” and of being sterile dogmatists obsessed with “abstract issues of Marxism” 
(Jonas, 2005: 139) The slightly more prosaic truth is that the Scottsboro Boys case 
came to the attention of the NAACP leadership after the CPUSA had already taken it 
up and demonstrated its potential as an issue. By the time Wilkins was appointed by 
the NAACP to intervene in the affair, the defence case was already being managed by 
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lawyers procured by the Communist Party. The CPUSA’s intervention and organising 
around the case was a logical corollary of its militant anti-racist position. Fourth, it is 
reductive to treat organisations such as the Civil Rights Congress as nothing other 
than an auxiliary of the CPUSA’s imperatives. The practical actions of the Congress, 
in defending African Americans and fighting civil rights cases pushed principles that, 
where won, were of general benefit to African Americans. (Horne, 1988) 
This point segues into another theme, in both Arnesen and Berg, viz. that the 
anticommunist repression has been made too much of, and the misfortunes of some 
radical black figures was not such a terrible loss. Thus, Arnesen suggests that if 
Robesen and Du Bois were deprived of their right to travel, deprived of certain 
platforms that they’d hitherto held, and in Robeson’s case deprived of income, “the 
actual content of the analyses … and their sectarian tone suggest that the 
marginalization of these two iconic civil rights figures did not lead to any profound 
impoverishment of American political discourse.” (Arnesen, 2012a: 28) This is crude, 
and emblematic of the problem with Arnesen’s overall analysis, which is that it 
reduces the politics of the Communist Party and allied intellectuals to their least 
attractive manifestations – above all, their unjustifiably sanguine approach to the 
Soviet Union.  
Berg takes a different route to essentially the same conclusion in that, having 
depicted socialism as being essentially extraneous to the African American freedom 
movement, he undertakes strenuous efforts to give the most benign possible 
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interpretation of the effects of anticommunism in it. Thus, in a discussion of the 
NAACP’s anticommunist policy, he highlights Walter White’s memorandum urging 
local chapters not to “call anybody and everybody a Communist” “just because those 
members disagree with the branch or its officers”. “We do not want a witch hunt in 
the NAACP,” White said, “but we want to be sure that we, and not the communists 
are running it.” The existence of such a caution is significant, but precisely in what 
way requires careful unpacking. First of all, it was the duo of White and Wilkins who 
had helped push the anticommunist argument in the organisation, vowing to be 
“utterly ruthless in clean[ing] out the NAACP, and, making sue that the Communists 
were not running it”. (Anderson, 2003b: 93) As Berg goes on to acknowledge, 
however, there was in fact precious little evidence discovered of ‘Communist 
infiltration’. If there were not mass purges, it is in part because the anticommunist 
resolution was not based on real evidence of such infiltration, but was primarily a 
performative self-cleansing. White’s warning attests, on the other hand, to a rational 
and well-grounded fear of anticommunism; as a form of politics which could work as 
well as any conspiracy to disrupt and disorganise the NAACP. As Leonard (2005) 
demonstrates, illegitimate claims of such infiltration served – despite White’s 
injunction – as ideal material for organisational battles against individuals who could, 
with little evidence or thought, be accused of communism. Such paranoia in an 
organisation about a non-existent communist threat can hardly be explained away as 
simply a rational aversion to working with a party that had proved to be sectarian and 
dogmatic in practice. Moreover, it is difficult to sustain the claim that this 
anticommunism did little damage to the NAACP’s struggle, given that it entailed 
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White and other NAACP leaders being eminently available to the Truman 
administration to effectively whitewash American racism in order to rebut “Soviet 
propaganda” – even going so far as to boast, in a manner resembling that of Sampson, 
that the quality of life for African Americans on key issues was rapidly approaching 
that of white Americans. Channing Tobias carefully downplayed the murder by a 
local Sheriff of four African Americans falsely imprisoned on rape charges, despite 
the victims being NAACP clients. It was left to organisations such as the Civil Rights 
Congress, which was obviously unafraid of handing the Soviet Union a propaganda 
coup, to assail the NAACP’s pusillanimity and prosecute the ideological war against 
American racism (Anderson, 2003b: 93-97) Another way to put this point would be 
to say that, contrary to what Berg and Arnesen assume, it is precisely because black 
communists were pro-Soviet, even to the point of glorifying an obviously oppressive 
state, that they had the potential to press home an advantage, by embarrassing the US 
in the international sphere – a crucial aspect of the civil rights struggle, and 
something that the NAACP had begun to resile from. 
Many of the criticisms of the CPUSA hang on the actions and policy prescriptions 
of its leadership, and its adherence to the Moscow line. There is, as Janken (2006) 
argues, a danger here of overstating the cohesiveness of Communist practice. The 
implied premise of such an approach is that the behaviour of Communist Party 
members can be explained by the political line of the Communist Party leadership, 
which in turn can be explained by reference to the desiderata of the USSR. This is 
simply to beg the question concerning the conditions under which a political 
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organisation develops, finds recruits and reproduces itself. Certainly, the ‘long arm of 
Moscow’ explanations for CPUSA behaviour in traditionalist historiography are not 
particularly fruitful in examining local contexts, particularly in the South. As Taylor 
(2005, 2009) argues, the practice of the party in North Carolina was decided far more 
by local imperatives, such as the struggles against lynching and segregation, and the 
need for practical reforms than by national or even international affiliations. The 
involvement of party activists in what has been dubbed ‘civil rights unionism’ is 
evidence of local communist activists turning their practical ends to a radical assault 
on segregation in the labour movement and in the workplace. The history of the Food, 
Tobacco, Agricultural and Allied Workers (FTA) Local 22, which organised black and 
white tobacco workers in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, is a meet-exemplar of the 
kind of case that would be not be analytically well-served by such an indiscriminate 
approach. (Korstad & Lichtenstein, 1988; Korstad, 2003; Korstad, 2008) Here, local 
activists worked against pressure from the middle class black leadership, which was 
focused on ‘racial betterment’ through good relations with white leaders, to organise 
not just a militant unionism which enjoyed considerable success against management, 
but also a local culture and social milieu wherein the union hall provided 
entertainment, pedagogy and political agitation.  
This was made possible because of a geoeconomic dynamic in which Southern 
urbanisation and industrialisation was drawing black workers off the plantations and 
sucking them into industries where they had previously only worked as a minority 
performing the most menial tasks. As Korstad (2008) puts it, a “predominantly 
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southern rural and small-town population” of African Americans became “one of the 
most urban of all major ethnic groups”. While the strikes of the 1930s had largely 
failed to make significant inroads in the South, particularly making little headway in 
the North Carolina textiles industry, the crisis of the South’s old geoeconomy 
(addressed in Chapter Four) was providing an opening for new forms of militancy. 
And even though – or rather, because – the local Communist Party adhered closely to 
a union agenda in Local 22, the Winston-Salem branch was able to recruit strongly 
among African American workers, so that union militancy fed into a political 
radicalisation. This was part of a wider awakening which observers saw as the 
potential basis for a new mass movement. Yet, early Cold War red-baiting played an 
unmistakeable role in terminating the era of ‘civil rights unionism’. The Taft-Hartley 
rules, banning communists from holding union office, were used by the CIO as an 
occasion to instigate an internal war against communist-led unions, often relying on 
racist support in order to win. In Winston-Salem, the employers and rival, more 
‘moderate’ unions, used red-baiting to divide the workforce, partially along racial 
lines, and ultimately displace Local 22. (Troy, 1958; Korstad & Lichtenstein, 1988; 
Honey, 1993; Korstad, 2003; Devinatz, 2005; Zieger, 2007: 162-163; Gentry, 2003: 
51-83)  
Communist-aligned organisations also addressed the problems of rural black 
workers in a way that the NAACP generally did not. It is not that the class dimension 
of African American oppression was lost on the NAACP, although it had not 
prioritised labour issues as such before the 1940s. Rather, its reticence stemmed in 
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part from the climate of the early Cold War, particularly since working on issues such 
as peonage would in many cases necessitate working with CPUSA organisations like 
the International Labour Defense – the organisation which had handled the 
Scottsboro Boys case. (Goluboff, 2007: 188) This was a missed opportunity on the 
NAACP’s part. The crisis in the Southern geoeconomy that I’ve described in Chapter 
Four meant that the traditional structures of rural authority, which underpinned 
segregation, were shaken. Segregationist leaders such as Senator Eastland were 
terrified of the effects that this would induce. To secure economic rights for black 
workers in this domain would have accelerated the crisis of Jim Crow. The effective 
but narrow legal strategy focusing on issues such as lynching, voting and school 
integration, both expanded the political rights of African Americans, and severely 
restricted the possible extent of the gains that could be made on the legal terrain. 
(Goluboff, 2007) In particular, even as integration necessarily challenged the 
boundaries of the very notions of ‘public’ and ‘private,’ the strategy left the premises 
of the race management (Roediger & Esch, 2012) of labour intact. In this light, it is 
not useful to isolate the precocious forms of civil rights activism in which the 
Communist Party played a key role as a mere Moscow-driven instrumentalisation of 
America’s ‘race problem’. Rather, they should be understood in relation to many of 
the same socio-structural causes already adduced for the emergence of civil rights. 
These are: the crisis of agrarian production, the urbanisation of the population, the 
decline of authority based on personal relations, and the emergence of new forms of 
collectivity in the cities: in sum, the transitional crises of Jim Crow.  
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The red hunt did not leave the civil rights movement powerless, nor did it destroy 
the Left. Where the CPUSA fell, new activist cadres often came to take up the role, 
albeit on the basis of more conventional social democratic politics. (Taylor, 2008) 
NAACP lawyers such as Thurgood Marshall continued to work effectively in the 
legal terrain and, however narrowly it was pursued, the ultimate success in Brown 
was part of a wider contribution that the NAACP made to the formation of the ‘New 
Deal’ state. (Francis, 2014)  The success of a new form of urban church-based 
activism in Montgomery, with NAACP activist Rosa Parks providing the initial spark 
of civil disobedience, indicated that alternative routes to struggle existed. However, 
while acknowledging the limitations of the CPUSA and its own contribution to its 
eventual marginalisation, and setting aside the significant effects of anticommunism 
on non-communists who were believed to be ‘soft’ on the issue, the erosion and 
destruction of existing organisations of black and radical activists prepared to 
challenge racism certainly weakened and retarded the incipient civil rights struggle. 
And insofar as it targeted communists, it helped prise apart a coalition centred on 
anti-racist class mobilisations which at least had the potential to play a constructive 
role in a mass civil rights movement. 
The ‘red menace’ in the South: wounded in Montgomery, buried in Selma. 
In this concluding section of the chapter, I want to look at the effects of 
anticommunism within the civil rights movement that did eventually emerge, through 
the prism of two mobilisations which chronologically bookend the period I am 
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studying: Montgomery and Selma. I have gone into detail as to the extent of 
anticommunist ideologies and practices, as deployed in the formation of Massive 
Resistance organisations and state apparatuses protecting segregation, and conserving 
a flaking Jim Crow coalition. This coalition had been exceptionally broad, including: 
Southern and conservative Democrats, conservative Republicans, presidents, most 
members of Congress, most of the Supreme Court, most federal court and state 
judges, most civil service officials, most white businesses and unions, most white 
churches, most academic institutions, and a range of white-supremacist political 
organisations. (King & Smith, 2011: 65) Yet, by the 1940s, cracks were beginning to 
appear. The idea of a ‘white’ labour movement was being challenged. The Supreme 
Court ruled out white primaries. Some academic institutions began to timidly 
abandon racist barriers. By the 1950s, presidents tended to avoid explicitly opposing 
civil rights, while new businesses were quietly on the side of pragmatic reform.  So 28
it was that by the time of Montgomery, it was not obvious that the Jim Crow system 
could survive, even if no one expected the sweeping changes that were afoot. 
Anticommunism had been deployed in the South to harry and contain civil rights 
activism well before Montgomery, and continued to be after Selma. But by the mid-
Sixties, it had lost its potency. A staunch, well-organised region-wide resistance to 
desegregation had been collapsing, one state after another, resulting in Wallace’s 
well-known ‘last stand’ for white-supremacy in Alabama against the marching ranks 
of the civil rights coalition, protected by Federal forces. What changed? 
 In a 1963 survey, businesses were found to be no more open to integration than other 28
Southern whites, but were more willing to make concessions for the sake of assuring the 
political stability needed to achieve economic growth. (Webb, 2004)
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The Montgomery Bus Boycott, lasting from December 1955 to December 1956, 
represented the first major success of a grassroots, civil rights offensive. Overlapping 
with the Brown decisions, it followed years of successful anticommunist offensives 
which had broken down the alliances of the Popular Front left and left the 
mainstream civil rights institutions dependent on an alliance with elements of the 
Federal state, it pointed to the development of a new mode of organising. Among the 
conditions for this mode were: the urbanisation of the class structure among African 
Americans, as cotton collapsed and industrial development took place; the 
politicisation of black churches in their new urban environment, such that church 
leaders became outspoken civil rights leaders in themselves; the growth of black 
higher education institutions, linked to the emergence of a black middle class but also 
to the desire of Southern states and philanthropists to fund black education in order to 
avoid integration; the growth of the NAACP in the 1940s, mostly concentrated in the 
South; the growing possibilities for organisation as the Jim Crow coalition began to 
shed layers and the state began to accept initially limited civil rights reforms. This 
combination of factors enabled a new civil infrastructure based on the black churches, 
as detached from the mainstream and at times coopted civil rights institutions as from 
the old Left, and it also furnished a moral idiom which, though hardly at odds with 
dominant ideological traditions, was not simply subordinated to the liberal-
conservative consensus. This was quite a reversal from the situation in the 1930s 
when Walter White could ask ‘Who owns the Negro Church?’ and answer: “the same 
people who own the factories”. Finally, there was a global context. The civil rights 
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struggle drew upon and was nourished by the anticolonial movements. King’s 
autobiography stresses the distinctly American tradition of civil disobedience – that 
of Henry David Thoreau – in the formation of his own tactical repertoire, but just as 
important was Gandhi and his concept of satyagraha. (McAdam, 1982: 94-95, 98-99, 
102, 103, 109-111; Selby, 2008; Dillard, 2001: 159; King Jr. & Carson, 1998: 46; 
Ansbro, 2000: 3-7) 
In this context, another decisive condition for the success of civil rights struggles 
was the emergence of activist milieus in local, metropolitan settings.  (Thornton III, 
2002) This was important in part because national civil rights organisations, such as 
the NAACP, were often targeted for legal repression and even statewide bans; and in 
part because where they could operate, they only did so on the invitation and with the 
decisive groundwork of local activist cadres. These local groupings, the “levels of 
indigenous organization” facilitated by ongoing socio-demographic transformations 
(McAdam, 1983), also provide a context in which tactics, or repertoires of contention 
(Tilly, 2004) can be experimented with. This is where the novelty of tactics such as 
boycotts, and the particular ensemble of actors implementing them, ought not to be 
over-stated. The tactic had been used by the Southern Negro Youth Conference to try 
to desegregate buses in Birmingham in 1942, in much the same way that SSNC 
activists who tried to register black voters had antecedents in 1930s Alabama 
communists. One of those who had been impressed by the use of this tactic in the 
Thirties was a young Edgar Nixon, a future leader of the local NAACP chapter and 
leading activist in the Montgomery Bus Boycott. (McDuffie, 2009: 96)  
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Nonetheless, the ability to make such tactics effective is what needs to be 
explained. In Montgomery, a number of local factors helped. The demise of the old 
political machine of mayor William A Gunter, and the continued brutality of the 
police force, indicated the necessity of rationalisation and reorganisation in the 
repressive apparatuses. The mayor embarked upon a slow-moving reform agenda, 
pushed along by pressure from black community organisations, and middle class 
white allies such as Virginia Foster and Clifford Durr, for the hiring of black police 
officers. The populist mayoral candidate Dave Birmingham gave assurances to black 
organisations that he would respect these demands, and acted to implement them 
upon being elected in November 1953. Birmingham had been assisted to office by the 
growing political independence of white lower middle class voters which introduced 
a new element of class-populist politics to the city. On the other hand, the changes 
wrought by Smith v Allwright contributed to a steady increase in black electoral 
participation, despite state-level attempts at obstruction. Even though the black 
electorate only comprised 7.5% of the electorate in 1955, while blacks represented 
37% of the population, they could wield the balance of power between rival voting 
blocs, be they business-led or populist. As a result, they were able to achieved what in 
retrospect appear to be mild reforms, but which in the context may have given 
evidence that change could be won through persistence. In addition, while the local 
NAACP branch had been predominantly middle class and male, there was a growing 
organisation of the city’s black poor, in which Edgar Nixon played a key role, and of 
professional, college-educated black women, through the Women’s Political Council 
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(WPC), which was often able to be more militant and confrontational than male-
dominated organisations. These were the forces which, alongside black churches, 
provided some of the organisational infrastructure for the bus boycott, and which 
would be fused in the Montgomery Improvement Association. (Thornton III, 2002: 
20-41; Robinson, 1987: 22-29; Robnett, 1997: 55-60) 
That a largely middle class black leadership chose to target bus segregation may 
seem counterintuitive. The majority of those affected by the segregation ordinances 
ruling that bus conductors had to organise seating so as to ensure a separation of the 
race, were working class blacks who, Rosa Parks estimated, comprised anything 
between 75 to 90% of the passengers. It was they who had to stand en bloc if a white 
person desired a seat, they who suffered routine abuse from white bus drivers. Most 
whites and more affluent blacks owned cars. Nonetheless, many of the core activists 
including not only Parks but Jo Ann Robinson, had experienced humiliation and 
threats of violence on the buses. Moreover, the long-term goal was progressive 
integration, through carefully graduated reforms. With a political environment 
amenable to cautious reformism, the minor act of civil disobedience on the part of the 
trained NAACP activist, Rosa Parks, allowed Nixon, the WPC, and the young 
Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., to plan a campaign for what at first was an 
extremely modest goal: reorganising the plan of seating segregation in a way that 
would be less disadvantageous to blacks. (Hampton & Fayer, 1995: 19-21; Robinson, 
1987: 19-22; Robnett, 1997: 56-57) So it was that Montgomery initiated a dynamic 
subsequently repeated in several locales: “a handful of black ministers helped 
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initiated the boycott, then secured the support of most of the city’s remaining black 
clergy, who, in turn, actively solicited the cooperation of their congregations”. 
(McAdam, 1982: 132)  
Another important condition for the emergence of an effective civil rights 
movement, however, was the weakening of anticommunism at the national level. The 
Senate’s decision to censure McCarthy in 1954 had reflected not only the Senator’s 
own particular talent for finding enemies, but above all the fact that McCarthy’s 
particular form of anticommunism was often aimed at elites, members of the military 
and political establishment, and particularly Democrats. In using the same logic of 
guilt-by-association-at-whatever-remove against Senators as against those 
unfortunates called before SISS during his tenure as chairperson, he incited the ire 
that would end in his being censured and subsequently losing control of SISS. (Mills, 
2015; Griffith, 1987) 
Moreover, in the year that the SCLC was formed, the red-hunters lost a vital 
weapon in their arsenal. The shifting balance of politico-legal forces condensed in the 
Supreme Court did not only result in the Brown decision, but also in the important 
breakthrough of Yates v United States. This decision reversed the convictions of 
fourteen leaders of the CPUSA under the Smith Act, while also interpreting the law in 
such a way as to make it practically impossible to secure future convictions. The 
Smith Act, as it had been interpreted, was effectively neutralised. In the logic and 
letter of the ruling, it was almost a precise reversal of the previous decision in Dennis 
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v United States. This was just one of a series of decisions by the Court reversing the 
trend of anticommunist repression. These included: Jencks v United States, wherein 
the conviction of a union organiser under Taft-Hartley anticommunist laws was 
reversed; Mesarosh v United States, in which the Court ordered a retrial of someone 
convicted on the evidence of a prosecution witness who had perjured himself; and 
Watkins v United States, wherein the Court sharply criticised the conduct of HUAC. 
(Lichtman, 2012: 91-92, 94-96) 
This general decline of anticommunist efficacy did not stop HUAC from 
functioning, nor did it necessarily blunt the SISS offensive, as the chair passed from 
McCarthy to the belligerent Southern segregationist, Senator James Eastland. 
Eastland, often working on information provided by the FBI, moved to ensure the 
pressure remained above all on black activists – and was a far more terrifying and 
bullying inquisitor than McCarthy was. Eastland’s techniques and choice of targets 
suggests an acute awareness of the potential socio-demographic sources of revolt. As 
both a planter-capitalist and a segregationist, he was particularly concerned to target 
those elements of the labour movement who tried to organise black workers. This was 
compounded by the well-grounded fear that, as black workers migrated from the 
plantations to the cities, they would be freed from the forms of authority wielded by 
the planters and find new forms of collective struggle in the cities. Eastland was 
convinced that the highest levels of the US government were penetrated by 
communism, and that African Americans were ‘dumb’ tools of red conspiracy. As 
such, he was concerned to prove that Communism intended not merely to overthrow 
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the US government, but – recalling the old CPUSA commitment to Black Belt 
independence – the establishment of a black-ruled communist state in the South. 
Civil rights organisations, even relatively timid outfits such as the Southern 
Council for Human Welfare (SCHW) and its offshoot the Southern Conference 
Educational Fund (SCEF), were dragged before HUAC and SISS in order to rebut 
claims that they were involved in Communist subversion. Affluent middle class civil 
rights leaders such as Virginia Foster Durr, who had previously experienced the red-
hunters’ wrath over her opposition to the Korean War, were brought before the 
Subcommittee to contend with a paid informant’s claims as to her secret communist 
agenda. And even as the power of these committees waned, and the anticommunist 
initiative shifted to local State Sovereignty Commissions, attorney generals and 
media, the HUAC and SISS files were mined for evidence of communist conspiracy. 
Such was the case when hearings in Mississippi used old HUAC claims to dub the 
SCHW ‘communist, or when local media in Atlanta targeted SNCC campaigners as 
‘communists’ in 1964, using claims already circulated by HUAC. (Asch, 2008: 
137-141, 144-145; Braden, 1964: 12, 23-26; Castledine, 2012: 75; Hanson, 2011: 
62-63)  
Nonetheless, as McAdam (1983) argues, the kinds of tactical innovations and 
disruptive capacities activated by the civil rights movement, depended for their 
success on there being “a political system vulnerable to insurgency”. The old modes 
of rule had to be weakening. Certainly, the Jim Crow coalition was experiencing a 
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crisis irrespective of what anticommunists had to say about it. However, had the 
nationwide anticommunist consensus held firm, had the committees retained their old 
power, and had the legal situation not changed, it is reasonable to infer that many of 
the leading organisers behind civil rights might have been more effectively shut 
down, hustled before tribunals, subject to more effective organisational crackdowns, 
if not prosecuted under legislation such as the Smith Act. It was also helpful that in 
the local context of Alabama, the state had not yet, by 1955, swerved to the Right 
under the impress of red-baiting and race-baiting. The recently elected governor, ‘Big 
Jim’ Folsom, was still seen as a racial moderate and a class populist. And the city of 
Montgomery was cautiously open to reform, with the Montgomery Advertiser 
generally supporting this position and denouncing the hardline segregationists. 
Yet, this did not prevent a backlash from forming. As ever, white resistance 
politics was formed in response to manifestations of local African American 
organising. Membership in the local White Citizens’ Councils “exploded from eight 
hundred in the entire state of Alabama before the boycott to fourteen thousand in 
Montgomery alone after the boycott began”. It was only a few months after the 
beginning of the bus boycott, as white conservatives began to cohere in opposition to 
Brown, that the city of Montgomery hosted the launch of the Alabama Association of 
Citizens’ Councils, at which Senator James Eastland expostulated against the 
NAACP, and a circulated leaflet invited genocide against black Americans. Although 
the Councils represented a hard-right minority for the time being, they had the effect 
of helping tilt the balance of political forces, applying considerable pressure to the 
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local administration, the editor of the Montgomery Advertiser, and Governor Folsom. 
The mayor of Montgomery, at first inclined to offer minor concessions such as 
instructing the bus company to treat black passengers more courteously and allow 
them to enter the bus through the front door rather than the back, cleaved under 
pressure to the segregationist right, and tried to break the boycott by urging that all 
black domestic workers be sacked – something that many white women who 
depended upon this labour were unwilling to countenance. Folsom presented himself 
as rejecting both the Montgomery Improvement Association and the Citizens’ 
Councils as two equally undesirable extremes. The parity, of course, was absurd, 
particularly given that Folsom knew that his police force that was harassing civil 
rights activists, as well as ordinary blacks participating in the boycott by using black-
run taxi services rather than the buses, and not Council members. Yet, police 
harassment and arrests, the opposition of Mayor Gayle and Council pressure were not 
sufficient to seriously disorganise the activist core – and even had the 
counterproductive effect of drawing national attention to the situation. An Alabama 
district court, supported by the Supreme Court, ruled that the state’s segregation laws 
were unconstitutional, and the city administration passed a new ordinance. The ruling 
explicitly drew upon the change embodied in Brown, stating that in this legal context 
it was not possible to uphold Plessy v Ferguson. (McMillen, 1994: 49-50; Phibbs, 
2009: 58-60; Hampton & Fayer: 27; Parks, 2001; Robinson, 1987; Green Jr. & 
Cheatham, 2009: 72-73) 
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 One of the major fruits of this civil rights success, which went much further than 
the initial cautious demands, was the formation of the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference, launched in 1957. The Conference was predictably baited by Southern 
critics as a communist organisation, as increasingly was King. Indeed, King had 
expected this, which is one of the reasons why he chose to insert the word ‘Christian’ 
into the name. (Lewis, 2004: 67) The fact that he did so, and took care to pitch the 
civil rights goal in an emphatically American and non-communist idiom, indicates his 
awareness of the potential power of such accusations – only recently demonstrated 
with great vividness. There were arguments within the organisation about whether to 
keep certain groups which had been systematically targeted by HUAC and SISS, like 
the SCEF, at a distance. Nonetheless, despite King’s care to distance himself from 
communism – which Virginia Foster Durr considered to be recycled red-baiting – the 
SCLC did not constitute itself as a specifically anti-communist organisation. In fact, 
at its core were leftist activists such as Bayard Rustin and Stanley Levison, for whom 
the bus boycott had broken the isolation and despair of the early Cold War years. So 
while the organisation, and King in particular, needed to protect themselves against 
red-baiting, they were not prepared to capitulate to the culture. (Fairclough, 2001: 
30-31, 69-70) 
The remainder of the Fifties was a period of slow and cautious struggles. There 
was an accumulation of successes, mostly taking place at the level of the courts and 
the Federal state, such as the 1957 civil rights legislation and Eisenhower’s forced 
integration of Little Rock Central High, but in the context of a furious Massive 
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Resistance backlash, there were few major initiatives from the grassroots akin to 
Montgomery. McAdam’s (1983) analysis of the pace of insurgency in this period 
demonstrates that the scale of actions initiated by civil rights activists, having slowly 
declined through the latter half of the Fifties, as the activity of Massive Resistance 
crested, suddenly peaked in 1960. This was the year in which the tide began to turn 
decisively against Massive Resistance. (See Chapter Seven). It was also the year of a 
wave of anticolonial successes in the African continent – Congo, Benin, Togo, 
Cameroon, Somalia, Niger, Mauritius, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Chad, Gabon, 
Senegal, Mali and the Central African Republic were among the states liberated that 
year, making a total of twenty-five – and of sit-ins at segregated businesses. And in 
the same year, the SCLC supported the formation of a new civil rights body, the 
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, to draw and implement the tactical 
lessons of the successful sit-ins. Initially, its statement of purpose expressed a purely 
Christian doctrine of love and nonviolence, but increasingly dominant elements of its 
young leadership moved sharply to the left in the ensuing years. The link was not 
merely coincidental. The civil rights movement’s organisers moved in a global 
anticolonial milieu, where the major axis of struggle was quite other than the febrile 
battle against communism. The Cold War context continued to structure both civil 
rights and anticolonial struggles and, for example, King did not hesitate to invoke the 
struggle against communism to argue for an anticolonial policy on the part of the US. 
Nonetheless, in some ways, the ex-Communist Richard Wright had observed of the 
1955 Bandung Conference, it moved the argument to a different realm. Participants 
often expressed sympathy with some of the basic goals of communism, but they had 
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their own modernising agendas, and they were sharply critical of the American 
obsession with fighting communism when, as they saw it, colonialism was the main 
danger. The US strategy of appearing not to take sides on colonialism while using 
anticommunism to divide the emerging Third World pole was largely ineffectual in 
this context. Thus, the rising arc of anticolonial struggles began to displace 
anticommunism both globally and in the United States itself. In 1962, Students for a 
Democratic Society, a tributary of the moderately social democratic League for 
Industrial Democracy, proposed a new basis for radicalism by invoking the 
anticolonial freedom struggle against which American society stood in “embarrassing 
contrast”. (Horne, 2008; King, 2005: 143; Wright, 1994; Fraser, 2003: 127; Westad, 
2007: 206) 
This did not mean that anticommunism had run out of countersubversive uses. 
President Kennedy, having been elected on a moderate civil rights agenda, invoked 
communism in order to belabour civil rights activists, exclaiming that Freedom 
Riders were “embarrassing” him by provoking white-supremacist violence: this was 
“exactly the kind of thing the Communists used to make the United States look bad 
around the world.” He urged his civil rights advisor to intervene and shut it down. 
Opponents continued to bait King in particular as an agent of communism. In an 
interview on ‘Meet the Press’ for NBC in 1960, King was asked by journalist Frank 
Van Der Linden of the Nashville Banner about his purported sympathy for Marxism. 
In his book, Stride Toward Freedom, King had criticised Marx for positing “a 
metaphysical materialism, an ethical relativism, and a strangulating totalitarianism” 
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but also granted that: “he pointed to the weaknesses of traditional capitalism”. King 
was to repeat these arguments in his autobiography, adding the clause that he 
considered communism to be “basically evil”. Van Der Linden took this to be a 
confession of faith: “I’d like to know just where does communism or collectivism fit 
into your program of resistance here?” He went on to link this to King’s support for 
integration and his dismissal of irrational fears about racial intermarriage: “is it 
correct to say that you don’t oppose racial intermarriage?” Former president Truman 
also weighed in to claim that sit-ins were inspired by communism, prompting King to 
note with sadness that this reflected the “McCarthy-like” campaigns that civil rights 
activists were faced with in the South. The growing internationalism of the civil 
rights campaign, and the emergence of a new militant leadership in Malcolm X, who 
in his later years built alliances with Trotskyists at the expense of coalitions with 
those to his right, also attested to the weakening of the anticommunist fervour. Civil 
rights activists adopted as a logical extension of their own activism an antiwar stance 
on Vietnam, despite the fact that the official enemy was communist, and antiwar 
activists would often deploy the same tactical repertoires which had been tested in 
civil rights. Certainly, this did provoke the familiar red-baiting vitriol. Roy Wilkins 
hinted to President Johnson that King had a communist agenda, and publicly 
speculated that King’s antiwar stance was something he was being influenced in by 
nefarious “aides” and that it was an abandonment of civil rights to “enter into a 
foreign policy matter that seems to be of more than passing interest to Communist 
China”. [Emphasis in original.] (Dudziak, 2000: 158-159; King, 2005: 428-432, 438; 
King, 1998: 57-59; Hampton & Fayer, 1995: 73-74; Marable, 2011; Zaroulis & 
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Sullivan, 1984: 27-32; Small, 2002: 5-6; Neale, 2004: 127-129; Hall, S., 2005: 96-97) 
Nonetheless, the growing inefficacy of anticommunism had already become evident 
in the fact that neither Kennedy nor Johnson were able to bring the civil rights 
movement to heel in the way that the Truman administration had been able to both 
through its influence in the NAACP and the prosecutions of communists. 
In fact, had anticommunism been effective enough to undercut the Freedom 
Riders, either by scaring them off or isolating them from allies, it would have had a 
disastrous effect on the future development of the civil rights movement. The tactic 
emerged from frustration at the deathly slow to static pace of integration of public 
transport since the Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery. The statutes were 
against Federal law, so the Court had decided, and yet the government was declining 
to enforce the law. This gave activists not only a powerful normative argument in the 
American context, but also a highly effective tactic. This entailed a relatively small 
number of people, hundreds in total, embarking on the ‘integrated’ use of public 
transport in defiance of the segregation statutes. Operating against threats, police 
repression and Klan violence, this sort of tactic – while innovative – could only have 
been enacted by cores of committed and trained activists. This was a powerfully 
formative experience in the political development of a new layer of activists, who 
learned how to cope with violence and intimidation, and even to use it as a weapon in 
their struggle by over-stretching municipal police forces and drawing media attention 
to Southern brutality, rather than being put off by it. These were activist cores who 
participated in SNCC and SCLC campaigns in to register voters and desegregate 
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public facilities in Albany, Georgia and Birmingham, Alabama, albeit they were 
dependent in each case upon local activist organisations. (Hampton & Fayer, 1995: 
73-96; McAdam, 1983)  
The ongoing thawing of the Cold War climate and the collapse of Massive 
Resistance contributed to the opening of a new political opportunity. The 1964 
presidential campaign of Lyndon B Johnson, while many of its hopes were to be 
disappointed, was won on the themes of civil rights, peace and mild redistribution 
against a candidate of the free market, anticommunist Right. Johnson had steered the 
passage of a Civil Rights Act which went much farther than previous legislation in 
outlawing all segregation in public facilities. Although it built on previous legislative 
efforts, the impetus behind its implementation was the SCLC’s Birmingham 
campaign, to force the desegregation of public facilities. The campaign had produced 
a violent reaction, helping drive the city’s politics farther to the racist, anticommunist 
Right. The state’s Klan was already bombing churches and attacking homes of civil 
rights activists on the premise that Red manipulation was behind the insurgency, 
while Commissioner of Public Safety ’Bull’ Connor justified his use of violent 
suppression of the civil rights demonstrators by claiming, just as George Wallace had, 
that these protests were organised by Communism. Indeed, Connor’s actions made 
him a hero to local white-supremacists, whose vote ensured that he won election as 
president of the Alabama Public Service Commission. However, it had also built on 
the success of the March on Washington, which inspired global solidarity protests 
from Berlin to Cairo, and earned global press admiration, particularly in the Third 
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World nations whose esteem Washington sought. The passage of this legislation, 
Johnson’s re-election, and the new liberal majority in Congress, suggested that even 
if the Deep South states continued to move to the right, evidenced in George 
Wallace’s Alabama gubernatorial campaign, the country as a whole was moving to 
the left. For Bayard Rustin, it was a chance not only to advance civil rights, but also 
to remake the Democratic Party, break the power of the Dixiecrats and create a new 
machinery based on a genuinely popular coalition. (Thornton III, 2002; Isserman & 
Kazin, 2008: 87-90; Dudziak, 2004: 192-198; Horton, 2005: 171) 
In the opening produced by this national context, the Selma campaign was 
launched. Selma, in the rural county of Dallas, was the most rigidly segregationist 
city in the state of Alabama, one where the black population at 14,000 was almost 
equal to the white population at 14,400. The city was also small enough, and its 
electorate even smaller at less than six thousand, that politically active whites could 
be tied together in a single milieu. Dallas County was also subject to many of the 
same socio-demographic transformations that were shaking the rest of the region, 
above all urbanisation accompanying a sharp decline in the level of black tenant 
farming, and a migration to the cities, including Selma. A growing minority of the 
County’s black population had some education and were thus in a position to follow 
public affairs – and, as importantly, wanted to be involved. In the decades leading to 
the Selma to Montgomery march, the city had been ruled by a small, conservative 
political machine dominated by Lucien Burns, and subsequently Chris Heinz. The 
state apparatuses, from the courts to the mayor’s office were the exclusive preserve of 
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a section of the white population. In this context, the Supreme Court in 1957 
delivered a shock to the city population even more astounding than that of Brown. In 
the case of a mentally unwell black man, William Fikes, charged with carrying out a 
home invasion and attempting rape on the daughter of Mayor Heinz, Jean Heinz 
Rockwell, local law enforcement and public opinion had been expecting the suspect 
to be executed. But an unusually lenient jury only sentenced him to 99 years in 
prison, and this gave NAACP lawyers a window to get involved. Fighting a 
combative campaign that stunned whites and gave confidence to blacks, they drove 
the case to the Supreme Court, which determined that the confession which the police 
had extracted was unreliable.  
This infuriated both the mayor and local whites, but it also set a precedent for 
black activists in Dallas County. By this stage, a local White Citizens’ Council had 
already emerged and engaged in an economic terror campaign against NAACP 
activists who tried to petition school boards to desegregate. Among its supporters was 
James G Clark, who fought a successful campaign to be elected as County Sheriff on 
the basis that he was a Council member who knew “how to handle our racial 
problems” – his prowess would later be on display at Edmund Pettus Bridge. Police 
and local white activists engaged in threats, kidnapping, arson and terror against 
potentially influential blacks. One thing that these reactionary milieus all agreed upon 
was that Selma would not be like Montgomery. The state capitol had showed 
weakness and lack of white unity in the face of the civil rights offensive, whereas 
Selmian whites must be, or appear to be, united. This necessitated that the 
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intimidation of African Americans must also extend laterally to ‘moderate’ whites. 
Another thing on which they agreed was that the civil rights movement was a 
communist infiltration. Both circuit judge James Hare, an old-hand McCarthyite , 29
and Sheriff James Clark expressed a desire in 1965 to testify before HUAC about the 
communist nature of the movement, a subject on which the judge kept a hefty file. 
Even the country’s Republican Party considered that any offensive against 
segregation was evidence of “totalitarianism”. (Thornton III, 2002: 380-420; 
Isserman & Kazin, 2008: 134; Carson, 2005; Lewis, 2000: 98-99) 
This was, then, an especially recalcitrant city, and one which – because of the 
potential demographic power of African Americans – depended upon terror. It was an 
extremely brittle power structure. It was also one in which the old Burns-Heinz 
machine was breaking down. The election of Joseph Smitherman as the city’s mayor 
in 1964 was the clearest evidence of this. Heinz, alongside the Citizens Council and 
the political machine, had sustained a hardline policy of white-supremacism for a 
decade since Brown. But by 1964, a coalition of local businesses, the Committee of 
100 Plus, had endured enough. Like similar coalitions in Birmingham, and in other 
states, this coalition was more concerned about economic efficiency than social 
justice – nonetheless, insofar as it sought rationalisation and reform of the municipal 
state apparatuses, it placed itself on the side of racial progress. The Committee’s 
efforts, alongside the votes of hitherto successfully silenced moderate whites and the 
 In 1953, as a solicitor, he claimed to have been privy to a document proving that the 29
Alabama Teacher Tenure Act of 1939 was a Communist plot to implant red teachers in the 
school system. (Thornton III, 2002: 424)
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few black voters, helped put Smitherman in the mayor’s office. This meant both that 
the political system was susceptible to pressure for reforms, and that the repressive 
apparatuses were susceptible to overreaction. Finally, there was the germinal 
development of a black civil rights infrastructure. For a long time, the Dallas County 
Voters League had been waging a cautious struggle for voting rights, virtually alone. 
The NAACP had been prevented from operating in the state of Alabama by a 
Montgomery Circuit Court judgment after it refused to turn over its membership lists 
to the Attorney General – one of a wave of crippling legal actions that drained 
NAACP capacities. This was only reversed by the Supreme Court in 1964. The 
SNCC first sent activists into Selma in 1963, but initially made little progress. It was 
only when the League and the SNCC coordinated their actions that they were able to 
put together the first mass meeting of local civil rights activists, on 14th May 1963. 
Sheriff Jim Clark wasted no time in organising the crackdown.  
Jerry DeMuth of the SNCC described a police attack on a meeting of 160 civil 
rights workers at a Catholic mission in July 1963: “Turning, I saw possemen charging 
through the crowd, nightsticks swinging. Among the possemen’s first targets were my 
photographer-companion and myself. He was beaten and shot at. I was clubbed over 
the head – seven stitches were required to close the gash – and struck and shoved 
with night sticks.” Nonetheless, the movement had been placed on the map. All prior 
calculations were rendered moot. And on this basis, the SNCC was able to begin 
organising local high school students who had been expressing discontent with the 
segregated system. In fact, the willingness of the youth to get involved in direct 
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actions which sometimes resulted in their being jailed often shamed their elders into 
taking part. (Thornton III, 2002: 414-440; Corley, 1982; Vaughn & Davis, 2006: 
207-217; Lee, 2008; Isserman & Kazin, 2008: 134-139; Carson, 2005; Dudziak, 
2000: 231-237; DeMuth, 1964; Hampton & Fayer, 1995: 209-214) 
Local state capacity to handle this insurgency was not, however, thoroughly 
depleted. The first major setback for the movement took place in July 1964, when 
Judge James Hare issued an injunction identifying forty-eight people and fifteen 
organisations, and banning them from further participation in protests. This 
immediately stopped all local meetings of the League, which were the source of 
information, contacts and nourishment for the movement’s participants. It also 
resulted in a sharp drop in black applications to vote. In the years prior to the 
movement’s emergence, black voting applications averaged 3 per month. They rose 
to 47 per month once the meetings began, only to fall back to 10 per month when the 
ban came into effect. By winter, the movement had reached a stalemate, unsure and 
divided over how to proceed.  
This was the context in which the SCLC was invited to come to Selma and 
collaborate in developing new tactics. The SCLC was considerably more top-down in 
its mode of operation than the SNCC had been, and this had been what gave the 
SNCC the advantage in being able to work with local activists. But in the negotiation 
between the two organisations, with their distinctive political styles, the tactical 
concept of a march from Selma to Montgomery was evolved. This was a classic 
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SCLC tactic, in that it was what Tilly (2004) would describe as a ‘WUNC display,’ 
which wielded a fundamentally communicative approach in a strategy of disruption 
through provocation, and which also exploited the ambiguities in American ideology, 
and the splits within the power bloc in Washington DC and the business class as to 
how best to contain the threat to social order. The SNCC were reluctant to commit to 
this approach, and critical of the leader-based mode of operating. Their tactics were 
intended to build a local black leadership, while King’s was intended to spark a 
confrontation. ‘Bloody Sunday,’ which took place at Edmund Pettus Bridge on 7th 
Match 1965, changed that. As approximately two thousand civil rights marchers 
approached the Bridge on the outskirts of Selma, police deputies and state troopers 
under the command of Sheriff Clark and Major John Cloud, and supported by 
Governor Wallace, attacked the marchers with billy clubs and tear gas. The resulting 
furore produced a ferment of angry, emotional, well-attended meetings and protests. 
The militant mood at these protests sufficiently agitated government officials, and 
tilted President Johnson’s calculations, that once against Federal forces were sent into 
a Southern state, to override the white defiance. And Johnson took the occasion to 
lean his weight behind Voting Rights legislation long demanded by the civil rights 
movement. This stage of Governor Wallace’s ‘last stand’ against communism and 
Federal ‘tyranny’ was concluded. (Vaughn & Davis, 2006: 217-219; Thornton III, 
2002: 450-452; Carson, 2005: 27-34; Isserman & Kazin, 2008: 134-139) 
Paranoid accusations of red infiltration continued to be voiced from the lowest to 
the highest reaches of the state. The Senate Judiciary Committee heard from a 
 408
Louisiana state judge that the Voting Rights Act was in fact “a Stalin Communist plan 
for the takeover of the Black Belt”. Governor Wallace alleged in pamphlets, speeches 
and even a state-made movie that the Selma-to-Montgomery marchers had 
participated in orgies, interracial sex and were linked to Communism. Vice President 
Hubert Humphrey was not alone in believing that the violence at Selma had been 
provoked by Communist agents operating in the civil rights crowd. FBI Director J 
Edgar Hoover was likewise certain that communism was responsible for the protests, 
and the Bureau’s Counterintelligence Programme continued to try to undermine civil 
rights and leftist groups. It had particularly targeted King, bugging his offices and 
telephones, searching for evidence of subversion or even tax irregularities, and 
briefing against him where possible as to his communism and sexual immorality. 
When Southern politicians had materials for a smear campaign against King, or the 
SCLC, or the SNCC, or CORE, it was usually provided by the FBI. Hoover finally 
targeted King for a public denunciation in a press conference shortly after the SCLC 
had arrived in Selma, and as the Selma campaign picked up, so did the FBI’s efforts 
to undermine the SCLC. (Borstelmann, 2001: 189; Flynt, 2004: 91; Dudziak, 2000: 
237; Heale, 1990: 196-197; Fairclough, 2001: 217-219; Loewen, 2000: 745-752) Yet 
ultimately these measures were inadequate. 
Cold War anticommunism had always been a form of crisis management, 
operating at various levels where transitional processes were underway. At its core 
was a fantasy, wherein the antagonisms and struggles that characterised American 
society, had to be the work of outside agents. Around this fantasmatic kernel clustered 
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a series of ideological thematics, ranging from Jeffersonian republicanism to Vital 
Center liberalism, and a repertoire of practices, from parapolitical mobs, 
neighbourhood spies, and red squads to investigative committees. The ideology 
operated on real experiences and fears, such as the USSR’s overland expansion and 
despotism, or the militant role of the CPUSA and its tendency to toe the Moscow line. 
It cohered, for a period of time, an historical bloc, a basis for class rule oriented 
toward an historic mission – the defence of democracy against totalitarianism. It 
enabled businesses to thwart further gains on the part of unions and helped the right-
wing of the unions to defeat and isolate the left and drive it out of its official 
positions. It enabled the United States government to make a transition to being the 
dominant global power, to centralise political power appropriately, and to extend its 
global reach in a series of often extremely violent interventions. And finally, it gave 
Southern politicians, acutely aware of the challenges that they faced, the means by 
which to shatter an emerging civil rights coalition, by attacking a militant, organised 
and yet sectarian and dogmatic core of activists. When a new civil rights coalition 
began to emerge out of Montgomery, anticommunism authorised the deployment of a 
series of countersubversive tactics and apparatuses, from prosecutions to 
investigative committees. Yet, as anticommunists gradually lost the means of legal 
repression, lost the ideological battles, and lost control of the dominant state 




CONCLUSION: “The country’s turning conservative.” 
A counterfactual. 
The arc of Cold War anticommunism reached its terminus with the détente 
reached between Nixon and Brezhnev in 1969. Fifteen years previously, just as 
McCarthyism was cresting, no more than 5% of Americans were prepared to entertain 
even a mildly favourable opinion of the Soviet Union, while only 27% conceded that 
communists should have the constitutional right to speak in public. Only 23% of 
Americans believed that peaceful coexistence with the Russians was possible, while 
61% held that a major war was inevitable. (Mayer, 1993: 47-55) By the late Sixties, 
HUAC had lost its terrorist potency. New Left provocateurs such as Jerry Rubin gave 
the Committee nothing but disrespect, and mock sieg heils. One youth, declining to 
invoke the Fifth Amendment as previous non-compliant witnesses had, simply 
offered: “I will not answer that question on the grounds that it nauseates me and I 
might vomit all over the table.” (Kopkind, 1997: 54-55) The basis for this shift was 
already being sedimented by the mid-Fifties, however, just as anticommunism 
seemed an indomitable force. The thawing of relations with the USSR was first 
engaged in by the Eisenhower administration, while the repudiation of anticommunist 
laws was undertaken by the Supreme Court in 1956-57. McCarthy’s over-reach cast a 
pall of disrepute over the hardest forms of anticommunism, and civil libertarian 
arguments became respectable once more. (Heale, 1990: 191-193) 
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What if that had not been the case? What if the international climate had remained 
frozen in a pattern of belligerent confrontation? What if no anticolonial wave had 
displaced that axis of struggle, and the narrative or ‘frame’ structuring it? What if the 
Supreme Court had cleaved to the Right? What if Senator McCarthy had been a more 
subtle prosecutor of the red-hunt? And what if, in this context, the balance of 
ideological forces in American society had continued to lean toward authoritarian 
nationalism? To answer that, I want to recapitulate the core claims made in this 
thesis: 
i. The Cold War was not just one process, but several. Insofar as it included a 
struggle by the United States government to expand its global dominion, which 
necessitated elements of hegemonic practice, this opened an opportunity 
structure for civil rights activists to internationalise their struggle. 
ii. However, insofar as the Cold War involved an anticommunist crusade, 
directed at anticolonial movements as much as domestic dissidents, it also 
weakened the international and domestic alliances upon which the civil rights 
movement depended. 
iii. The anticommunist moment in American politics secured a subordinate 
place for the segregated South’s embattled leadership in a national power bloc 
for a period of time (approximately 1945-1954). 
iv. Anticommunist politics helped Southern leaders to manage transitional 
crises in the Jim Crow structure during this period, by providing 
countersubversive mechanisms and ideologies through which to supplement 
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failing authority structures and break up the political alliances already made 
possible by new forms of urban collectivism. 
v. Subsequently (approximately 1954-1960), anticommunist politics enabled 
segregationists in the South to respond to the civil rights movement by shifting 
the balance of forces within the state institutions to the Right, developing and 
deploying a range of countersubversive apparatuses, cohering a broad coalition 
of social forces integrated with the state which used a range of measures from 
economic terror to political violence, and thus effectively disorganising the 
incipient civil rights movement and significantly slowing down the growth of 
civil rights action. 
vi. Yet, in the same period, anticommunism outside the South went into decline. 
Senator McCarthy fell out of favour, HUAC lost some of its prestige, the 
Supreme Court made significant decisions which undermined anticommunist 
legislation, and the national political climate shifted moderately to the left. 
vii. By 1960, the legal strategies of Massive Resistance had begun to fail, 
rejected in the courts. Meanwhile, a new civil rights leadership had formed, one 
which was not decisively formed by the traumatic battles of the early Cold War, 
less deferential to anticommunism and more tactically adventurous. The year 
1960 saw a sudden spike in civil rights activism, with sit-ins proving an 
effective tactical innovation, thus inaugurating a new, successful phase in the 
movement. Federal state leaders could not use their relationships with the 
anticommunist wing of the civil rights movement to compel it to moderate its 
tactics and discourse. 
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 The broad direction of this argument is clear. Without anticommunism, 
segregationists would have been deprived of a vital means of protecting white-
supremacy for as long as they did. Had the anticommunist consensus held, white-
supremacy would have been sustained for longer than it was. However, this verdict 
must be qualified in an important way. The introduction of Lacanian psychoanalysis 
in Chapter Six, I have suggested, represents a disturbing element in the unfolding of 
the thesis. It is intended precisely as a counterpoint to the rationalising tendency 
wherein anticommunism is understood in terms of its strategic utility. The kernel of 
fantasy structuring the ideology of white-supremacist anticommunist consists 
schematically of two phases: first, the fantasy of total being in whiteness and 
concomitant enjoyment of, and mastery over, black life as inferior being; and second, 
the fantasy projection of this desire onto a racially ambiguous communism whenever 
whiteness is threatened and its historical basis exposed. The moral splitting and 
projection involved here segues into different phases of fantasy, involving violent 
repression and revenge. In this light, it is unwise to treat the tactics and even the 
strategic goals of Massive Resistance as being necessarily and thoroughly rationale. 
Segregationist violence was often counterproductive, drawing in Federal forces and 
escalating struggles in ways which gave the civil rights movement an advantage. 
Selma would not have been possible were such violence entirely rational.  
Even the overall strategy of Massive Resistance, of uncompromising refusal of 
any abridgement of the status quo and the enforced presentation of a united front, can 
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be called into question. It ultimately led to defeat in the courts and, again, humiliating 
Federal interventions. The strategy of ‘practical segregation’ advocated by Governor 
Coleman of Mississippi, and the tactics of ‘token integration’ supported by the Sibley 
Commission in Georgia, ultimately proved to be more effective. Anticommunism had 
served the cause of white-supremacy well, on balance, and the strategies of Massive 
Resistance would probably have enjoyed more success if the nationwide 
anticommunist consensus had been maintained. But while Massive Resistance was 
effective for a while at blocking change, it is arguable that the broad lineaments of the 
system which Massive Resistance set out to defend might have been better defended, 
given the general balance of forces that then obtained, by the sort of conservative-
adaptive strategy which ultimately did prevail. After all, many Jim Crow laws 
remained on the books and segregation, rather than disappearing, was effectively 
restructured along different lines. (Jim Crow Study Group, 2004; Massey & Denton, 
1993; Massey, Rothwell & Domina, 2009) Moreover, had Southern states adopted a 
‘practical segregation’ strategy from the outset, it is possible that the far more 
sweeping transformations wrought in the Sixties would have been averted. There is a 
risk, in stating this, of overestimating the extent to which what is now possible to 
know about the dilemmas facing Massive Resistance could have been understood at 
the time. To this extent, these conclusions simply underline that political situations 
are never fully transparent, that any choice is always to an extent a gamble, and that 
even insofar as agents are able to act on the basis of a strategic rationality, there is 
necessarily a non-rational core to such actions. Finally, even though the 
anticommunist countersubversive thrust did not prevent the overthrow of de jure 
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segregation, there is the possibility that it contributed to the attainment of another, 
seemingly tangential, objective. 
Anticommunism (Slight Returns) 
At the close of an early rally of the United Klans of America, the right-wing 
evangelist Bob Jones was witnessed in conversation as the crowds left. “I can just 
feel it,” he said. “The country’s turning conservative.” (Cunningham, 2013: 142) This 
was the hope of many in the Massive Resistance movement in the 1960s. As one of 
the White Citizens’ Council leaders explained: “It is fundamentally the first real 
stirrings of a conservative revolt in this country”. (Bloom, 1987: 94) And indeed, the 
right turn was not long coming. By the mid-1970s, the broad lineaments of a New 
Right were already clear. At the elite level, it was represented by the neoliberal 
austerity project driven by the financial sector in New York City, which presaged 
‘Reaganomics’. At the party-political level, it was represented in the emergence of 
‘Southern strategy’ politics, and a militantly anticommunist neoconservative current 
in both Republican and Democratic parties. At the grassroots, it was reflected by the 
growth of a new activist Right, especially a Christian Right.  
The contribution of the South to these developments has been examined from 
different perspectives by MacLean (2008), Crespino (2007, 2008), Jewell (2010), and 
Lassiter & Crespino (2010). There has been a tendency to overestimate the South’s 
role, neglecting the specific influences of the New York intellectuals who played a 
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critical role in the emergence of neoconservatism, and of Chicago-based 
neoliberalism. Nonetheless, the South was an important point of reference for the 
emerging Right, and also provided much of its social basis. I will suggest three 
specific contributions that the politics of Massive Resistance made to the emergence 
of a New Right. First, the social basis of the Christian Right was overwhelmingly 
southern and western. The anticommunist, pro-segregation crusades of the likes of 
Reverend Billy Hargis anticipated the emergence of a modern Christian Right with a 
mass, grassroots basis. The issue of segregation and remedial efforts aimed at 
overcoming it also provided the Christian Right with a vital spark, goading it into 
organising. Crespino (2008) shows that one result of the unsuccessful strategy of 
school privatisation to avert court ordered desegregation was nonetheless a network 
of private, effectively segregated schools often linked to the Christian church. When, 
under pressure from black parents, the IRS moved to withhold tax-exempt status from 
private schools effectively avoiding desegregation, it kick-started a national 
campaign. Second, in re-polarising the region’s politics to the Right, it used race as 
the axis to break the grip of New Deal liberalism and mobilised new social coalitions 
which provided the basis for Nixon’s ‘Southern strategy’. Third, through the mediator 
of George Wallace, it helped shift the balance of national politics to the Right. 
As Lowndes (2005) argues, Wallace began early in his segregationist career to 
position himself as a tribute of ‘the common man’ across the US, by arguing that the 
experiences of white workers, small business owners, and the suburban middle class 
had a shared experience of powerlessness at the hands of a culturally alien, super-rich 
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elite in league with protesters, subversives, criminals and welfare recipients. Having 
been a New Deal populist, he embraced a classically right-wing populist strategy, 
condensing a range of social antagonisms into a straightforward conflict of ‘the 
people’ vs ‘the elite,’ and linking race and nationalism to ‘free market’ discourse. This 
entailed a shift from the standard Southern complaint that the North had no 
experience of the South’s ‘racial problems,’ and the production of a chain-of-
equivalents firmly placing the white South at the centre of American nationhood: 
“you are Southerners too, and brothers in our fight”. In this emerging articulation, 
anticommunism continued to be an important thematic, but as the battle over 
segregation was lost, red-baiting was increasingly subordinated to being simply one 
of a range of many lines of attack. It was not just the Reds now, and it was no longer 
simply a question of subversion: sections of white working and middle class voters 
felt disempowered and ignored. In fact, when the Nixon administration did attempt to 
turn to traditional McCarthyite red-baiting to counter the social movements and union 
militancy, even J. Edgar Hoover couldn’t see the use in it, since the Communist Party 
was marginal. Anticommunism began to disperse into a more generalised antipathy to 
liberalism and progressivism. Wallace’s campaigns taught the Republican leadership 
how to reach out to white workers especially on a right-populist basis, and laid the 
ground for the ‘Reagan Democrat’ in the coming years. (Crespino, 2010: 111; 
Lowndes, 2005: 152; Lowndes, 2008; Hall et al, 2013; Carter, 1996; Cowie, 2010) 
Anticommunist white-supremacism, then, did not only consolidate opposition to 
the overthrow of Jim Crow for a period of time. It also played a role in birthing a 
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New Right. It changed the politics, culture and class coalitions of the South in such a 
way that, once the legal fight over segregation was decisively lost and the 
McCarthyite countersubversion campaigns gradually wound down, a new populist 
and ‘free market’ Right was able to emerge which would divide and frustrate the 
progressive coalition that civil rights leaders had hoped for, obstruct the further 
erosion of de facto segregation, and frame racially-laden policies in racially neutral 
‘anti-government’ language. Anticommunism did persist in some formats, but it was 
largely on the terrain of foreign policy, in that it supplied the rationale not only for the 
continued maintenance of right-wing dictatorships in the ‘Free World’, but 
particularly for the administration’s defence of apartheid South Africa. As the 
neoconservative intellectual Jeane Kirkpatrick argued on being appointed US 
ambassador to the UN, “racial dictatorship is not as onerous as Marxist dictatorship”. 
Kirkpatrick would later defend Latin American death squads on the grounds that they 
were emanations of an legitimate national culture and political authority, and were 
preferable to totalitarian (communist) government. Pinochet was likewise, for the 
New Right, “a bulwark against communism”. Yet, even here, the Cold War rhetoric of 
countersubversion and antitotalitarianism ultimately gave way to a new ‘human 
rights’ lexis. (Crespino 2007; Borstelmann, 2001: 261; Kirkpatrick, 1979; Grandin, 
2006: 106; Guilhot, 2005).  
Such anticommunism as did persist was generally articulated concurrently with, 
rather than in direct articulation with, a new culturalist form of racism. Southern 
states had made an important contribution to this culturalism (Walker, 1998; 2009), 
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but here too the neoconservatives played a leading role. The ‘melting pot’ image of 
American society, popular in ‘colourblind’ liberal discourse, gave way to a 
neoconservative ‘mosaic’, in which America was a land of culturally distinctive 
immigrant communities each pulling themselves up by the bootstraps. (Glazer & 
Moynihan, 1970) The poverty and social distress of African Americans, Puerto 
Ricans and others was blamed not on the politics of white-supremacy and empire, but 
on cultural propensities which were contrary to American social forms, above all the 
family. One of the doyens of neoconservatism, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, was 
responsible for a report on the ghetto which blamed black poverty on a “tangle of 
pathology” antipathetic to American values, and perpetuated “without any assistance 
from the white world”. Central to neoconservative political thought was a Burkean 
conservatism, in which the longevity of institutions was evidence of their 
accumulated wisdom. In this purview, moderate attempts to remedy racial 
discrimination, in the form of Affirmative Action, could be interpreted – much as 
segregationists interpreted the Federal enforcement of Brown – as, in Moynihan’s 
terms, a “totalitarian” instrument forcing equality at the expense of freedom. 
Reagan’s later racially-loaded offensive against “welfare queens” drew from the same 
rhetorical stream. (Gerson, 1997; Ehrman, 2005; Briggs, 2002: 1-10; Buhle, 1999: 
189) 
Despite the brief revival of anticommunist fervour in the late 1970s, the end of the 
Cold War saw it ebb to the far margins of American national life. However, it was 
capable of sudden resurgences in a new format stressing free market and culturalist 
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thematics, as the instance of the Tea Party illustrates. Indeed, in the discourse of the 
far right which shaped Tea Party ideology, from the John Birch Society to the Klan, it 
never really disappeared. (Berlet, 2012) This specifically American fusion also 
continued to have a life in the European far right. The ‘manifesto’ of the neo-Nazi 
mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik condensed Islamophobia and anticommunism 
into a distinctive ideological format, drawing from – and in some cases simply 
cutting and pasting from – the discourse of the American far right. (Humphreys, 
Rundle & Tietze, 2011) It is likely that such ideological hybrids will emerge for as 
long as there are struggles over the meaning of race, property and government, and 
for as long as there is a Right for whom these struggles are evidence of subversion. 
Further lines of inquiry 
In the Methodology, I described the anfractuous process of working through this 
thesis – the obstacles, adaptations, false solutions, further obstacles, rethinking, 
finding a fresh starting point, and then further obstacles. Ultimately, the only way 
forward was to treat obstacles as stepping stones. For example, the research in the 
archives did not yield the kind of information that I had hoped; yet it did give me 
something unexpected that I hadn’t been looking for. This required that I achieve a 
certain distance from my theoretical commitments, a certain freedom of movement 
which an obsessively coherent theoretical construction is almost designed to frustrate. 
Nonetheless, aside from the introduction of a Lacanian discourse analysis relatively 
late in the work, I did not decide to break with the broad theoretical lines that I set out 
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with. This approach came with a certain bias in terms of its focus. I was able to 
develop a theoretical approach to the organisation of classes, the state, ideology and 
social movements. This, however, leaves a great many areas still to be investigated. 
In the first instance, this thesis is implicitly gendered in a way that I don’t find 
satisfactory. That is, there is a relative lack of scrutiny of the specific role of women, 
of kinship, and of vivid and powerful sexual and gender fears, in anticommunist 
politics. There are several reasons for this silence, but space can be made for the 
possibility that it is symptomatic of a wider perplexity of the Left as ‘fourth wave 
feminism’ has challenged its inadequate praxis. So it remains as a problem to be 
explored that, at each stage in the struggle against civil rights, communism coded for 
some a fear that integration in the schoolroom would lead to integration in the 
bedroom. From the very beginning of the movement that became known as Massive 
Resistance, this concern was vividly spelled out. Judge Tom Brady, a founding 
member of the White Citizens’ Councils, explained that civil rights was a drive by 
northern blacks in alliance with “Communist-front organizations” to “indoctrinate the 
Southern negro” with the objective of creating an “amalgam of the two races” 
through which the “American negro” would “ameliorate” his “inherent deficiencies”. 
(Walker, 1999: 399-400) Although this problem has persistently arisen in my review 
of the material, I have not given a detailed consideration, much less a theoretical 
articulation, of this problem. And although I have stressed the role of black agency, 
and in particular black women, in displacing the anticommunist narrative of the Cold 
War, I have said relatively little about the attempts by black communists, and 
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particularly black communist women, to challenge the traditional forms of kinship. 
This would certainly be worth evaluating in relation to the anticommunist fears for 
traditional sexual morality. (See Jones, 2009; Lang, 2009)  
There is a space for reflection on the complex relationship between gender, race 
and nation. There is a great deal in feminist literature which would provide a 
framework for interpreting the masculinism of Cold War anticommunism and 
segregationism from this purview. Yuval-Davis (1997) points out that the family and 
sexuality is the site of reproduction of race and nation. Women "reproduce nations, 
biologically, culturally and symbolically”. This has been a persistent theme in 
nationalist and white-supremacist discourse. Angelika Schaser's (2006) study of the 
patriotic German women's movement in the 'Second Reich' remarks that for many 
Germans, national feeling was itself "an extension of family feeling". The familial 
trope, as McClintock (1993) points out, has several uses: it sanctions a national 
hierarchy as at the same time an organic unity, and it offers a "single genesis 
narrative" for the nation. It has also has its extension in the colonial metaphor of a 
"family of black children ruled over by a white father". Theodore Roosevelt’s 
anguished complaints that the use of birth control by modern women was leading to 
“race suicide,” can be taken as typical of white-supremacist masculinism. (Dyer, 
1980: 143-167) The specific role of the family as a site of conservative hegemony, 
and of white women in conservative and white-supremacist politics, has been 
theorised by Blee (1991), Blee & Deutsch (2012) and Ware (2015). Clarke (2000) has 
theorised the role of masculinity in Cold War ideologies, while Spruill (2008) has 
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outlined the restoration of conservative gender ideologies after civil rights. There are, 
therefore, several potentially fruitful paths of inquiry opened up by a reading of 
gender, sexuality and race in relation to anticommunist ideologies. In particular, I 
would suggest that at times of social change and authoritarian reaction, the cultivation 
of what Faludi (2007) describes as “protection fantasies” can be productively related 
to the existential threat seemingly posed by communism. 
There is also work to be done in the cultural key. I have theorised the white-
supremacist anticommunist discourse and the fantasy life structuring it: what role did 
the culture industry play in perpetuating this fantasy, or rivalling it? It is hardly 
irrelevant that a major frontal focus of Cold War anticommunism was the 
interrogation of ‘subversive’ influences in Hollywood. The ‘dream factory’ of the 
world provided the imaginary experiences through which people lived their 
relationship to their social situation (Meeks, 2009), and cultural figures from Paul 
Robeson to Mohammed Ali played a vital role in shaping the discourse of black 
liberation. Lhamon (1990) has identified the rich and complex brew of modernism 
and rebellion which was – even while instrumentalised by the CIA for Cold War 
imperatives (Saunders, 2000) – pointed against the cultural and political freeze of the 
Cold War. How did these countercultures interact with the anticommunist consensus 
and the enduring structures of white-supremacy? What about other ideological 
fantasies? I have analysed the fantasy at the core of white-supremacist ideology, and 
specified some possible modulations, but what about the ideological structures 
associated with other racial projects? What about those of the organised Left, of the 
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labour movement, of the Communist and pro-Communist elements in the Left? It is 
clear from Chapter Eight that even communism is hardly innocent of race, and that 
there is a need to contend with the eurocentric and often colonial ideologies and 
practices embedded in the history of the Left.  30
And what of religious discourse? The ‘mountaintop’ rhetoric and elevating oratory 
of King and the church-based civil rights movement (Selby, 2008), as well as that of 
the segregationist Christian Right (Newman, 2001; Haberman, 2000), is briefly 
touched upon in the thesis, but is given nowhere near the attention it deserves. 
Indeed, there is a fascinating ideological seam to be explored here, in both Gramscian 
and Lacanian registers. In particular, a study of the way in which the libido  is 31
cathected to religious and political morality, to the valuation of certain social goals 
and the literal demonisation of religious and political enemies, would in my 
estimation potentially provide a powerful analysis of another layer of 
anticommunism, and another axis of civil rights struggle. 
Finally, even in those areas which I have dedicated particular attention to, and 
attempted to provide some account of, it seems to me that there is a great deal of 
room for further development. I have referred to the discourse of ‘Americanism’, and 
 I have already made a detailed historical contribution to the study of this problem on the 30
axis of colonialism. (Seymour, 2008)
 One of the more influential figures on the international Christian Right, the Reverend Ian 31
Paisley from my home Six Counties, was fond of the metaphor of the Holy Ghost: to thunder 
against opponents was ‘Holy Ghost language’, while the Christian alternative to being drunk 
was to be ‘filled with the Holy Ghost’; to be filled with the Holy Ghost was to be alive; life 
without the Holy Ghost was death.  (Paisley, 1969; 1976) This recalls Althusser’s quip that “the 
Holy Ghost is quite simply libido”. (Althusser, 1996: 127)
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it seems to me that there is a great deal of material in this thesis which could be 
developed in order to advance a new understanding of that particular trope, and 
perhaps even to open up a new understanding of nationalism. The role of the State 
Sovereignty Commissions, insofar as the documentation can be obtained or 
participants interviewed, seems to be to be ripe for a general historical survey and 
theorisation. There is also room for the development of a distinctive theory of right-
wing social movements. In relation to this, I have introduced two original concepts: 
‘countertransformism’, and ‘parapolitics’. These require, and are undergoing , 32
further development. 
 A concrete instance of the strategy of ‘countertransformism’ is explored in Seymour (2015)32
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